From its beginning religious studies has been motivated by the wish to explore alternatives to modern civilization. Religions have been seen as containing some hope for those suffering from the limits of human reason and the modern suppressive society. Religious studies, however, has also been formed through the criticism against religions. It is an important part of the formation and development of religious studies to penetrate into the oppressive aspects of religions. Thus religious studies has created new intellectual horizons by incorporating keen critical understanding both of religions and modernity. In this paper the author examines three thinkers (Tominaga Nakamoto, David Hume, and F. Nietzsche) as the predecessors of those who contributed to the opening of perspectives combining criticism against religions and criticism against modernity. Each of their criticism against religions is based on their strong awareness that religions have been playing extremely important roles in human history. Religions are regarded by them to have deep roots in humanity and thus as almost insurmountable. They did not suppose that religions would soon decline as a result of the progress of human knowledge. Their acute awareness of the limits of the human reason was closely related to their thought that religions are deeply grounded in human nature. This is precisely the reason why penetrating understanding of religions is so challenging and important.

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Religion has been criticized in many different ways and contexts. Religion can be criticized directly as being meaningless, but criticism of religion is not limited to such cases. It is entirely possible that arguing for the significance of religion implies criticism of religion. That is to say, talking about religion in general, and about how religion should be, can, in a sense, imply criticism of individual existing religions. We can find an example of this in the theory of religion of Nishida Kitaro. That Nishida attached great importance to religion can be clearly seen in his first book, An Inquiry into the Good. In this book, when talking about "religion," Nishida did not have any of the individual existing religions in mind, but rather how religion should be. But he argued about how religion should be while having in mind what is lacking in the concrete forms religion takes. His theory thus implied a criticism of the existing individual religions. Of course Nishida thought that the contradictory relation between the Self and the Absolute, which he calls the "contradictory correspondence," can also be found in Christianity and Buddhism. But he points out that in Christianity, the transcendental keeps an "exterior" character, in other words, that in Christianity the Self and the Absolute correspond only in an inadequate form, for stressing the transcendental character of God. Nishida recognized that the contradictory relation between the Self and the Absolute, which is realized through negation, forms the core of Buddhist belief. But on the other hand, he criticized Buddhism for sequestering itself from the world. Because Buddhism concerns itself mainly with how we can free ourselves from the bonds of our desires, it does not place much value on the truth of the actual world. Nishida thought that this passivity should be combined with activity. This passivity has to be combined with us becoming "historical individuals" in the actual world; in other words, as elements of the self-formation of the historical world, we should take part in this self-formation in a creative way.

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The concept of the "history of Japanese religion" was coined by Anesaki Masaharu at the end of the Meiji era in English for Western readers, then later translated into Japanese by him. Eventually almost all Japanese scholars avoid using this phrase, especially after the Asian-Pacific War, because it carries the nuance of nationalistic exclusiveness. In studies of specific religious phenomena, scholars try to comprehend the negotiating process between "the transcendental" and "the indigenous" to explore the characteristic ways of Japanese religion. In these cases Japanese religion is actually reinterpreted as the hybrid space of negotiation to deconstruct the unified substance of Japanese religion, and the unit of each religion (Christianity, Buddhism, Shinto and so on) where the transcendental is indigenized and the indigenous is transcendentalized.

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Various new religions have appeared as Japanese society rushed into modernization. Such new religions have received criticism from various angles. In this paper I take up Tenrikyo, Soka Gakkai, and Aum Shinrikyo. The purpose of this paper is to show clearly what kind of criticism these three new religions have received. Tenrikyo was a pioneering new religion. Media and established religious groups criticized Tenrikyo for spreading an inferior faith and for deceiving people. Since the rapid growth of Soka Gakkai was a threat to established religious groups, criticism was received from such religious groups at first. After Soka Gakkai advanced to the political world, it received criticism from left-wing political groups. Soka Gakkai caused trouble over free speech and blocking publications, and came to receive intense criticism from the media. Aum Shinrikyo received criticism from the media from the very beginning. But, media temporarily treated this religious group in a friendly way. Recently, media have taken the lead in criticizing new religions.

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Religious criticism is a task to try to affirm a certain way of thinking concerning the truth by denying the truth of religion, a specific religion, or a religious sect. Therefore, it seems that a pattern for religious criticism can be made by considering the problem of "truth" concerning religion from three standpoints: atheism, absolutism, and inclusivism. In this thesis, the atheistic criticism of L. Feuerbach, the theological criticism of K. Barth, and the philosophical criticism of K. Nishida are taken up as criticisms of religion carried out from each standpoint, and the structure and the relation of their religious criticism are considered. As a result, the religious criticism of Feuerbach aims at the construction of an anthropology, that of Barth aims at the revival of theology, and the religious criticism of Nishida aims for the explanation of religion. All of those criticisms were an affirmative, creative work.

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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate an actualization of the "Critique of Religion." The critique has its own historical origin and character. First, we examine the text of Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) and reveal the significance of his critique of religion. His criticism was based on a careful and radical questioning of "modernity" in Japan. Second we explore a possibility of the heritage of "the Enlightenment." The critiques of religion by K. Marx and S. Freud were two main successors of the Enlightenment. Third, we point out a problem of "national (or civil) religion" as a focus of the contemporary critique of religion. As "a religion of daily life" (Marx), it has a kind of natural character. Its critique, therefore, requires a rethinking on " (human) nature." Finally we urge the importance of a sense of "ambivalence" and two dimensions of "nature" and "nothingness," and we emphasize the dynamic process of nature and nothingness.

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Reformed epistemology, which argues that religious beliefs are rational without any evidence against the evidentialist attacks to such beliefs, provides a great deal of insights into what rationality really means. In this paper I introduce the arguments of one of the most influential Reformed epistemologists, William P. Alston, and try to find a way to respond to his claims. In brief, he argues that (1) religious practices are as justified as perceptual practices, and (2) perceptual practices are rational, therefore (3) religious practices are rational. I agree with (1) but not with (2). So I disagree with (3) also. Even if perceptual practices are rational, it is not rational in a truly epistemological sense. Our perceptive practices are not constituted in order to inform us of true nature of the external world. In conclusion, the fact that religious practices are as justified as perceptual practices is not sufficient for Alston's claim that the former is epistemologically rational.

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Jaspers' Philosophie lasst sich einerseits als eine "religiose" Philosophie bezeichnen, weil sie an das eigentliche Selbstsein als "Existenz" appelliert, die in ihrer "Unbedingtheit" auf Transzendenz bezogen ist. Andererseits betont er jedoch entschieden den Unterschied zwischen Philosophie und Religion, und ubt eine scharfe Kritik an der Religion, die auf dem Gehorsam gegenuber Dogmen und auf Autoritat beruht. Aus der Sicht seines "philosophischen Glaubens", in dem "Existenz" im entscheidenden Augenblick in der geschichtlichen einmaligen Situation "Chiffre" als "Sprache der Transzendenz" vernimmt, setzt er sich kritisch mit dem christlichen Offenbarungsglauben" auseinander, welcher die "Offenbarung" Gottes in seiner Leibhaftigkeit und Realitat in Jesus Christus fur die einzige absolute Wahrheit halt. Jaspers verlangt vom "Offenbarungsglauben" die folgenden "drei Verzichte": (1) Jesus ist nicht mehr fur alle Glaubenden der Gottmensch Christus. (2) Die Offenbarung wird zur Chiffer der Offenbarung. (3) Die Ausschliesslichkeit der dogmatisch bestimmten Glaubenswahrheit fallt. Jaspers beabsichtigt damit nicht, den "Offenbarungsglauben" auf den "philosophischen Glauben" zu reduzieren. Er appelliert vielmehr an das Christentum, sich von der Bindung an die Dogmen and von ihrem Ausschliesslichkeitsanspruch zu befreien und zum "Ernst" seines Ursprungs zuruckzukehren. Er versucht zugleich auch den "gemeinsamen Boden" zu eroffnen, auf dem die verschiedenen Glaubensursprunge einander begegnen konnen.

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It is probably high time for biblical scholarship to direct its critical attention to Jesus himself. He must have reached his very last stage, namely crucifixion, after making several important leaps in his last years. Therefore, not all things he spoke should have unanimous relevance to us today. His words about the eschatological coming of the Reign of God do not have the same importance as 2000 years ago. Also, the threatening utterances and words that demand absolute authority for himself should not be uncritically adopted by the church. We should rather critically observe Jesus' words and deeds from the viewpoint of his very last development, namely how he was and what he was between Gethsemane and Golgotha.

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In this article I make a survey of some criticisms of Christianity in the first four centuries C.E. in relation to the concept of philanthropia. In 64 C.E. the Christians in Rome were persecuted by the emperor Nero. Tacitus, the famous Roman historian, has written about this in his Annales 15, 44, that the Christians were executed for their "hate toward mankind" (odium humani generis=misanthropia). The Christians were viewed by the Romans as those who were antisocial in the Roman Empire. Against this criticism Justin of Rome pointed to the philanthropia of the Christians in his Second Apology 10;1 (ca.155 C.E.). According to Justin, God is philanthropos and the Christians imitate their philanthropical God. In about 247 C.E. Origenes of Alexandria wrote Contra Celsum, which tried to refute the criticisms of Celsus the philosopher against Christianity. Celsus had made the criticism that God must not be incarnated into a human being because God is perfect in himself and need not to change himself (CCels. 4 14). Against this Origenes replied that God is essentially philanthropical, so he became a human being. He did not, Origenes said, change himself, but remained essentially as same as He had been, because He is always philanthropical. In the fourth century Julian the Apostate criticized in his Letter to a priest that the Christians cared for the poor people and by their practice "atheism" (which refers to Christianity), spread over the Roman Empire. In 372 Basil made a hospital for the poor near Caesarea. He practiced the care for the poor who were affected with leprosy and thus showed his philanthropia. In this period philanthropia meant philoptochia, and Christianity spread philanthropia as philoptochia throughout Roman society and developed itself in the Roman Empire. In the midst of these criticisms in the first four centuries, Christianity has practiced and thought of philanthropia and theologicaly and practically developed itself.

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Modern Christian thought has evolved out of the ineluctable interplay with modern rationalism. Confronted with a new strain of religious criticism birthed out of the European Enlightenment, Christian thought became newly encumbered with the popularization of modern empirical science and its emphasis on positivism. In particular, Darwin's theory of evolution served as the catalyst for the confrontation between science and religion in the 19th century. As a result of this challenge, one arm of Christendom countered by developing and advancing a movement known as Creationist Theory. These two opposing paradigms have constituted a highly visible and persistent touchstone in the protracted contest for popular acceptance. This essay focuses on Richard Dawkins's criticism of religion and attempts to elucidate the concept of rationality (empirical, evidentialist rationality) which underpins the paradigmatic conflict between science and religion. My thesis is that the above-mentioned paradigmatic imbroglio could be reconciled by a reexamination of the concept of rationality based on a broader interpretation.

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Modern critical biblical scholarship has shown that the formative period of ancient Christianity saw a very diverse group of people with a wide variety of opinions about Jesus, his life, death, and resurrection. This diversity is realized keenly only when we look into the many apocryphal writings such as The Gospel according to Mary and The Gospel of Judas. They are now brought into the spotlight because they are so valuable for reconstructing the history of ancient Christianity. Indeed, they are labeled as heretical, but they have some relevance to our modern problems, such as hegemony, sexuality, and leadership. I would hazard the criticism that even liberals do not quite speak favorably of this information. It would seem that clergy, though trained in the academy, join in a conspiracy of silence to suppress it in one way or another, for fear that it may possibly challenge institutional Christianity. That is where they agree with intolerant evangelical or fundamentalist Christians on somewhat hysterical claims for the inerrancy of their sacred texts. It is a matter of urgency that average citizens should achieve religious literacy, and their critical voices have an impact on academicians.

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No one can escape, either consciously or unconsciously, from the pluralistic situation of religious diversity and, more ultimately, from the relativization of religious truth claims in the contemporary world. The purpose of this article lies in an attempt to indicate a direction towards the way in which the structure and essential doctrines of Shinran's "Jodo Shinshu" ought to be brought into urgent question under those historical circumstances with which we are now confronted in the 21st century. We have discussed four different angles from which Shinran's theoretical foundation of Pure Land Buddhist doctrines should be clearly placed in a new light on subjects of primary importance for pluralistic reality of world religions. Two angles will be summarized to express the point I wish to focus on here. First, Shinran's criterion of judging "all" religions and thoughts in and out of Buddha's teachings (dharma) as "true," "provisional," and "false" has been taken into serious consideration. Second, given my theoretical critique of John Hick's working hypothesis that one or single reality might be equally found within each one of world religions, I would like to assert as an alternative even more radical criterions: 1. Ultimate reality which seems to preexist at the basis of all great religions should not be presupposed even as a hypothesis. 2. We must stand on a post-modern Weltanschauung that true reality lies in a network where all things are mutually and organically related throughout past, present, and future. 3. Although all religions are conditioned by their traditions transmitted from the past, they must be always open to their unlimited possibilities towards the future. 4. All religions must not refuse self-transformation which is necessarily required through interfaith dialogue. 5. Participation in the dialogue and self-transformation brought from it should not be enforced by other religions, but they must be necessary results from the foundation of existence in which each religion has been originally rooted.

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Buddhism in Sri Lanka has a long history stretching back to the times of King Asoka. This history, however, has not always been peaceful. The rule of Sri Lanka by the Europeans from the 16th century brought with it not only the proselytizing of Christianity but also the suppression of Buddhism. The period of colonization under England in particular saw Buddhism driven almost to the verge of extinction. At that time Buddhist monks and two Christian pastors were involved in intense doctrinal debates. The Buddhists were seen as victorious, and this became the turning point for the revival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Colonel Olcott, who went on to make great contributions to the revival of Buddhism, became a supporter of Buddhism as a result of these debates. The Buddhist revival movement also influenced the revival and modernization of Buddhism around the world, including India and Japan. Thus these debates, that took place out in the countryside in 19th century Sri Lanka, played an important role in the modern history of Buddhism. However, these debates have received almost no scholarly attention. In this article I would like to discuss the significance of this forgotten and overlooked chapter in the history of modern Buddhism.

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Nowadays, a claim for establishment of an Islamic government by the supporters of radical Islamic Revivalism have increased. These supporters insist that only the Islamism-movement can repair and cure the somber predicament found in Islamic societies as a whole. To anyone who is working to build a modern society with free citizenship, the slogan "The rule is just to God" makes them cringe. Against these examples of radical Islamism, al-'Ashmawi, a modern Egyptian intellectual and former chief judge of the High Court, has been bravely standing up to the extremists, even though he is under constant threat of death. His writings and assertions are often accused of being apostate, not only by the extremists but also by the 'Ulama of al-Azhar University. Although accused as apostate, al-'Ashmawi's views on reform of Islamic law and society are based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and are developed academically within historical contexts. His assertion on the separation of state and religion, his criticism of the Khaliphate and the blind application of Shari'ah, and his contention of the ideal Islamic government are regarded as liberal ideas that are inevitable for a modern Islamic society. It is desirable that his ideas and thought will contribute to the enlightenment movement seen recently in Egypt.

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The purpose of this article is to reconsider the way to understand the problem of belief in Japanese folk religion and folk culture, from the perspective of the relationship between folk societies and the "outside" (especially outside power), not within the framework of folk society itself. In Japanese folklore, the outside power of a religious system is usually excluded from the interpretation of belief in folk religion. However, in referring to cases of Japanese folk religion, it can often be seen that the model (or mold) of folk religion was provided from an outside religious system, and then developed into folk religion. In fact, in some cases the legitimacy of folk religion is guaranteed by the outside religious system. It is the analysis of this relationship which is required to reconsider and deconstruct the modernity of folklore and religious studies.

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