After the World War I the armistice day was celebrated for a few years on Nov. 11th. But again the world played a foolish game (World War II) only after 20 years. Now we have passed 35 years since the Hiroshima atom bomb disaster, and there are such atmosphere as it is out of date to speak of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan is now being pursuaded to promote military renovation from U. S. A., some Japanese financiers and goverment officials are crying to raise military enterprise against the menace of U. S. S. R.
Japan had abolished old militarism to keep her peace institution. Why we must go back to the height of folly once more ? Citizens at Hiroshima are very delicate to be touched their miserable disaster, Mr. Matsumura, the commissioner of our general convention, advised me not to speak on this item.
But I dared to appeal the members of our Society in defence of peace of the world and next generation, as I thought it is our duty to be responsible to the world, though not directly but through some English and American sources on the Hiroshima atom born disaster.

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Korea, whose independence was promised by the Allied Powers during World War II., witnessed the division of the country into two as a result of American-Soviet disagreement. Moreover, in 1948, each section took necessary steps for independence while the country remained disunited.
Japan formally recognized Korea's independence when the Peace Treaty became effective. She had, however, acknowledged the existence of independent Korea even before the Peace Treaty was concluded. Furthermore, the Japanese Government was ready to accept the government of the Republic of Korea as the legitimate regime in Korea in view of American wishes and the resolution adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations. Subsequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the government of Japan entered into negotiations with the Korean Government on various problems which would arise when the treaty became effective.
The talks, however, brought about no result, and without any agreements between the two governments, the Peace Treaty went into effect. Since then, six sessions of intermittent talks were held between the two governments during the past eleven years. There are many reasons for the prolongation of the talks. These include, emotionalism among the peoples of Japan and Korea, as well as the extreme anti-Japanese sentiment which prevailed in Korea during the Rhee administration. Concrete causes for the failure, however, have been, among others, the questions of property settlement and fishery in which the fundamental differences of opinion of both parties have been evident.
The ROK government regarded the question of property as vital, and maintained the attitude that without the settlement of this issue other problems existing between Japan and Korea would remain unsolved. In the face of such a stiff argument of the ROK government, the Japanese Government made significant concessions on two occasions. The first was the withdrawal of the six-year old Japanese demand, in late 1957, for compensation for the property previously owned by the Japanese nationals in Korea. The second concession involved Japan's modification regarding her demand for property compensation based on legal principle. The new Foreign Minister Ohira hoped to settle this issue on the basis of political expediency rather than on legal basis. These concessions brought about a basic agreement regarding the property question which had been one of the greatest obstacles in the talks. This being accomplished, hopes for the conclusion of talks brightened.
Be that as it may, the future of the talks seems to depend on the degree of the concessions by the ROK government on the question of fishery (the removal of the Rhee Line) which the Japanese Government consider important.

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When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August 1945, the latter was almost exhausted after over three years of the Pacific War. Ironically enough, at that moment Japan was trying in vain to find a way out of the war by means of the good offices of the Soviet Union. Because of such circumstances, the people in the Soviet Union seemed to be apathetic at best to another round of war after the deadly fighting with Nazi Germany. Thus, to justify the war with Japan, Stalin felt it even necessary to cite the old humiliation due to the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 to 1905.
Until August 1945, a major concern of Stalin was how to adroitly find an opportune moment to enter into the war against Japan. After the Japanese surrender, he was very resolute in trying to ensure the Soviets a proper place as a great victorious power. The present paper intends to show what Soviet Russia attained and how, through joining her allies in defeating Japan.
Though Stalin wished to expand the Soviet security zone as far as possible, he also recognized that such an advancement of Soviet power would be possible only in areas subdued by Soviet armed forces. In this sense, his foreign policy reflects his trust in strength. General V. Chuikov, designated a military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Chungking in autumn 1940, records an interesting statement suggestive of Stalin's future policy in Asia after the war. Stalin told Chuikov then that as long as Chinese communists were less able than the Kuomingtang to resist Japanese aggression, the USSR could not help but bolster Chinese nationalists despite her ideological sympathy for the communists, because any Chinese prolonged resistance would lessen the Japanese threat to Soviet far eastern borders (V. I. Chuikov, Missiya v Kitae, 1983).
Such a view about the importance of strength in foreign policy may be considered an ingredient of a general belief system rather than a circumstantial perception. Consequently, this “operational code” probably convinced Stalin, after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union should be cautious in conducting her occupation policy in Japan. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept U. S. predominance in Japan provided that Soviet basic security requirements would be satisfied. Besides this precondition, all Stalin wished for was an apparent equality with the U. S. in controlling Japan.
The Soviet Union and the United States had heated arguments over the allied control machinery regarding Japan. The United States was in a much more advantageous position because of the sheer fact of the existence of American armies in Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union also had a lever for influencing the U. S. policy in Japan. This lever was her dominant status in Eastern Europe. If the United States wanted to gain some concessions in Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, the former was obliged to make concessions regarding Japan. Thus both countries could, before the end of 1945, come to a compromise to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. Afterwards, with the advent of the Cold War, the Soviet Union became more and more antagonistic towards U. S. conduct in Japan. But that is another story.

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This paper investigates the issue of the participation of various countries in the Japanese Peace Treaty (hereafter JPT) Conference in 1951, with a particular emphasis on Korea, which was once a Japanese colony.
An investigation of the discussions about which countries should be invited to the JPT Conference is a good way to understand how powerful nations such as the U. S. and Britain achieved mutual consent on the issue of participation, and helps clarify the formation of the international situation and relations among the postwar nations. In particular, I will focus on the participation of former Western colonies in the JPT and the major powers' decision to reject Korea's request to participate in the Conference.
Firstly, I examine the differences among the Japanese, British, and American plans for the list of participants in the JPT Conference and also discuss the processes by which these differences were resolved. Cases such as the debate over the participation of China or Indochina show that the interests of powerful nations were more important in determining the participants of the JPT than a consistent logic of the law.
Secondly, I analyze the Korean issue in the JPT. The Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) government put a considerable effort to participate in the Conference. In addition, the United States strongly wanted to see Korea take part in the JPT because it hoped to demonstrate its power over the Soviet Union by making the Korean government a part of an international conference. On the other hand, Britain, which hoped to resist the U. S. stance over the question of China's representation, opposed Korea's participation by reasoning that Korean participation might provoke China. Eventually, the United States accepted Britain's opposition to the Korean participation so as to avoid confrontation among the Western Allies. Then the United States notified Korea that it did not have the right to participate in the JPT Conference because Korea had not participated in the fight against Japan during World War II and the Allied Nations had not officially recognized the Korean Provisional Government during the war.
In this respect, the prewar ‘imperialism’ continued into the postwar era as well. As a result of this Anglo-American logic, Korea was not able to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan, which had colonized Korea for more than thirty-six years. In contrast, because Southeast Asian nations were former colonies of Allied nations, they were able to participate in the conference and gain the status of victorious nations. Consequently many problems between Japan and Korea were left unsolved.

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The paper aims at constructing a new regional concept: “Peripheral East Asia”, by grouping Okinawa, Taiwan and Hong Kong together for future developments of the East Asian Studies.
The creation of the new concept is established on three characteristics noticeable amongst Okinawa, Taiwan and Hong Kong. To begin with, the three places were historically seen as peripheral areas in the traditional East Asian world order, according to the Huayi System (Huayi Zhixu) or Zhongyuan-Bianchui (center-periphery) consciousness since pre-modern eras. Secondly and more importantly, the three areas experienced “sovereignty change” including “returning to motherland” two to three times after entering modern times. Thirdly, identity problem becomes a grave concern in the relationship between the three areas with their old and new suzerain states particularly in recent years. The paramount issues focused on the identity crises in the “Peripheral East Asia” have been: the huge wave of “Taiwanese nationalism” against China, the appearance of the new “Hongkongese Identity” since the sovereignty handover in 1997, and the reinforcement of Okinawan identity against the mainland Japanese.
Based on the three major characteristics of the “Peripheral East Asia”, the new regional concept can be summarized into the following keywords: “peripherality”, “sovereignty change” and “identity”. The notion of “sovereignty change” should be perceived as most important in the concept in comparison with other peripheral areas in the world. In addition, the definition of “sovereignty change” does not merely refer to the formal transition of territories between two or more sovereignty countries, but also includes all political, economic and cultural problems generated due to the “sovereignty change”, as well as the related identity issue on national integration in the “Peripheral East Asia”.
Regarding my research on “Peripheral East Asia” up to now, I have been concentrating on the relationship between “sovereignty change” and the formation of identity in the' three areas. My argument is that the dynamism of identity politics with the phenomenon of “de-peripheralisation” in “Peripheral East Asia” occurs as a result of the clash between the centripetal force from the “center” and the centrifugal force from the “peripheries”. Furthermore, I believe that the centrifugal force issuing from the “Peripheral East Asia” against the “center”, their suzerain states or central governments, arises due to the repeating experiences of the “sovereignty change” in Okinawa, Taiwan, Hong Kong and even Macau since modern period.
In the paper, I suggest, in place of a rather stable state system and world system built from the “top” following the logic of the “centers” or powerful countries in pre-modern and modern periods, it is about time to rethink the worth of establishing a new state system and world system from the “bottom”; the localities or “peripheries”-based regional orders in this globalization era.

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The 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was a diplomatic event of major importance. Because the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) lacked comprehensive provisions such as commodity agreements and agreements regarding foreign investments, which had been contained in the 1948 Havana Chapter, the membership of GATT was basically limited to western countries. This was a major driver for newly independent countries in Asia and Africa and economically isolated countries in Latin America to call for a new economic order. The developing countries formed a caucus, negotiated through a common spokesman, and voted as bloc, eventually, forming Group of 77 (G77). UNCTAD was the first major international conference in which the confrontation between East and West was overshadowed by a North–South problem.

Supported by the former Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness in Latin America President Raúl Prebisch, who was a strong ideologue, these developing countries demanded fundamental changes in international economics. They identified four areas of controversy: access to markets including a preference system, commodity policy, invisibles and finance, and institutional arrangements. The expressed expectations for economic change were extremely high, thus received negative reactions from all of the western countries. The Unites States adhered to the Most Favored Nation policy and coming negotiation of GATT Kennedy round. The United Kingdom made an impressive speech advocating for a constructive role for UNCTAD but expressed concern over replacing the preference system of the Commonwealth. France and the European Economic Community also tried to keep their colonial ties with African countries. Furthermore, it was clear that Japan, whose level of industrialization was still low, had no intention of giving any concessions to developing countries.

The negotiations at UNCTAD were harsh between the Southern and Northern countries, and very little was achieved except for some specific institutional arrangements. Eventually, the Secretary General of UNCTAD, Prebisch, acted as a pragmatic compromiser. However, he insisted that consensus, rather than confrontation, was the only viable approach to reforming global trade and development policy. The developing countries that had been advocating radical resolution for their vision of a new economic order, reluctantly agreed to compromise.

This article concludes that the quest for a new economic order at the first UNCTAD resulted in little achievement, because the countries that were involved did not have any concrete ideas or concepts to build suitable new international trade and development policies. Reflecting the confrontation with Southern countries, the Northern countries tried not only to develop international cooperation arrangements but to reactivate the GATT through tariff cuts and trade liberalizations.

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日本の旧植民地の都市計画は，内地より先進的な制度を具えていたと紹介されることがあります。本研究では，朝鮮市街地計画令と台湾都市計画令の特長について分析しました。朝鮮では，建築取締と都市計画が一つの法令に統合されました。これは，建築と都市計画の一体化という理想よりも，審議の二度手間を省くことが目的でした。台湾では，土地区画整理の条文などに進歩がありましたが，主に内地で明らかになっていた不備の解消でした。内地・植民地の法令は時代の要請に応じて各々変化しています。先進的な朝鮮・台湾の法令と旧態以前とした内地法という単純な二項対立とは言えません。むしろ一連の法令群として進歩・改良されていることが判明しました。似て非なる朝鮮・台湾と内地の事例とは，制度面における対照実験の関係にあります。したがって，朝鮮・台湾の事例は我が国の都市計画にとって貴重な経緯を持つ事例であると言えます。

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 国際保健医療政策の変遷は国際政治経済と開発全般の動向から影響を受けている。このため、国際保健医療を深く理解するには国際政治経済史を知ることが必要である。第二次世界戦後の国際政治経済は冷戦期を経て多極化の時代へと劇的に変貌した。その間、米国政権に歩調を合わせる国際通貨基金や世界銀行などの国際金融機関の動向が途上国における開発の行方を決定づけてきた。本稿は、国際政治経済と開発の変遷に関連づけて、国際保健医療における政策や戦略の成立過程を考察する。

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This paper focuses on Ryukyuans and Koreans living in Taiwan after the end of the Second World War, and by drawing a comparison of disparity in treatment between these two ethnic groups, examines the Chinese Nationalist government's seizure of Taiwan.
The theme of this paper is “vicarious decolonization.” As a consequence, neither the ruling power (suzerain: Japan), nor the ruled (colony: Taiwan) were involved in the actual process of decolonization. For this reason the decolonization of Taiwan can be deemed to have been carried out vicariously.
In this paper, I begin by discussing the Chinese Nationalist government's post-war relations with the Ryukyu Islands and the Korean Peninsula. Then, against the background of the collapse of the Japanese colonial empire and the Chinese Nationalist government's seizure of power, I compare the repatriation and conscription of the Ryukyuans and Koreans living in Taiwan by the Chinese Nationalist government by focusing the discussion on the drawing of boundaries among ethnic groups in Taiwan. Finally, I discuss the role played by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan's post-war decolonization.
Although the repatriation of the Ryukyuans and Koreans occurred slightly apart, there was little actual difference in the processes of repatriation. Soldiers and army personnel were repatriated at an early stage, followed by the repatriation of ordinary residents. The Chinese Nationalist government actively pursued the conscription of experts and engineers deemed useful for governing Taiwan.
However, the conscripted experts and engineers were all outsiders, and the concept of conscription was nothing more than a temporary measure by the Chinese Nationalist government to secure its rule of Taiwan. The system of conscription conducted by the Chinese Nationalist government was a miniature copy of the pre-existing structure formerly adopted by Japan. Although there were some Ryukyuans amongst the experts and engineers working in the administration and research organizations, most positions were occupied by those born on the Japanese mainland. The fact that no Koreans can be found on the list of conscripts implies that Koreans were not included as part of the administrative side within the governing structure of the former colony of Taiwan.
The Chinese Nationalist government's policy of repatriation and conscription of “Japanese people” reestablished borders among ethnic groups in Taiwan, and resulted in the vicarious decolonization and withdrawal of Taiwan from the Japanese colonial empire, while at the same time, through a continuation of existing occupation policies, was oriented toward maintaining the status quo.

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