2002 年 2002 巻 53 号 p. 177-187,244
The New Academy is characterized by two features: a thesis, viz. that all things are incognitive (henceforth I), and a recommendation, viz. that we should suspend judgement about them (henceforth S).
According to Sextus, New Academics make the affirmation, whereas Pyrrhonists only announce I as their own state of mind. But Sextus does not include Arcesilaus in New Academy and says "Arcesilaus certainly seems to me to have something in common with what the Pyrrhonists say" (PH 1. 232). Moreover, Sextus does not argue against Arcesilaus' notion "eulogon(the reasonable)". The point I want to make is that Carneades' notion "pithanon(the plausible)" played an important role in weakening Scepticism. Through this notion, I was affirmed as the New Academics' own position and S was modified. The pithanon as "supremely perfect judgement" (M 7. 181)ruled out persisting in inquiry, which is a definitive feature of Pyrrhonism.