Abstract
This paper proposes a differential fault analysis on the stream cipher MUGI, which uses two kinds of update functions of an intermediate state. MUGI was proposed by Hitachi, Ltd. in 2002 and is specified as ISO/IEC 18033-4 for keystream generation. Differential fault analysis (DFA) is a type of fault analysis, which is considered to be a serious threat against secure devices such as smart cards. DFA on MUGI was first proposed at ICISC 2010 [25]; however, the attack condition for the successful attack such as the position into which the fault is injected was restricted. In this paper, we extend the attack methods which are more practical, based on a one-byte and a multi-byte fault models using the relationship between two kinds of update functions that are mutually dependent. In the proposed attack, the attacker can know the position affected by the fault injection even if he has no control of the timing of the fault injection. As a result, a 128-bit secret key can be recovered using 13 pairs of correct and faulty outputs on average.
