This article reconsiders the problem of the life, set up by Kitamura Toukoku, in the twenties of the Meiji era. He was a poet and a critic, and died very young, at the age of 25. But he left us very important articles a lot about the concept of the life.

  In those days, the democratic movement abated, while Japanese society was modernized rapidly. The constitution was promulgated, and the Diet was opened. The society had been regulated, but many conflicts remained unsolved. Kitamura said that this society was just like a jail. In such society, Kitamura considered the significance of the life.

  For him, the life should be going on a principle of the natural law. The force of the nature is the absolute cause and the only substance. It rules the human body and soul, which are the modes of the force. Human beings are passive against the force of the nature. But human beings can recognize that the force rules the human beings. There lies the problem of the freedom. This recognition involves the problem of the freedom of reason. Human beings of reason can know what the life is. And human beings can endeavor to get own liveliness and pleasure. That conatus is a human's right based on the natural law. Such human-nature relation is a core of the concept of the life. When this relation is good for human beings, the life will be healthy. But if not good, it is ascribed to the social power because of the restraint of this relation.

  Kitamura witnessed that the social power of the Meiji era kept the people poor and miserable forever. So he decried the Meiji government hard. Besides, he also criticized the social evolutionism that had supported the government. He valued human's life on the natural law, hence it follows that he demanded to ameliorate the condition of society.

  His concept of the life was connected with the politics from the beginning. Put another way, his revolutionary consciousness needed the concept of the life as an urgent problem. He demanded the democracy after the end of the constitutional monarchy. The agency of this democracy was the people who were oppressed by the government. Such people are the multitude. He hoped that people would be relived and would live healthy together. The concept of the life propounded by Kitamura is still important for us today.

  The subject of this paper is to prove that the racial inequality which Alexis de Tocqueville points out in the first volume of De la démocratie en amérique is not only a problem of the America but also the problem of democracy. While the previous researches have focused excessively on the positive aspects of American democracy in Tocqueville, they had not focused sufficiently on the negative aspects of that. One of these aspects is “the racial inequality”.

  It is certain that Tocqueville says that the issues of the racial inequality in the United States ‘were tangential to my subject: they are American but not democracy’. However, it is possible to insist that the racial inequality is an important ‘democratic’ issue of the US. Tocqueville himself does not simply describe the inequality in the undemocratic relation between whites and black slaves. He also observes carefully “the prejudice” in the North that there exists democracy and institutional equality between whites and ‘free blacks’. Although almost all States had already abolished the slavery in the North, the prejudice existed and even intensified in the North. This suggests that the racial inequality in the United States is paradoxical for democracy, since the “democracy” for Tocqueville means principally ‘the equality of conditions’. And it is more important that he explains, in a note, such a relation between whites and ‘free blacks’ as a typical example of “the tyranny of majority” that is the ‘democratic’ despotism.

  Lastly, this paper examines briefly the religion in the early 19th century US which has often provided the ground for the justification of the slavery. During the period the American anti-slavery movement developed as a part of the religious reform, but even the white abolitionists were assailed by the Northerners including ‘the gentlemen of property and standing’. These mobs represented the majority of the people in the North that approved the abolition but still clung fiercely to the prejudice and refused such a crusade against the inequality. This case goes against Tocqueville's expectation, for the religion could not moderate the tyranny of majority.

  Thus two paradoxes will be discussed in this paper ; paradox of De la démocratie en amérique itself as well as that of the American democracy. The analysis in this paper indicates that certain features of the racial inequality are democratic and it may be even intensified in democratic societies.

  The present article explains interesting points that George Cornewall Lewis (1806-1863)'s theory on authority raised when observed in a historical context. Lewis was an eminent statesman and an excellent man of letters, but he has been almost forgotten. This article chiefly examines “An Essay on the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion” (1849) as a starting point to approach his social thought as a whole. Among many Lewis's treatises, this book is the most important work for the investigation of his theory on authority.

  When inquired from our aspect, the most important authority this book presented is the authority of professionals, because gentleman was the ideal type of man for his contemporaries. Gentleman was a man of landed upper class and had comprehension of wide literal culture, and thus, was not a narrow-eyed man. On the other hand, professionals were to make themselves specialize in one calling and earned for his bread ; so they were generally seen with considerable contempt. (Lewis meant by profession lawyer, physician, engineer and so on.) However, Lewis dared to defend professionals as authority, and claimed a proper social position for them. He advocated professional as a man with particular scientific knowledge. Of course, since they had knowledge of only one field, a society comprised of various kinds of professionals. Lewis argued that to each field State should give support, but he denied its intervention. In Lewis's vision, society of professions was based on a spontaneous and a plural order, and people were to chose a proper authority rationally in each situation.

  However this argument on professionals did not cover the whole body of Lewis's political thought. He also argued that political bodies should be run in accordance with the “principle of corporate action”, and thus, he advocated (aristocratic or democratic) republic as a form of government ; its ultimate decision should be made by plural persons in an assembly. This assembly had a “supreme political authority (sovereignty)”, and thus, unavoidably, its decision had to be made by a majority of that assembly.

  Moreover, in the political realm, he did not demand a critical position for professionals like other realms. In addition, he did not accept the professional of politics. Thus statesmen had to understand history from the ancient time.

  Among various kinds of republics, he especially defended a representative government as an aristocracy. In his ideal constitution, people (the inferior) chose superior aristocracy, and a real political judgement was sanctioned by the latter. Therefore, in spite of many differences, his idea of political constitution appeared with the same form of other professional realms : one can find his vision of the order of authorities lying both in professional realm and politics.

  Enzo Traverso categorizes many Marxists' theories on anti-Semitism from 1843 to 1943 into three types: economist, functionalist and psychological theory. He classifies Horkheimer's theory before 1939 to economist, and that after WWII to psychological. In this article, however, it is argued that this is over-simplification, and that there were in fact two aspects in 1939.

  This paper first traces the formation of theories on anti-Semitism by Frankfurt School, and examines Horkheimer's attitude toward anti-Semitism. It has been said that Horkheimer underestimated the danger of anti-Semitism, because his first analysis on anti-Semitism “The Jews and Europe”, published in 1939, considered Jew as an economic category and regarded anti-Semitism as subordinate phenomena following transformation of capitalism. Horkheimer, however, had already paid attention to a psychological aspect of anti-Semitism, and also had a plan to research anti-Semitism.

  Secondly, we use “The Research Project on Anti-Semitism”, published in 1941, to investigate his perspective on anti-Semitism. There were two major objects turning into anti-Semitism in his project, one was psychological origin and the other was socio-economic background. Moreover, there was a fascist-political anti-Semite, who organized the spontaneous actions of people against the Jews without hate. In spite of such an ambitious plan, this was not complete one. Horkheimer did not adequately consider the importance of nationalism, although his theory had a potential for pursuing the articulation of nationalism and racism.

  Thirdly, in two lectures held in 1943, “The Plan of Research Project on Anti-Semitism” and “To Psychology of Anti-Semitism”, he propounded a new perspective for analysis on anti-Semitism. In these lectures, he integrated his earlier attempts, and criticized the processes of civilization over a specific context with them. In this direction, Horkheimer and Adorno worked out their most important work ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ as a philosophical self-reflect on civilization in 1944.

  In conclusion, those two theories suggest there are two different approaches to resolve anti-Semitism. “The Research Project on Anti-Semitism” aimed at giving practical and concrete way to struggle against anti-Semitism to Jewish and non-Jewish progressive circles. On the contrary, ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ has a view of universal emancipation.

  The purpose of this paper is to supplement libertarian state theory through investigating the structure of the state theory of Robert Nozick(1938-2002). Nozick proves legitimacy of the minimal state not using social contract theory but using natural rights theory in his primary book Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). And yet, libertarianism that “denies coercion” that violates personal freedoms is compatible with contract theory that makes just norms and institutions formed by “agreement among individuals”. In fact, investigating Nozick's state theory, we can identify the idea of contract theory in it. In this paper, I supplement Nozick's state theory by uniting natural rights libertarianism with contract theory, and consider the contemporary significance of extending libertarian state theory in this way.

  Nozick argues that a state existing itself is not always unjust by demonstrating that a (minimal) state “could” arise without violating individual rights from a state of nature. In his argument, Nozick dismisses the concept of social contract or joint agreement. But he proves legitimacy of political domination by a state using contract theory, because individuals indicate agreement to each transition itself to the minimal state from the state of nature. Moreover, the minimal state is the framework common to various communities of which inhabitants can move to any other community freely, and institutions and rules of the communities within the state are made as these members like. That is, communities in the minimal state are exactly formed on the basis of the idea of contract theory. Therefore, it is possible to interpret Nozick's libertarian state theory and contract theory compatibly.

  In particular, regarding contract theory as a method of normative analysis like contemporary contractarians, we can even find practical solutions toward problems related to the state and community. This is typically found in the problem of legitimacy of taxation to administer the state and community. As far as taxation is concerned, libertarianism seems to be in conflict with contract theory. However, regarding contract theory as normative analysis, libertarianism is never in conflict with contract theory, and significantly, services provided to individuals by the state and community come to correspond with benefits individuals receive from them. Furthermore, focusing attention on the relation between the state and the community in Nozick's state theory, we can also regard the minimal state as “the world” and communities as “states”. From this perspective, we can understand that the minimal state shapes not only the framework of one state but also the framework of the world. In that sense, Nozick's minimal state theory has relatively high comprehensiveness.

  This paper examines how two apparently contradictory sides of Hermann Cohen's political philosophy, namely, nationalism and the universalistic idea of a league of states (Staatenbund), are theoretically compatible. First, I examine how Cohen interprets the Old Testament and the Talmud to posit the universality of Judaism. Next, I explore his contention that a universalistic character similar to Judaism can be found in the modern state defined by so-called Ethical Socialism, especially in the German state. I conclude that this theory of the state led Cohen to regard the First World War as a just war for the Jews and Germans.

  With regard to Cohen's understanding of Judaism, the paper concentrates on his conception of the love of neighbors. He contends that “neighbor” in the Mosaic Law refers not to Jews, but to aliens residing in the Israeli state. According to Cohen, the Law which commanded love of these aliens (“Noachide”) granted citizenship in the old Israeli state to them, and so this state attained a universalistic liberalism. The paper pursues the connection between this theory of Noachide and Cohen's approval of the Diaspora. In order to be truly universalistic, Cohen argues, the modern Jews must not form a particular nation-state, but must themselves remain aliens in existing states.

  The paper then turns to Cohen's view of the modem state. He finds the universality of the modern state not in erasing the specificity of peoples, but in preserving and integrating a multiplicity of peoples. For Cohen, especially Germany, which embodied universalism through the principle of nation in the Reformation and in the wars of liberation against Napoleon, can do justice both to universalism and to the specificity of peoples. The German state thus succeeds to the old Israeli state in integrating aliens as citizen without assimilating them to the majority group. Cohen considers that this universalism of the Israeli-German state can become the basis for a principle of international order, that is, a league of states. Therefore, he regards Germany's national war as defending universalism and as preparing perpetual peace via a league of similarly-constituted states. The paper concludes, however, that his idea of a league of states fell into a just war theory, and that his universalism could not escape nationalism.