抄録
The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of care in Gilligan’s feminism theory. Gilligan insists that Rawls’ theory of justice does not include the implications of responsibility, care, and concern for others. Similarly, Gilligan criticizes how Kohlberg’ s theory describes only morality development in men, and that there is another voice, namely another process of moral development which is seen in women. She insists that for men the absolutes of truth and fairness are defined by the concepts of equality. But people have real emotional needs to be attached to something, and equality does not give this necessary attachment. While the theory of justice proceeds from the premise of equality, the theory of care rests on the premise of nonviolence: that no one should be hurt. In addition, the second wave of feminism criticizes Rawls’ theory of justice in that it neglects the issue of justice or injustice in the family. They propose the abolition of the private sphere because it can foster the oppression of women. This proposition results from the dualism of men and women. Certainly, gender inequality is an important part of feminism. But human beings are thoroughly diverse. We differ from each other not only in gender-sex identity but also in our own personal characteristics. The rhetoric of equality in men and women often tends to deflect attention from the diversity of individuals. To overcome the dualistic theory of men and women, it is necessary once again to recognize Gilligan’s morality of care and responsibility. Gilligan’s morality of care and responsibility does not bury the individual. In turn, Gilligan’s feminism theory creates a new ideology that transcends the dualism of men and women.
