Reformed Epistemology and Its Moral(<Special Issue>Criticism of Religion)

Abstract

Reformed epistemology, which argues that religious beliefs are rational without any evidence against the evidentialist attacks to such beliefs, provides a great deal of insights into what rationality really means. In this paper I introduce the arguments of one of the most influential Reformed epistemologists, William P. Alston, and try to find a way to respond to his claims. In brief, he argues that (1) religious practices are as justified as perceptual practices, and (2) perceptual practices are rational, therefore (3) religious practices are rational. I agree with (1) but not with (2). So I disagree with (3) also. Even if perceptual practices are rational, it is not rational in a truly epistemological sense. Our perceptive practices are not constituted in order to inform us of true nature of the external world. In conclusion, the fact that religious practices are as justified as perceptual practices is not sufficient for Alston's claim that the former is epistemologically rational.