EU Studies in Japan
Online ISSN : 1884-2739
Print ISSN : 1884-3123
ISSN-L : 1884-3123
Volume 2000, Issue 20
Displaying 1-12 of 12 articles from this issue
  • Norio KOMURO
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 1-40,329
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The banana dispute merits attention in that it was dealt with on three levels: the GATT/WTO, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and EC Member States' courts. Because the EC banana import regime discriminated against Latin America bananas to protect ACP bananas, and favored traders of traditional ACP/EC bananas over those of Latin America bananas, it was found by GATT/WTO panels to be inconsistent with GATT/WTO rules. In contrast, the ECJ rejected legal challenges against the EC regime. The author reviewed the banana dispute before the GATT/WTO, the ECJ and national courts to compare each judicial control over the EC trade measure.
    The author's conclusion can be summarized as follows:
    1. Impact of the WTO on the EC Trade Policy
    The banana dispute demonstrated the extent to which the EC trade policy is subject to the WTO adjudicative control. First, the EC could not block the adoption, by the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), of panel and appellate body reports that found the WTO-inconsistency of the EC banana regime. Second, the implementation of the DSB recommendation by the EC was kept under strict surveillance. Third, in the absence of compliance with the DSB recommendation, the DSB authorized the United States to take retaliation against the EC. The WTO dispute settlement procedure therefore proved itself effective to pursue a major country's trade measure inconsistent with the WTO.
    2. Passivity of the ECJ
    In contrast with the GATT/WTO panels, the ECJ confirmed the EC banana regime. In Germany v. Council, the ECJ rejected the German arguments that the banana regime was void because of the breach of fundamental rights, general principles of law and GATT rules. With regard to the plea of the breach of the GATT, the ECJ held that the German Government could not invoke the breach of the GATT to challenge the legality of the banana regime.
    The ECJ remains passive in dealing with a question of whether the WTO rules have direct effect. If the ECJ continues to deny the direct effect of the WTO rules without giving sufficient reasoning, it would be criticized for maintaining the deni de justice. In addition, the ECJ's insufficient judicial control over the EC trade measure would make realize the threat expressed by the so-called Maastricht judgement.
    3. Threat of the Maastricht Judgement
    The German Constitutional Court in its Maastricht judgement claimed power to supervise whether the EC law protects the essentials of the fundamental rights to a degree which is comparable with the German Constitution. As the banana regime is suspicious to infringe fundamental property rights under Article 14 of the German Basic law, German courts would be confronted with a question of whether the EC banana regulation protects the essentials of the fundamental rights. Consequently, the ECJ's passivity could lead to a serious conflict between the ECJ and the German Constitutional Court, and thereby endanger the principle of primacy of EC law over national laws.
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  • Margarete SAWADA
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 41-71,331
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper advocates the transformation of EU/US politico-economic relations into a consolidated, integrated New Transatlantic Partnership. The centrepiece of the transformed relationship would be a completed New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM) outlined by the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and taking shape under the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP).
    Completion of the emerging NTM requires four major measures: 1. removal of regulatory obstacles to trade in goods; 2. a free market in services; 3. complete liberalisation of government procurement; 4. abolition of all remaining industrial tariffs. The main hurdle are regulatory barriers. Their removal involves politically sensitive domestic policy issues. To achieve a breakthrough replacement of the hitherto applied MRA-approach by the ‘once approved, accepted everywhere’ principle is deemed necessary. Instead of the bottom-up, building-block approach a top-down, overarching agreement is being called for. A completed NTM would be flanked by and closely interlinked with the ‘foreign policy’ and the ‘home affairs’ components of the NTA.
    A New Transatlantic Partnership seems feasible because EU/US political-economic relations have already evolved over time into an almost equal partnership due to steady US support for European integration, a new holistic concept of security, geopolitical change in Eastern Europe, and a strong communality unparalleled in other international relations.
    EU/US politico-economic relations constitute the most important relationship in the world today and are crucial in solving global problems. A viable and stable international system can only be maintained through ‘ever closer cooperation’ between the EU and the US. As all measures taken to transform EU/US relations would be WTO compatible, the global trading system only stands to benefit from a more integrated, strengthened New Transatlantic Partnership.
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  • An institutional analysis of comitology
    Machiko HACHIYA
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 72-90,333
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This article analyzes a committee procedure as a part of decision-making mechanism of implementation measures within the EU. It is called “comitology”.
    Three types of committees (Advisory, Management, Regulatory) are formed in order to express opinions on the relevant Commission proposal of an implementation measure, each committee composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by a Commission representative.
    “Comitology” first appeared at the launch of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1962 as an ad hoc measure, brought in as a result of the structural necessity of the EEC that foresaw a need for systemic cooperation between the European and national levels when implementing policies. It has gradually spread to other fields where the implementation power was conferred from the Council on the Commission.
    “Comitology” has provoked questions about its legitimacy because of the lack of democratic control, and about the meaning of the delegated power in relation to the institutional balance (division of power) in the EU. The former was symbolized by the exclusion of the European Parliament from the procedures, the latter by the fact that in case of a negative or no opinion of a regulatory committee, the final decision was to be taken by the Council.
    The recent Council Decision of 28 June 1999 on comitology intended to resolve some of these problems. The EP was given the legal right to express an opinion, committees are now to publish annual reports, criteria for the choice of a committee were set up, and legislative and executive powers were clarified through the simplification of procedures. These changes may not be much more than a realignment of the status quo. However, expert groups representing various sections of the public have been created along with comitology committees in the RTD field. The combined qualification as “experts” of officials and members of the public may give a certain type of legitimacy to the EU as an emerging new polity.
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  • Emil J. KIRCHNER, James SPERLING
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 91-132,335
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The interests that Asia and Europe share in common have been largely mediated by the United States. The regional parochialism of both the leading European and Asian states makes trilateral solutions to common problems difficult to forge and sustain. Despite the fluidity of the post cold war international system, it is increasingly viewed as organisable, its constituent actors are viewed as interdependent, and the benefits of cooperation are judged to outweigh its costs. This shift in orientation has been driven by the changes in the content of security as well as the security dilemma itself: states must adopt a broad, systematic definition of security, rather than the narrowly egotistic definition of security that has informed the security calculus of states in the modern era. A number of important questions emerge from the geostrategic upheaval attending the end of the cold war: How is the globalisation of security to be organised and managed? Will the US continue to act as the major international policeman and will the EU, or for that matter Japan, take a growing stake in how other countries govern or misgovern themselves. What reliance can or should be placed on international organisations to deal with international conflicts? The answers to these questions are heavily dependent upon the interpretation given to the changes that have occurred in the international system, the emergent balances of power (global and regional), and the mix of dependence and independence shaping relations between the United States, the European Union and Japan.
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  • Developments and Perspectives
    Shouzou IWAMI
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 133-152,337
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The Deutsche Bundesbank has argued that the euro can have economic and social advantages only when the stability-oriented policy take the highest priority. ECB inherited this principle from the Bundesbank. Up to now ECB has succeeded in maintaining price stability. In addition, the real GDP growth is recovering after the end of 1998. The issue of the euro-dominated securities has incresed rapidly since the introduction of the euro.
    But the economic developments in 1999 have problems to solve. First, the recovery of industrial production is largely supported by the exports to the outside of the euro area. The weakening of the euro contributed to this increase of the exports. Therefore the recovery in 1999 doesn't necessarily reflect the structual improvements. Second, the euro-dominated securities issued in 1999 are mostly bought by the institutional investors in the euro area. In this sense the internationalisation of the euro is still developing. Third, from the ECB's view the weakening of the euro have nothing to do with the structual problems. But the Bundesbank admits that the structual problems have effected the euro exchange rate. This fact indicates the difference of the exchange rate policies among the centralbanks in the Eurosystem.
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  • Hiroko YAMANE
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 153-184,339
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In most countries, electricity, gas, railroad and sometimes telecommunications have generally been treated as natural monopolies and owned or run by publicly owned utilities. The universal aspects of these services were assured through price and entry regulations. Everywhere in the world, however, new technologies have rendered possible new types of services, resulting in the dismantling of monopolies which had provided services through one system and one policy. Each country today has to find a new balance between regulation and competition, which the history of its institutions will allow.
    In the EU, public utilities services are highly developed, but their conceptual foundations vary from one country to another. The French service public, for example, had been supported by the concept of citizens' rights and solidarity. This tradition differs significantly from the more decentralised local administrations in many of France's neighboring countries.
    Among EU members with radically different administrative traditions, how has the new balance between regulations and competition been struck? How, at the EU level, has the pace of liberalisation of services of general economic interest been decided? What is the role of EC competition law in this process? And what are the consequences?
    The report consists of three parts. The first part deals with the ways in which the pace and method of liberalisation have been decided at the EU level in different public service sectors. A significant part of the European Commission's powers to regulate competition issues is involved in the liberalisation of telecommunications. For example, access charges, interconnection, exclusive licence, etc. are based on Article 86 (3), (former Article 90 (3)), whereas other sectors rely mostly on Article 95 (former Article 100 (A)). Secondly, the report analyses how the Commission and the EC Court changed their methods of competition law enforcement from applying solely to private undertakings involving regulations, to include public undertakings and the authorities themselves. The third part examines the various ways in which EU competition law has been applied to the process of transition from public monopolies to private ones.
    The report pays particular attention to the so-called “essential facilities” doctrine. Through the analysis of Commission decisions and Court decisions which relied on this doctrine or were inspired by it, the report attempts to identify the scope of essential facilities, the criteria for judging what is “essential”, and the types of competition analysis employed (for example, whether the aim is to protect competition or competitors). The European essential facilities doctrine is then compared to the American one. The report affirms that particular concern for EC competition law is justified in part by the fact that the European markets have many state-made bottlenecks.
    The application of EC competition law to services of general economic interest has a wide range of regulatory purposes including fair pricing and non-discriminatory treatment, whereas the American Antitrust analyses are narrowly focused on consumer prices and economic efficiency. Opposing approaches to competition among EU members for regulated industries were reflected acutely in the negotiations leading to Article 7D, as well as the attached two declarations and a protocol of the Amsterdam Treaty.
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  • Takako UETA
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 185-209,341
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Firstly, this article traces the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union from the “Blair Initiative” in October 1998 to the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000. The idea of conducting military crisis management by the EU has gained quick consensus among the 15 member countries. The major reason for introducing this new policy is because of the EU's incapability in Bosnia and then in Kosovo.
    Secondly, it deals with US attitudes towards the ESDP since EU military crisis management needs to establish a modality of cooperation with NATO. Hitherto, there has been no formal contact between NATO and the EU mainly because France has tried to impede strong US influence on EU affairs. The US administration has an ambivalent attitude towards the development of the ESDP. It might damage NATO cohesion while stronger European capabilities might strengthern NATO and reduce the US burden.
    At the moment, the EU has no idea about its territorial defence. Many countries in the EU oppose it for different reasons. The UK believes that it is NATO's mission, and Sweden, Finland and other countries are not in favor of being involved in a military alliance. This is one of the rationales for the EU's developing capabilities of non-military crisis management which is based on a tradition of a “civilian power.”
    In order to conduct military crisis management, the EU needs to have real military capability and decision-making mechanisms. The EU-NATO mechanisms for consultation and cooperation is another challenge. Lastly, this article examines future prospects. This evolution might lead to a changing balance between Europe and the US, if the EU successfully develops its military capability.
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  • Stances of the Commission, Germany, France and the United Kingdom
    Atsuko HIGASHINO
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 210-234,343
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper analyses the process of the preparation for the EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Counties (CEECs) from the Madrid European Council in 1995 to the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. It sheds light on and compares roles played by main actors of the European Union, i. e. the European Commission, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. It also argue that there was a clear division of labour between the Commission and the Member Countries, before and after the publication of the Opinion for the Enlargement (‘Agenda 2000’).
    The agreement between France and Germany in the mid-November in 1995 created an important foundation for the EU to agree at the Madrid Summit to speed up the preparation for enlargement process. This enabled the Commission to launch the enormous task for preparing the Agenda 2000'. The role of the Commission was dominant and decisive, in processing huge data, contacting the applicants and diffusing information from time to time concerning technical evaluations by the Commission both to the applicants and Member States.
    In the meantime, the three main Member States were consolidating their positions toward enlargement issues, rather than committing the process actively. Partly as the result of the efforts for policy co-ordinations between Germany and France (especially in the framework of the “Weimer triangle”), the position of the French Government gradually shifted towards that of the German; it started to admit the possibilities to start the accession negotiation with the most prepared candidates (i. e. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic).
    The United Kingdom has always been a strong advocate for the EU enlargement Eastwards. Despite changes of government throughout this period, there seemed to be no major policy change between the Conservative and the Labour government; in favour of an early enlargement, with the most prepared CEECs, i. e. Vishgrads (and Baltic countries).
    Thus, when the Commission submitted the ‘Agenda 2000’ there were little difference in the positions of the three Member States. It means that there already exited a ground to admit the method proposed by the Commission (to start the accession negotiation with the 6 applicants) was created without harsh bargaining between the Member States, well before the Luxembourg Summit. Rather, the focus of the discussion was to keep the ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ of the entire negotiation process, without leaving the ‘second waves’ outsides. Here, the role played by the French government, advocating the idea of the European Conference, which is to gather all the applicants into one umbrella, is remarkable. And the British government, who determined to commit to the European Affairs stronger than its previous government, and tried to take an advantage of taking the next EU Presidency, committed actively to rap up the agreement for the Luxembourg.
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  • Kimiko ISONO
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 235-257,345
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper outlines the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which form part of the Agenda 2000 Agreement that was agreed by EU heads of governments at Berlin summit in March 1999, and also refers to the potential impact of the Agreement's constrains through to 2000.
    It notes that this reform (the '99 reform) was based on the '92 CAP reform and though it was intended to take those reforms further, it is in fact a watering-down of the Commission's legislative proposals of March 1998 and the Farm Council deal of March 11 1999.
    The EU's strategy presumes that the reformed CAP can maintain the blue box exemptions and benefit large farm even into the next decade also. In the '99 reform the principle of subsidiarity is invoked in many areas: the national envelopes, agri-environmental schemes and the rural development policy. In view of the enlargement of the EU, the invoking of the principle of subsidiarity is of major importance for solving the budget problems of the CAP, since agriculture accounts for a large proportion of the GDP and employed population of the CEECs..
    After a full analysis of the '99 reform, the paper suggests that the early part of the next decade will see a similar scenario to that which followed the '92 reform; i. e. that the next WTO round will prompt further fundamental reform of the CAP.
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  • Hideki HASEGAWA
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 258-279,347
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    POSEI (Program of Special Options for Island Remoteness and Insular Nature in French) is founded in 1989 by an initiative of France which has some remote island oversea regions (so-called DOMs). And in 1991 EC council decided that three Atlantic island regions (Canary Islands, Madeira and Azores) are selected as a region covered by POSEI.
    Different from PTOM (Oversea Island Countries and Territories in French) islands for example French TOMs, oversea British islands and Dependency which are excluded from European common policies, POSEI island regions are included into them. And in future these islands are to be completely integrated into European common policies. However because of some geographical handicaps, the Community took account of some exceptional options about application of the common policies into these regions from a viewpoint of social and economic cohesion.
    POSEI is mainly composed of: 1) special supply adjustment that the EU makes a special financial aid to the agents which transport specified products in the Continent to the remote island regions and that the cost which risks to discourage these regions from creating new local productive activities and raise the local consumer price are cut down, 2) temporary prevention of the application of common custom policies, safeguard of traditional economic activities strongly linked with non-EU territories in the island regions, 3) exception of the application of European agricultural and fishery policies, European financial back up system for specified agriaquacultural fields that are unique in the region and needed for stability of the Common Market, and 4) creation of special taxation system, for example tax-free zone and special imposition for promoting local production and consumption.
    Nowadays POSEI is needed as a European island region policies for the other island regions for example Mediterranean Area.
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  • Norimoto FUJITA
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 280-301,349
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    As a monetary policy management by Eurosystem, a flexible inflation target (f-IT) and a pragmatic monetary target (p-MT) which also contain concerns about the stability of the real economy seem to be better. The reason why I support it and the summary of each chapters will be given below.
    In Section 1 of Chapter I, judging from monetary conditions in EMS and using macroeconomic models, EMS is a result of the core countries' lead characterised as an exchange rate target (EXT). Generally bad fundamentals' countries had the vulnerabilities and particularly suffered more pain from the increase of an interest rates. In Section 2 of Chapter I examines the period in which the third stage of EMU started, it seems that convergence of eleven member states had been promoted more in macroeconomic area, less in structural area. Thus because a convergence in structual area seems to take a relatively long time, shock absorption like OCA is limited now. Conversely, the convergence in macroeconomic area is earlier inclined to diverse and additionally each member states has a limited fiscal and monetary policy after 1999. Therefore, though each member states' efforts for structual policy become an important issues, at the same time, an appropriate central (ECB's) policy to support it is hoped.
    In Section 1 of Chapter II, I suggest, because of various changes following the start of the third stage of EMU, it became possible and necessary to pursue a monetary policy made allowance for growth more. In addition the conditions for it was also fulfilled. In Section 2 of Chapter II, with regard to IT and MT used as ECB's monetary policy target by a survey of related study and ECB's actual stance, I focus on the usefulness of f-IT and p-MT which also contained concerns about the stability of the real economy. I also make mention of trasparancy and accountability which is needed to get a credibility of ECB's monetary policy. In Section 3 of Chapter II, in a survey of Euroland's economic condition in recent years, a private consumption and investment, supported by growth forecasts and low interest rate, seem to play an important role in its future growth. This means the monetary policy made allowance for growth more is an particurally important under a limited each country's own policy to recover the stagnant conditions.
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  • Sadayoshi TAKAYA
    2000 Volume 2000 Issue 20 Pages 302-327,351
    Published: September 30, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 21, 2010
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This article provides the theoretical model to analyze the impact on the Euro Zone economy with focusing the relationship between the price target and the independence. The European System of Central Banks gives priority to the price stabilization, which is emphasized by Neo-classical Economics that suppose the perfect price adjustment. The Neo-classical economics proposes central bank independence in order to promote the central bank stabilize inflation more than variation of income. ESCB is also designed for high independence according to this view.
    However, it must be investigated theoretically whether such ESCB is optimal in Euro zone, where price does not adjust perfectly at least shortterm. That is, trade-off between inflation and unemployment appears in the zone. This article pursues the optimal interest rate policy by ESCB faced the trade-off, such like the Keynesian economy with supply shock. ESCB is supposed to have the weighted lost function including the inflation and income fluctuation. Though Barro and Gordon model solves the optimal monetary policy under the Neo-classical economy with perfect price adjustment, our model gets the optimal monetary policy under the Keynesian economy with price rigidity. Our model suggests the supply shock affect the trade-off between inflation and income fluctuation.
    Further, we pursue the optimal design for the ESCB by the mathematical simulation. Rogoff (1985) solves the optimal target weight between inflation and income with perfect price adjustment, whereas we get the optimal weight with price rigidity that is suitable for the Euro zone. From our conclusion, optimal weight between inflation and income fluctuation depends on the interest rate elasticity of income. So, ESCB should pay attention to not only price stabilization but also income fluctuation. In order for ESCB to have two targets optimally, the framework for accountability of ESCB should be adequate, to improve credibility of ESCB.
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