EU Studies in Japan
Online ISSN : 1884-2739
Print ISSN : 1884-3123
ISSN-L : 1884-3123
Volume 2003, Issue 23
Displaying 1-14 of 14 articles from this issue
  • Yoshihiro FUJII
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 1-19,289
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Enlargement of EU for 10 acceding countries does not lead directly to enlargement of Euro.
    There are several unsolved issues both present Euro participating countries and future possible participating ones. We might make a best scenario as follows: a first step is 3 non-participating countries within EU, such as UK, Sweden and Denmark will join smoothly, a second step is several acceding countries will join ERM II scheme, and then some of them will turn to Euro fulfilling 4 criteria setting by Maastricht Treaty. Through these step-by-step scenario, possibility of softening for the value of Euro could be decreased and hardening and deepening of that would be increased.
    However there are also several issues and some of those are envisaged now. First one is critical issue for present Euro participating countries that is a coordination between SGP regulations and budgetary policy in the Member countries. Some countries such as Germany, France and Portugal which have been combating with prolonged recession. Whether EU can manage these coordination without using loosening up interpretation of SGP regulations.
    Second one is a resolution of above issue might influence on additional participation within EU Member countries UK, Sweden and Denmark. These three have now enjoyed so-called “sound free-ride positions” which is compared with participating countries because they can use both monetary and budgetary policy relatively freely. Actually their latest economic performances are relatively better than Euro participating countries. These results should be regarded as without rigid restraint by SGP. Their joining Euro zone could make hardening of value of the Euro. But up to modification or loosening up of interpretation of SGP, these hardening and deepening effects might be delay.
    Third issue is step-by-step participating in EMU by 10 accessing countries after, they getting EU membership in 2004. Their participating in Euro would be good contribution for lots of entrepreneur and business people who seek to get higher productivity in their productions through locating their product platform in those frontier area and sell their products in pan-European market. But in order to avoid softening Euro, they should be examined by rigid judgement and criteria which will be modified or even loosened up adapting to cyclical economic changes as discussion occurred now.
    In addition, ECB has to be modified not only voting system in the decision making process in the Governing Council by introducing rotation procedure in line with future enlargement but also strengthening accountability for their decision to the market and European citizen.
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  • Jean-Victor Louis
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 20-43,291
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The subject of the international relations of the European monetary union (EMU) raises different questions.
    One concerns the respective role of the political institutions of the European Union and of the European Central Bank in the conclusion of exchange rate and monetary agreements. It is a topic that was prominent in the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty and led to a compromise laid down in article 111, paragraphs 1 to 3 of the EC-Treaty. If it is for the Council to conclude, the European Central Bank has an important say in the matter.
    Another one concerns the allocation of competences between the Member States and the Community or its Central Bank. Is there an exclusive or a shared competence of the Community? The answer is clearly that due to the singleness of the monetary policy, within the meaning of Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, the external competence has to be exclusive in favour of the Community. Article 111, paragraph 5 on the possibility for the Member States to conclude or keep international agreements, does not allow concluding to the contrary.
    A third one is related to the vexed question of participation and representation of the European Union or the Euro area in International Organisations and caucuses. Article 111, paragraph 4 bears on that question but this provision that also asks for common positions to be adopted by the Union in fields related to EMU, has not been applied. Pragmatism has been the keyword in the conclusions of the European Council on that topic and in the practice of the institutions. Informal talks within the Euro Group, where Finance, Ministers seat with the Commission and the ECB, have evolved as a substitute for the application of formal procedures as provided by the Treaty. Hence the proposals made by the Commission, France, Germany and the Benelux countries to recognise in the future constitutional treaty the existence of this informal grouping.
    The trickier question in that context concerns the relations with and the participation to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It raises important political and legal questions. Let us quote the relations with the United States, the reluctance of the Member States of the European Union to loose visibility on the international scene, the specificities of the IMF: the composition of the constituencies and the allocation of the quotas, the vast spectrum of competences exercised by the IMF. These elements make difficult the realisation of what is not a dream but a necessity for one of the three most important international currencies, the full and exclusive participation to this organisation. Requests of a “single chair” for the European Union become more and more common but resistances are still there. As often, the biggest opposition to European solidarity towards the external World does not come from outside but from within the Union.
    The contribution concludes with the expression of the hope that reality will triumph on nostalgias.
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  • the roles of the Structural Funds, the Cohesion fund and the European Investment Bank
    Kazuyoshi MATSUURA
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 44-64,293
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The question this paper seeks to address is: how have the South European Countries been involved in the EMU which is led by the core nations. This paper examines the role of the EU regional policies toward the Southern European Countries in the EMU.
    Article 109j (1) of the Maastricht Treaty sets out some economic criteria related to the development of prices, government financial positions, exchange rates and long-term interest rates under which a country would be eligible to join the third stage of the EMU. These conditions are classified as the nominal convergence criteria. Besides them, to attain the economic stability after the adoption of a single currency, the real convergence criteria, such as productivity, per capita GDP and employment, need to be fulfilled so as to reduce the economic disparity between the core nations and the peripheral nations. This paper assesses how the EU regional policies tackle the disparity issue between the two.
    The first part of this paper outlines the role of the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and the European Investment Bank. This part also explains the complementary relationship between two Funds and the EIB.
    The second part of this paper assesses an effect of the EU regional policies on the Southern European Countries. In case of Spain and Portugal, regional policies are of benefit to the economic performance to a great extent. First, the transfer of the EU funds contributed to the enhancement of income and employment, and contributed to improvement of the productivity in the nations. Second, the regional funds support the small and medium sized firms. Third, these policies give an impetus to foreign investment. However, the policies are of less benefit to Greece because of its delay of the structural development.
    The third part of this paper points out the problems which confront the Southern European countries. First, although the regional policies contributed to the reduction of the income disparity among nations, they leave the disparity within a nation unsolved. Moreover, there is a tendency for the real divergence to widen in Greece. Second, the supervision and regulation of banking sector is urged to harmonize with other EU nations.
    This asymmetry is attributable to speed and progress of the structural adjustment in the peripheral nations. As the EU enlarges toward the.central and eastern Europe in the future, the disparity between the new comers and the core nations would be the central issue to maintain the stable economy in the EU.
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  • The Referendum on 28 September 2000
    Nobuhiko YOSHITAKE
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 65-87,295
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The single currency, the Euro, was introduced to the market in twelve member states of the European Union (EU) on 1 January 2002. Denmark, Sweden, and UK are still outside the ‘Euroland’. Among the three countries, Denmark held a referendum to introduce the Euro on 28 September 2000, but the government proposal was rejected by 46.8% to 53.2% then. According to the governments of Sweden and UK, the both countries will also hold a referendum on this topic in the near future.
    The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Euro referendum in Denmark and to examine why the majority of the Danes rejected the government proposal.
    It has two important points for research on the EU. Firstly, the Euro was introduced in most of the member states as previously scheduled, but this was a controversial issue in domestic politics and there was anxiety about the Euro among the people. The referendum in Denmark clearly shows the attitudes of the government, political parties, interest groups, and the people towards the Euro. This will lead to analysis of anti-Euro sentiments in the EU, which can be seen especially in Sweden and UK.
    Secondly, this case of Denmark will be a good example to analyse the future integration of the EU. Deepening the integration has resulted in serious polarization of the member states. This has two aspects; member states and the people in each member state that are keen or reluctant to deepen the integration. It is essential for the EU to overcome these difficulties of polarization. This problem will be more and more important in an enlarged EU. Membership of the 10 countries in 2004 will expand a diversity of integration plans of the EU, especially scope and speed of integration.
    In conclusion, the people in Denmark had difficulties in coordinating the two identities; national identity and European identity. The Danish currency, crown (krone), was regarded as a symbol to maintain national identity of Denmark and Danish way of life. This is very closely connected with the future of the Danish welfare state. Based on this anxiety, the majority of the Danes said No to the Euro at the referendum, although only small parties like Danish People's Party and Socialist People's Party voted against the Euro at the national parliament. The Euro problem reminds us that it is of importance for the EU to get support from the people and that deepening. the integration is closely linked to domestic politics of the member states.
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  • Kaoru Hoshino
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 88-120,297
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Since the introduction of the Euro, it is becoming clear that EMU and the Internal Market strategy bring the principle of competition into every domain of the European social institutions, and compel the coordination conducted so far by the states and the other social institutions to be at the mercy of the market. Competition is now dominating the moment of the European integration instead of social solidarity. The Directives and Regulations enforced by the European Commission and Council aiming at leveling the playing field, the binding Stability and Growth Pact, and the tight monetary policy of the European Central Bank also accelerate this trend.
    As a result, accompanied by the influence of the globalization and the overwhelming spread of neo-liberalism, the traditional European social model is just on the edge of erosion, as the German case shows. The density of the trade unions is declining steadily. The membership of the employer association also is decreasing due to divergence of members' interests. German government cannot arbitrate between the trade union and employer association any more, as the deadlock of the negotiation aiming at job creation among trade union, employer association, and government (Bundnis für Arbeit) shows. Under the change of the social and economic environments, the capabilities of the states and traditional social institutions to coordinate have been declining, and the erosion of the social institutions is beginning.
    Nevertheless, there is not yet a sigh that the social institutions are reorganized or reunified at the European level. There is little progress concerning the solidarity among the trade unions of the member's countries, whereas many European companies act at the European and global scale. Indeed the integration of the markets is progressing in the European Union, but it doesn't become the community, in which each member and actors are bound together organically at the European level, based on the social cohesion and solidarity. It is the present stage of the European Integration that, despite of the completion of the monetary integration, the national economies faced with the erosion of the traditional social institutions coexist still. There is no sigh that a European national economy or a new social model capable of enhancing the competitiveness and social solidarity at the same time might emerge. In the foreseeable future the European Union is thus expected to remain as the association of nation states.
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  • Toyoji Fujiwara
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 121-139,299
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The EU is on the verge of revising, or at least making flexible the guiding principle of its unified currency. They are making, I'm afraid, a fatal error of judgement. The remarkable success, so far, of the euro was entirely due to the shift of macro-economic principles, from demand management to monetary targeting.
    The guiding principle of the single currency, of which the most important is to contain budget deficit within 3% of the GDP, was certainly a kind of straight-jacket to many of the participating countries to the euro. The majority of the 12 participants, including such laggards as Ireland and Greece, managed to endure inflationary and other pressures, inflicted by the “one-size-fits-for-all” measures demanded by the stability and growth pact.
    Ironically, it is Germany, France and Italy, the 3 largest and central countries of the euro zone, that are now crying for help. It is especially paradoxical that Germany, which has been demanding the strict application of the SGP principles, has now excessive budgetary deficit and is calling for flexibility in their applications.
    As of the beginning of March, 2003, it is not decided yet whether the SGP should be revised or not, but judging from the report the Commission presented to the Ecofin Council, they are sure to make “flexible interpretations”, if not revisions to the SGP. Are they right? I thnk not.
    Ms. Kathleen McNamara, Assistant Professor at Princeton, produed a remarkable book on the euro, called “The Currency of Ideas” (1998). Based on the analysis of the world monetary history after the war, including the Bretton Woods system, she concluded that European monetary systems made a great success, because their guiding principles were shifted from Keynesian to Neoliberal theories. In European context, this meant that all the euro participants had virtually abandoned Keynesian demand management policies and converted to the monetarist approach, which the German Bundesbank had pursued since the end of the World War II.
    World monetary authorities are now facing unprecedented pressures of world-wide deflation. It is understandable that European financial authorities are demanding flexibility in applying the SGP. But we must remind ourselves that in the colossalised economies, demand stimulus rarely works, as is shown by Japanese policies. Euro financial ministers should be patient.
    Fortunately for the majority of euro-participants, the March Ecofin Council only produced a very short statement on the SPG that it “provides a robust and flexible framework within which any additional strains on public finances will be addressed”. It was reported that Gordon Brown, British Chancellor of Exchequer, had tried to present a plan to make a flexible interpretation to the SGP, but Belgium, Spain, Italy and other small countries prevented the proposal, made in collaboration with France and Germany. The EU might have to endure some period of uncertainty over the euro. But it may turn out to be beneficial to the single currency after all.
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  • Hirohito YASODA
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 140-161,301
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Under the pressures of the criteria for the EMU, Italian administrative and fiscal reforms have been directed by the Center-Left governments and technocrats during the 1990s. They have obtained legitimacy through the tripartite agreements (“social pacts”) signed by the Government, the employers' federations and the labor unions.
    Despite many provocative statements made by “Eurosceptic” ministers, Berlusconi Government has syntonized the domestic labour market reforms to the EU's targets of occupation rate, following the “White Paper on Labour Market” drafted by the labour law experts including prof. Biagi, the assassinated “pro-Europe” consultant of the minister of Labour. The focus of the arguments is the Article 18 of Labour Rights Act, which guarantees rehiring and compensations to workers dismissed without just cause. The new social pact, the “Pact for Italy”, which partially loosens the rigidity of the Article 18, was signed by the Government and major social partners except the CGIL, Italy's largest left trade union. This means a partial collapse of the “concertation” of the 1990s.
    The “Pact for Italy” also demands to augment domestic investment especially to the Mezzogiorno, the less developed southern half of Italy. Between the domestic pressure to public spending and the external requirements of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, Italian Center-Right government must seek a difficult balance of public finance. The Center-Left opposition is missing the opportunities to indicate the alternative way for reforms by the internal split between the moderate center parties and the Left activists of the “girotondo” (human-chain demonstration) movement.
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  • Yuuji KAWANO
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 162-184,303
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Recent works mostly supports interest rate channel, as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the euro area as a whole. In order to work it effectively in the region, Eurosystem ought to have the controllability of the yield curve. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the Eurosystem affect interest rates based on the expectation hypothesis.
    We estimate money market yield curve that is composed of EURIBOR (euro inter-bank offered rate), because of simplicity. From two-period model estimation, we found it is difficult to accept the expectation hypothesis. This result is similar to empirical studies that other researches had done in the United States. These studies became more preferable result by taking account of financial institution's expectation against future change of official interest rate.
    Then, we re-examined the expectation hypothesis by using EONIA (euro over-night index average) instead of one or two period of EURIBOR, because it is sensitive to the information released by Eurosystem and it contains expectation against future change of MRO rate (Eurosystem's official interest rate).
    We estimate EONIA-model in the same method as two-period model, we obtained the result closer to the theoretical value compared with other studies that used the Federal Funds rate in the United States, though the expectation hypothesis was not strictly supported. As a result, we come to the conclusion that Eurosystem's information is important factor for the term structure of interest rates of euro.
    Next, we set Eurosystem's statement as a variable, and estimate how this variable affect euro yield curve by using vector error correction model. In this estimation, we adopted the idea of “open mouth operations” which have been adopted by studies between other central banks and money market too. The results indicated Eurosystem's statements have influenced all maturity of EURIBOR to the direction that we have predicted, and also, long-term EURIBOR react more sensitive by statement than short-term EURIBOR. This is consistent with theory of expectation hypothesis that as maturity of interest rate is longer, expectation affects the interest rate greater.
    On the contrary, we found MRO rate has a reverse impact on EURIBOR to our prospect. The reason is that EURIBOR fluctuated earlier than MRO rate, because financial institutions change the forecast of the future interest rate as soon as statement was released, and that they did not change it any longer when MRO rate was changed.
    From these results, we could obtain two conclusions. First, Eurosystem do not affect EURIBOR directly through MRO rate policy, but through statement policy. Second, it is implication, for researchers, we should have take statement into account, when we study whether the central bank succeed in controlling yield curve or not.
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  • Sadayoshi TAKAYA
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 185-211,305
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    We empirically examine the monetary policy of European Central Bank (ECB) after introduction of the Euro. It has been determined by the contract that the main monetary target is price stability. The policy of the Bank is successful from the view of the stability. However, importance of not only price stability but also employment as the target is increasing because of the possibility of slipping into recession.
    This paper firstly focuses on the monetary policy, effects on the price stability and production in the Euro area. The method is simple econometrics, that is, the equations of monetary policy rules by ECB are estimated. The results is that ECB may place a high value on the production same as the inflation.
    Secondly, the monetary policy effects are estimated through the use of the estimated monetary policy rule. The results are follows the effectiveness of monetary policy to the inflation restrain is significant, but that of the policy to deflation is not significant. It is significant that the effectiveness of the policy to both boom and recession of the real economy.
    In conclusion, the ECB policy may face the problem that agreement of direction as to the policy is difficult because the participating countries have diverse preferences. Therefore, It is necessity for current Euro area that the discretionary monetary policy will be operated by ECB.
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  • the Impact of Local Voting Rights for EU citizens in France
    Noriko SUZUKI
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 212-230,307
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht institutionalised the rights of European Union citizens to vote in local elections in their country of residence. This paper describes the main characteristics of the concept of EU citizenship and analyses the way in which national and/or European identities affected the voting behaviour of non-French residents during the French local elections in March 2001.
    The introduction of these limited political rights within the EU established the notion of “multiple citizenship”, combining both the traditional idea of citizenship of a nation-state, and that of the new wider citizenship based on a multi-national agreement.
    The author takes the case of the March 2001 local elections, when some reluctance to extend voting rights to include all EU citizens residing in France became apparent amongst the French public, and political parties adopted different attitudes to the issue, in some cases even questioning the basic principle of giving foreigners the right to vote. The newly acquired rights of EU citizens were seen to have created unequal political status in the absence of similar rights for long-term residents in France from non-EU countries.
    It is important to note that majority of EU citizens in France who have obtained voting rights are from South European countries such as Portugal, Italy and Spain. This fact has drawn the attention of many political parties which had in fact encouraged those with South European nationalities, particularly Portuguese, to stand for the local election of March 2001. The paper argues that some political parties expected these candidates with South European nationalities to attract a large number of potential voters among EU citizens from South European countries.
    Another aspect covered by the paper concerns the various levels of identity—local, national and regional—reflected in the exercise of voting rights of EU expatriates, within a political system which recognizes the diversity of cultural origins of its electorate.
    Finally, the author suggests possible future means of achieving European integration and describes several incidents which illustrate the impact of the participation of non-French EU citizens in local elections.
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  • Hiromi UEDA
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 231-250,309
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper presents a legal study of employee participation in the European Company and the EU. Generally, companies are controlled by their shareholders and their employees remain outside of the decision making process of management. But in the European Community, employee participation has been fully discussed since 1970. In 1994, the directive of European Works Council (94/45/EC) was adopted. In October 2001, after a political agreement was reached in Nice, the regulation for the European Company (Societas Europaea, hereinafter “SE”) and the directive for employee involvement in the SE were finally both adopted. The first SEs will commence in 2004, which are expected to bring forth new developments with economic and social dimensions in the EU.
    This paper analyzes the nature of employee participation and its limits within the company structure, and then reviews its influence on the European integration.
    The first part of this paper explains the process of the harmonization of company law in the members states and the European Community. According to the new legislation, the structure of a SE shall not be prescribed by the 2157/2001 regulation, but shall depend on the Articles of Association of each SE. Employee participation in the administrative or supervisory organs of a SE shall not necessarily apply to all SEs established pursuant to the particular cases provided for under the 2001/86/EC directive.
    The second part explains the two directives on Works Council for the purposes of providing a vehicle for informing and consulting with employees. In particular, shortcomings of the 94/45/EC directive are pointed out such as the fact that consultation does not precede a management decision, and that information which is confidential or critical to a company is not subject to disclosure. However recently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has emphasized that the directive serves a useful purpose, as it touches upon the essence of the law of labor-management relations.
    In conclusion, this paper states that employee participation with its social costs is not easy to realize in an EU which is also facing a global trend that emphasizes profits, and that the introduction of such employee participation does not however mean that the corporate management. system has yet taken on a socialist form. Now, employee participation is an indispensable element in the competition between modern companies. From the view of company law, employee participation should have limits. However from the social dimension of the EU, employee participation is likely to be actively discussed together with “European-like Values” and the “Social Responsibility of Companies”.
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  • a case study of MTR
    Kimiko ISONO
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 251-277,311
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The purpose of this paper is to review the history of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, and then to examine the mid-term review (MTR) of Agenda 2000, which was published in July 2002 by European Commission as a part of the 1999 reforms.
    The objectives of the CAP were set up in the Treaty of Rome, Article 39 and the policy has been operated under Stresa principles: a single product market, so-called Community preference, and financial solidarity among the Member States.
    These objectives of the CAP have not been revised since they were set out in the Treaty of Rome, while the European Treaty has revised the Treaty of Rome, the Maastrich treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty. This reflects the fact that these objectives have been accepted while the operation of the CAP has posed many problems and has been begging for reform since early 70s.
    In the long history of reforms, the agreement on the MacSharry reforms of the CAP in 1992, implemented from 1993, marked the beginning of a new phase. Its basic aim was to decouple the income problem of EU agriculture from price policy which would be more oriented towards the efficient functioning of the agricultural market.
    An agreement was reached on Agenda 2000 at the Berlin European Council in March 1999. Agenda 2000 explicitly established economic, social, and environmental goals within a new reformulated set of objectives for the CAP. But indeed, seldom has a Commission proposal come through such a long and difficult negotiating process and remained so intact as these proposals on CAP reform. At that time the Commission severely miscalculated both the timing of its new attempt at CAP reform and the forces it could use. Then the Commission scheduled to review it again in detail in 2002.
    In July 2002 the new round of debate on CAP reform, the mid-term review (MTR) of the Agenda 2000, was launched by the EU farm Commissioner Franz Fischler. The first task of MTR is a stocktaking and improvement of the Agenda 2000 reform process.
    The basic and main proposal of MTR is decoupling of direct aids and establishment of a farm income payment. This payment will be based on historical payment adjusted to take into account the full implementation of Agenda 2000. In my paper, the basic idea of decoupling direct aids payment from production is criticized in that its outcome may be not decoupled, since the base their distribution upon historic yields and production entitlements.
    On the other hand, MTR instructed Member States to introduce an element of cross-compliance into farm policies, so that a farmer's direct aid payment would be paid in full if certain environmental criteria had been fulfilled. This means that the EU will want also to secure and maintain the Peace Clause on the next WTO round.
    In my perspective of the CAP reform thus far, EU has to apply the principle of subsidiarity to reforming process of the CAP more practically as it's political economics.
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  • Junko UEDA
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 278-283,313
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This review encompasses analytical propositions put forward by the book, entitled as above. The book is a collection of formidable papers presented at the Conference of European Association of Law and Economics held at the University of Corsica, France, in May 2000. Selected papers, all contributed by distinguished professors, who have shown marked scholarship in the field of law and economics throughout Europe, were considerably revised before being compiled in this book. “European law” is intended not only to be EU law as harmonized among the member states, but also among any country in Europe which has potential to be a member state, as well as national law of each European country.
    Whereas Europe has been a subject of economic analysis, European law itself has not been of great concern to economists. This book delves into this academic trend and refers to the usefulness of the economic tool of analysis, developed in law and economics. Examples of this usefulness are, among others, the rational actors' model in analyzing private individuals' behaviour, political economic considerations in rent-seeking by interest groups or Tiebout's model in competitive local authorities, as developed by the law and economics academia, which may be equally applicable to the EU or European processes of law-making and jurisprudence. Public choice theory in political economy is also of great value to the analysis of judicial actions paralleled with political actions in the member states. In any event, the main aim of this book is an exploration of the legislative and judicial framework of Europe towards the future, by using the above economic methods. Competition (natural selection) vs. harmonization, decentralization in the process of harmonization and centralization in the process of creation are subject to circumspect considerations from the context of evolution of EU or European law.
    The issues are presented in the order from general to specific, with the concluding part concerning a future integration of Europe. Although the likely economic analytic methods used in each issue are variable, the core and in-depth cognitive proposition is to canvass a view of desirable European integration, which could be justified through economic analysis.
    While allowing for a variety of economic methods depending upon each specific topic, this author's scepticism may arise as to whether economic methods used in each topic are appropriate. Whether marginal analysis, the mainstay of microeconomics, can be applicable when precise value of costs and benefits are not quantified (whether costs or benefits associated with ripple effects, opportunity costs or psychic benefits may be included, etc.); whether an ambiguous concept such as legal culture may be analyzed and expected from a perspective of market behaviour, although this author appraises an innovative attempt at juxtaposing legal culture within the borders with a concept of natural monopoly in order to justify the differentiation of legal culture among. the member states.
    The overall course of action, that arguments in the book suggest, and we may regard as its possible conclusion, imply the justification of retaining differences in the member states or, say, Europe. This is perfectly right as legal (i. e., legislative as well as judicial) integration of Europe has been directed more towards a socio-economic Europe than an economic union. The significance of the book is first to show and justify this direction of Europe from an economic perspective. However, any detail of analytic methodology should be re-evaluated as this is a crucial point which might completely undermine the concept of the book. Moreover, further refined discussions concerning other specific areas of law that the book does not address is necessary with a view to substantiating the maintenance of member states' or nation-state's autonomy in harmonizing European law.
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  • Hideaki TADA
    2003 Volume 2003 Issue 23 Pages 284-288,317
    Published: September 30, 2003
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    More and more mergers are reported nowadays in every sector of the economy all over the world. This trend has been strengthened as a result of the globalisation of the world economy. To cope with this phenomenon, competition authorities have been attempting to realise efficient and transparent merger control by amending their respective regulations or adopting guidelines thereto. This work timely produced by Professor Hiroko YAMANE at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) focuses on the merger control practices of the US, EU and Japan.
    In the introduction of the book, Professor Yamane emphasises the importance of “transparency” in merger control procedures with respect to the analysis and decision of cases and the analytical methods and criteria set up therefrom. According to the author, “transparency” under merger control regimes matters in (i) both substantial and procedural rules, (ii) the relationship between the competition authority and parties concerned in the decision-making process, and (iii) decisions of the competition authority. The author also mentions as analytical viewpoints economic reasonableness, usefulness to economic development, legal certainty, and expectations of the parties concerned.
    After analysing in depth US merger control practices in Chapter I, Professor Yamane subsequently addresses EU practices in Chapter II. In this chapter, the author highly praises the painstaking efforts made by the European Courts (the ECJ and CFI) and the European Commission in establishing a transparent merger control regime since the enforcement of the Merger Regulation in 1990. Contributions made by private parties (both the parties concerned and third parties) should not be underestimated in the above-mentioned process.
    In spite of the rapid growth of the Merger Regulation, however, the author lists several problems to be solved; (i) too much reliance by the Commission on the opinions of competitors in its decision-making, (ii) information exchange process between the Commission and the parties concerned, (iii) lengthy procedure in the CFI after a Commission decision, (iv) political intervention in the decision-making process, (v) improper use of information obtained by the Commission in its procedure, and other problems both in substantial and procedural aspects of the law (evaluation of economic theory, extra-territorial application of the Merger Regulation, etc.).
    Professor Yamane nevertheless insists that there is much to learn from the US and EU experiences in improving the merger control regime in Japan. The author appreciates in Chapter 4 the recent trends witnessed under Japanese Antimonopoly Law, such as the procedural amendment and the revision of the merger guideline by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). Even so, there remains the problem of transparency in the decision-making process because of the heavy reliance by the parties concerned on the informal pre-consultation procedure at the JFTC in which substantial decisions are made. The author thus casts doubts on the present practice when a transparent and open merger control regime is needed.
    This work including detailed analyses of US and EU merger cases is highly recommended to those who are interested in the merger control practices in the US and EU, as well as in the status quo and problems of the Japanese merger control regime. Lastly I need to make mention of the useful materials made by Mr. Syuya HAYASHI, lecturer at Kobe City University of Foreign Studies on US, Japanese and EU guidelines, and flowcharts on the merger control procedures in Germany, France, UK and Canada.
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