1981 年 12 巻 p. 13-33
In discussing strategic levels of regional income, production and employment within a regional economic planning, plural policy authorities, viz., central and local governments, may participate in it. In that circumstances, the contents of the regional economic plans, which would have been drawn out from centralized regional planning directed by the central government and from locally decentralized regional planning directed by the local governments, are freaquently inconsistent with each other. The central government will be displeased with the decentralized plan in the sense that the local governments only concern their own interests, and similarly each local government will be dissatisfied with the centralized plan in the sense that the central government considers its regional interests to a small extent. That is to say, there occurs a conflict between the central and the local governmnets. The conflicts not only may lie between the central and local governments. but also may lie between each local government because each regional economy can not be independent from other regional economy.
Now, in order to regulate such conflicts, we propose two schemes. The one is to make a intermediate planning between the centralized and the decentralized plannings, and the other is to introduce the concept of the “conjectural variation” often used in oligopolistic economic theory into the decentralized planning. Then, after investigating the sources where the antagonism comes from and clarifying the mechanism which brings out the conflicts, the validity of these schemes is proved empirically with reference to the regulated stateds in the interregional input-output model of nine regions for the Japanese economy at 1975.