In this article, I elucidate “spiritual nature (霊性 reisei)” in the later Nishida philosophy with relation to self-awareness (自覚 jikaku). Self-awareness does not mean a consciousness of oneself but a grasp of the historical task. Although animals act according to some kind of purpose, they do not know the historical end. The grasp of historical tasks is what distinguishes humans from animals. How possible is it to become self-aware? Nishida said, “It is not through self-refection but by facing our eternal death that we become truly self-aware.” In this passage “facing our eternal death” means “facing Absolute Being.” When we face Absolute Being, we must choose between two paths. Either we convert, attain faith, and gain eternal life or we do not and are forever damned to the fires of hell. “Eternal death” means that we understand ourselves as sinful beings and that we are reborn by the death of past selves. “Facing Absolute Being” has two directions. One direction is Judgment, in which God points out our sinful lives, and the other is forgiveness as agapē. We can find these directions in the words of Jeremiah the prophet as follows: “Do justice and righteousness, and deliver from the hand of the oppressor him who has been robbed. And do no wrong or violence to the resident alien, the fatherless, and the widow, nor shed innocent blood in this place.”

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This paper discusses the term “Divination (rei-kaku 霊覚),” which Suzuki Daisetz (1870-1966) used in order to describe religious experience and consciousness. This concept refers to such awareness as the heart of the individual who has life sufferings related to “the suffering due to the fetter of deeds (gokke-ku 業繋苦).” These sufferings mean, from his point of view, critical contradictories with which we are likely to confront in our lives. He supposed that humans are destined to live these sufferings, which we have difficulties in getting over on the basis of duality or rationalism. He thus explored some ways to find out the relation held together in a unity, a kind of “self-identity of contradictories (mujunteki-jikodoitsu 矛盾的自己 同一).” In other words, in his opinion, human beings must realize that such contradictory relation is based on the divination to get over the spiritual suffering due to the fetter of deeds. 　　This paper, therefore, concludes with the detailed definition of “divination” which Suzuki Daisetz tried to figure out in his essays, especially his writings in post-war time, and at the same time, this analysis aims to illustrate the similarity of philosophical traits between Suzuki Daisetz and Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) who also examined “self-identity of contradictories.”

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The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper examines Nishida’s “energetistic” ethics with focus on the ideas of eidos and Tatsache (“fact”). Second, it clarifies the presentism inherent in his eidetic thought. The texts to be discussed are Nishida’s An Inquiry into the Good (1911), especially its Part Ⅲ, and Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness (1932), especially “My Thought about Self-Determination of Absolute Nothingness” (1931), as well as Miki’s Philosophy of History (1931-1932) and other texts. Unlike Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre which begins with the first principle of Tathandlung, the kernel of Nishida’s energetistic ethics is Tatsache, defined as present self-productive poesis of sensible and embodied reality. In An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida argues that the self-productive and sensible reality of Tatsache is inseparable from three eidoi (truth, goodness, beauty) and that this energetistic ethics is compatible with eudaimonism of Plato and Aristotle. But how can the idea of “fact as such” (Tatsache) be the basis of normative thought of the eidoi? The paper shows that Nishida’s eidetic thought has some similarities to G.E. Moore’s metaethics in Principia Ethica (1903), in which Moore criticizes the “naturalistic fallacy.” Contrasting Nishida’s eidetic thought (of Tatsache) and Moore’s metaethics (of Sache) the paper clarifies the presentism of Nishida’s energetism as an essence of his ethics.

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In An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida accords great significance to personality, seeing it as the root of all value and as one of the concepts central to ethics grounded in a theory of pure experience. “Personality is the basis of all value, and in the universe only personality possesses absolute value.” (NKZ1, 122.) On the other hand, when he contends that “The sphere of consciousness is never limited to the individual person, for the individual person is no more than a small system within consciousness” (NKZ1, 32), Nishida makes an impersonalist argument against limiting the scope of consciousness and life to the individual personality. Using the newly discovered ‘Lecture Notes on Ethics’ as a guide, in this paper I will seek not only to clarify the implications and scope of Nishida’s theory of personality but also to examine the position that the concept of personality has in his theory of pure experience.

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この論文は、デリダ、道元、西田を読み解き、言語―有時の思考の出来事とし ての一回性の論理を、各人がどのように表出しようとしたかを検討するものであ る。 第Ⅰ部では、思考について言語の内側から思考することの可能性・不可能 性というダブルバインドをめぐるデリダの考えを示し、それを通して第Ⅱ部で道 元と西田の共通点を示そうとする。 しかしながら、その共通点は、究極的には 二者の相違点を浮き彫りにするものである。道元は「非思量」、西田は「無の場所」 への道を示すことで一回性について考えることができる。これに対して、デリダ は西欧的伝統の言葉で考え続けるため、この道は必然的に彼には閉ざされている。 デリダは形而上学の言語の脱構築を企てるが、まさにそのために、彼は形而上学 的言語に囚われたままなのである。 それに対して、道元は言語を、西田は哲学を、 存在（有）の論理ではないものに変容させる。 西田哲学は、一方では西洋哲学 との対決、他方では禅仏教との対決という二重の対決から生まれたものであり、 そのことによって、出来事の一回性の論理を歴史性の創造的契機の論理として表 出することに成功する。

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