Where is the ontological location of an intrinsical quality which is felt without mediation? In this paper, we examine the possibility of regarding this quality as an intermediate and indefinable reality which cannot be subsumed under our ordinary concept of consciousness nor under material function. And we attempt this through an examination of the concept of "experience" proposed by William James. The reason why this quality has no concrete position in a materialistic framework is found in our cognitive premise which is objective from the beginning. On the other hand, as in the case of "experience", we are compelled to regard this quality as something ineffable and too near to grasp. Because this quality is neither objectiue nor subjective.
Thus, this quality is essentially not attained without our becoming identical with it. Concerning this, some insist that the essence of subjectivity necessarily continues to slip out from external grasping or that the essence of mind is closured from our native cognitive abilities. Thus they regard this reality as something beyond objective understanding but having a certain status of its own. And this apparently contradictory peculiarity is ultimately not refutable.
The existence of will or meaning can also be deduced from the reality of this fundamental quality. Moreover, the ground of this reality is to be found in the ontological right of subjective directness which can only be grasped from within. And this directness justi-fies itself in the fact that the cause of it is not to be sought out. On the contrary, we are to inguire the fur ther cavse of an objective reality, whenever we think we have arrived at the core of the reality. But we can avoid this difficulty by regarding reality as something not objective and in definable.
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