This paper is intended as an investigation for the problem of Body in Bergson and Nishida. In the both philosophers, the problem of body plays an important role to overcome the conflict between materialism and spiritualism, between realism and idealism, between subjectivism and objectivism. Bergson’s theory of “Image” defines the representation perceived in function of the possible action of body. But the presence of “Image” rests irreductible. Moreover, when he attempt to include the material world in the “Duration”, he seems to confront with some difficulties. Criticizing Bergson, the philosophy in Nisida’s later period oppose the individual-time-consciousness against the universal-space-matter in dialectic schema, where the matter has expression. We can say that Nishida's, philosophy of Nothingness has possibility to surmount the conflict in the philosophy of “Being”.

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This presentation attempts to show how Nishida’s philosophy and phenomenology relate to each other in terms of the “body” and “history”. Roughly speaking, phenomenology bases itself upon the principle that “what appears, appears”[das Erscheinende erscheint].(This is not a mere tautology.)Contrary to the prevalent view, body and history are central issues for phenomenology. Phenomenology describes how the Erscheinendes is initially accomplished and how it appears as a sense-unity. The medium of this process is the body, and the sense that appears through the process plays in history the role of a signifier of direction. These analyses relate to Nishida’s concept of the “historical body”. In today’s historical situation, bodies encounter other bodies interculturally and become hybridized(not only in the biological sense, but in the sense that intercultural encounters influence the constitutive functions of the body). New things appear, and those who live within the framework of tradition can easily lose their way. The dialogue between Nishida’s philosophy and phenomenology, which has already begun, can expand our view of this new reality.

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Nietzsche sagt: „es handelt sich vielleicht bei der ganzen Entwicklung des Geistes um den Leib: es ist die fühlbar werdende Geschichte davon, daß ein höherer Leib sich bildet.“ In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich das Verhältnis vom Leib zum Geist beim späten Nietzsche am Leitfaden seiner Ansichten über Kunst und Moral aufzuklären. 1. Nietzsche bestimmt den Geist als Selbst-Auslegung der leiblichen Zustände, die aber nicht dem Leib selber zugeschrieben werden, die also als zum vom Leib unabhängigen Gebiet gehörend falsch geurteilt werden; dann entsteht der Dualismus von Materie und Geist(oder Seele). 2. Moral ist im Grund „ein langer Zwang“, d. h. Orientierung und Festlegung der geistigen(nämlich: mißinterpretierten leiblichen)Kräfte, wodurch Möglichkeiten dieser Kräfte zugleich verwirklicht und beschränkt werden; nach Nietzsche hat besonders die christliche Moral durch die Interpretation von bestimmten leiblichen kränklichen Zustände als geistige „Sünde“ die Entwicklung der leiblichen Möglichkeiten gehemmt. Dagegen 3. kann die „dionysische“ Kunst neue virtuelle leibliche Kräfte freilegen und zur Durchführung gelangen lassen, was zugleich die Entwicklung der noch unentwickelten geistigen Kräfte bedeutet. Deshalb will Nietzsche gerade in der Kunst eine Möglichkeit der Überwindung der europäischen Nihilismus erkennen.

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This paper develops a comparative analysis of the philosophies of Kitaro Nishida, William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce, who was James’ contemporary logician and lifelong friend. The influence of James on the early philosophy of Nishida is widely known, but there are significant differences between what James and Nishida respectively understand as pure experience. The main view of this paper is that for both Nishida and Peirce pure experience is marked with phenomenal as well as logical unity, whereas James fervently rejected such logical unity. Torataro Shimomura once noted that Nishida was sympathetic with James’ notion of pure experience and that he inherited the term junsuikeiken from James, but not its philosophical content. By focusing on logic in An Inquiry into the Good, this paper identifies striking commonalities between Nishida and Peirce rather than between Nishida and James. Given Nishida’s strong leaning toward logic, on the one hand, and James’ persistent repulsion for logic, on the other, it is unsurprising that this reading receives solid textual support, which may lead to a reappraisal of James’ influence on Nishida’s early philosophy.

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Nishida discussed the problem of love in his two philosophico-religious works, “A study of Good”(1911)and “Self-conscious Realization of Nothingness”(1932). At first Nishida considered the essence of religion as “Unity of Human with God”, and love as a “Unifying Act” in “A Study of Good”. His concept of religion seems, however, to have been radically changed and deepened in “Self-conscious Realization of Nothingness”: the essence of religion is not to be seen as an immediate unity of Human with God, but as the retrieved oneness mediated through God’s “Agape”, i.e. His self-emptying love. In this paper, I will explain why such a radical sift has happened. To this purpose, I would like to focus on Nishida’s idea of “Reality” and “the historical world” as a new theme of his later philosophy, heralding a new dimension of dialogue between Nishida’s philosophy and Christianity.

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When presented with some forms of nature and works of art, we feel they are beautiful. These kinds of experiences are generally believed to be quite different to cognitive experience and are called “aesthetic experience”. This paper aims to reveal what Nishida thought about aesthetic experience through his paper “Problems of consciousness”. In his theory, aesthetic experience is different from cognition, and does not serve a cognitive purpose. However, it is not purely subjective ― it also has an objective aspect. We think that the world of art is subjective and the world of experience is objective, but artists also have an objective world to discuss with each other(“Problems of consciousness”). In his argument for the objectivity of aesthetic experience, he uses Kant’s argument for the objectivity of cognition to argue for the apriority of aesthetic experience. Cognition has its language of concepts as the base of its apriority and, in the same way, aesthetic experience has its language of senses as the base of its apriority. This is called‘pure seeing’ after Fiedler’s theory of expression(“Über den Ursprung der künstlerischen Tätigkeit”). Nishida also argues that cognition and aesthetic experience represent the same reality in their own languages. By arguing in this way, he invokes the unity of apparently diverse experiences, which is one of the main theses of Nishida’s philosophy.

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Dans l’ouvrage De l’agissant au voyant(1927), Kitarô Nishida écrit que les mots ne sont que des signes, mais apprécie aussi positivement le langage comme corps de la pensée. Cet article se propose de lire ensemble ces deux affirmations en examinant les positions de ce livre. Nishida parle, à cette époque, de la réalité intuitive comme d’un hypokeimenon qu’il définit, en référence à Aristote, comme ≪Ce qui est sujet mais jamais prédicat≫. Cependant l’hypokeimenon n’est pas le sujet grammatical d’une proposition, car il est ≪un concept extrême qui n’est même pas sujet≫. En fait, sujet et prédicat sont tous deux des abstractions de cet hypokeimenon, des choses simplement dites ou écrites. Selon Nishida, la définition de l’hypokeimenon s’interprète donc comme ≪ce qui n’est jamais exprimé par le langage≫. Or si l’hypokeimenon transcende le langage, les jugements n’entretiendront plus aucun rapport avec lui, et ils ne pourront plus constituer de connaissances logiques. Nishida établit alors, d’une part, le jugement comme auto-détermination de l’hypokeimenon et, d’autre part, considère celui-ci comme la limite des déterminations de notions universelles formant des séries subsomptives. Nishida renouvelle ainsi le modèle traditionnel de définition par le genre et la différence spécifique.

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The notion of the individual(個物 kobutu)is well known to be a key element of the later Nishidian philosophy. There, it plays a necessary role in the dialectical logic of the historical world, so much as to give rise to what Nishida calls a “dialectical monadology”. However, it did not always enjoy such an importance and served essentially to sustain a philosophy of unification based on the idea of the concrete or self-determining universal. In this paper, we will take a closer look at the place assigned to the individual in the formation of Nishida’s philosophy, especially his first usage of Leibniz’ monadology in The problem of Consciousness. The subsequent developments, meanwhile they are accurately explained from the perspective of the concept of nothingness, can also be presented from the correlative idea of the individual. From this position, we will interpret the role of the hypokeimenon and the later transformations of the subsomptive logic into a dialectical logic. The progressive emancipation of the concept of the individual can thus be seen as one of the important developments leading to Nishida’s late thought.

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