Feedback signals promote changes in behavior that may help to avoid negative out- comes. Feedback evaluation primarily calculates the difference between expected out- comes and the actual outcomes presented by feedback. Gambling tasks are used to in- vestigate the processing of feedback evaluation. Studies have shown that event-related brain potentials (ERPs) reflect a feedback signal (e.g. feedback negativity, FN), such as monetary gain or loss, and its magnitude of reward. While feedback information can deliver multiple results (e.g. hits and misses) immediately for choices with multiple se- lections (e.g. bets on red/black and odd/even in roulette), it remains unclear whether ERPs reflect the number of hits/misses indicated in the feedback. This ERP study focused on evaluating the number of misses indicated by feedback for risky choices. Electroencephalograms were measured while participants performed the task. In each trial, two geometric stimuli (square or triangle, colored blue or red) were presented in series with an interval between. During the first stimulus presentation, participants bet on differences of color and shape between the presented and subsequent stimulus. The second stimulus provided feedback on the result. Participants won for two hits and lost the bet if they had single or double miss. ERP results showed that feedback from double miss evoked a larger P3 on the front central site than feedback from single miss, regardless of the amount lost. This indicates that the combination of FN and P3 reflects processing of the number of misses in multiple selections in a single trial notified by feedback.
This study examined the relationship between the amount of legal knowledge, knowl- edge of the lay judge system, cognitive factors (i.e., perceived risk to one’s life, perceived cost to act as a saiban-in “lay judge,” perceived benefit to act as a saiban-in), emotions (anxiety, stress, and anticipated regret), and behaviors (i.e., intentions and requests to act as a saiban-in) in the lay judge system. First, we surveyed a sample of 307 citizens in 2007 and 700 citizens in 2012, and compared the decision-making processes in these two years using structural equation modeling. The results indicated that the effect of perceived benefit to act as a saiban-in on intentions was weaker in 2012 than 2007. In contrast, the effect of perceived cost was stronger in 2012 than in 2007. This may explain why the intention to act as a saiban-in was low in 2012, despite the greater knowledge of saiban-in processes in 2012 than in 2007. Second, the groups in 2012 were (1) males with a decision-making style defined by low responsibility scores, (2) males with high responsibility scores, (3) females with low scores, and (4) females with high scores. We examined the decision-making processes among the groups. For all groups, there was a cognitive process that perceived risk to one’s life affected intentions to act as a saiban-in, mediated by the perceived cost to act as a saiban-in. However, emo- tional process differed among groups. Therefore, in order to increase intentions to act a saiban-in, it is necessary to provide information that draws on individual differences (e.g., gender, decision-making style), particularly including emotional content.
A fundamental problem in collective decision-making is the conflict between individ- ual and collective rationality. Rational individuals maximize their own self-interest, yet such individual decisions often cause sub-optimal results for the group. Seeking a resolution of this problem, we study an iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) in order to analyze the relationship between individual and collective rationality in the social dilemma. Led by past psychological and economic literature, we introduce a sort of bounded rationality in which the players are not given the payoff structure, but must learn it from experience. Although each player learns to maximize expected payoff in the partial information IPD, our analysis shows the development of a mutually coopera- tive relationship. This result can be interpreted as the relaxation of the social dilemma: bounded individual rationality is also collective rationality.
It is not difficult for residents, for the most cases, to know the knowledge of disaster prevention, while it is quite difficult for them to take appropriate evacuation behavior. For example, it is easy to know why flooded underpasses should not be gone through by cars. It is just because cars would be submerged and got stuck on the way. However, people sometimes fail to apply such knowledge to take an appropriate action, due to the so-called knowledge-to-action gap. In the present study, a preliminary investiga- tion and two experiments were conducted. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify the kinds of unsafe evacuation behavior with reference to newspaper articles on flood disaster over the past 15 years. The two experiments are to examine if the knowledge-to- action gap can be confirmed by means of paper-and-pencil tests consisting of knowledge and intention tasks. Preliminary investigation revealed ten kinds of unsafe evacuation behaviors in flood disaster. Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that participants take unsafe evacuation behaviors even though they have appropriate knowledge. In addition, the experiment 2 indicated that they perceived danger in unsafe evacuation behaviors and flood disaster situation.These results demonstrate an aspect of unsafe evacuation be- havior, and the importance of disaster prevention education, which has to be carefully designed to bridge the gap between knowledge and action for disaster prevention.
This paper examines two-stage multi-attribute decision strategies in different condi- tions where numbers of alternatives, and attributes are varied. A Monte-Carlo com- puter simulation using the concept of elementary information processes identified de- cision strategies that approximate the accuracy of normative procedures while saving cognitive effort in the two-stage decision making process. The elementary strategies examined in the simulation were nine decision strategies: lexicographic, lexicographic semi-order, elimination by aspect, conjunctive, disjunctive, weighted additive, equally weighted additive, additive difference, and majority of confirming dimensions strategies. Elementary information process and relative accuracy were computed for all combina- tion of two decision strategies for two-phased decision making process. The result of the computer simulation suggested that comparatively effortless and accurate heuristic was the two-phased strategy that used lexicographic strategy to eliminate until a few alternatives in the first stage and used weighted additive strategy in the second stage. Lastly, theoretical and practical implications of this study were discussed.
The purpose of this research is to experimentally clarify the influence both of mar- ket factors related to market conditions and of investors’ individual factors related to cognitive tendency on their investment behavior; for this purpose, we conducted an ex- periment using an experimental market in which participants were asked to buy and sell stocks whose prices were controlled. Specifically, we analyzed generalized linear mod- els where each of three behavioral indicators related to investment (the ratio of trend following trading, the extent to which a participant took risks, and disposition effect) was a response variable and both market factors (market trend and volatility) and in- vestors’ individual factors (risk attitude and degree of proficiency) were explanatory variables, so that we could identify whether or not the explanatory variables explained each response variable. Five professional traders and 11 personal investors participated in this experiment. As a result, the following three things were clarified: First, it was affected not by market factors but by their risk attitude whether they followed market trends or not; second, the extent to which they took risks was affected both by market factors and by their degrees of proficiency; finally, disposition effect was affected only by degree of proficiency, which meant that professional traders could avoid disposition effect.
The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of the numeracy and educational levels on biases in five decision tasks: denominator neglect, risk-format effect in breast cancer screening risk communication, misunderstanding of correlation, framing effect, and conjunction fallacy. An internet survey was conducted with Japanese citizens in metropolitan areas (n = 960) whose numeracy scores were previously measured by the Japanese version of Lipkus et al.’s (2001) numeracy scale, aged from their 20s to their 60s with high and low educational levels. Data were analyzed based on 3 criteria of numeracy levels: median split (10), split according to the previous study’s criterion (9), and top-quartile (11) vs. bottom-quartile (7 and under). In the results of analysis by median split, there were no significant differences except the denominator neglect. There existed significant differences in educational levels across the three tasks. In the results by the other criteria, there were significant differences in the tasks of conjunction fallacy and framing effect, but those biases were rather stronger in the high-numeracy group. The influence of the ceiling effect measuring numeracy in Japanese citizens compared to the previous studies’ participants was discussed, as were the kinds of tasks and the difference of response by numeracy.
This study investigated the effect of moral foundation and feeling of disgust toward a criminal case on non-professional legal decisions. Three hundred and sixty participants were asked to read a fictional story about a murder attempt case and rated a possi- bility that a defendant, who had denied all charges against the case, would be judged as guilty. Participants were also rated a degree of regrets about their decision if the truth would be either guilty or not guilty. The degree of physical injury of a victim was varied in accordance with three conditions (i.e., minor, heavy, and permanent damage). The analysis revealed that participants who put much value on not harming others felt disgust toward the criminal case, and that resulted in higher ratings of possibility that the defendant would be judged as guilty. In addition to that, as the degree of physi- cal injury of the victim got severer, the ratings of the possibility also got higher, and participants felt less regrets of their decision even if the defendant was actually not a real perpetrator and thus they made Type II error. We discussed characteristics of non-professional legal decisions from both theoretical and practical perspectives.
Consumers often express different preferences for beverages in sensory test settings compared with those in real-life settings. This study investigates the effects of tasting context on consumer tasting and evaluation of beverages. Three groups of respondents participated in a blind taste test of a consumer beverage in different settings and then evaluated the pleasantness of the beverage. Those who tasted in a real-life setting tended to report greater pleasantness for the sample than those who tasted in a test setting where they were asked to rate multiple sensory characteristics of the sample. Those who tasted in a test setting in which they were not asked to rate these char- acteristics tended to give the sampled beverage moderate ratings that ranked between those given by the other two groups. Several potential explanations for the effects of tasting context are discussed.
Knobe (2003) demonstrated that people’s intentionality judgments of side-effects de- pend on whether the consequence is positive or negative. This indicates that people’s judgments of intentionality of action depend not only on their perception of the inten- tion of the actor but also on the results of the action. The current study examines the Knobe effect in terms of causal structure and probability. To address these issues, this study employed almost the same experimental procedure as Knobe’s original experi- ment (2003). We also added a condition where participants were required to consider the intentionality of an action whose side effect also affected the actor. In addition, this condition required intentionality and probability judgments about outcomes. The results demonstrated that both causal structure and probability play an important role in the Knobe effect.
Processing fluency influences judgment as metacognitive cue. Laham, Koval, & Al- ter (2012) demonstrated name-pronunciation effect whereby easy-to-pronounce (i.e., easy-to-process) names were judged more positively. In their study, however, the “pro- nouncability” was not defined by objective criteria, which may cast doubt on the inter- nal validity of the effect. To overcome this limitation, the present study replicated the name-pronunciation effect by manipulating two objectively defined and well-established pronouncability factors: within-item phonological similarity and phonotactic frequency of the name. Phonological similarity is manipulated by making the constituent morae share the same vowel or not. Phonotactic frequency is defined by a composite score of mora, bi-mora and position-mora frequency. We asked participants to rate impression of names, presenting nonwords as names of foreign person who would come to their of- fice. The result indicated independent effects of phonological similarity and phonotactic frequency with phonologically similar and low phonotactic frequency names being rated negatively. The present study confirmed the internal validity of the name-pronunciation effect in the previous study.
When we are shown pairs of human faces and instructed to decide which face is more preferred, our gaze is gradually biased toward the face that we eventually choose. Shi- mojo, Simion, Shimojo, and Scheier (2003) coined this effect as the gaze cascade effect. In this study, we investigated whether the gaze bias could be observed in various judg- ments other than the preference judgment. In Experiment 1, we showed participants a human face and asked them to memorize it. Then we showed them another human face and asked to do two kinds of judgments: the preference judgment where they had to choose which face they liked more and the dislike judgment where they had to choose which face they disliked more. We found the gaze bias for memorized stimuli in both judgments. In Experiment 2, we showed other participants two human faces and in- structed to select one depending on each specific criterion for five different judgments including the preference judgment. The gaze bias was observed in all judgments, most robustly in the similar judgment where participants instructed to decide which face was more similar to themselves. Contrary to findings by Shimojo et al. (2003), our results suggest that the gaze cascade effect might be involved in the process of visual decision, not limited in preferential formation.