「恥を知れ」とはいかなる非難か

抄録

Many philosophers suspect that the emotion of shame cannot play a significant role in morality because shame is the reaction to others’ contempt and therefore, a heteronomous emotion. This paper aims to defend the view that shame is a morally significant emotion by focusing on one form of reproach —“shame on you.” We employ this reproach, for example, with a President who establishes discriminatory policies or a scientist who falsifies data in his academic paper and in these cases, we assume this reproach is morally important. Therefore, what does “shame on you” imply? How can it be morally justified? Moreover, what are its characteristics? In this paper, I answer these questions by clarifying the notions of shame and self-respect.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I resolve the issue of autonomy and heteronomy in the emotion of shame based on Gabriele Taylor’s observation that shame contains two elements — a self-directed adverse judgment and a notion of an audience. I argue that the adverse judgment is always rendered autonomously, but the audience can be either autonomous or heteronomous; essentially, agents feel shame either in their own eyes or in the eyes of others. Second, I explain the meaning of “shame on you” and demonstrate the moral validity of this reproach by referring to the nature and classification of self-respect. Finally, I examine the distinctive significance of “shame on you.” Examining the different characteristics of shame and guilt, I argue that this form of reproach involves more a comprehensive assessment of the agent than other forms of reproach that concern, for example, the violations of moral rules.