EU Studies in Japan
Online ISSN : 1884-2739
Print ISSN : 1884-3123
ISSN-L : 1884-3123
Volume 2002, Issue 22
Displaying 1-17 of 17 articles from this issue
  • Tamio NAKAMURA
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 1-28,349
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper presents an assessment of the Nice Treaty from the perspective of a European civic society in the making. The paper consists of two parts. The first part traces the overall change of emphasis by the Member States in making EU polity during three Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. Broadly speaking, more emphasis is now being put at a European level on creating a civic society rather than just an economic market: there is a quest for more “democratic” decision-making, creating an area of “freedom, security and justice”, proclaiming an EU “charter of fundamental rights”, and developing a European security and defence policy. The same change of emphasis is also traceable, I would argue, in the case-law made by the European Court of justice in the 1990s: European citizens' role in making their civic society at a European level is becoming more evident.
    The second part of this paper will assess the new institutional arrangements as a result of the Nice Treaty in the light of the civic shift by the EU polity. Though the paper takes note of several positive achievements in EU institutional reform under the Nice Treaty, it is pointed out that the Nice Summit failed to tackle new problems which have grown from the civic change of emphasis in EU governance: in particular the decision-making process at the Council is still on a (mainly economic) sector-by-sector basis, and this method cannot adequately meet trans-sector (“horizontal”) complex issues which are arising more frequently, even in the traditional field of market regulation, such as trade and environment protection, and development and regulation of biotechnology products. The paper suggests that the agenda for a new IGC scheduled for 2004 should include the reform of the decision-making method by sector based Councils, which might entail consolidation of some sectoral Councils to establish a few major “horizontal” Councils.
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  • Yoshikatsu Washie
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 29-55,351
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In December 2000, the Nice European Council agreed on a new treaty for the EU: the Treaty of Nice. The treaty was signed in February 2001 and is in the process of being ratified by the 15 member states of the EU. The treaty concerns institutional adaptation of the EU for enlargement within a few years.
    This article analyze the reforms in the Treaty of Nice, in particular, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the decision-making system of the EU.
    1) The European Parliament
    The number of MEPs (Member of the European Parliament) of existing member states will be reduced at next election of the European Parliament in 2004. 302 seats are to be allocated to new member states.
    2) The Council of Ministers
    The treaty re-allocates the voting strength of individual existing member states and new member states in the Council of Ministers. Two qualified majority thresholds are to be introduced. The new qualified majority requires assent of at least 62% of the total population of the EU and a majority of the members.
    3) The European Commission
    The Treaty of Nice amends the appointment procedure of the Commission. The nominee President is to be chosen by the Council (composed of Heads of State or Government) by a qualified majority. The list of other members of the Commission is to be adopted by the nominee-President and the Council, acting by a qualified majority. The Commission is to be appointed by the Council by a qualified majority.
    The composition of the Commission is also to be amended. If there are fewer than 27 member states, the composition of the new Commission from 2005 will have the same number of member states. When the EU consists of 27 member states, the number in the Commission is to be less than the number of member states. Membership in the Commission will be by rotation.
    The treaty of Nice also reinforces the powers of the Commission President by amending article. 217.
    4) Decision-making
    The qualified majority voting of the Council and the co-decision procedure are to be extended to new areas. But those areas needing the unanimity of the Council still remain.
    This Treaty represents the largest possible modification within the existing EU framework. However, the EU also is in need of fundamental institutional reform.
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  • Nao YAMAMOTO
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 56-77,353
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The European Union has regarded the concept of “democratic principles” as important, which includes human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The purpose of this article is to examine the implication of these principles from the point of view of political conditionality.
    The typical form of the EU conditionality was the inclusion of “essential element clause” and so-called “non-compliance clause” in some agreements between the European Community and the third countries. The formulation of conditionality in this line has developed after the mid-1990's. First, these two clauses were more universally included. Second, the concept of “good governance” has been linked with the non- compliance clause in the new agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACPs). Third, various external assistant programmes under the Community have become conditional.
    In parallel with these trends, the EU has become a global actor in the field of democratic principles. Acceptance of qualified majority voting in the internal procedure of the Community made the non-compliance clause more applicable. This led unific sanctions at EU level in the case of some ACP countries. On the relation to neighboring countries, the strict political conditions have been established, especially in the context of enlargement policy toward Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In addition, the sharing of image of the democratic principles among the Member States through some effort to define them shall increase the actorness of the EU.
    While the conditionality toward the third countries has been strengthened, there is any possibility of “internal” conditionality for the Member States. It seems unclear whether suspension clause of Article 7 TEU introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty is applicable, although new Article 7 (1) TEU by the Nice Treaty will provide some opportunity that EU concludes a risk of breach by a Member State of democratic principles.
    The powers which relate to the conditionality have been transfered from the Member States to the EC/EU level not only in the foreign policy but also in the internal one.
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  • from the Lomé Convention to the Cotonou Agreement
    Keiichi MAEDA
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 78-95,355
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Since 1990s, EU Development policy has changed dynamically and I have mentioned its trends as the changed character of EU Development policy.
    Article 130u of TITLE XVII, Treaty on European Union is described as follows,
    “1. Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster:
    —the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particulary the most disadvantaged among them;
    —the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
    —the campaign against poverty in the developing countries”
    It should be noted that the Article 130u had changed the former character of EU Development policy. Attention focused on the following 7 points: (i) Not only ex-colonies but also developing countries in general will be objectives by EU Development policy; (ii) then, EU Development policy for ACP has a dual character that it is targeting both ex-colonies and developing countries in general; (iii) EU Development policy is far from the common Development policy, because Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation shall be complementary to the bilateral policies by the Member States; (iv) the above three development objectives are all related with the so-called poverty problems, there is a possibility that it will be divide the ACP countries into LDCs and non-LDCs; (v) the political conditionality means that EU has get the chance to intervene in the domestic problems of recipient countries; (vi) it stresses that “the gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy”, the inclusion of EU-ACP trade into WTO system; (vii) the Complementarity, Coherence, Co-ordinance are noted to improve the efficiency of EU Development policy.
    On 23 June 2000, the Cotonou Agreement has signed. And ACP countries had admitted the agreement and REPAs (Regional Economic Partnership Arrangements) that there are a serious problems and unclear matters regarding to the future trading systems of EU-ACP. The Concrete contents of individual arrangements have been not yet clear, and we can see the scheduled FTA plan and foresee the division of ACP countries at this moment. So, we have to say the Agreement will lead the era from the non-reciprocal system to the reciprocal system of trade. Thus, the conclusion of FTA between EU and developing countries (ACP sub-regional groups) under the Agreement will show us that EU could take a chance to form a new kind of the influence towards developing countries.
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  • Senior Fellow Centre for European Policy Studies BRUSSELS
    Malcolm ANDERSON
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 96-106,357
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Two straightforward questions are posed in this article—does nationalism pose a problem for the European Union? Does the EU undermine nationalism? Like many basic questions in politics, it is easy to formulate the questions and very difficult to answer them. Disagreements are inevitable about the answers and plausible objections may be made to all of them.
    It is not possible to envisage, in the foreseeable future, a Europe in which nationalism is eradicated. Until some equally powerful political doctrine or belief emerges, the preservation of democratic institutions probably requires that basic loyalty to the nation and nation state should not be seriously undermined. But in certain areas of policy, nationalism represents a problem for the European Union, a problem which will probably become more difficult in an enlarged EU. More generally, it represents a latent threat to the cohesion of the Union.
    The article is organized in four sections: first, a brief introduction to nationalism, nations and national identity; second, an assessment of the importance of nationalism in contemporary European politics; third, a view on the controversy about whether European integration poses a threat to the European nations; and finally the implications for the EU of the persistence of nationalism.
    In conclusion, the result of the persistence of nationalism is that the “permissive consensus” supporting European integration has disappeared. Any democratic consultation on important additional powers to EU institutions will be highly controversial and the result uncertain. It is also clear that the European Union cannot, in its final form, be modelled on the nation state, even if there may be a certain superficial resemblance in the symbolism-with an EU flag, anthem, constitution, currency, etc. The emotionally charged identification of individuals with a language and a history, a nation and a state cannot be replicated at the European level. This does not, however, justify pessimism about the future of the European Union.
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  • Yumiko NAKANISHI
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 107-131,359
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper examines provisions regarding enhanced cooperation in the Treaty of the European Union and that of the European Community after Nice.
    The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced institutional enhanced cooperation into the above Treaties. Enhanced cooperation is a kind of flexible or differentiated integration. Some of the Member States can advance further through applying provisions on enhanced cooperation. But these provisions have not yet been applied. Therefore the Treaty of Nice, which has not yet been ratified by all the Member States, will modify these provisions, so that the Member States will be able to apply them more easily.
    There are surely many good articles available about flexible or differentiated integration in the EU. However there are as yet few analyses from a legal perspective. In this paper I intend to clarify how new provisions on enhanced cooperation could thus be interpreted.
    In the first section, this paper outlines the new provisions on enhanced cooperation in the Treaties in three parts. The focus is on differences between the old and new provisions under first, second and third pillar of the EU. The first part makes clear under what conditions some of the Member States can establish an enhanced cooperation. The second one explains what procedures the enhanced cooperation should follow. The third part explains how other Member States can participate at a later stage in the established enhanced cooperation.
    In the second section, this paper deals with five potential problems when the enhanced cooperation is implemented. The first problem is how an enhanced cooperation will be implemented. The second one is what characteristics the acts and decisions necessary for the implementations of enhanced cooperation have. The third refers to what forms of those acts and decisions could take. Fourth, this paper considers the relationship between those on one hand and the EC acts on the other hand. Lastly this paper discusses the supremacy of those acts and decisions compared to the law of the concerned Member States.
    In conclusion, using the results from the first and second sections, I would try to evaluate the new provisions on enhanced cooperation in the treaties from two points. Firstly, this paper considers, if the new provisions could evade any free enhanced cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties. Secondly, it discusses, whether a dilution of the EU could emerge.
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  • Kazuto SUZUKI
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 132-157,361
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    European space policy has been dealt by European Space Agency (ESA) rather than EU framework. However, since the latter half of 1990s, the European Union became more involved in the making of space policy for Europe. This article examines the importance of current approximation of institutional relationship between ESA and EU. In doing so, this paper introduces the “policy logic” approach as the analytical framework and discusses its application to the analysis of European space policy, and then focuses on the historical accumulation of institutional differences of the two organizations and the difficulties of creating new system of cooperation through the formulation process of the “European Strategy for Space (ESS)” and Galileo project.
    In the first phase of institutional development, European space development was separated from EEC/Euratom framework for three reasons: experience of founding fathers in the establishment of intergovernmental organization, CERN; strategic importance of space activities; and the membership of the most advanced country in Europe, Britain. The institutional characteristics of ESA can be described in two aspects the optional participation and the principle of juste retour. These two characteristics give wider freedom for member states in participating and contributing to the space programs. In other words, member states can choose programs according to their policy logics.
    However, since 1988, European Commission became interested in taking some responsibilities in European space policy because of its involvement in R & D activities. In the early 1990s, European Commission made many attempts to increase its influence on space programs but these efforts were not effective because it challenged the “logic of technology” on which ESA has concentrated. Then the Commission aimed to promote the “logic of commerce” through fostering applications and space market.
    This change initiated the new development of institutional affiliation of ESA and EU. The paramount moment was to adopt the ESS document in 2000. This document focuses on the logics of technology, commerce and military of which both organizations could contribute jointly. The Galileo program which associated the ESS was also decided in 2000 ESA and EU Councils, however, the program contains variety of difficult questions. Firstly it is the relationship with the US, which aims to monopolize the GPS system; secondly, the question of security issues where many member states were quite sensitive in dealing with; thirdly, the question of finance; and finally, the institutional difference between ESA and EU.
    Through the analysis of historical development of European space policy and the ESS/Galileo issues, this paper concludes that the approximation of institutional relationship between ESA and EU would not result the integration of the two organizations in near future. Member states would prefer to maintain the ESA institutional arrangement in order to secure the implementation of their policy logics, and even if space policy is included in the EU policy area, the policy making system will remain as it is in ESA.
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  • Mitsuo MIYAMOTO
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 158-184,363
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Quo vadis Europa? This is the very question that has always been posed in the history of European integration when confronted with an enlargement, and each time the answer was not given, or vague, if any. One held back from making a blueprint of future Europe, concentrating on immediately necessary minimal reforms, which was tolerated and justified from a viewpoint of the “Monnet method”. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, putting forward a concept of “European Federation” at the Humboldt University on 12 May 2000, took the initiative in making public his stand on the finality of European integration, and caused other leading political figures to likewise present their thoughts on the future shape of Europe. This article, by analysing German, French, and British governments' positions on the EU's future, makes a study of a possible new turn of the integration process, and in consequence a change in EU-Nation States relations in the medium and long term.
    The key to the future is: to deepen the integration is considered to be indispensable for Europe's coping with new situations since the Cold War ended, especially the globalization. French president Chirac's move towards an avant-garde “pioneer group” and a European Constitution as well as Fischer's “Federation” is not a mere vision, but a realistic answer to the challenges of the times. Although French leaders including Chirac persist in the sovereignty and prefer intergovernmental methods, they nowadays are ready to accept the necessary restrictions on the sovereign state's freedom and start again the “franco-german motor”. Germany and France are determined to construct the strong and autonomous Europe enough to be a major player in the world, both economically and politically. In the future, it would be possible for the CFSP to be really communitised, and the social and economic policy as well. In that case, the EU itself would strengthen independence from the Nation States and become more sovereign, and inversely be curbed and limited the state sovereignty. It would thus be established a “Federation of the Nation States”.
    The problem to be solved is: whether the British nation could be identified with Continental ones and fitted for deepening on the one hand, and whether an integrative balance of power in the European Union could be kept not only between the large and the small, but also among the large Member states on the other. There would be a probability of an differentiated integration, according to circumstances. Even French foreign minister Hubert Védrine, who doesn't favour an idea of forming a “core group”, is going to resort to that and go ahead, unless at the Intergovernmental conference in 2004 one could agree about a substantial progress towards deepening, that is, a political union.
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  • Taketo FUKUDA
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 185-205,365
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Since the beginning, the SNP's European policy has swung between pro-and anti-Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine why this waver happened focusing on the party elite's initiatives and political context surrounding its European policy, and to make it clear what kind of influence the party's arguments on Europe has had over the party's definition of sovereignty.
    The SNP's European policy started as a pro-European one after the Second World War. The policy was based on the assumption that the European integration was not federal but confederal process and it would function as a “safe-guard for small nations.”
    In 1960s, political context surrounding the party's European policy changed. In the party, fundamentalists, who strive for “whole sovereignty” for Scotland, gained power. The fact that European integration progressed beyond people's prospect showed its federal dynamism to the party. In addition, Britain's accession to the European integration was approaching. Because of these changes, the SNP's assumption that the European integration was confederal came to be seen suspicious. In this situation, William Wolfe, who was the Chairman of the SNP and a fundamentalist himself, came to regard the integration process as federal one and steered the party in the direction to anti-Europe.
    In 1983, the SNP returned to pro-European tenet. This is because of the elite's initiative and changes of the political context again. The party's hostility to the European integration decreased because of pragmatists, who had a more moderate attitude to Europe, taking the party's control form fundamentalists. Scotland's antagonism to Mrs. Thatcher also highlighted the importance of the EC as a substitute for British government. Furthermore, Winnie Ewing MEP showed, through her efforts to secure Scottish interests in the EP, that the EC could be a provider of socio-economic policies to maintain and improve Scottish society and economy.
    In 1988, Jim Sillars, Vice-Chairman, put forward the SNP's flagship policy “Independence in Europe”, which had two aspects: carrot and stick. The benefit is to make independence more realistic option by using Europe as a framework of independence. The cost is to accept federal elements in the European integration and to abandon the concept of “whole sovereignty” in stead of accepting Scotland's accession to the EC. His attempt succeeded in the former but failed in the latter because of the fundamentalists' opposition. Thereafter, the party's executives have been in a dilemma because while “Independence without Europe” is no longer realistic, hasty redefinition of sovereignty and the European integration would bring about a split in the party. Again, SNP requires its elites' initiative to overcome this dilemma.
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  • Hitoshi SUZUKI
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 206-234,367
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The eEurope Initiative and eEurope2002 Action Plan were launched by the European Commission in 1999-2000 to bring Europe on-line. The objective of eEurope is to accelerate the development of the Information Society. The internet penetration in Europe will be growing rapidly in the near future.
    The growth of the internet use is restricted by the level of tariffs acces-sing the telecommunication infrastructures and the related services. Therefore, the liberalization of telecommunications to increase competition and reduce prices was very important for making the base of the Europe's Information Society and Europe's New Economy, so called, eEurope.
    The liberalization of telecommunications in Europe was started by the European Commission in 1987 with a publication of the Green Paper on the development of the common market for communications services and equipment. The telecommunications regulatory process was expanded by the European Commission. At last, the telecommunications markets were fully liberalized in Europe from 1998.
    We should consider that the telecommunications regulatory process was as part of the wider process of the economic integration and Information Society Initiative of Europe. The White Paper on “Growth, Competitiveness and Employment” in 1993 and the Bangeman report in 1994 were published by the Commission. Both reports made reference to Information Society and placed the telecommunications liberalization policy at the heart of the EU's general policy. The result of the development of digital technology, or the digital revolution, has brought about the convergence of the telecommunication, media and information technology sectors. This convergence is discussed from the view of an approaching the Information Society in Europe.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the progress of the European Information Society and the development of the eEurope from the following points of view.
    First, we emphasize that the regulatory process for the liberalization of telecommunications and the advancement of the Information Society were dependent on one another in European Union. Second, we examine the contents and the structure on the eEurope 2002 Action Plan.
    Third, we examine that the widening of the productivity gap from the rapid growth of labour productivity in the US and the slow growth in the EU since the mid-1990s was determined by the less development of technological progress and the low investment of the information technology in the EU.
    Fourth, we stress that the internet penetration will grow fast and then ICT (information and communication technology) expenditure and investment will rise in Europe to become the knowledge-based society in 2010. Because the eEurope Action Plan is build to force benchmarking method to achieve the targets of eEurope and it will continue to function as a rolling action plan after 2002.
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  • Ken-ichi ANDO
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 235-259,369
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The EU integration has been partly motivated by its own weakness in the world economy, while the rest of the world worries about the protectionism tendency in the EU. Because of this the previous research tends to study the comparative disadvantage sector more than the comparative advantage sector. On the other hand, this paper analyses the integration in the pharmaceutical industry, which is one of the comparative advantage sectors of the EU with the large and expanding trade surplus, so that we could fill the gap of the present research.
    This paper makes clear three interesting points. First is the asymmetrical feature of the EU integration. The EU integrates the new drug marketing authorisation procedure through the mutual recognition and the centralised system. However, the regulatory and natural obstacles against the pharmaceutical market unity still remain.
    Second point is the strategic nature of the EU integration. With its own success of the pharmaceutical market integration, the EU actively takes the initiative for the development of the international conference of the harmonisation (ICH), which harmonise the marketing authorisation procedure among the EU, the USA and Japan. The ICH makes the EU enter Japanese market more easily than otherwise.
    The third point is the lighting-up effect of the others' weakness and problem by the EU integration. The ICH accelerates of Japanese pharmaceutical companies to conduct the clinical tests in the EU and the USA, but this illustrates the “howling-out” of the clinical tests in Japan.
    Thus, the analysis of this paper gives us the unique and interesting basis for the study on the regional economic integration.
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  • Hisashi WATANABE
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 260-282,371
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    As enlargement and deepening of the EU integration go on, the functions of the borders in Europe are gradually changing. Rapid increase of organizations for cross-border, interregional and transnational cooperation for the last decade shows clearly this new regional dynamics, which brings about a few questions: Is the dividing effect of the border on the economic sphere possively not overestimated, especially in the internal border regions of the EU? and how does the double structure of the border of a federal state effect on cross-border regional cooperation?
    First, on the one hand INTERREG for the internal border regions of the EU aims to remove the structural gap between core area and periphery within a nation, because there is not such deep gap in living standard between neighboring border regions as between both sides of an external border of the EU. In so far as this is the case, only removal of the dividing effect of the economic border is considered as the primary aim of INTERREG for the internal border regions. On the other hand the aim of Euregios is, just as illustrated by the activities of the Mozer Committee of EUREGIO, to remove the barriers in all dimensions of social life for true reconciliation and coexistence of Dutch-German neighboring inhabitants. In this meaning the removal of the border itself as “scar of history” is maybe considered as the end purpose of Euregios. Consequently there is a certain discrepancy in the understanding of the border between Euregios and INTERREG.
    Secondly, the operational programs of INTERREG I and II were carried out in accordance with each special agreement under the actors. On this occasion the both states (Länder) of Germany, Northrhine-Westfalia (NRW) and Lower Saxony (Nds) along with the Netherlands play supervisory role for the five Euregios on the Dutch-German border. Furthermore the co-finacing amount of the states in the section “space structure” of INTERREG II for EUREGIO exceeded that of the EU fincing and reached 48%, by far over the share limit of 30%. It suggests that the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany fuction at first as those of the states, not of the Federation. Maybe it is an example of the general understanding in Germany that the substantial unit of regions should be state, namely NUTS 1-level in the postulate of “Europe of the Regions”. On the other hand each Euregio endeavors to integrate the both sides of the border de facto into one unit, which will converge rather on NUTS 2-level. A certain tension may lurk, therefore, in understanding of “Europe of the Regions” between the German states as territorial governmental units and Euregios as organizations for cross-border cooperation.
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  • The Politics of Commitment, 1988-1989
    Michito TSURUOKA
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 283-312,373
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In January 1999, the biggest project in the history of European integration, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), was realized and a dream of having a single European currency finally came true. The achievement of it was neither foreordained nor just a logical consequence of market integration in the EC. It was rather a project highly political in nature.
    This article tries to explain the significant initial phases of the political process to create a European single currency from the early 1988 to the end of 1989. In January and February 1988, some proposals for a monetary union in the EC were aired by the French, Italian, and German ministers, which were, however, rather vague in content and proposed mainly as political balloons at the time. But two years later in Strasbourg in December 1989, the leaders of the European Communities came to the agreement to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to draw a new treaty on EMU, which was to begin its work by the end of 1990. Why and in what ways was such a great leap from just a vague balloon to the concrete agreement to revise a treaty made possible during this relatively brief period of less than two years? What has changed the nature of the EMU discussions?
    The main line of argument is as follows. When some calls for EMU notably the Balladur Memorandum were tabled and the discussions on its possibility became lively in the early 1988, there was no political commitment to the realization of EMU at all. Though the subsequent decision in Hanover in June that year to create a so-called Delors Committee on the study of EMU, and the approval of the Committee's report at the Madrid European Council meeting in June 1989 were of course significant steps forward, they by no means determined or ensured the way to the single currency. In fact, the Madrid summit failed to set a date to convene the IGC to make a new treaty on EMU. We had to wait six more months to have a concrete political commitment to EMU from Paris and Bonn, the two most significant actors on this issue. And the decision at the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 to start an IGC by the end of 1990 made the road to EMU irreversible. Leading up to the Strasbourg agreement, the ever-accelerating upheavals in the Communist countries in the East, the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, and the ensuing acceleration of the issue of German unification all played the significant role of stimulating the emergence of the political commitment to EMU.
    The situation under which the issue of EMU was discussed thus went through a radical change, which inevitably influenced the positions and perceptions of the actors. As the political commitment particularly by France and West Germany emerged in the fall of 1989, the road to EMU became irreversible, which was a great leap from the situation of two years earlier.
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  • Ritsuko SAOTOME
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 313-331,375
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This article focuses on anti-EU tendency of Swedish women and tries to examine it from a viewpoint of political preferences. The aim of this study is to investigate reasons of Swedish women's strong anti-EU tendency.
    In the referendum concerning Swedish EU membership in 1994, a majority voted “yes” and Sweden decided to become an EU member. However, support for EU membership has been weak in public opinion in Sweden. Since the early 1990s, percentage of “against” the EU has been higher than “for” in almost all opinion researches. Especially, Swedish women tend to be against the EU. Even in the referendum, a majority of women voted “no”, though a majority of men was “yes”. This disparity still continues according to opinion surveys. It is noteworthy of notice that women's percentage of “against” is always higher than men's one in almost all the socioeconomic categories. Opinion surveys on Swedish EMU membership show the same gender difference.
    This gender gap is supposed to relate to general political preferences. Women's political preferences changed in the 1980s. Swedish women turned leftish and became environmentally conscious. They pay much more attention to social and environmental issues than men do. Thus women have strong tendency to chose and support political parties concerning social security, family, education, and environment as important policy areas.
    Swedish women's support and evaluation on political parties relate to political parties' EU policy. Political parties that have high percentage of women's supporter take anti-EU policy and women rate that policy highly. In contrast, many women who support parties that take pro-EU policy give low evaluation on parties' policy. Anti-EU political parties emphasize negative influences of the EU on social issue, environment, and gender equality in Sweden.
    From a viewpoint of political preferences, Swedish women's main reasons to stand against the EU are fear and anxiety about social security, employment in public sector, environment, and gender equality. Women concern about retreat of policies in these issues by being an EU member. However, there is a possibility that Swedish women's anti-EU tendency makes the EU pay attention to social, environmental, and gender policies that have not enough developed at the EU level yet.
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  • Yoshio OHARA
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 332-336,377
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence has hosted Annual EC Competition Law and Policy Workshop since 1996. Its fifth edition held on 2-3 June 2000 was devoted to the ongoing debate about the modernization of EC antitrust law enforcement. This publication includes a transcript of the discussions and a collection of the writings submitted by 33 participants at the Workshop. The Workshop concentrated on issues which the European Commission's White Paper for decentralizing enforcement of Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty and ensuing discussions identified as particularly problematical and controversial. Proceedings were divided into following three sessions. Panel One was devoted to the three aspects of the reform such as its compatibility with the EC Treaty, its effects on the efficiency of EC anti-cartel enforcement, and its consequences for undertakings interested in legal security. Panel Two focused on risks that the reform entails for the coherent application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty. Panel Three concentrated on specific problems that the reform will generate for national judges who will become responsible for interpretation and application of Article 81 (3).
    The centralization of exemption power under Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty in the hands of the Commission and corresponding notification requirements have raised various problems in enforcement. The Commission has never succeeded to manage its exemption monopoly. The debate on subsidiarity stimulated requests for abolition of the Commission's exemption monopoly in favor of national competition authorities (NCAs). Increase in the number of agents entrusted with the implementation of Article 81 (3) will lead to divergences in its interpretation and application. Some participants fear divergent decisions because of overlapping responsibilities of NCAs, the limited territorial effect of NCA decisions, multiple jurisdictions and forum shopping by private parties. The Commission suggests relying on two broad principles to minimize the risks resulting from radical decentralization of application of Article 81 (3). The first is co-operation within network of enforcement agencies formed by the Commission and the NCAs. The second is the principle of supremacy of EC law over national law. The risks of divergent decisions would be reduced if cases were attributed within the network of enforcement agencies, according to clear and transparent criteria. The Commission's intervention into cases pending before NCAs raise problems under principle of subsidiarity. The White Paper mainly concentrates on vertical co-operation between the Commission and NCAs. It hardly discusses horizontal co-operation among NCAs themselves. However, such horizontal co-operation is indispensable to efficient functioning of the network of enforcement agencies within the EU. The extent to which Article 81 pre-empts the application of national antitrust law is important for the possible reach of such national law in a new situation.
    The majority of participants expressed their overall support for the Commission's reform suggestion while critical remarks were also uttered. Thus, the Workshop was a contribution on long march to a new, modernized and more efficient enforcement system of EC antitrust law.
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  • Soko TANAKA
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 337-341,379
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The book is said an intermediate level text which has been carefully designed to appeal to a wide range of students studying economic integration as part of an economics, law, business or public administration. But this book is not merely a textbook, but a research work with highly qualified analysis. Written by one of the Europe's leading analysts of the European Union, the book combines economic analysis with a detailed knowledge of the integration methods employed in the EU for about fifty years. Readers can comprehensively understand logic, reality and history of the economic integration of the European Union. Economic analysis develops with pictures and graphs without making use of highly mathematical models. In order to bridge the gap between theory and policy practice, 37 columns for case study are proposed.
    The book consists of four parts: “Foundation, ” “Internal market, ” “Common Policies, ” and “Equity, Stabilisation and Extension”. In part 1, the author explains all about European Integration: definition of economic integration, its history, developing economic constitution of the EU and economics of subsidiarity. In part 2, analysis of integration is proposed in five chapters on product market from the customs union to the present single market, services market and factor market and special attention is paid to the internal market of network industries in chapter 8. In part 3, the CAP, competition policy, common trade policy and industrial policy are analyzed. In part 4, equity for the Union, European macro-economic cooperation, EMU and pan-European economic integration of today are explained in detail.
    The author is a committee member of the WRR (think-tank under the Dutch prime minister) and the dean of economics department in College of Europe in Bruges. He is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. He is an expert in the European Integration, since he has been involved as a researcher and a policy maker in the Integration for a long time. This book will surely help pull up the level of research activity on the European Integration in Japan. A Japanese version of the second edition will appear in spring next year.
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  • Etsuko NAKANO
    2002 Volume 2002 Issue 22 Pages 342-347,381
    Published: September 30, 2002
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Simon Nuttall, Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, attempts to describe the events surrounding development of the European Foreign Policy from 1987 to 1994 from an historical perspective. Nuttall notes that the duty of an historian is “to paint a picture of the past in order to make it comprehensible”, and highlights that the aims of this book are to explain why such events occurred and to place the debate in wider political context. This book is a follow-up to his previous publication European Political Council in 1992, in which he also attempts to note the rule of an historian.
    Interestingly enough, he emphasizes “the duty of an historian” in studying European Foreign Policy. Nuttall describes the events of European Foreign Policy and orients the narratives of them as well as “interpretive historical sociologists”, noted by Theda Skocpol. Recently only a few works on the European Union have been written from an historical perspective. Therefore his method as an “historian” makes his work very attractive.
    Furthermore, Nuttall effectively stresses the theme of his book itself, his description and his assessment of the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the EU.
    Nuttall discusses the foreign policy and security dimension of European Integration. According to Simon Duke, Associate Professor at the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, recently quite a number of studies on European Integration have been concentrating on institutional aspects and theoretical discussions of the EU and detailed case studies on relations between Europe and non-European countries. These studies have been recognized as main stream in the academic context. Therefore, his work is a notable exception.
    Secondly, when reading this book, one can capture the feeling of those who faced in such events. For instance, Nuttall writes on the process in which the draft on the CFSP changed, and how it was influenced by the Gulf War and the conflict of Yugoslavia. As one notes the process in making the CFSP with such events for background-reading as seen by the media, his description becomes much more lively.
    Finally, Nuttall observes the extent to which the new CFSP differs from the old EPC, even though most academics argue it has not changed so much. Although this observation is not the main theme of this book, it is nevertheless very interesting.
    Nuttall's work is undoubtedly unique and interesting. One may read the offstage and negotiation of the further development of European Foreign Policy in his next book.
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