Focused on his view of Chan doctrine (禅教観), this paper examines the position of Fayan Wenyi (法眼文益, 885–958) in the history of Chan thought.Zongmi (宗密, 780–841) and Yanshou (延寿, 904–976) were Chan monks who explained the relationship between Chan and the Teachings tradition (Tiantai). Through a comparative analysis of their ideas, I explain the characteristics of Fayan’s thought. Zongmi believed all Buddhas originate from the same source, and that Chan and the Teachings tradition are not in conflict. However, he respectively classified Chan and the Teachings tradition, and explained their relationship, so his views on Chan doctrine were stratified. Nevertheless, Fayan paid attention to the Teachings tradition while valuing Chan, and treated equally every sect of the Chan school. Yanshou regarded Chan and the Teachings tradition as both having originated from the single source of the heart. Yanshou believed Confucism, Taoism, and the Hundred Schools of Thought are not stratified, and equal in nature. This is the extension of the single-layer view of Chan and the Teachings tradition. Fayan explained the relationship between Chan and the Teachings tradition from a unique perspective and proposed the single-layer view.

This article makes the following three points through an analysis of the figure of Hakuin Ekaku 白隠慧鶴 (1686–1769) and the oracle of bodhicitta.

(1) Hakuin created the oracle of bodhicitta by combining several descriptions from the Shasekishū 沙石集 (Collection of Sand and Pebbles) with his own memories and understanding to fill in the details.

(2) This oracle of bodhicitta allowed Hakuin to attain complete awakening and to realize the importance of saving people by expounding the dharma.

(3) Yet because Hakuin’s disciples did not record this incident in the chronicle of Hakuin’s life which they compiled, this oracle of bodhicitta has not received much attention.

The Pŏphwa kyŏng chiphŏmki 法華経集験記 (Jpn. Hokekyō Shūgenki), thought to have been completed in 718 AD, was first reported by Shōjirō Ōta to exist in Japan in 1958.

However, because in this manuscript the name of the author was written only using the character Zyaku 寂, the theory was that it was written by Yiji 義寂 (919–987) from China, who was active during the period of the Song Dynasty.

In 1980, Ōta argued that the author of the manuscript was Ŭijŏk 義寂 (7th to 8th century), who was active in Silla during the Tang dynasty, but the evidence for his theory is inadequate.

In this paper I prove that Ŭijŏk of Silla was a disciple of Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664), and because the influence of the disciples of Xuanzang can be seen in the preface to this manuscript, the author of the manuscript is Ŭijŏk of Silla.

In addition, because there are discrepancies between the records in Buddhist catalogs and the manuscript of this book, it will be clarified that this manuscript is not the original Pŏphwa hŏmki 法華験記 written by Ŭijŏk of Silla, but an abbreviated version of it.

In “Tsong kha pa’s 15 Thangkas Pictorial Biography (Tsong kha pa rnam thar ras bris),” published in the 18th century, there is a single scene that is not supposed to be directly related to Tsong kha pa’s own achievements. The purpose of this investigation is to justify the relationship between Tsong kha pa’s pictorial biography and the contents of the paintings, which are considered to be a scene (the so-called Pho lha nas scene) related to Pho lha nas bSod nams stobs rgyas (1689–1747). As a result of collating references and iconographic materials, I am able to show that the “Pho lha nas scene” is irrelvant to Tsong kha pa’s own achievements, but is rather only an extra section. Furthermore, it is also clarified that it is a scene created when publishing the woodcuts of the Kanjur and Tanjur, based on Pho lha nas instructions. It is obvious that the extra scene in “Tsong kha pa’s Pictorial Biography” was dedicated to the remarkable achievements (bsNgo rten) of Pho lha nas.

Ka/sKa ba dPal brtsegs was a prominent great translation master of the Tubo kingdom, Shus chen gyi lo tsa/tsā/tstsha pa/ba, and became one of the three so-called masters called Ka/sKa Cog Shaṅ gsum in later times. Earlier I studied Buddhist texts mentioned in colophons of the Tibetan Buddhist canon (sDe dge edition) which are described in the dkar chag lDan/lHan dkar/kar ma (Dk. No. 10–458, 483–513, 573–605, 614–654). In this paper, I’d like to consider this translator’s colophons in the sDe dge Edition described in Dk. nos. 464–713, and want to obtain a glimpse of how the translator translated Sanskrit Buddhist texts into Tibetan.

Candrakīrti (ca. 600–650) states in his Madhyamakāvatāra 6.34 to the effect that, if an entity were established by way of its character, emptiness (śūnyatā) would be the cause of destruction of the entity, and that, if so, the conventional reality (saṃvṛti) of such an entity would bear analysis by reasoning. It is evident that Candrakīrti here criticizes another school’s tenets. Who is the target of criticism? There are at least two interpretations in Tibet regarding this question.

Tsong kha pa (1357–1419) and his followers of the Dge lugs pa argue that the Svātantrika school is the target of criticism since it accepts, on the conventional level (tha snyad), the existence of things established by way of their character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). On the other hand, Shākya mchog ldan (1428–1507) and Go rams pa (1429–80), both belonging to the Sa skya pa, reject the Dge lugs pa’s interpretation on the basis of their own understanding of the Madhyamakāvatāra and its autocommentary. They argue instead that the Mind-Only school is the target of criticism here. The underlying idea of the Sa skya pa argument is that there is no ideological difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

The present paper discusses the two interpretations of Madhyamakāvatāra 6.34 with special emphasis on the problem of “own character” (rang mtshan), which is discussed in detail in Shākya mchog ldan’s Dbu ma rnam nges.

In this study, I examine mudrās mainly in the Mouli mantuoluo zhou jing 牟梨曼陀羅呪経, which has been called the earliest text indicating mudrās. I list the mudrās, and analyze their roles and meanings. As a result, I found that the mudrās are closely related to maṇḍala, the main story (nidāna), and the esoteric ritual of abhiṣeka.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the *Mahājñānābhiṣekadhāraṇīmaṇḍala in the Vajrapāṇyabhiṣekatantra. This tantra explains the three types of maṇḍala for abhiṣeka. Preceding studies have discussed the first and second maṇḍalas, but none have disscussed the third. For this reason, this paper focuses on the third maṇḍala.

There has been a great discussion about Hindu deities in the scriptures of tantric Buddhism. The story of Trailokyavijaya’s victory over Śiva is explained in most of the texts identified as Yoga-tantra texts, included the eighteen assemblies of the Vajraśekhara cycle. Some studies have suggested that 7th and 8th century Indian Tantric Buddhism was strongly hostile to Śiva in light of this story.

However, the attitude they have taken to Hindu deities other than Śiva is unclear because there are few related matters in the scriptures of the Vajraśekhara cycle. In this paper, I examine the story of Trailokyavijaya’s victory over Śiva and Indra in the Guhya­maṇi­tilaka, overlooked in previous studies, in order to elucidate the Tantric Buddhists attitudes toward Indra. As a result, it became clear that a moderate response was taken toward Indra. This fact leads to the conclusion that not all Hindu deities were hated in all cases by Tantric Buddhists at that time.

This presentation concerns Sādhanamālā (SM) 134, a meditation on the Mārīcī of three faces and eight arms (an image seen on extant art objects). The traits of the sādhana of SM 134 are elucidated via an understanding of its structural components.

Among the Buddhist goddesses of the Pāla Empire (8th–12th century CE), works depicting Mārīcī are said to have been second in number only to those of the goddess Tārā, and Mārīcī worship was especially widespread in India. Sixteen types of Mārīcī sādhana are recorded in the SM, with Mārīcī displaying variously one face and two arms, three faces and eight arms, five faces and ten arms, six faces and twelve arms, or three faces and sixteen arms.

In SM 134, in the preparatory stage for meditation, the concrete description of the figure of the goddess is characteristic. The reason is not clear, but in SM 142, in the preparatory stage for meditation (similar to SM 134) is the phrase “depict images [paṭa], etc. of the figure of the holy mother [Mārīcī]” (paṭādigatamūrrtiṃ bhagavatīm avatārrya); therefore, it may be that the concrete figure of Mārīcī spoken of in the preparatory stage of SM 134 is suggesting not only a mediation, but also the creation of actual objects depicting the goddess. From the fact that numerous holy images of Mārīcī have been confirmed in India, we surmise that in addition to mediation, emphasis was also placed on the mechanism of gaining blessings by the pious act of creating actual art objects.

Although the *Hevajranāmatantrārthasaṃgraha (abbr. HVNTAS), a commentary on the Hevajra-tantra, exists only in Tibetan translation, it has no attribution of authorship in its colophon. The purpose of the present paper is to present clear evidence that the authorship of HVNTAS belongs to Nāro-pa.

Research on HVNTAS reveals that the text, attributing the source, quotes the *Paramādya, the *Vinayāmoghasiddhi, the Kāśyapaparivarta, and the Pradīpoddyotana of Candrakīrti. The same quotations of the *Paramādya, the *Vinayāmoghasiddhi, and the Kāśyapaparivarta are also found in the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa (chap. 9) of Āryadeva. Furthermore, HVNTAS also refers to the Pradīpoddyotana.

The Tantra classification of HVNTAS is four classes—Kriyā, Ubhaya, Yoga, and Mahāyoga. In HVNTAS, the *Paramādya, the Sarvatathāgatatattvasaṃgraha, the *Sarvakalpasamuccaya etc. are listed as Yogatantra, the Samāyoga, the *Vinayāmoghasiddhi, the Guhyasamāja, the Abhidhānottara etc. as Mahāyogatantra.

The Sekoddeśaṭākā of Nāro-pa quotes two parts from the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa, so Nāro-pa is related to the Ārya School. According to the author’s studies, the influence of the Pradīpoddyotana is clearly found in the *Vajrapadasārasaṃgrahapañjikā and the *Sarvaguhyapradīpaṭīkā written by *Yaśobhadra, alias Nāro-pa. The author, therefore, understands Nāro-pa as a successor of the doctrine of the Ārya School, especially of Candrakīrti.

Judging from the fact that the HVNTAS mainly quotes many scriptures and treatises important in the Ārya School, and also refers to the Pradīpoddyotana, it most likely is to be attributed to Nāro-pa.

This article reevaluates the East Asian Buddhist yinming/inmyō (因明) tradition as a bridge between South Asian and East Asian traditions of Buddhist logic. Specifically, focus is placed on the concept of satpratyayakartṛtva or “producing the cognition ‘existent’,” which has its background in Vaiśeṣikasūtra I.2.7. In Xuanzang’s translation of Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāyapraveśaka, this term was translated as zuo you yuan xing (作有縁性). Xuanzang’s disciple Wengui (文軌) seems to have understood well its original Sanskrit meaning, whereas another disciple, Ji (基), offered a different understanding based on the dual meaning of you yuan: the cognition ‘existent’ and the object that possesses the cognition. Although the second interpretation seems peculiar in this context, his intention lies in maintaining the rule that the property to be proved in this thesis, including satpratyayakartṛtva, should be applied to both the subject matter, i.e., sattā, as well as to similar examples, like sāmānyaviśeṣa. In order to satisfy the demand, Ji interpreted the Chinese term to mean “forming the object’s nature that produces a cognition.”

In Dharmakīrti’s apoha-theory, the terms ākṣepa (inclusion) and pratikṣepa (exclusion) are used in arguments concerning property and property-possessor (dharma / dharmin), which are included among linguistic practices such as the universal (sāmānya). In the arguments about property and property-possessor, the distinction between property and property-possessor, a linguistic problem, is explained by turning it into problems such as that of the appearance of conceptual awareness (pratibhāsa), the speaker’s intention, the effect of daily action (vyavahāra), and so on.

In examples of ākṣepa concerned with property and property-possessor, it is stated that words expressing property-possessor include other distinctions, while words expressing property do not. But in the examples of pratikṣepa concerned with property and property-possessor, it is stated that words expressing property exclude other distinctions, while words expressing property-possessor do not. Therefore ākṣepa means negation of pratikṣepa, apratikṣepa, and the negation of ākṣepa means pratikṣepa.

In Chapter Three of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya, a sūtra called Akṣarāśisūtra (ARS) is quoted as a source of the Triyāna-theory. Akṣa is the name of a plant, and rāśi means an accumulation. Therefore, I suppose that ARS must be “Accumulation of Akṣa’s Fruit Sūtra.” However, Prabhākaramitra, the Chinese translator of the work, rendered ARS as 多界修多羅, which is completely different from the original title just given. In this study, I would like to consider why the two titles are different.

Although 多界修多羅 has been understood to be the title of a sūtra in previous studies, it is difficult to come to this conclusion based on my survey of Prabhākaramitra’s translation of the word 修多羅. In translating a specific sūtra, Prabhākaramitra uses the word 経, as in 十地経, yet when it comes to general references to types of sūtras, he intentionally uses the word 修多羅, as in 大乗修多羅. Therefore, I assume that 多界修多羅 is not the title of a sūtra, but rather, it is a type of sūtra that discusses 多界.

In fact, Prabhākaramitra’s incomprehensible translations are related to the development of translations of the ARS. The ARS is roughly classified into two kinds, and one of them cannot be a source of the Triyāna-theory. Consequently, Asvbhāva in his commentary quoted another sūtra called the Bahudhātuka-sūtra in order to make its source clear. I suppose that this is how Prabhākaramitra translated ARS and other sūtras including the Bahudhātuka-sūtra as 多界修多羅.

This essay studies Sthiramati’s view of dharmāyatana in the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā (PSkV). Sthiramati accepts five types of dharmāyatana, just as does Asaṅga in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (AS). However, Vasubandhu explains only avijñapti in the Pañcaskandhaka (PSk). The five types of dharmāyatana are ābhisaṅkṣepika, ābhyavakāśika, sāmādānika, parikalpita, and vaibhūtvika. Among them, sāmādānika corresponds to avijñapti. Sthiramati commented on why the four types were not mentioned in PSk. First, Sthiramati commented that ābhisaṅkṣepika and ābhyavakāśika were not re-explained as dharmāyatana because they were not different from paramāṇu. Next, for parikalpita and vaibhūtvika, both are the same as vijñāna, so it is interpreted that it was not explained as dharmāyatana. Therefore, Sthiramati understands that Vasubandhu did not deny the four kinds of dharmāyatana, but didn’t dare to explain it. There is no negative attitude toward Vasubandhu in Sthiramati’s commentarial attitude in the PSkV, and this clearly shows the character of PSk as a short text (saṃkṣepita).

In the layers of the Yogācārabhūmi divided by L. Schmithausen, we explored the original meaning and origin of ālayavijñāna, only in the layer up to the ‘Proof Portion’ of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, in which the physical features were conspicuously apparent. First of all, we could see that based on 阿頼耶所蔵 in the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra, which was noted by N. Funahashi as the original form of ālayavijñāna, the two meanings of the word ālaya, the settling place, the attachment, point to a body. As a result, since the technical term “ekayogakṣema” used in the definition of ālayavijñāna in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is based on the idea of āśrayaparivṛtti, ālayavijñāna is the name of a series of āśrayaparivṛtti processes, and the introduction of ālayavijñāna came from the discovery through yoga practice.

This paper investigates the kṣāntipāramitā in the smaller Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtras. Translated terms in the Daoxing banruo jing 道行般若経 (T. 224), the oldest version of the smaller Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtras, were examined first. The translator of the Daoxing banruo jing, Lokakṣema, had translated kṣānti into 忍辱, kṣāntipāramitā into 羼提波羅蜜, and anutpattikeṣu dharmeṣu kṣāntiḥ into 無所従生法楽. Moreover, the Daoxing banruo jing barely explained the contents of the practice of kṣānti. In conclusion, the smaller Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtras did not change the contents of kṣānti practice already known through other sūtras and elsewhere.

It goes without saying that dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda) plays an important role in Buddhist thought. But this was not necessarily the case in the early Mahāyāna. Surprisingly, there are also few examples of the use of this term in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. In particular, little importance was attached to it in early Prajñāpāramitā sūtras such as the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā and the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and related texts. Furthermore, in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and related texts, from the first chapter of entrustment onwards, there began to appear some noteworthy discussions of dependent co-arising that have a bearing on the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā.

In expanded versions of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, however, this situation changes completely. In particular, there appear several discussions of dependent co-arising that are notable for their influence on later Buddhist thought.

The main uses of dependent co-arising in expanded versions of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras are the visualization of dependent co-arising as an antidote to ignorance and its use as a source for the verse of salutation in the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, known as the eight negations. In this paper, I examine these and situate the verse of the eight negations in the context of the doctrines that developed as the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras grew in volume. Nāgārjuna brought together the negative expressions found in expanded versions of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras in the form of the eight negations and linked them to the idea of dependent co-arising, which was then transmitted in later versions of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras such as the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā. In addition, Asaṅga’s *Madhyamakānusāra (Shunzhong lun 順中論) played a role in strengthening the ties between the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the eight negations.

The first chapter of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, famous for its strong criticism of the independent inference (svatantrānumāna) method adopted by Bhāviveka and its justification for Buddhapālita’s reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) method, shows large discrepancies with Dignāga in the theory of inferences, but bears a striking resemblance to the three kinds of inferences theory usually known to be found in Kuiji’s commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 (T. 1628 [XXXII] 1b11–12, 25–27). Due to a neglect of the Chinese texts, few former studies have noticed the similarities between Candrakīrti and Kuiji, and some even imprudently misunderstood Dignāga’s svārthānumāna, Candrakīrti’s svārthānumāna and Kuiji’s inference for self (zi biliang 自比量) as the same. This paper, therefore, examines the possibilities of explaining Candrakīrti’s texts with the three kinds of inferences theory of Kuiji, and proves that Candrakīrti’s conscious development of his theory of inferences truly has much in common with Kuiji’s idea.

In the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā, Haribhadra develops a criticism of atomic theory. Concretely speaking, he, following the critical methods of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, quoted verse 49 of Śubhagupta’s Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā, and criticized the view about atomic theory presented by Śubhagupta. There is no such case in the works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Haribhadra has been generally thought to be a faithful successor of the ideas of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but at the same time he seems to have developed his own theory. In this paper, through an examination of the significance of the quotation by Haribhadra of verse 49 in the Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā, two conclusions can be reached. The first is that Haribhadra attempts to develop the originality of his own work by referring to verse 49 not quoted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. The second is that Haribhadra has an intention of sharpening the criticism of Śubhagupta repeated by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla quote many verses of the Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā in their works and criticize Śubhagupta, and it seems that Haribhadra, increasing this tendency, intends to completely destroy the view about atomic theory presented by Śubhagupta.

There is a crucial sentence in the Lotus Sūtra that implies that the Śākyamuni Buddha of the Lotus Sūtra is eternal. In order to accurately understand the life-span of the Buddha, it is necessary to interpret the contents of KN, 318. 15–319.5, especially 319. 2–4. The text here consists of two negative phrases. In comparison, the corresponding parts of the Chinese translations by Dharmarakṣa and Kumārajīva, and the Tibetan translation, contain only one negative phrase. In this paper, I discuss my reasons for suggesting that the Sanskrit text itself should be reconstructed based on these differences. Furthermore, based on previous studies, and referring to various manuscripts, the Chinese translations, the Tibetan translation, as well as the Chinese commentaries, I offer my own tentative reconstruction of the text.

The metaphor of “digging a well in the desert” found in Chapter X of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra involves a narrative about a certain person searching for water in a desert. To this end, he makes other persons dig a well there. As long as he sees sand, he knows that the water is far off; if he sees mud, he knows that the water is near. Previous studies have overlooked the relationship between the person searching for the water and the other persons digging the well, leaving the structure and purpose of this metaphor unclear. The aim of the present paper is to examine them in detail and thereby to show how Bodhisattvas can attain Buddhahood quickly.

According to the teachings represented by the metaphor in question, the following can be pointed out. When a Bodhisattva makes his disciples hear and then accept the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra as their own, he approaches Buddhahood; Bodhisattvas can attain Buddhahood quickly by listening to some Mahāyana sūtras that precede the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, by understanding the doctrine of emptiness, and then by hearing, keeping in mind, and preaching the doctrine of One Vehicle taught in this sūtra.

The present paper provides the Sanskrit text of verses 18–32 of the Abhidharmadīpa extracted from the newly available folios of the Abhidharmadīpavṛtti manuscript. In the published edition of the Abhidharmadīpavṛtti edited by Jaini, the opening portion of the text is incomplete: only the first verse (in fol. 1) had been available, while fols. 2–30 remained unavailable. However, the lacking folia have recently become accessible through microfilms preserved at the CTRC. The newly available folia are as follows: Fols. 2–30, 46, 67–82, 84–89, 118–125, 138, 147, 151 (Fol. 17 appears twice, and fol. 80 already appeared in the folios used by Jaini). The following folios have been available and edited by Jaini: fols. 1, 31–39, 41–45, 47, 49–51, 80(!), 91–117, 126, 128, 130, 134–137, 139, 141–144, 146, 148–150; and the following folia are yet to be found: Fols. 40, 48, 52–66, 83, 90, 127, 129, 131–133, 140, 145, 152.

In my previous paper, I presented the Sanskrit text of verses 1–17, and I present here verses 18–32, in which verses 18–20 deal with the eight core topics of the text (i.e. the five skandhas and the three asaṃskṛta-dharmas), verse 21 summarizes the three pramāṇa (i.e. pratyakṣa, anumāna, and āgama) that establish the existence of the eight core topics, and verses 22–23, which discuss the three pramāṇas with a detailed argument about āgama.

In the commonly accepted theory of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh) texts, in sentences containing kila Vasubandhu indicates his disagreement, and in sentences without kila Vasubandhu show the understanding of the ordinary Vaibhāṣika in Kashmir (Kaśimīra Vaibhāṣika). This article questions that conventional understanding.

The phenomena of mindfulness (dharmasmṛtyupasthāna) in the AKBh appears in a sentence without kila, yet was supplemented in the *Nyāyānusāra (NyA. Chi. Shun zhengli lun 順正理論). This is because the sentence was incomplete for the Vaibhāsika of Kashmir. Therefore, the *Tattvārtha (TA) cites and is supplemented by the NyA, and the *Lakṣanānusāriṇī (LA) cites and is supplemented by the Abhidharmadīpa. In other words, the TA and LA considered the AKBh imperfect from the standpoint of the Kashmir Vaibhāṣika. On the other hand, the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (AKVy) did not consider it incomplete or in need of supplement, because the AKVy was not Kashmir Vaibhāṣika, but Sautrāntika.

I believe this difference derives from whether respect was given to the *Jñānaprasthāna (JñPr. Chi. Fazhi lun 発智論) or sūtra. The seven points and three contemplations (trividhārthaparīkṣa and saptasthānakauśala) were not explained in the AKBh because it was modified by the JñPr. Kashmir Vaibhāṣika respected the JñPr, but Sautrāntika would not accept an alteration by the JñPr.

There is an established theory of Śrīlāta’s idea of the process of perception, which was interpreted by Kato Junsho 加藤純章 (1989) as, “The sense organ and the object-field are in the first moment; then perceptual consciousness arises in the second moment; after that, feelings→concepts→volition will arise gradually in the third and subsequent moments.” Śrīlāta approved the existence of feelings, concepts, and volition’s mental functions. Conversely, the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman denied it. Based on the difference between the two, Kato indicated that in terms of mind and mental functions which are arising gradually one by one, Śrīlāta had the same idea. If this is so, can Śrīlāta’s theory of the process of perception really be as stated? The theories of the process of perception of the Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika cannot be lumped together. In order to reconsider Śrīlāta’s theory of the process of perception, I examine the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and its commentaries, the Tattvārtha and Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, and the Nyāyānusāra. I conclude that Śrīlāta’s theory of the process of perception should be expressed as, “The sense organ and the object-field are in the first moment; then perceptual consciousness arises in the second moment; after that, feelings, concepts and volitions arise in the third moment.” On the other hand, the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman cannot explain it as well as Śrīlāta unless they approve of mental functions. Therefore, it can be said that Śrīlāta’s idea cannot be identified with the theory of the process of perception of the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman.

According to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the Ābhidharmikas say that when someone born in the realm of desire (kāmadhātu) regards Brahman as a sentient being and as permanent, the conceptions are not erroneous views but are false knowledge. These conceptions are not the grasping of a self (ātman) or of things possessed by a self (ātmīya). They are applicable neither to a view of the self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), nor to a view that grasps the extremes of permanence and annihilation (antagrāhadṛṣṭi) founded on the view of the self. A sentient being does not exist in and of itself, and is merely real by way of a conception like the self. But the statement that “I exist” is correct in the world. The false knowledge that non-existence is taken for existence is interpreted to be undefiled by the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā. It has an aspect that does not exist in an object, as if a branchless tree is mistaken for a person. The Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā mentions that factors tending toward the fluxes (sāsrava) are not pure. Moreover, the factors that have both mental disturbances (kleśa) and a perceptual object that tends toward the fluxes are defilements, but the factors that have only a perceptual object tending toward the fluxes have some purity, in which case they are called non-defilements.

The author has confirmed the validity of the claim that a monk is required to acknowledge his offense before he can be subject to any form of punitive legal action, focusing on the aniyata section, the third section in the Pātimokkha/Vibhaṅga of the vinaya. As a result of an investigation of sikkhāpada and vibhaṅga of the first aniyata section and the meaning of the tassapāpiyyasikā procedure which appears in the vibhaṅga of the rule, the following facts have come to light.

1. The first sikkhāpada of the aniyata section of all of five vinayas except the Mahīśāsaka vinaya, a reduced version, can be interpreted either to mean, “a monk is required to acknowledge his offense before he can be subject to any form of punitive legal action,” or “the monastic community can take punitive legal action against a monk without his acknowledgement.”

2. The vibhaṅga of four vinayas, that is, except the Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya, adopt the former interpretation, and only the Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya adopts the latter.

3. The vibhaṅgas of three vinayas of the above mentioned four vinayas, the Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṃghika, and Mūlasarvāstivāda vinayas, introduce the tassapāpiyyasikā procedure, one of seven adhikaraṇasamatha-dharmas, as part of handling methods of aniyata. The tassapāpiyyasikā is a kind of punitive action performed by the Buddhist order against a monk who has made inconsistent allegations. Only adopting the former interpretation, the introduction of the tassapāpiyyasikā procedure can be contextually rational. No rational explanation can be possible in adopting the latter interpretation. Therefore it is inconsistent that the Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya, which adopts the latter interpretation, contains the tassapāpiyyasikā procedure in its vibhaṅga.

Based on these facts, the following conclusion can be drawn. It is inconceivable that the sikkhāpada of aniyata was enacted on the interpretation that “the monastic community can take punitive legal action against a monk without his acknowledgment.” Such an interpretation is unique to the Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya. It is quite possible that the Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya later introduced it in place of the traditional one, the former interpretation. Borgland’s idea that all vinayas hold in common the principle that the monastic community can take punitive legal action against a monk without his acknowledgment has to be reconsidered.

The oldest Chinese translation of a vinaya text is the Binaiye 鼻奈耶. Although many scholars having pointed out that there is a need to examine its content due to the time of its translation, almost no research has been carried out. One of the reasons for this is that the Chinese is difficult to understand. However, this is also because of its unique structure. The extant vinayas are basically comprised of a vibhaṅga section and skandhaka section (or section equivalent to the skandhaka). However, the Binaiye only consists of the former. While the structure of its vibhaṅga does present some issues, like other vinayas, it contains stories, rules, and explanations. Based on limited research findings it is thought that the Binaiye came into existence before the extant vinayas. One of the notable characteristics of the Chinese translation of this text is that it does not discuss “proper rules.” In my past research I have examined the content of the proper rules found in vinayas and made clear the process of the sangha’s transformation. However, when and from where the Chinese-language concept jing 淨 (Pāli kappa/kappiya; “proper”) appeared remains as a major issue to be addressed. In order to examine this problem, I turn to the Binaiye and discuss its relationship with “proper rules.” I conclude that one does not find any passages showing their existence therein, and present various possible reasons for this. The lack of “proper rules” in this text is a very important point when thinking about the placement of this vinaya text, how “proper rules” came into existence, and circumstances surrounding the Chinese translation of vinaya texts. It is an issue that requires further examination.

Most Indic manuscripts contain post-colophons that offer a wide range of information, such as, date, place, scribe, author, purpose of scribing etc. In recent years, research on Indic manuscripts has attracted worldwide attention, but it is mainly based on textual research. In conventional research, it can be said that colophons have been given an auxiliary role to understand the content of a manuscript. However, colophons can play a major role by revealing the message of the scribe.

Focusing minutely on the description of the colophon itself rather than the text content of the manuscript, this paper explores the possibilities of research of colophons to elucidate the reception of Indic manuscripts from the social, religious and cultural aspects through a case study of the colophons of palm-leaf manuscripts of Odisha (India) treating them as the primary material. These colophons are limited to the karaṇī script, Odia language religious manuscripts such as the epics, purāṇas, stotras etc., preserved in different repositories in Odisha and in a private collection in Beijing. Most of them were scribed in the 1800s.

Merit-making is regarded as a virtue in Buddhism. In Thailand, making merit is referred to as “Tham Bun,” which means making (Tham) merit (Bun), and it is common to see laypeople offering donations to temples or monks. This practice is a characteristic of Thai Buddhist culture. Yet it is unclear where this practice originated from, and it can be speculated that the establishment of this practice is strongly influenced by one particular type of scripture.

To understand this point, the existence of a non-canonical Buddhist scripture called “Ānisaṃsa: merit, result of good karma, benefit” becomes significant. This scripture, which developed in Thailand, explains the merit-making practice. Ānisaṃsa is a set of literature which describes a concept of karma, that is, that making merit will allow one to be born in heaven in the next life.

Many of the Ānisaṃsa texts have been used by monks while preaching or reading scripture to encourage laypeople to make merit. The content that is preached covers a wide range of topics, including donating daily necessities for monks, or flowers, lanterns, and incense to be used in Buddhist rituals, in addition to donating temple buildings, or listening to preaching.

This paper is based on the Ānisaṃsa literature and will consider the Sabbadāna-ānisaṃsa (The Merit of All Donations), the Pāli text that exhaustively covers the merits of giving donations, yet is rarely introduced in Buddhist studies.

The text was handed down as a palm-leaf manuscript for a long period of time. Some manuscripts are shorter at 18 folios, while there are also longer ones with over 240 folios. What is striking here are the differences between the quotations and expressions from the Pāli Buddhist scriptures, which are the sources that the texts draw from to explain merit. As can be seen from the differences themselves, we seek to clarify the purpose of making the manuscripts.

Based on these considerations, we consider the role of the Ānisaṃsa literature upon donations, as well as the significance of the creation of this type of literature in large numbers.

Amongst the Sanskrit fragments kept in the Schøyen Collection in Oslo, Norway, and in a private collection in Virginia, USA, some have been identified as corresponding to the Za ahan jing 雑阿含経 (T. 99) translated by Guṇabhadra. This paper demonstrates that two more fragments, G 14.6 and MS 2627/1.3A, correspond to Sūtras 482–483 of the Za ahan jing. Among those, G 14.6 belongs to the private collection in Virginia, and MS 2627/1.3A previously belonged to the Schøyen Collection, but is now kept in the Department of Archaeology and Museums, Pakistan. Although the two fragments do not contain continuous text, they may constitute one and the same folio.

Some passages in Sūtra 482 of the Za ahan jing are referred to in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, and the whole of the Sūtra is cited in the Abhidharmakośopāyikā. Moreover, the Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ and Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi also refer to the Sūtra.

Why did the Buddha not answer the ten questions (four on life after death, four on the end and limit of the world, and two on the relation of body and soul) asked by other religious thinkers? His reason has not been clear yet.

A most popular opinion is that Buddhism is a way of empirically pursuing enlightenment, and thus it does not play with metaphysical questions. But Buddhism analyses all dharmas (things/matters), including imaginary ideas. Metaphysical aspects are naturally included.

Some scholars understand that avyākata means silence or the cessation of judgment to the ten questions as they are unknowable. But the Buddha allowed his disciples to name him sabbaññu (the omniscient). Is it plausible that there remained somethings unknowable to him?

On the contrary, the Buddha often preaches to his disciples that the ten questions do not make sense. That would mean that the ten questions themselves do not logically stand up from the Buddhist viewpoint, which consists of the three aspects: all constituent matters are unstable, all constituent matters are meaningless, and all matters are unsubstantial.

From the Buddhist viewpoint, the four questions on life after death do not understand the point that a “person” does not exactly exist, but mental and physical activities dependently originate.

The four questions on the end and limit of the world do not stand either, because perception of the world is the world for sentient beings. One can perceive nothing beyond his/her perception. The end and limit of the world means the end and limit of his/her perception.

Finally, because an eternal and unchangeable “soul” does not exist, such an imaginary concept cannot be subject to speculation.

In this paper, first, I arrange Theravāda Buddhist stories of Vakkali, considered among the first saddhādhimutta, in chronological order. As a result, I clarify that what causes Vakkali to become an arahant or attain nibbāna has changed from suicide to jumping (Skt. pra-√skand) from a mountain cliff, and from jumping to observation (vipassanā).

I then examine how Vakkali’s saddhā relates to his story. Vakkali’s saddhā toward the Buddha is described as too powerful to allow contemplation practice. Such stagnation of training can be pointed out in the context of his dedication to seeing the Buddha too. Similarly, seeing the Buddha is also the purpose of his jumping from the mountain cliff. I think that his powerful saddhā toward Buddha is also in the background of these two things.

It is said that the twelve-fold chain of dependent origination is complete in its formative process. Although many scholars have tried to clarify the formative process and the meaning of the notion as a whole, there seems to be no generally accepted theory about it. This also applies to a three-fold chain, which includes “possession” (upadhi) as a member of the chain caused by “thirst” or “craving” (taṇhā). The question we have to ask here is why a member caused by taṇhā is “attachment” (upādāna) in common dependent originations, but upadhi in the three-fold chain. In this paper, I examine the usage of upadhi to elucidate why upadhi has come to be regarded as inappropriate as a member of the chain of dependent origination.

This examination reveals that the meaning of upadhi varies depending on context—therefore, upadhi is a specific and individual term. For this reason, there are several cases in which the cessation of upadhi does not lead to the cessation of suffering. Contrary to this, the cessation of upādāna leads to liberation in almost every case.

Based on this difference, the substitution of upādāna for upadhi in the standard chain of dependent originations may be attributed to the following: as the notion of dependent origination developed into a central dogma, upādāna became much more suitable as a member of the chain of dependent origination, because dependent origination refers not only to the occurrence of suffering but also to its cessation. Upadhi therefore became unsuitable for use in this context.

Ānāpānasati is a Buddhist practice aimed at obtaining various results by focusing awareness on one’s breath. It is currently attracting attention as Mindfulness. Previous research has often discussed this practice in relation to the cattaro satipaṭṭhānā (sometimes rendered “four foundations of mindfulness”), and the Ānāpānasatisutta has been regarded as the representative exponent of ānāpānasati. However, a comprehensive investigation of the Pāli canon shows that each Nikāya maintains a different system of ānāpānasati. Subsequently, taking the Paṭisambhidāmagga, an early Abhidhamma text, into consideration, we see that the idea of ānāpānasati as cattaro satipaṭṭhānā was inherited as a specific type that developed into various practices, and a unique theory was added to it. Thus, the starting point of ānāpānasati in the Theravāda originates in the Pāli canon.

The term pañca kāmaguṇā is used to analyze kāma through the five sensory organs. In the Buddhist prose scriptures, most cases of kāma are replaced with pañca kāmaguṇā. Moreover, the plural sentences used to define pañca kāmaguṇā become one of the fixed forms of expression used in the prose scriptures. Conversely, one can also observe some sentences providing a definition of pañca kāmaguṇā that corresponds to the six organs in the prose scriptures. We can conclude that this was affected by the saḷāyatana, a fundamental notion in Early Buddhism.

Śaśadhara, a Navya-nyāya philosopher active in the 14th century, explains prior absence (prāgabhāva) by referring to the dissolution of a world (pralaya) in the “Causeness Chapter” (Kāraṇatā-vāda) and “Absence Chapter” (Abhāva-vāda) of his Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa.

Gaṅgeśa, on the other hand, who was contemporary with or immediately following Śaśadhara, defines that absence without referring to such a dissolution in the “Absence Chapter” (Abhāva-vāda) of his Tattva-cintāmaṇi. His attitude with regard to absence represents the method independent of mythical aspects such as that kind of dissolution, and dependent on daily experience. If mythical aspects represent revelation (mokṣa) and the results of rituals, we cannot deny that Navya-nyāya is subject to them. However, it is sure that Gaṅgeśa attempts to avoid those aspects as much as possible, in defining philosophical concepts such as absence.

Jain Carita Literature has a long tradition. The Jains had formalized their saints into Sixty-three Great Men. However, the authors of Carita works often created many biographies about saints other than the Sixty-three Great Men. This paper takes up three people, Neminātha, Bāhubalin, and Śālibhadra.

Neminātha, the 22nd Tīrthaṅkara is included in Sixth-three Great Men. But the Jain Old Gujarati works, succeeding a tradition of the Jain Caritas, emphasized the love of his fiance Rājul for Neminātha, rather than the biography of Neminātha.

Bāhubalin overwhelmed his brother, the first Cakravartin Bharata, in a battle, and underwent a conversion to Jain doctrine by his father, the first Tīrthaṅkara, Ṛṣabha. Bāhubalin is the most important character in that story.

Śālibhadra was a very wealthy merchant whose wealth outdid that of the king. But one day he realized that the king dominated him, and all people also had a master. Then Śālibhadra renounced the worldly life.

This paper proposes that the Jain authors gave these Extra-saints appropriate roles required according to the social or political situation.

Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya 6364 prescribes ten kinds of monastic rules for the monks. These rules are for those who are: (1) in the position of the monk who practices sāmāyika, and (2) in the position of the monk who must be newly initiated because he has been demoted from his position due to transgressions. In this article, I point out that while the enumeration of these rules is not found in any Śvetāmbara scriptures, Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya 6364 has parallel verses in other Śvetāmbara Bhāṣya commentaries, the works of Haribhadra Virahāṅka, and the Digambara pseudo-canon or the Bhagavatī Ārādhanā and the Mūlācāra. I also point out that the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras give different interpretations to the first rule on “nudity (accelakka, etc.).” While the Digambaras interpret “nudity” as a synomym of aparigraha or non-attachment, the Śvetāmbaras argue that a monk is regarded as “nude” only if he wears rag clothes.

The tooth-filing ceremony on the island of Bali is a rite of passage into adulthood, in which, as Balinese Hindus believe, fang-like qualities of human teeth are smoothed away, and the six inner enemies inherent in human nature are removed. This article explores the sources of the concept of the six enemies in Sanskrit and Old Javanese literature.

Indeed, the idea of the aggregate of six (ṣaḍvarga) as the inner foes is duly transmitted from Sanskrit to Old Javanese texts, as evidenced in the Bhaṭṭikāvya and the Rāmāyaṇa Kakawin. The items enumerated as the six components are, however, not identical with those used for the explanation of tooth-filing in Bali.

A possible solution may be found in a trend of contemporary Balinese Hinduism. Numerous scriptures and teachings popular in India have been imported to Bali towards further “Hinduization.” The ethical concept of the six enemies to be conquered for meditation, as cited in the Devībhāgavatapurāṇa, might be a good example. It might have been introduced in Bali without passing through hundreds of years of literary tradition, and it has also come to be used as an “authentic” interpretation of such an indigenous custom as tooth-filing.

We find in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads stories of householders who have already learned the Vedas approaching the teacher to learn the esoteric teachings. In some cases, the teacher teaches the teachings with ánupetāya (ŚB.11.4.1.9, ŚB.11.4.2.20) or anupanīya (ChU.5.11.7): “without initiation.”

This paper examines the background and meaning of ánupetāya and anupanīya, focusing on the description that “one should teach him who already has stayed for a year” in ŚB.14.1.1.27. Although the backgrounds of ŚB.11.4.2.20 and ChU.5.11.7 are different from the background of ŚB.11.4.2.20, it is presumed that students are already qualified at the time of teaching in both cases. This paper also presents the possibility that the meaning of ánupetāya and anupanīya is “since he is already suitable for esoteric teachings, one will not initiate him.”

To some chapters and sections of the Āraṇyakas (and the Upaniṣads in them), one or more prayers in verse and prose are attached. Such prayers are traditionally called śāntis (pacifications). They are apparently connected to the teaching and learning of the texts to which they are attached. While they would not have been a part of the body of the texts from the beginning, some of those śāntis came to be regarded as part of the texts at various stages of the development of the Āraṇyaka texts and the rites for learning them.