In the Post-Cold War era, the End of History thesis proposed by F. Fukuyama and Clash of Civilizations theory by Samuel P. Huntington were two competing ideas concerning the framework of the world order. Which will be the dominant mode of world order, either a universal dominance of liberal democracy or the civilizational divide? This “Fukuyama-Huntington Question” has been the underlying issue in the study of Post-Cold war era global intellectual history. Political and intellectual history of the Arab world has been the crucial issue in assessing the validity of either frameworks. In this short proposition, liberal predicament of the Arab intellectuals in the modern condition is reaffirmed. Also Huntingtonian unitary vision of a Islamic Civilization is refuted by juxtaposing the alternative view of the Arab world order characterized by mosaic-like “Dots and Spots” mired with multiple divisions based on sectarian, tribal and national identities.

  Albert Hirschman’s classic The Passions and the Interests (1977) provides the backdrop of the argument for the rise of populism. The book offers a thrilling account of the intellectual transformation that occurred during the initial phase of capitalism: the pursuit of material interest, once condemned as “avarice,” one of the seven mortal sins, was assigned the new and positive role of containing the other sins by repressing and harnessing unruly passions. The word “interest,” however, meant more than “the material aspects of a person’s welfare.” In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Puritan literature, the word “interest” means “being objectively concerned” in spiritual privileges. Likewise, the “interest” of populism today is not a material gain but the sense of participating in a world larger than the self via social media. Populism becomes more intelligible in the light of religious passion expressed in this desire for direct and meaningful social engagement. Integrating individual voices for social justice was once the function of organized religions, but today their function is replaced by populism. The religious character of populism is also evident in its dualistic world-view that paints political camps either in total good or total evil, resulting in unyielding fundamentalism. Participants in populist movements enjoy a sense of representing ultimate orthodoxy. Populism by default tends to rely on individual leaders’ charisma, bypassing the party system. Here also lies a parallel to what has happened in the churches and other religious organizations, since these earthly media of grace have fallen into disrepute today in favor of an unmediated relationship to God. The remaining question would be: are intermediary institutions dispensable, in either religion or politics?

  Although social science scholars tend to downplay the role of religion in public life, many modern social thinkers had argued for the need for “civil religion.” The aim here is twofold. First, this essay examines how most researches in the field of the history of social thought in Post-war Japan has underestimated the influence of religion in society, taking some leading textbooks for example. Second, the essay attempts to show that many social thinkers in post-revolutionary France considered the invention of new religion as essential for the maintenance of democratic society, focusing on Jules Michelet’s view of religion.

  In recent years, there are several social or political theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, who give considerable attention to the role of religion in public sphere. However, their attention is limited to the established religion. This essay demonstrates that some ideas of new religion were developed by many social thinkers and they were the invisible one in the sense that they were not institutionalized like the revolutionary religion from the Cult of Reason to the Cult of the Supreme Being. Among them, Michelet’s view of religion is most similar to Rousseau’s idea of civil religion. The essay also shows that it is a prototype of “the populism as the alternative religion” in the United States, the concept that Prof. Anri Morimoto presented in the 42^nd SHST Annual Conference last year.

  The purpose of this paper is to examine on the whole Hegel’s thought of ‘Ethical Life’ developed in the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) in terms of his response to Rousseau’s theory of the State.

  Although Rousseau indicated the principle of State to harmonize obedience with liberty, he did not indicate an adequate solution of how to solve the disagreement with the general will and the particular will in the actual “man”.

  Hegel succeeded Rousseau’s idea of “autonomy” which is the same as “community” that to obey general will is to obey one’s will. However, Hegel comprehended “constitution of the general will” not as social contract, but as the process to actualize mutual recognition through laws and institutions. In this case, Rousseau’s logic of “alienation” is transformed to the logic of “education or building”. Individuals who cultivated themselves recognize that it is possible for them to exist as free person only in the being-recognized among others which is based on laws and institutions. This recognition leads themselves to foster an attitude to pursue the public interests. By correlatively comprehending the process to actualize mutual recognition through institutions and the process of individual’s building, Hegel could indicate the logic to mediate the individual and the general will, which Rousseau could not do.

  This article clarifies the contemporary role of philosophy in the neo-Marxist theory. In Empire (2000), Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt showed the analysis of the new form of global power that was emerging as Empire. This analysis brought ambivalent vision: Empire was the realization of global society of control and real subsumption of labour under capital, but in Empire, the possibility of revolutions was getting larger. This vision was based on the Italian Marxist’s argument, which regarded workers’ power (potere operaio) as an essential element for the development of capitalism. Hence in their point of view, real subsumption never means the one-dimentionalization. Negri and Hardt accepted this optimism of Italian Marxism.

  However, class struggle cannot be a spontaneous product. Hence Negri and Hardt discussed “the contemporary role of intellectuals.” And they argued that spontaneity and hegemony were not the only alternatives. But their metaphor for the new form of revolution (an orchestra keeping the beat without a conductor) sounds like spontaneity of organization. This article shows how the role of philosophy in the new class struggle is determined in Negri and Hardt’s work.

  In this paper, I examine one of Gandhi’s experiments with brahmacarya (sexual celibacy) during his stay in South Africa (1893-1915), namely “the renouncement of [cow’s] milk” (dūdhnā tyāg; hereafter dt). By so doing, I show that the experiment with dt was the key factor to understand his core idea of political nonviolence (ahiṃsā) in South Africa.

  During the initial stage of his satyāgraha (nonviolent resistance) struggle in South Africa, Gandhi lived together with his friend Hermann Kallenbach, a German Jewish carpenter. Gandhi’s autobiographical writings rarely mention about their cohabitation and their exotic experiment with dt.

  By examining Gujarātī and English-language primary materials about their cohabitation, I demonstrate that Gandhi’s experiment with dt was practiced with the intention to root out Gandhi’s homoerotic feelings towards Kallenbach. Gandhi believed that milk was the primal cause for the arousal of “sexual desire” (vikār); Gandhi and Kallenbach developed a close and intimate relationship during their cohabitation. Gandhi had to take the vow of dt in order to gain a victory in his satyāgraha struggle; Gandhi firmly believed that the visible violence in the outside world was a reflection of the invisible violence (sexual desire) inside him.

This paper examines how the view of refugee movements has been formed in the pot-war international society and inquires a possibility to overcome the now fixed view. First, this paper roughly describes a history of refugee studies as an academic discipline. Too often, refugee movements have been presented as an object of humanitarianism in the field. Second, although refugee studies have aimed at solving the refugee problems, it has become clear that implementing several solutions, which are suggested for the current situations of refugee movements, is difficult. This paper explores the causes of the difficulties. Third, there is a fundamental relationship between refugees and the nation-state system established in the modern era. The forced migrations inevitably stem from the state system demarcating the distinct borders and the membership. Forth, this paper inspects a liberal view of refugees, which is a premise shared both with refugee studies and the international refugee protection regime. Fifth, the liberal view has overlooked a dimension of collectiveness and communality in the refugee movements. Refugees move collectively rather than individually and try to keep or create their own communities. Finally, this paper explores a possibility that refugees as ‘exiles’ can unite each other.