The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which consists of seven countries around the Horn of Africa, is one of the least recognized regional organizations in the world. In fact, in the small amount of literature dealing with this organization, it is quite common to depict it as a dysfunctional organization where conflicts and mistrust among the member states have hampered its proper functioning. It is even referred to as a ‘perfect example’ of a paralyzed organization. Given that the Horn has hosted many inter-state, as well as intra-state conflicts, such a harsh judgment might seem plausible.
In this article, a somewhat different view is suggested. By exploring various aspects of IGAD—its activities, motivation of the member states, their relations with each other and with the outside world—, it draws attention to the often overlooked roles of this organization, especially its utility for the survival of the governments of the member states.
First of all, IGAD is by no means a paralyzed organization. Tracking its record of activities reveals that member states have quite frequently gathered at regional meetings. Many of them have actively been involved in diverse activities such as mediations in civil wars in Sudan and Somalia, as well as building a regional conflict early warning system.
These activities are consistent with the urgent needs of the countries in the Horn, that is, regime survival in the context of a more or less fragile state. At the same time, however, these endeavors in IGAD do not necessarily entail deepening regional cooperation, much less integration, among the member states. While they have been trying to expand their cooperation in many fields, including mutual dialogue, conflict resolution, and even collective military action, these have been pursued mostly in an ad hoc manner and their effects remain very limited.
With its stated objective of integration a distant possibility, what aspect of IGAD could ensure its continued existence? The article illuminates the valuable link this organization provides, that is, the link with the wider international society. IGAD can be considered as a sort of forum where member states mobilize various extra-regional actors (AU, EU, UN, donor countries, etc.) for the survival of their own regimes. In fact, the countries in the Horn not only obtain external resources through IGAD, but also raise collective voices there, urging the international community to take specific policies that are conductive to strengthening their domestic rule.
Although the responses from outside the region have scarcely been as much as was expected, they can be helpful for the countries in the Horn, which have been struggling in desperate material and political conditions.

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The paper analyzes Middle Eastern countries’ foreign aid and military activities in African countries through the lens of Economic Statecraft (ES), the art of employing economic means to exert influence over other countries and thereby pursue geopolitical and strategic goals.

Due to changes in the strategic environment, such as the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East and the escalation of intra-regional conflicts, Middle Eastern countries have pursued foreign and security policies that place greater emphasis on their national interests. Arab states in the Gulf and Turkey are upping their foreign aid to Africa and establishing military bases at geopolitical chokepoints to expand their spheres of influence. The economic and military expansion of Middle Eastern countries into Africa also intensifies competition among various state and non-state actors.

There have been studies on foreign aid to African countries and on the establishment of military bases by Middle Eastern countries. By examining these regional dynamics from the perspective of ES, this paper seeks to decipher the complex and multi-dimensional competition, confrontation, and cooperation. Additionally, the paper investigates the effectiveness of the ES as practiced by non-major powers, which is often overlooked, the impact of ES on regional politics and security, and the linkage with international order and international security.

ES is frequently discussed in the context of great power politics and strategic competition, such as the US-China rivalry. However, the same is true for regional and middle powers that use economic means to pursue their geopolitical objectives. The distinction is that great powers such as the US, China, and Russia are exceptional in the scale of their military and economic clout in international politics. Therefore, to better understand ES, it is necessary to focus on tactics being employed at the regional level and the geopolitical shifts that arise.

This paper outlines the debate on ES in/towards/from the Middle East and examines the trends and background of the pursuit of geopolitical goals linked to foreign aid, which has accelerated in recent years. Then, as a case study, this paper focuses on the Middle Eastern countries’ intervention in Sudan and the Horn of Africa region, as well as the competition among the regional countries. The intervention of Middle Eastern countries in Somalia and Libya is also analyzed to demonstrate that ES involves various actors, including unrecognized states and non-state actors.

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Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2002, the attitude of African countries, particularly regarding resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), has attracted broad attention because a significant number of them did not vote for the Western initiative accusing Russia of the invasion. Despite their various attitudes, there has been a systematic difference in voting patterns among African countries. This paper aims to identify the differences in voting patterns and explain the reasons.

From the analysis of three important UNGA resolutions, this paper identified three different voting patterns, which have been consistent over time. To explain the patterns, Russian influence over African countries has been investigated through the analyses of military and economic relations. Although Russia is Africa’s largest supplier of military equipment, the relationship between arms provision and UNGA voting has been unclear. For most African countries, economic relations with Russia have not been significant.

Various reasons, including their economic vulnerabilities and dissatisfaction with the Western-led international order, have been explored to explain African countries’ ambiguous attitudes toward Russia. While these reasons are generally convincing, they do not explain the different voting patterns among African countries.

The paper argues that the internal political structure of African countries can explain the difference. Classifying the countries by the length of the ruling party’s dominance as well as the extent of political freedom, the study finds that two groups of countries have tended not to follow the Western accusation against Russia, namely, the countries in which the same ruling parties have maintained long-term political dominance, and the countries with authoritarian rule. While some countries can be classified into both groups, the latter includes countries where political parties are banned.

The first group mainly includes countries where liberation movements became the ruling parties after independence and have maintained power until today. During the liberation struggle, the movement had antagonistic relations with Western countries and the existing international order. The memories of the liberation have been vivid since then because of the ruling parties’ efforts to sustain them, which are the primary source of their legitimacy. As the current war in Ukraine is turning into a proxy war between the major powers and is considered to be closely connected with the international order, these countries are reluctant to follow the Western-led initiative. Regarding the second group, the distance from Western values, such as democracy and political freedom, has arguably determined their voting pattern.

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