抄録
This paper addresses the structure of property-rights regime by analyzing household data. We review and revise a “bundles of rights” framework developed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) for applying a case study, collective forest tenure reform in Jinggangshan, Jiangxi Province, China. We apply the framework to both local government and households’subjective comprehension on bundles of rights in forestry. Moreover, we devote more attention on quantitative analysis to verify the constrained relationship between households and the government. As a conclusion, we provide a new structure, which contains “alteration”, “short-term benefits”, “long-term benefits (self-management)” and “long-term benefits (relying on others)”. These 4 types of bundles are applied to clustering those households and consequently the households’ characteristics are specified as “positive” and “conservative”. Considering that, we also discuss the possibility about how to stimulate households’ incentives of forest management.
