This article will attempt to analyse the détente policy of the Harold Wilson government in the mid-1960s. The structure of the Cold War system began to significantly change from the 1960s. After the second Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, the intense confrontation that had up until this time characterized this conflict was mitigated by the fear of all out nuclear war, thus creating the first atmosphere of Cold War détente in East-West relations. At the same time, within both the Eastern and the Western alliances multipolarity was being promoted, as a result more states were able to contribute to the process of détente. This interconnectedness of détente and multipolarity affected the way the British government engaged in détente and alliance politics.
The 1960s saw British power decline in world affairs and the rise in power of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in Europe, a situation that became a symbol of multipolarity in the West. To maintain influence in European Cold War politics, Harold Wilson's government pursued a purposeful improvement in relations with the FRG. Therefore, even if the Wilson regime had had its own prescription to the German problem, it could not talk to the East in disregard of the wishes of the FRG government. The continuation of the policy of non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a second German state and the Order-Neisse line as the western border of Poland was the logical result.
This initiative taken by the Wilson government centred on the idea of a “declaration on Europe”, which was intended to establish a code of conduct applied to all signatory states with the aim of creating a better political atmosphere in East-West relations. It depicted, for instance, removal of restrictions on trade and promotion of cultural exchange with the East. Behind the idea lay the prospect that multipolarity would enhance the autonomy of the East European states vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Due consideration was also paid to the FRG's special insistence on inserting the principle of self-determination in the draft text of the declaration. But the political circumstances were not suitable for the initiative to materialize. The Eastern insistence that the German problem had to be resolved to further détente through Western acceptance of the GDR and the Order-Neisse line, and the Western position that détente must be a pre-condition for the settlement of the German problem, effectively stalled the process of further detente.
This initiative by the Wilson government needs reappraisal in order to show not only how the British government possessed a forward looking idea to promote and further détente but such a reappraisal also demonstrates the degree to which the German factor regulated the British diplomatic line. In this vein, détente and multipolarity were two determining factors underpinning British détente policy in the middle 1960s.

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On March 10^th, 1952 the USSR sent a document called “Stalin's Note” to the representatives of the Western Powers; the USA, the UK and France. It proposed both making a “peace treaty” with Germany and unifying Germany. For seven years following the end of World War II, Germany had been divided into two states. The separate governments of West and East Germany were provisionally formed in 1949. To resolve this situation, “Stalin's Note” proposed that Germany form a Unified Government and establish a “peace treaty” on a principal of neutrality. However, the USA, the UK, France and the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, were pursuing a policy of West European Integration of West Germany, and rejected “Stalin's Note” forthwith.
Since the Western Powers didn't accept “Stalin's Note”, the real intention of the USSR has remained a big mystery in post WWII history. Academic disputes continue to this day, as to the real intentions of the Soviet Diplomacy. These disputes are roughly split into two groups. One group, the positive group, argues that “Stalin's Note” was a peaceful attempt to establish a “Neutral German State”, while the other, negative group, believes that it was an “Obstructive Operation” to disturb Western diplomacy and cut off the military connection between West Germany and the Western Powers.
Following the end of the Cold War, historical materials were released in the former East Germany. Researchers had hoped to find the truth of “Stalin's Note”. Many papers have been presented by historians specializing in diplomatic history of Germany and the USSR, but the disputes have not ended between the positive and the negative groups. This paper investigates the truth of “Stalin's Note” and its relation to the Cold War through rethinking its problems from the viewpoint of the East German leaders. As a result, this investigation finds that East German leaders had formed two groups; supporters of “Stalin's Note, ” the domestic group, and dissidents, the Moscow group.

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本稿では、1950 年代の国際政治におけるソ連の講和条約計画について、日本とドイツの状況を比 較した。 冷戦の緊張のなかで、米ソ関係は絶えず悪化した。欧州情勢においては、ベルリン封鎖、東西ドイツの成立、そして西ドイツの再軍備政策がソ連外交を守勢へと追い込んだ。これに対して極東情勢では、中華人民共和国の建国と朝鮮戦争が、アメリカとソ連との国益が衝突した出来事となった。これらの出来事のなかで、日本とドイツの講和条約に関する問題は、1950 年代初頭に国際的な争点となった。アメリカ主導の対日講和案に対抗して、1951 年 9 月 5 日、ソ連は独自の対日講和案（グロムイコ提案）を示し、それをサンフランシスコ講和会議で発表した。1952 年 3 月 10 日、ソ連はさらに、欧州統合の一環である欧州防衛共同体計画の進展を防ぐために、独自の対独講和案（スタ ーリン・ノート）を米英仏に提案した。とくにスターリン・ノートは、中立を基礎としたドイツ統一提案であり、歴史家はその真意を明らかにすることに大きな関心を持った。 本稿では、ソ連の講和条約計画を検討することにより、ソ連が日本とドイツとを中立化することを追求し、さらにはソ連に有利な地域構造を構築する意図があったことを明らかにした。

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The purpose of this paper is to examine European Union projects in the early 1970s and to examine how the End of Cold War was considered in this project. In this period, the European Community (EC) would enlarge its member states for the first time, try to deepen internal policies and also Conference for pan-European security (that is formed afterwards as CSCE) began. The author tries to reexamine the relations between Cold War and European integration, having an attention to the European Union project concerns both European political integration and European international order.
In December 1969, EC countries agreed the political cooperation concerning foreign policies (known as later EPC) at Hague summit. EPC mechanism developed as the arena in which EC countries discussed about the CSCE and whether EC would/should participate in the CSCE negotiation. But in EC Commission, Commissioner Borschette and Spinelli discussed how Political Union could realize from the development of EPC. This Political Union concept conceived as ‘finalité’ (final aims or final form) of European Integration, considering the evolution of economic integration like agriculture and especially the start of monetary integration.
In 1971, French President Pompidou launched his plan for the reactivation of European Integration entitled ‘European Confederation’. In this plan, member states would select ‘European State Secretary’ and these Ministers would hold regular meetings and finally this organization would develop ‘European Government’, transferring gradually government's competences to this Ministers institution. On the other hand, EC Commission discussed the acquirement of the role of EC in the field of world politics. Pompidou's concept and that of Commission was opposing each other, but both agreed that EC would be changed after the enlargement of member states and development of EPC. This plan manifested as ‘European Union’ in the communiqué of Paris Summit in the 1972.
Realizing of Détente within the framework of CSCE, development of EPC, and acquirement of the role of EC in the world politics connected each other. That is, EC tried to improvement of the relations with Eastern Bloc within the framework of CSCE, and looked for the political integration by deepening EPC mechanism, which would develop at the CSCE negotiation. When these two aims would realize EC would be ‘independent Europe’ as an actor of world politics, so EC sought the redefinition of the relationship with the USA. Especially Spinelli argued that when the entity of Europe restored by establishing new European order which would cover Pan-Europe by CSCE and which would be supported by ‘Political Union’ at the its western side, Europe would step into the “New Yalta” era.
Political Union Project, which appeared as ‘European Union’ in the Paris Summit communiqué, was not the project of merely internal community institution, but the project which designated the structural transformation of cold war as prerequisite.

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This paper sheds light on formerly unknown details about the diplomacy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to conclude the IAEA-Euratom agreement (hereafter the “verification agreement”), the signing of which in 1973 was an essential precondition for FRG’s ratification to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1974.
In order to start the negotiations to sign the verification agreement, FRG required consensus among the Euratom member states. However, France requested its exemption from the Euratom inspections as a condition of its agreement to start the negotiations. They argued that since the Euratom inspections should be under the influence of IAEA due to the verification agreement, France would be under the influence of IAEA as well because its peaceful nuclear activities were under the control of the Euratom inspections. However, there were no legally justifiable grounds for France to be under the influence of IAEA because it did not sign the NPT and therefore had no obligation at all toward IAEA. Therefore, in order for France to be freed from the influence of IAEA, it requested exemption from the Euratom inspections.
At first, FRG rejected this stance and tried to change France’s position; it was afraid that if France was exempted from the obligations of Euratom this could badly influence European integration. However, France would not change its position and FRG became concerned that worsening its relations with France would have an even more detrimental effect on European integration as a whole. In the end, FRG was judicious enough to concede to France’s request in order not to antagonize relations between them. As a result, France agreed to start negotiations to conclude the verification agreement.
Based on this consensus among the Euratom member states, FRG was able to start negotiations with IAEA. FRG aimed to minimize the influence of IAEA on Euratom and successfully achieved this objective. However, FRG was under strong pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States to conclude the negotiations and ratify the NPT as early as possible, since FRG’s ratification to it was one of the essential conditions for easing of the Cold War confrontations in Europe. Moreover, FRG itself was anxious to improve relations with the Eastern bloc as part of its “eastern policy.” FRG therefore pushed to ensure the date for signing of the verification agreement as soon as possible.
By these actions FRG achieved not only its fundamental purpose, minimizing the influence of IAEA over Euratom members, but also achieved its diplomatic objectives to maintain good relations with France and improve relations with members of the Eastern bloc.

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