In the early 1980s, Indonesia witnessed the extrajudicial killings of thousands of hoodlums by security forces. The victims’ bodies were left at prominent public places. Because the authorities did not admit to any involvement, the Indonesian media termed the killings “Petrus,” which means “mysterious shootings.” This thesis aims to analyze the ruling style of Suharto’s regime by considering the mass killings.

From the beginning, the Suharto regime regarded Indonesian society as a legitimate target for intelligence activities and machinations, as symbolized by the existence of Operasi Khusus (Opsus); this was initially a team set up for the army’s intelligence work in Malaysia, but later became institutionalized to rule over Indonesian society. Applying intelligence and machinations to maintain domestic rule may be considered a rational step for the authorities. Given that other strong political ideologies still had deep roots in society, it was extremely difficult to create the Golkar system based on the state-sponsored Pancasila ideology by means of repression alone. Thus, the government had to rely on intelligence operations, such as machinations, provocations, and propaganda that justified the repression of potential enemies.

This thesis, based on interviews, seeks to show that many victims of Petrus were hoodlums who had been recruited as agents for covert operations. They were organized under Ali Moertopo, the head of Opsus and Suharto’s right-hand man in the early days of the regime. Though there has long been a speculation that the real target of Petrus was Moertopo’s network, the rumors have not been substantiated.

My argument is as follows. The Suharto regime, in its effort to build up the Golkar system, often used intelligence machinations toward members of its own society to eliminate or weaken potential enemies. This ruling style naturally alienated a specific societal group and created social divisions. The target of Petrus (or in any case, one of the main targets) were the hoodlums who had been used as a tool for such machinations. After their mission was over, the hoodlums came to be seen as unnecessary and dangerous; they were eliminated themselves through another huge machination—Petrus. In this context, Petrus symbolized a fundamental contradiction in the Suharto regime, which sought the thorough permeation of “harmonious” Pancasila ideology, but, in reality, could not rule the country without dividing society.

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 This article attempts to analyze Indonesia's New Order under its post-1965 military leadership in light of its political modernization. The discussion assumes that the ability of the ruling elite to implement political modernization depends upon four conditions : first, the ruling elite must be able to maintain national unity in a political and geographical sense; second, it must define national objectives appropriate to prevailing national conditions; third, it must formulate economic plans and organize an effective administration for their execution; and fourth, it must allow for political groups to function as long as they support the goals and directions of Indonesia as prescribed by the ruling elite.
 The current military elite has demonstrated its ability to restore and maintain national unity, and to define the appropriate national objectives through the new political symbols of "development" and "Panca Sila democracy." Since 1969 the regime has launched the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, by which the regime has sought to justify its own existence and which has functioned as a symbol of national unity to a great degree. This regime also has earned political legitimacy through the general elections of 1971,which resulted in the victory of its party, Golkar. Although these actions encourage Indonesia's political modernization, there are other factors which seem to stifle it. The regime has mobilized highly educated technocrats into economic planning, but they have encountered many difficulties in implementing it effectively. The Javanese-dominated "moderate" wing of the Army, which controls the post-1966 Indonesian government, has consolidated its political position by eliminating the Army's more "radical" leaders, weakening the Indonesian Nationalist and Muslim Parties, regrouping the nine political parties into two large ones, and placing Golkar under the control of the Defense and Security Department. Although the Suharto leadership has been strengthened temporarily by these actions, its lack of political generosity in maintaining competing groups within the political system appears to have stifled desirable political development in Indonesia. Although the Suharto government may tolerate a low level of political development, it can not afford failure in economic development. In short, the future of the current Five-Year Development Plan and its succeeding plans, which are so much a symbol of national unity, may well determine the political life of the regime.

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 Qualities of leadership of two Indonesian presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, often are contrasted in such traits as personality, professional background, and national policy. As a pro-Communist revolutionary, Sukarno's charisma is hardly similar to that of his successor, an anti-Communist, development-conscious "Smiling General." Yet there are at least as many similarities in, as differences between their respective styles of governing. Both have been intensely concerned about the political unity of the nation and have used to this end the Proclamation of Independence Day, the Constitution of 1945 and the Pancasila (five principles of the state).
 A brief content analysis of the presidential speeches presented annually on Independence Day reveals, as is shown in the table, a strikingly frequent use of certain key words and slogans during both Sukarno's Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) and Sukarto's Panca Sila Democracy period (1966 to date). Sukarno's attachment to "revolution" and Suharto's concern for "development" both have been fashioned into slogans and acronyms, thus into symbols of governmental performance. The post-1965 Panca Sila Democracy and the pre-1965 Guided Democracy, in substance, differ only slightly from each other.
 Continuity also can be observed in the management of governmental and political apparatus. Rule by the Javanese majority has been a fundamental principle of Indonesian politics for the last three decades of independence, and with this has come an extreme sensitivity to balancing power between Javanese and non-Javanese forces. Sukarno's concept of NASAKOM has prevailed in Suharto's idea of three political groupings : Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party and the Development Unity Party. Both leaders have attempted further to turn the bureaucratic apparatus into a convenient machine to support and to promote government ideology. Finally, the pre-Gestapu and post-Gestapu presidents, not being able to use effectively the massive government bureaucracy, have resorted to "extra-constitutional" means to accomplish their objectives, as exemplified by Sukarno's creation of the National Front, KOTI, and KOTOE, and Suharto's similar reliance upon BAKIN for intelligence, OPSUS for political operations, and KOPKAMTIB for security and order.
 The personality cult of "Pak Harto" is much less distinct than that of "Bung Karno." Sukarno's use of "aku" (the intimate form of the first person singular) appears amazingly often in his 1965 speech, but in contrast, Suharto's more recent efforts to present himself as a symbol of unity must not be overlooked either, Too, while Sukarno's concern for himself and his nation led to the construction of monuments of "revolution, " Suharto has followed suit through his monuments of "development" : the increase of hotels and entertainment facilities in and around the capital, as well as an ill-fated "Mini-Indonesia" project somewhat resembling Disneyland.
 It may be wondered whether Suharto's leadership will draw closer to that of Sukarno, if he remains in power for a long period of time. It is impossible to determine now how his style will develop. What seems more certain is that Suharto will continue to create slogans of unity and development and will resort to extraconstitutional as well as to constitutional instruments of convenience.

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Since several bombings such as the Bali bombings or Marriott Bombing, Indonesia has increasingly seen the war on terror being waged against perceived threats of terrorism in the context of growing “militant Islamism”. On the other hand, concerns have been raised against extensive human rights abuses being involved with the war on terror.

This article is intended to disclose the real situation of the war on terror and terrorism by examining a series of the violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, where the so-called religious conflict between Christian and Muslim broke out in the end of 1998. As the conflict became the most furious around the year of 2000 and 2001, with the initiative of the Indonesian government, both sides released the Malino Declaration in December 2001 for reconciliation. Conflicts between the two religious groups have indeed dramatically decreased since the declaration, but Islamic terrorism started to emerge thereafter.

Many cases show us the indications that the violence in Poso was connected to local political elites’ interests that sought to mobilize crowds to obtain political posts, or to divert people’s attention from the corruption cases. It is also pointed out that the security forces were deeply involved in the violence to enlarge their power and to acquire budgets for the military operation.

The structure that the certain individuals or groups try to obtain an interest from the conflict, in other words “conflict building theory” should be clarified for the conflict resolution and sustainable peace.

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本論文は、オランダ人民族学者G・J・ヘルトとインドネシア人人類学者クンチャラニングラットの宗教概念を精査し、彼らが活動した独立後インドネシアの文脈の中に位置づけ、その意味を考察するものである。国民が公認宗教のいずれかに属すことを義務づけられた、事実上の宗教国家インドネシアにおいて、何が「宗教」で何が「宗教」ではないものなのかは、非常に重要な問題である。インドネシアの人類学は、植民地時代にオランダが設立した官吏養成講座を母体として誕生し、独立後の文化と宗教をめぐる議論の中で大きな役割を果たしてきた。ヘルトとクンチャラニングラットは、両者ともインドネシア大学で教鞭を執り、デュルケームを参考にして宗教と宗教ではないものについて考察を重ねたが、彼らの視線の方向の違いによって理論にも違いが生じたのだった。しかし、両者の理論はインドネシア社会への反応として形成され、インドネシアの宗教の動きを示していたのである。

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