差異的自己の同一性

ルーマン、ミード、ポスト構造主義

抄録

　This article is a theoretical contribution to the problem of the self and identity in sociological inquiries. In sociological discussion the identity of modern man is traditionally characterized by the overambitious notion of the subject. Such characterization is mainly due to the assumption of ego-identity which could not fit the specific structure of our time. Now it is proposed to replace this notion of subject with a new theoretical model of selfconsciousness. The present essay tries to formulate starting points for a general theory of the self and describes basic characteristics of our conscious systems.
　For this purpose three current studies and Mead's "self" are examined and related to each oter. The first is Luhmann's "Autopoiesis." He takes our conscious systems as recursive and autopoietic process of self-reference, which could be found also in Mead's theory of reflexive self. Secondly we refer to Cooley's "looking-glass self" and Lacan's "stade du miroir," from which we can get some important suggestions about non-identical constitution of the self. And finally the author compares them with the concept of "differance." Derrida bases his theory of "differance" on the reproduction of self-repetion which holds true for Luhmann's self-referential reproduction of conscious systems.
　On the basis of brief reviews of Luhmann, Mead, Cooley, Lacan and Derrida the self is consequently redefined as follows: the self is a paradoxical process of selfreferential reproduction or, in other words, a self-referential unity of "Autopoiesis" and "differance."