2026 年 14 巻 3 号 p. 105-131
The cooperative life cycle framework has been predominantly developed from evidence in Western economies where cooperatives emerge from grassroots collective action. However, in many Asian countries, agricultural cooperatives are frequently initiated, designed, and governed with strong state involvement and embedded within federation systems. This raises a fundamental question: can the cooperative life cycle framework adequately explain cooperative evolution in contexts where development is institutionally structured rather than primarily member-driven? This study addresses this question through a PRISMA-based systematic review and bibliometric analysis of 74 studies on agricultural cooperatives in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and China. The review shows how cooperatives evolve from pre-establishment to regeneration or degeneration under varying degrees of government intervention and federation-based governance. The findings show that although cooperatives in these countries pass through stages resembling those described in existing life cycle frameworks, transitions between stages are largely driven by government intervention, regulatory frameworks, and federation structures rather than by internal governance dynamics. Across countries, cooperatives respond to developmental challenges through four strategic pathways (reinvention, status quo maintenance, spawning, and exit), but these responses are often triggered by government reform or withdrawal. Most importantly, the review highlights the role of the initiator and federation governance as underexplored dimensions in existing interpretations of the cooperative life cycle. By synthesizing fragmented evidence across disciplines and countries, this study revisits the cooperative life cycle framework and offers new insights into how it operates in institutionally embedded contexts.
Cooperatives are autonomous associations of individuals who voluntarily unite to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs through jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprises [1]. Within the agricultural sector, cooperatives play a critical role in reducing transaction costs, achieving economies of scale, improving market access, and facilitating value-added activities for farmers. At the macro level, agricultural cooperatives contribute to rural development, food security, and overall agricultural performance, making them strategically important organizational forms in many countries.
Scholars have long sought to explain how cooperatives emerge, develop, and either persist or decline over time. Early discussions of the cooperative life cycle framework can be traced to Levay [2], who conceptualized cooperatives as organizational responses to market failures faced by farmers. Building on this foundation, Cook [3] proposed a five-stage cooperative life cycle framework emphasizing genesis, growth, and eventual demise. Subsequent contributions refined and extended this framework. Hind [4] classified agricultural cooperatives into life cycle stages based on capital structure and governance characteristics, while Cook [5] revised his model to acknowledge that cooperatives may undergo multiple life cycles as they adapt to changing internal and external conditions. More recent studies have diversified life cycle interpretations, including the four-stage model proposed by Zhang and He [6] and analyses of regeneration and degeneration in Mondragon’s industrial cooperatives [7].
Despite their conceptual richness, existing cooperative life cycle frameworks share an implicit assumption, namely, cooperatives primarily emerge from grassroots collective action initiated by farmers or members themselves. This assumption underpins explanations of organizational justification, governance design, growth trajectories, and internal challenges such as free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and influence-cost problems. As a result, dominant life cycle interpretations have been largely shaped by empirical evidence from America and Europe, where cooperative formation is typically driven by bottom-up member initiatives. However, this assumption does not hold in many Asian contexts. In several Asian countries, agricultural cooperatives are actively initiated, designed, and governed by the state. Governments have used cooperatives as instruments for transferring resources, implementing agricultural policy, achieving food self-sufficiency, and promoting rural development [8]. In these settings, cooperatives operate within regulatory and organizational frameworks predetermined by policymakers and embedded in multi-tier federation systems.
This divergence raises a deeper theoretical issue. Existing interpretations of the cooperative life cycle framework implicitly assume that cooperatives are initiated through grassroots collective action and that transitions between life cycle stages are primarily driven by internal governance dynamics and market pressures. However, in many Asian contexts, agricultural cooperatives are initiated, structured, and coordinated through state intervention and embedded within multi-tier federation systems [8]. Under such conditions, the observable stages of the life cycle remain recognizable, but the forces driving transitions between stages may differ fundamentally from those assumed in existing frameworks.
Asia therefore provides a compelling context to revisit this assumption. Some of the world’s largest agricultural cooperatives, such as Zen-Noh in Japan and NongHyup in South Korea [9], operate within highly institutionalized federation systems and have historically been embedded in state-led agricultural development strategies. At the same time, political, institutional, and socio-economic differences across Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and China create variation in how these systems evolve.
The selection of Japan, South Korea, China, and Indonesia follows a purposive comparative logic rather than an attempt to represent Asia as a whole. These countries were chosen because they captured diverse institutional configurations of agricultural cooperatives within the region. Japan and South Korea represent highly institutionalized and federated cooperative systems with strong historical state involvement, China reflects a state-led, yet rapidly evolving cooperative sector shaped by rural reforms, and Indonesia illustrates a more decentralized and heterogeneous cooperative environment with varying levels of institutional support [8]. This diversity enables a comparative examination of how different governance structures and policy environments influence cooperative life cycle dynamics, thereby providing analytically meaningful variation rather than broad regional generalization.
Accordingly, this study does not treat Asia merely as a regional case, but as a set of contrasting institutional environments. Instead, this study uses evidence from Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and China to re-examine a core assumption of the cooperative life cycle framework, namely, that cooperative evolution is primarily driven by internal governance dynamics and market pressures [3]. In relation to that, the review places particular attention on two dimensions that have received limited attention in existing interpretations of the life cycle, namely the role of the initiator of cooperative formation and the role of federation-based governance. By examining how these dimensions are discussed across literature, this study seeks to understand how cooperative development is interpreted in contexts where organizational forms are strongly shaped by institutional and political structures.
2. Theoretical frameworkThe cooperative life cycle framework is commonly presented as a conceptual model explaining how cooperatives emerge, grow, encounter governance challenges, and either regenerate or degenerate over time. Early discussions by Levay [2] positioned cooperatives as organizational responses to market failures faced by farmers. Building on this logic, Cook [3] formalized the cooperative life cycle into stages of genesis, growth, maturity, and potential decline. Cook [5] later refined this perspective by acknowledging that cooperatives may experience multiple life cycles as they adapt to changing internal and external conditions. Subsequent contributions extended this interpretation from different angles. Hind [4] emphasized capital structure and governance orientation in defining life cycle stages. Zhang and He [6] proposed a four-stage model of cooperative development, while Bretos et al. [7] examined regeneration and degeneration processes within Mondragon’s industrial cooperatives. Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, these contributions converge on a shared understanding of cooperative development as a staged process shaped by governance, member heterogeneity, and organizational adaptation.
Across these interpretations, a common sequence can be identified. Cooperatives are justified through collective action to address socio-economic constraints. Organizational design emerges through member negotiation of governance rules and management structures. Growth occurs through membership expansion, professionalization, and vertical or horizontal integration. At later stages, cooperatives encounter governance challenges such as free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and influence-cost problems [3, 5]. Strategic responses, including reinvention, maintaining the status quo, spawning new ventures, or exit, are therefore framed as outcomes of internal governance deliberation.
A critical but often implicit assumption underlies these life cycle interpretations, namely, cooperatives are initiated and structured through grassroots member action, and transitions between stages are primarily driven by internal governance dynamics and market pressures. This assumption reflects the empirical foundations of the framework, which are largely drawn from American and European cooperative experiences where cooperative formation is typically bottom-up [3, 5]. Moreover, this assumption becomes problematic in contexts where governments actively initiate, regulate, and support cooperatives. In countries such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and China, agricultural cooperatives have frequently been established as instruments of rural development, food security, and policy implementation. Organizational statutes, operational objectives, and governance rules are often predefined by state authorities rather than negotiated by members. In addition, many cooperatives operate within multi-tier federation systems that coordinate marketing, finance, input supply, and policy execution across organizational levels [8].
Under such conditions, the observable stages of the cooperative life cycle remain visible, but the forces driving transitions between stages differ from those assumed in existing frameworks. Cooperative genesis may be motivated by policy objectives rather than market failure. Organizational design may follow regulatory templates rather than democratic negotiation. Growth may be enabled by legislation, subsidies, and administrative coordination rather than economies of scale alone. Later, challenges may arise not only from member heterogeneity but also from political dynamics and regulatory dependency.
A further dimension largely overlooked in existing life cycle interpretations is the governance role of federation systems. Traditional life cycle models focus primarily on governance within individual cooperatives. However, in many Asian contexts, federations represent an additional governance layer between members and decision makers. As cooperatives grow and become integrated into these systems, member participation, autonomy, and strategic choice are influenced not only by internal governance but also by inter-organizational coordination.
Accordingly, this study adopts an expanded perspective of the cooperative life cycle that incorporates two additional dimensions: (1) the role of the initiator of cooperative formation and (2) the role of federation-based governance. This perspective allows the cooperative life cycle to be examined not only as an organizational evolution model but as a process embedded within institutional and inter-organizational governance structures.
Guided by this perspective, this study addresses the following questions:
a. What are the characteristics of the literature on agricultural cooperative life cycle research in Asia?
b. How has this body of research evolved over time?
c. How does the role of the initiator influence cooperative justification and organizational design?
d. What factors determine cooperative growth trajectories?
e. What challenges arise during cooperative development?
f. What strategic responses are observed?
g. What gaps remain in the literature, particularly regarding federation governance?
This study employs a combination of a systematic literature review and bibliometric analysis to examine how the cooperative life cycle framework has been discussed in relation to agricultural cooperatives in selected Asian countries. Rather than reviewing cooperatives in general, this study focuses on how life cycle dynamics are shaped within institutionally embedded contexts. A systematic review is therefore appropriate for synthesizing fragmented theoretical and empirical evidence across disciplines and countries in a transparent and structured manner. The review follows the PRISMA 2020 (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) guidelines to enhance transparency, replicability, and methodological rigor (Figure 2).
Two databases were used, namely, Scopus and Google Scholar. Scopus was selected for its curated collection of peer-reviewed academic publications, while Google Scholar was included to capture a broader range of scholarly outputs, including books, reports, and region-specific studies that are often not indexed in Scopus [10, 11]. Furthermore, the literature search was conducted in December 2024.
3.1.1 Search strategyThe search strategy was designed to capture literature on agricultural cooperatives and their organizational development across selected Asian contexts. To reflect the diversity of terminology in the field, keywords were grouped into three categories:
a. Object terms: “agricultural cooperative”, “farmer cooperative”, “producer organization”, “farmer organization”
b. Life cycle-related terms: “life cycle”, lifecycle, development, sustainability, evolution, transformation
c. Geographical scope: Japan, China, Indonesia, and Korea
The term “Korea” was used instead of “South Korea” to capture publications that refer to the country without the political qualifier (for example, Agricultural Cooperatives in Korea [12] and The Cooperative Movement in Korea [13]). Moreover, a snowball sampling technique was also applied by reviewing reference lists of selected articles.
3.1.2 Country-specific search procedureTo ensure balanced and context-specific coverage, searches were conducted separately for each country (Japan, China, Indonesia, and Korea), rather than using a single combined query. For each country, the same Boolean structure was applied, with only the country name modified. This approach enabled more precise retrieval of country-specific literature and avoided overrepresentation of countries with larger publication volumes. The following Boolean string was applied in Scopus (Title, Abstract, Keywords fields), with the country term adjusted accordingly:
“Agricultural cooperative” OR “agricultural co-operative”
AND
“life cycle” OR “development” OR “sustainability”
AND
(country name)
Where (country name) was replaced individually with “Japan”, “China”, “Korea”, or “Indonesia”.
For example, the full Boolean string used for Japan in Scopus was:
“Agricultural cooperative” OR “agricultural co-operative”
AND
“life cycle” OR “development” OR “sustainability”
AND
“Japan”
Furthermore, filters applied consisted of language (English only) and document types (journal articles, reviews, and book chapters only). On the other hand, in Google Scholar, searches were conducted using the general search function, which scans titles, abstracts, and full-text content. Furthermore, Google Scholar returned substantially larger numbers of records due to its broader indexing scope [11]. Initial search results (per country) were as follows:
a. Japan: Scopus (898) and Google Scholar (17,700)
b. South Korea: Scopus (403) and Google Scholar (8,760)
c. Indonesia: Scopus (703) and Google Scholar (8,650)
d. China: Scopus (2,530) and Google Scholar (17,300)
Due to the limitations of Google Scholar, records were retrieved using Publish or Perish (version 8), which allows a maximum of 1,000 results per query. To ensure comprehensive coverage across time, searches were conducted in multiple time-based segments spanning from 1800 to 2024. The starting year (1800) was selected to capture the earliest possible literature related to cooperative development, while 2024 represents the year in which the review was conducted. Each segment retrieved up to 1,000 records, thereby enabling broader coverage of relevant studies across different historical periods.
All retrieved records were exported and managed using Microsoft Excel. Given the large volume of retrieved records and the inclusion of many irrelevant results in Google Scholar, an initial keyword-based filtering step was applied using the Excel SEARCH function. This step was used to identify records containing relevant terms, such as cooperative, co-operative, agricultural cooperative, agricultural co-operative, and country-specific terms such as Japan, China, Indonesia, or Korea, within titles or abstracts. This filtering step was applied systematically across all retrieved records and was used solely to remove clearly irrelevant entries. The filtering step did not replace manual screening, thereby minimizing the risk of selection bias. Only records retrieved through segmented queries (up to 1,000 per query, sorted by relevance) were considered for screening.
3.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteriaExplicit inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to ensure consistency during screening (Table 1). Importantly, studies were not required to explicitly mention the “life cycle framework”. Publications addressing cooperative formation, growth, governance, challenges, or transformation were included when their content aligned with life cycle stages. Furthermore, study selection was not based solely on keyword presence. All records that passed the initial keyword-based filtering were subsequently evaluated through title, abstract, and full-text screening using these criteria.
| Criteria Type | Description |
|---|---|
| Inclusion Criteria | |
| 1. | Studies discussing agricultural cooperatives in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, or China |
| 2. | Studies addressing organizational development, governance, growth, challenges, regeneration, or degeneration |
| 3. | Publications written in English |
| 4. | Peer-reviewed articles, books, and book chapters relevant to cooperative development |
| Exclusion Criteria | |
| 1. | Studies not focused on agricultural cooperatives |
| 2. | Studies discussing cooperatives without organizational or governance relevance |
| 3. | Duplicate records across databases |
| 4. | Studies not substantively related to research questions after full-text screening |
The study selection process followed the PRISMA framework, consisting of five stages: identification, pre-screening, screening, eligibility, and inclusion (Figure 2). The total number of identified records (56,944) reflects the combined results of four independent country-specific searches conducted in Scopus and Google Scholar. The screening process proceeded as follows:
a. Identification: 56,944 records
b. Pre-screening: reduced to 8,320 records through keyword-based filtering
c. Screening: title and abstract screening reduced the sample to 1,240 studies
d. Eligibility: full-text assessment reduced the sample to 186 studies
e. Inclusion: 74 studies were selected for final analysis
Screening was conducted using a two-step reviewer approach. The first author performed the initial screening of titles, abstracts, and full texts. Subsequently, a second reviewer independently checked the screening decisions to ensure consistency and adherence to the predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Discrepancies between reviewers were discussed and resolved through consensus. In cases of uncertainty, studies were retained for full-text assessment to minimize the risk of erroneous exclusion. This approach is consistent with methodological guidance, which recommends the involvement of at least two reviewers in study selection, while allowing initial title and abstract screening to be conducted by a single reviewer [14]. All records were managed and tracked using Microsoft Excel.
3.4 Quality assessmentA formal risk-of-bias or quality appraisal was not conducted. This is because the objective of the study is to map and synthesize conceptual and empirical discussions on cooperative life cycle dynamics, rather than to evaluate causal effects or intervention outcomes. The included studies comprise a heterogeneous mix of qualitative, conceptual, and case-based research, for which standardized quality appraisal tools are not always applicable. Moreover, to ensure robustness, quality considerations were addressed implicitly during full-text screening by excluding studies that did not provide sufficient information on data sources, methods, or analytical approach, as well as those with limited relevance to the research questions.
3.5 Bibliometric and qualitative synthesisThe final set of publications was analyzed using two complementary approaches:
a. Bibliometric analysis, to examine publication trends, country distribution, authorship patterns, and thematic development over time. Keyword mapping was conducted using VOSviewer to visualize thematic relationships across studies.
b. Qualitative synthesis, to map how cooperative evolution is discussed in relation to justification, organizational design, growth, challenges, and strategic responses.
To enable systematic comparison across studies, each of the 74 publications was coded using a structured coding sheet. Each article was categorized based on:
a. Initiator of cooperative formation
b. Justification for establishment
c. Organizational design approach
d. Determinants of growth
e. Developmental challenges
f. Stakeholder strategic responses
These dimensions were derived from the cooperative life cycle framework and extended to incorporate the roles of the initiator and federation governance. Moreover, categories were refined inductively during reading, and articles could be assigned to multiple categories when relevant themes were discussed. Frequencies of occurrence were converted into proportional shares and reported in Tables 2–10.
This coding procedure allows qualitative literature to be systematically interpreted through the life cycle lens, making it possible to observe how transitions between stages are described across different institutional contexts.
This section describes the characteristics of the reviewed literature to understand how research on agricultural cooperatives in Asia has developed over time. Rather than interpreting cooperative development directly, this section maps how scholars have studied and framed the topic across countries. The analysis focuses on article type, theoretical foundations, and research methods.
4.1 Article characteristics 4.1.1 Article typeThe reviewed studies were classified into descriptive and empirical articles. Descriptive articles primarily provide historical, institutional, or policy-oriented discussions of agricultural cooperatives, often relying on secondary data. Empirical articles are based on systematic research designs and original data collection.
A clear pattern emerges across countries: descriptive studies account for 66% of the literature, while empirical research represents 34% (Table 2). Japan contributes the largest share of descriptive work, while China contributes the largest proportion of empirical studies. South Korea and Indonesia show more limited empirical engagement. This distribution indicates that much of the literature documents institutional history and regulatory change, while fewer studies explicitly examine cooperative development through a life cycle perspective.
| Article Type | Share | Total | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | South Korea | Indonesia | China | ||
| Descriptive | 0.31 | 0.19 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.66 |
| Empirical | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.23 | 0.34 |
* Shares represent the proportion of the total reviewed articles classified into each category. Each article is assigned to one category only
4.1.2 Theory UsedThe literature frequently draws on theories originally developed to explain investor-owned firms, particularly transaction cost theory, principal–agent theory, and institutional perspectives (Table 3). Transaction cost theory is most frequently applied, followed by principal–agent and institutional approaches. Moreover, only a small share of studies explicitly employs the cooperative life cycle framework as a primary analytical lens. In most cases, life cycle dynamics appear implicitly within broader theoretical discussions.
| Theory | Share | Total | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | South Korea | Indonesia | China | ||
| Path dependence | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Behavioral | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Knowledge-based | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Patron-client | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Life cycle | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Game theory | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Transaction cost | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.22 | 0.22 |
| Principal-agent | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| Property rights | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Theory of the firm | 0 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| System-4 | 0 | 0 | 0.03 | 0 | 0.03 |
| Motivational | 0 | 0 | 0.03 | 0 | 0.03 |
| Institutional | 0.09 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.09 |
| Organizational | 0 | 0.06 | 0 | 0 | 0.06 |
| Neoclassical | 0.03 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.03 |
| Political economy | 0.06 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.06 |
* Shares represent the proportion of the total reviewed articles classified into each category. Each article is assigned to one category only
4.1.3 Research methodsQuantitative methods account for 43% of studies, mixed methods for 42%, and qualitative approaches for 15% (Table 4). Quantitative studies frequently use secondary datasets to assess performance and governance, whereas qualitative studies primarily rely on historical, institutional, and policy documentation. This methodological pattern indicates that although empirical work exists, it is often oriented toward documenting cooperative conditions rather than examining developmental processes across stages.
| Research Methods | Share | Total | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | South Korea | Indonesia | China | ||
| Qualitative | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.15 |
| Quantitative | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.43 |
| Mixed (Qualitative and Quantitative) | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.42 |
* Shares represent the proportion of the total reviewed articles classified into each category. Each article is assigned to one category only
The reviewed literature shows that agricultural cooperatives in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and China broadly follow the stages described in the cooperative life cycle framework. However, the presence of strong government intervention systematically alters how each stage unfolds. While similarities appear in the early stages (pre-establishment, organizational design, and growth), substantial divergence emerges during the recognition, introspection, and choice stages. These differences are reflected in how the literature in each country has developed and what aspects scholars emphasize.
Figure 3 synthesizes the cooperative life cycle dynamics identified across the reviewed literature, illustrating how life cycle stages unfold differently across Japan, South Korea, China, and Indonesia. The justification stage reflects the initial rationale for cooperative formation, which in the selected Asian contexts is predominantly driven by government policy objectives rather than purely grassroots collective action. This leads to a relatively short organizational design stage, as institutional arrangements, bylaws, and operational mandates are largely predefined by the state. The growth stage is characterized by rapid expansion supported by favorable legislation, subsidies, and the development of federation systems, which facilitate scaling and coordination. However, as cooperatives mature, the recognition stage emerges as a prolonged phase in which governance tensions, member heterogeneity, and institutional constraints become more visible. Finally, in the strategic choice stage, cooperatives adopt different pathways depending on their institutional environment: reinvention in Japan and South Korea, hybrid reform in China combining state-led restructuring with continued political control, and status quo persistence and/or exit in Indonesia. Overall, while the sequence of stages remains consistent, the duration and dynamics of each stage vary significantly across countries.
Bibliometric mapping using VOSviewer reveals distinct keyword networks across countries (Figure 4-7). China’s literature is associated with governance, modernization, and service cooperatives. Japan’s literature is closely linked to agricultural politics and regulatory reform. South Korean studies emphasize federation structures and state power, while Indonesian studies focus on revitalization and liberalization of village unit cooperatives.
These patterns show that discussions of agricultural cooperatives are embedded in political and institutional debates rather than explicitly framed through the cooperative life cycle perspective.
Before modern agricultural cooperatives emerged, traditional cooperative movements already existed in rural societies across these countries. These early movements were informal, community-based, and motivated by social solidarity and mutual aid [15, 16, 17]. However, modern agricultural cooperatives were strongly influenced by external models, particularly the Raiffeisen model from Europe, and were frequently initiated or formalized by governments and respected local elites [18, 19]. The literature shows a clear distinction between:
a. Traditional cooperative movements driven by social and economic solidarity [20, 21], and
b. Modern agricultural cooperatives driven by political, economic, and policy objectives [8]
This distinction is critical because it shapes not only who initiates cooperatives, but also why they are established and how they are structured from the outset. Moreover, unlike Western contexts, where cooperatives emerge from bottom-up member initiatives [7], agricultural cooperatives in Asia are often positioned by governments as instruments of agricultural policy and rural development [22].
Table 5 demonstrates that, unlike the Western assumption of grassroots initiation, the establishment of modern agricultural cooperatives in Asia is overwhelmingly associated with government involvement, fundamentally altering the genesis stage of the cooperative life cycle [8]. Furthermore, the dominance of political justification in modern cooperative establishment suggests that the initial purpose of cooperatives in these contexts is aligned more with state objectives than with member-driven economic needs, reshaping the motivational foundation underlying the life cycle framework. As a result, the subsequent organizational design stage is not driven by democratic negotiation among members, but by predefined regulatory and policy templates imposed from above.
| Country | Share | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional cooperative movement | Modern cooperative | |||||||
| Gr | I | NGO | G | Gr | I | NGO | G | |
| Japan | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0 | 0 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0 | 0.31 |
| South Korea | 0.43 | 0.07 | 0 | 0 | 0.50 | 0 | 0 | 0.79 |
| Indonesia | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0 | 0 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0 | 1 |
| China | 0.08 | 0 | 0 | 0.04 | 0.33 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.88 |
Note: Gr = Grassroots movement, I = A respected individual, NGO = non-governmental organization, G = Government. ** Shares represent the proportion of reviewed articles in which the specified theme is discussed. An article may address multiple themes or none of the themes listed.
In Western contexts, this stage is prolonged due to democratic negotiation among members [5]. In contrast, in Asian contexts, governments frequently prescribe statutes, bylaws, and performance metrics. Performance is often measured through policy implementation indicators, such as fertilizer distribution, credit provision, and membership numbers, rather than member-oriented performance indicators [23, 21, 24]. In addition to that, in China, the literature introduces an additional pattern termed “top-down entrepreneur,” where traders, large farmers, or agribusiness actors design the cooperative structure while small farmers follow [25, 26].
The distribution in Table 7 indicates that organizational design in Asian agricultural cooperatives is predominantly top-down, suggesting that the design stage of the life cycle is compressed and externally structured rather than democratically negotiated among members.
| Country | Share | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional cooperative movement | Modern cooperative | |||||
| Social | Economic | Political | Social | Economic | Political | |
| Japan | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.08 |
| South Korea | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0 | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.29 |
| Indonesia | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.10 |
| China | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.46 |
** Shares represent the proportion of reviewed articles in which the specified theme is discussed. An article may address multiple themes or none of the themes listed
| Country | Share | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Bottom-up | Top-down | Top-down entrepreneur | |
| Japan | 0.12 | 0.46 | 0 |
| South Korea | 0.50 | 0.71 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 0.10 | 0.70 | 0 |
| China | 0.25 | 0.58 | 0.46 |
** Shares represent the proportion of reviewed articles in which the specified theme is discussed. An article may address multiple themes or none of the themes listed
5.3 Determinants of cooperative growthLiterature consistently identifies favorable cooperative legislation as the primary driver of cooperative growth in all four countries. Legal exemptions, subsidies, tax reductions, and direct state support enable cooperatives to expand rapidly, often beyond their initial agribusiness functions into financial and insurance services [27, 28, 29, 30] (Table 8).
A key feature of this stage is the development of federation systems, which facilitate policy implementation, reduce transaction costs, and enhance economies of scale [31, 21, 32]. Notably, Indonesia is the only case where the federation system is more strongly member-driven than state-driven [33]. Moreover, other factors influencing growth include innovation [12], economic transformation [34, 35], political dynamics [32, 36], and human resource capacity [25, 37].
This evidence suggests that cooperative growth in Asia is not primarily market-driven, as implied in the life cycle framework, but institutionally engineered through legislation, subsidies, and federation systems. Across countries, federation systems function as a central coordinating mechanism through which government policies are implemented, linking cooperative growth directly to institutional design rather than purely market expansion.
| Country | Share | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Favorable Cooperative Legislation | Innovation | Economic transformation | Political dynamics | Human Resources | |
| Japan | 0.96 | 0 | 0.12 | 0.73 | 0 |
| South Korea | 0.93 | 0.29 | 0.21 | 0.36 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 0.90 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| China | 0.92 | 0.08 | 0.42 | 0.38 | 0.50 |
** Shares represent the proportion of reviewed articles in which the specified theme is discussed. An article may address multiple themes or none of the themes listed
5.4 Developmental challengesAs cooperatives mature, the literature highlights recurring challenges, namely, political dynamics and regulatory shifts [29, 38, 39], economic transformation and market liberalization [40, 41, 42], member heterogeneity and conflicting interests across organizational levels (members, primary cooperatives, federations) [43, 44], human resource limitations [33], and regulatory loopholes enabling opportunistic behavior [45] (Table 9). These challenges resemble those described in the cooperative life cycle framework, such as control, influence, and horizon problems, but are intensified by political and institutional dependencies.
These issues illustrate that, in addition to classical governance problems identified in the life cycle framework, Asian cooperatives face an added layer of political and regulatory dependency that intensifies developmental challenges.
| Country | Share | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political dynamics | Economic transformation | Conflict of interests | Human Resources | Regulation loophole | |
| Japan | 0.35 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0 | 0 |
| South Korea | 0.64 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 0 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.60 | 0 |
| China | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.33 |
** Shares represent the proportion of reviewed articles in which the specified theme is discussed. An article may address multiple themes or none of the themes listed
5.5 Stakeholders’ choiceIn response to the developmental challenges, stakeholders adopt one of four strategic responses consistent with the cooperative life cycle framework, namely, reinvention, status quo, spawning, or exit. However, the literature shows that reinvention in Asian contexts is often initiated or strongly influenced by government reform rather than internal member deliberation [40, 46]. Status quo persistence is linked to human capital and local conditions [47, 48]. Spawning occurs when members attempt to escape federation constraints [29]. Exit typically occurs when government support diminishes or managerial capacity is insufficient [33].
Table 10 indicates that strategic responses such as reinvention or exit are frequently triggered by government reform or withdrawal rather than internal member deliberation, altering the choice stage of the cooperative life cycle. Taken together, these findings indicate that while agricultural cooperatives in Asia pass through stages similar to those described in the cooperative life cycle framework, the drivers of transition between stages are predominantly external and politically embedded rather than internally generated through member-driven governance dynamics.
| Country | Share | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reinvention | Status Quo | Spawn | Exit | |
| Japan | 0.42 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 0.04 |
| South Korea | 0.64 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.50 | 0.40 |
| China | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0 |
** Shares represent the proportion of reviewed articles in which the specified theme is discussed. An article may address multiple themes or none of the themes listed
This study extends the cooperative life cycle framework proposed by Cook by demonstrating that, in institutionally embedded contexts, life cycle transitions are not primarily driven by internal governance dynamics and market pressures, but by external political and institutional forces. In contrast to Cook’s original model, which assumes bottom-up formation and emphasizes endogenous challenges such as free-rider and horizon problems, the evidence from Asian agricultural cooperatives highlights two additional dimensions: the role of the initiator of cooperative formation and the role of federation-based governance. These factors reshape the life cycle in three important ways. First, early stages are compressed due to top-down institutional design rather than member negotiation. Second, growth is accelerated through policy-driven expansion rather than gradual market adaptation. Third, later stages are shaped by interactions between cooperatives, federations, and the state, introducing governance tensions that extend beyond the firm-level focus of existing frameworks. As a result, this study proposes a revised interpretation of the cooperative life cycle that incorporates inter-organizational governance and state involvement as central drivers of cooperative evolution in Asian contexts.
Consistent with this theoretical extension, the findings show that agricultural cooperatives in Japan, South Korea, China, and Indonesia pass through similar life cycle stages. However, the forces driving transitions between stages differ fundamentally across institutional contexts. Across all four countries, transitions between justification, organizational design, growth, recognition, and strategic choice are strongly shaped by government involvement and, crucially, by federation-based governance. This finding indicates that the cooperative life cycle in Asian contexts is not an internally driven and sequential process, but a context-dependent and institutionally mediated trajectory, in which external actors actively shape both the timing and direction of life cycle transitions. The bibliometric findings further support this interpretation, showing that research on agricultural cooperatives in these countries evolves alongside national policy agendas, reinforcing the argument that both cooperative development and its scholarly interpretation are institutionally embedded.
These findings indicate that while the cooperative life cycle framework remains descriptively valid across contexts, it requires theoretical extension when applied to institutionally embedded cooperative systems. Table 11 illustrates that although life cycle stages are observable across countries, the institutional drivers, governance arrangements, and federation structures fundamentally alter how these stages unfold in practice. In Western interpretations of the life cycle framework, cooperative evolution is primarily explained by internal governance dynamics and market pressures [3]. In contrast, the literature reviewed here consistently describes cooperative development as embedded in institutional environments where legal frameworks, policy objectives, and administrative structures predefine organizational forms before member participation matures.
In Japan and South Korea, multipurpose federated cooperatives were deliberately engineered as instruments of rural modernization [22, 41]. In Indonesia, cooperatives were integrated into food security and rural development programs [49]. In China, the 2007 Cooperative Law and subsequent policy incentives triggered rapid cooperative formation driven by regulatory compliance rather than collective action [50]. This demonstrates that, in these contexts, early life cycle stages are institutionally sequenced rather than organically evolving from member needs.
A comparative reading of these cases further reveals that the degree and form of state involvement produce distinct life cycle patterns. Japan and South Korea exhibit highly institutionalized and stable life cycle trajectories supported by strong federation systems, whereas China demonstrates rapid but heterogeneous development shaped by policy expansion. Indonesia, in contrast, reflects a more fragmented and uneven life cycle progression due to weaker institutional coordination and varying local capacities. Rather than representing Asia as a whole, this comparative design captures differences across four distinct institutional settings, enabling analytical generalization about cooperative life cycle dynamics in state-influenced contexts rather than broad regional generalization.
| Life cycle Stage | Western Cooperative | Japan | South Korea | China | Indonesia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Justification / Genesis | Bottom-up farmer initiative | State-embedded multipurpose coops | State-engineered multipurpose federation | Policy and entrepreneurial elites | Government food-policy instrument |
| Organizational Design | Democratic, member-controlled | Multi-tier federation, finance-centered | Three-tier → two-tier federation | Core vs common members, patron-client logic | Program-driven structure |
| Growth Driver | Market need, economies of scale | Financial services & political protection | Credit, input, marketing monopoly | Legal framework & rapid registration | State program & subsidies |
| Recognition of Problems | Member conflict, free-rider issues | Liberalization pressure, farmer exit | Democratization, identity tension | Fake/shell coops, governance failure | Liberalization → collapse of cooperative |
| Strategic Response | Internal governance reform | Federation restructuring & mergers | Corporatist transition | Supervision reform, digital governance | Revitalization attempts |
| Role of Federation | Support service layer | Central political & financial actor | Core development infrastructure | Oversight and reform target | Weak/administrative |
Moreover, as cooperatives develop, governance issues reported in the literature reflect not only the classical problems identified in the life cycle framework, but also agency issues arising from the separation between members and those who control cooperative operations. The distinction between core and common members and the dominance of federations indicate that decision rights and income rights are frequently concentrated in the hands of entrepreneurial leaders, local elites, or federation managers. The presence of “shell cooperatives”, patron–client governance arrangements, and member disengagement illustrates governance dynamics that are not fully anticipated in traditional cooperative models [16, 51, 52].
At the same time, the heavy reliance on federation systems can be understood as a response to the high transaction costs faced by small farmers. Federations centralize marketing, finance, and input supply, enabling coordination and economies of scale. However, this efficiency introduces an additional governance layer between members and decision makers, often weakening direct member control and creating bureaucratic distance. Federations therefore simultaneously solve coordination problems and generate governance tensions that emerge in later life cycle stages.
This dual role highlights a fundamental trade-off in cooperative development, while federation systems enhance efficiency and scalability, they may also reduce member control and create new forms of governance complexity. As a result, later life cycle stages are characterized not only by internal organizational challenges but also by tensions between centralized coordination and member autonomy.
A central insight emerging from this review is therefore the pivotal role of the federation system during cooperative development. Federations are intended to align activities from the local to the national level, reduce transaction costs, and support value-added agricultural production. However, literature also documents instances where members leave existing cooperatives to form new organizations better aligned with their interests, suggesting that federation structures may generate tensions when member preferences become heterogeneous [42].
Comparison across countries further shows that federation systems are structured differently but are always central to cooperative evolution [12, 53]. Across these cases, reforms increasingly make federation participation optional when perceived costs exceed benefits, indicating that federation structures become critical points of tension influencing later stages of recognition, introspection, and strategic choice [29, 42]. Taken together, the evidence suggests that cooperative evolution in these contexts cannot be fully understood without considering this inter-organizational governance layer between primary cooperatives and the state. This layer is largely absent from existing life cycle interpretations.
From a synthesis perspective, three key insights emerge. First, cooperative initiation in Asia is rarely purely bottom-up, as external actors, particularly governments, play a decisive role in shaping formation and early-stage development. Second, growth trajectories are strongly conditioned by institutional support, with federated systems enabling more coordinated and stable expansion, while decentralized systems lead to more heterogeneous outcomes. Third, life cycle challenges are intensified by the interaction between political dependency and internal governance issues, requiring adaptation strategies that extend beyond traditional cooperative models. Taken together, these findings indicate that both the evolution of cooperatives and the evolution of the literature analyzing them are shaped by the same institutional forces, further supporting the need to reinterpret the cooperative life cycle as an institutionally embedded process.
This review therefore extends the cooperative life cycle framework by showing that governance between cooperatives, through federation systems, is as consequential as governance within cooperatives. Future research should examine how federation systems manage member heterogeneity without eroding autonomy, what determines whether remaining in a federation is beneficial for primary cooperatives, and how different federation models influence transitions between growth, recognition, and strategic choice stages.
Overall, the findings suggest that the cooperative life cycle framework should be reconceptualized as an adaptive and context-sensitive model in which institutional environments, policy interventions, and inter-organizational governance structures are not merely external conditions, but central drivers of cooperative evolution. By incorporating the roles of the initiator and federation-based governance, this study advances the life cycle framework beyond firm-level analysis and highlights the importance of multi-level institutional dynamics in shaping cooperative development, particularly in state-influenced contexts.
This study extends current understanding of the cooperative life cycle framework by examining how it unfolds in Asian contexts, where agricultural cooperatives are deeply embedded in state structures and federation systems rather than emerging primarily from grassroots collective action. Drawing on a PRISMA-guided systematic review of literature retrieved from Scopus and Google Scholar, 74 studies were analyzed.
The review reveals that the existing literature is largely descriptive, documenting historical, institutional, and policy developments, while empirical studies tend to focus on governance issues, heterogeneity, efficiency, and emerging cooperative forms. Bibliometric patterns show that research agendas are closely aligned with national policy debates. Moreover, a central finding of this study is that although agricultural cooperatives in these countries pass through stages consistent with the cooperative life cycle framework, the drivers of these stages differ substantially from those observed in Western contexts. Organizational design follows regulatory templates and administrative objectives rather than extensive member negotiation, and growth is strongly supported by legislation, subsidies, and federation systems. At later stages of the life cycle, stakeholder responses such as reinvention, maintaining the status quo, spawning new organizations, or exit are observable, but these responses are often triggered by shifts in government support and federation arrangements rather than solely by internal member deliberation.
The key theoretical contribution of this study is the identification of federation governance and the role of the initiator as missing dimensions in existing interpretations of the cooperative life cycle framework. Federations do not merely support cooperatives but also shape how cooperatives evolve, how members participate, and how strategic choices are made across life cycle stages.
Overall, the findings suggest that applying the cooperative life cycle framework to Asian agricultural cooperatives requires moving beyond an internal governance perspective to incorporate the roles of state intervention and inter-organizational federation governance. By incorporating these dimensions, the cooperative life cycle framework can be reinterpreted as an institutionally embedded process rather than solely an internally driven organizational evolution. This reconceptualization extends the relevance of the cooperative life cycle framework beyond the Western contexts in which it was originally developed and opens new avenues for research on cooperatives operating within complex institutional environments.
Abi Pratiwa Siregar: Writing – original draft, Visualization, Validation, Methodology, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. Cathal O’ Donoghue: Supervision, Validation, Methodology, Formal analysis, Conceptualization. Becky Whay: Supervision, Conceptualization.
This study was supported by funding from the Indonesian Education Scholarship, the Center for Higher Education Funding and Assessment, and the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education.
The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: Abi Pratiwa Siregar reports financial support was provided by the Indonesian Education Scholarship, the Center for Higher Education Funding and Assessment, and the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education. The other authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
We would like to thank the Indonesian Education Scholarship, the Center for Higher Education Funding and Assessment, and the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education for supporting this study.
| No | Country | Author(s) | Citation | Main Focus | Life cycle Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | China | Deng (2022) | [54] | Governance problems, member heterogeneity, digital control tools | Governance Challenges |
| 2 | China | Liang & Han (2023) | [45] | Governance features, core vs. common members | Organizational Design / Governance Challenges |
| 3 | China | Lei (2015) | [50] | Political drivers of cooperative growth | Justification / Genesis |
| 4 | China | Sultan & Wolz (2012) | [55] | Stakeholder roles after decollectivization | Justification / Genesis |
| 5 | China | Huang & Liang (2018) | [56] | Evolution of agricultural organizations and institutional role of cooperatives | Growth |
| 6 | China | Wolz et al. (2020) | [35] | Viability and developmental role of agricultural production cooperatives in China | Organizational Design / Growth |
| 7 | China | Hu et al. (2017) | [16] | Typology of fake, shell, and decooperativized cooperatives | Governance Challenges / Degeneration |
| 8 | China | Liang & Hendrikse (2013) | [51] | Entrepreneurial and government-driven genesis of cooperatives | Justification / Organizational Design |
| 9 | China | Zhang et al. (2023) | [26] | Conditions for successful state-led cooperative development | Justification / Growth |
| 10 | China | Sultan et al. (2011) | [34] | Government as driver of cooperative modernization | Growth |
| 11 | China | Wan et al. (1988) | [57] | Reform of supply and marketing cooperatives | Federation Governance |
| 12 | China | Chen & Scott (2014) | [25] | Cooperative contributions and governance limits under government support | Governance Challenges |
| 13 | China | Bijman & Hu (2011) | [58] | Role of entrepreneurs and local state agencies | Justification / Organizational Design |
| 14 | China | Liu et al. (2019) | [59] | Member usage, income effects, and cooperative performance | Growth / Governance Challenges |
| 15 | China | Deng et al. (2010) | [60] | Legal framework and policy as primary growth driver | Growth / Justification |
| 16 | China | Chan & Ip (2014) | [28] | Cooperatives operating through policy rather than legal regime | Justification / Genesis |
| 17 | China | Wan (2023) | [52] | Patron–client governance and core member dominance | Organizational Design / Governance Challenges |
| 18 | China | Liang et al. (2012) | [37] | Skewed decision and income rights in cooperatives | Organizational Design |
| 19 | China | Guo et al. (2008) | [31] | Governance declines in federated supply and marketing cooperatives | Federation Governance / Degeneration |
| 20 | China | Hu et al. (2016) | [61] | Historical roots of cooperative failure and political drivers | Justification / Governance Challenges |
| 21 | China | Zhong et al. (2023) | [62] | Fake vs. genuine cooperatives and capital accumulation | Governance Challenges |
| 22 | China | Zhang & He (2019) | [6] | Value-creation mechanism of farmer professional cooperatives | Growth / Organizational Design |
| 23 | China | Saunders & Bromwich (2012) | [63] | Aid-assisted cooperative formation and participatory governance | Organizational Design / Growth |
| 24 | China | Hu et al. (2007) | [64] | Governance, heterogeneity, market orientation, control rights | Organizational Design / Governance Challenges |
| 25 | Indonesia | Rifin & Nauly (2020) | [39] | Cooperatives in global value chains | Growth / Strategic Choice |
| 26 | Indonesia | Widjojo (2018) | [47] | Political misuse vs. member-driven cooperatives | Justification / Genesis |
| 27 | Indonesia | Tulus (2022) | [65] | State-centric legal frameworks for cooperatives | Justification / Genesis |
| 28 | Indonesia | Baga (2013) | [66] | Entrepreneurial leadership and top-down cooperative formation | Organizational Design / Governance Challenges |
| 29 | Indonesia | Tanaya (1997) | [67] | Performance tied to government policy requirements | Recognition / Introspection |
| 30 | Indonesia | Tabor et al. (1999) | [46] | Government roles and institutional direction of cooperative | Justification / Genesis |
| 31 | Indonesia | Suradisastra (2006) | [33] | Cooperatives as government food-policy instruments | Justification / Organizational Design |
| 32 | Indonesia | Hatta (1957) | [68] | Ideological foundation of cooperatives for national development | Justification / Genesis |
| 33 | Indonesia | Suratno (2023) | [24] | Liberalization impact and cooperative decline after state withdrawal | Recognition / Degeneration / Exit |
| 34 | Indonesia | Riswan (2017) | [30] | Revitalization models for failing cooperatives | Recognition / Strategic Choice |
| 35 | Japan | Kurimoto (2004) | [32] | JA as state agency, pressure group, and cooperative | Justification / Genesis |
| 36 | Japan | Esham et al. (2012) | [18] | JA decline in agribusiness and governance challenges | Recognition / Governance Challenges |
| 37 | Japan | Freiner (2019) | [40] | Federation power and policy implementation | Federation Governance |
| 38 | Japan | Klinedintlt & Sato (1994) | [69] | Dominance of cooperatives in agricultural sector | Growth |
| 39 | Japan | Esham & Kobayashi (2013) | [36] | Strength of federated cooperative model | Federation Governance |
| 40 | Japan | Honma & Mulgan (2018) | [29] | Reform pressure under Abenomics | Recognition / Introspection |
| 41 | Japan | Muchetu (2021) | [42] | Reinvention through federation restructuring | Recognition / Introspection |
| 42 | Japan | Maclachlan & Shimizu (2020) | [41] | Political embedding of JA in agricultural policy | Growth |
| 43 | Japan | Mulgan (2016) | [86] | Institutional tension in JA reform | Recognition / Introspection |
| 44 | Japan | Ishida (2002c) | [20] | Historical government assistance to cooperatives | Justification / Genesis |
| 45 | Japan | Ishida (2002a) | [70] | Member heterogeneity and farmer exit from JA | Recognition / Introspection |
| 46 | Japan | Godo (2001) | [71] | Economic turning point after financial deregulation | Recognition / Introspection |
| 47 | Japan | Godo (2009) | [72] | Political power and trade protection role of JA | Growth |
| 48 | Japan | Mukhjang (2012) | [73] | Cooperatives for sustainable development | Justification / Genesis |
| 49 | Japan | Sasada (2015) | [43] | Political motives behind JA reform | Recognition / Introspection |
| 50 | Japan | Mulgan (2016) | [87] | Federation–state dynamics in agricultural policy | Federation Governance |
| 51 | Japan | Maclachlan & Shimizu (2016) | [44] | Domestic political drivers of JA reform | Recognition / Introspection |
| 52 | Japan | Morris-Suzuki (2018) | [17] | Interaction of bottom-up and top-down history | Justification / Genesis |
| 53 | Japan | Maclachlan & Shimizu (2022) | [48] | Leadership, members, and adaptive capacity | Recognition / Introspection |
| 54 | Japan | Tanaka (1997) | [74] | Federation restructuring and loss of multipurpose structure | Federation Governance |
| 55 | Japan | Mandal (1970) | [75] | Strong government support and policy role | Justification / Genesis |
| 56 | Japan | Godo (2022) | [76] | Decline of JA political power | Recognition / Introspection |
| 57 | Japan | Ishida (2002b) | [77] | Legal reform weakening member control | Organizational Design |
| 58 | Japan | Fabusoro et al. (2020) | [23] | Liberalization and competitiveness of JA | Recognition / Introspection |
| 59 | Japan | Prakash (2013) | [78] | Progressive amalgamation and federation logic | Federation Governance |
| 60 | Japan | Kaewthep (1989) | [79] | Historical state–cooperative relationship | Justification / Genesis |
| 61 | Korea | Burmeister (2006) | [27] | NACF as infrastructure of agrarian transformation | Growth / Federation Governance |
| 62 | Korea | Burmeister (1999) | [22] | Shift from parastatal control to corporatist intermediation | Recognition / Introspection |
| 63 | Korea | Jang (2013) | [15] | Legal transition to framework cooperative law | Organizational Design |
| 64 | Korea | Syden & Lee (2016) | [80] | Government-owned multipurpose cooperatives | Justification / Genesis |
| 65 | Korea | Jivani & Murray (2006) | [81] | Financial arm of cooperatives and credit role | Growth / Federation Governance |
| 66 | Korea | Kim (2013) | [13] | Cooperative transformation | Recognition / Introspection |
| 67 | Korea | Lee (2008) | [82] | Federation model | Growth / Federation Governance |
| 68 | Korea | Choi et al. (2020) | [38] | NACF within developmental state framework | Justification / Genesis |
| 69 | Korea | Park et al. (2012) | [19] | Federation evolution from three-tier to two-tier | Federation Governance |
| 70 | Korea | Guilian & Yang (2015) | [83] | Supervision model inspired by NongHyup | Federation Governance |
| 71 | Korea | Jin (2020) | [84] | Peasant resistance and identity crisis | Recognition / Introspection |
| 72 | Korea | Choi (2006) | [12] | Adaptation through privileges and bargaining power | Growth |
| 73 | Asia | Taimni (1991) | [85] | Why agricultural cooperatives evolve differently in Asia | Justification / Genesis |
| 74 | Korea | Jung & Rösner (2012) | [21] | Historical roots and state control of cooperatives | Justification / Genesis |
