After the World War I the armistice day was celebrated for a few years on Nov. 11th. But again the world played a foolish game (World War II) only after 20 years. Now we have passed 35 years since the Hiroshima atom bomb disaster, and there are such atmosphere as it is out of date to speak of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan is now being pursuaded to promote military renovation from U. S. A., some Japanese financiers and goverment officials are crying to raise military enterprise against the menace of U. S. S. R.
Japan had abolished old militarism to keep her peace institution. Why we must go back to the height of folly once more ? Citizens at Hiroshima are very delicate to be touched their miserable disaster, Mr. Matsumura, the commissioner of our general convention, advised me not to speak on this item.
But I dared to appeal the members of our Society in defence of peace of the world and next generation, as I thought it is our duty to be responsible to the world, though not directly but through some English and American sources on the Hiroshima atom born disaster.

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Korea, whose independence was promised by the Allied Powers during World War II., witnessed the division of the country into two as a result of American-Soviet disagreement. Moreover, in 1948, each section took necessary steps for independence while the country remained disunited.
Japan formally recognized Korea's independence when the Peace Treaty became effective. She had, however, acknowledged the existence of independent Korea even before the Peace Treaty was concluded. Furthermore, the Japanese Government was ready to accept the government of the Republic of Korea as the legitimate regime in Korea in view of American wishes and the resolution adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations. Subsequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the government of Japan entered into negotiations with the Korean Government on various problems which would arise when the treaty became effective.
The talks, however, brought about no result, and without any agreements between the two governments, the Peace Treaty went into effect. Since then, six sessions of intermittent talks were held between the two governments during the past eleven years. There are many reasons for the prolongation of the talks. These include, emotionalism among the peoples of Japan and Korea, as well as the extreme anti-Japanese sentiment which prevailed in Korea during the Rhee administration. Concrete causes for the failure, however, have been, among others, the questions of property settlement and fishery in which the fundamental differences of opinion of both parties have been evident.
The ROK government regarded the question of property as vital, and maintained the attitude that without the settlement of this issue other problems existing between Japan and Korea would remain unsolved. In the face of such a stiff argument of the ROK government, the Japanese Government made significant concessions on two occasions. The first was the withdrawal of the six-year old Japanese demand, in late 1957, for compensation for the property previously owned by the Japanese nationals in Korea. The second concession involved Japan's modification regarding her demand for property compensation based on legal principle. The new Foreign Minister Ohira hoped to settle this issue on the basis of political expediency rather than on legal basis. These concessions brought about a basic agreement regarding the property question which had been one of the greatest obstacles in the talks. This being accomplished, hopes for the conclusion of talks brightened.
Be that as it may, the future of the talks seems to depend on the degree of the concessions by the ROK government on the question of fishery (the removal of the Rhee Line) which the Japanese Government consider important.

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The paper aims at constructing a new regional concept: “Peripheral East Asia”, by grouping Okinawa, Taiwan and Hong Kong together for future developments of the East Asian Studies.
The creation of the new concept is established on three characteristics noticeable amongst Okinawa, Taiwan and Hong Kong. To begin with, the three places were historically seen as peripheral areas in the traditional East Asian world order, according to the Huayi System (Huayi Zhixu) or Zhongyuan-Bianchui (center-periphery) consciousness since pre-modern eras. Secondly and more importantly, the three areas experienced “sovereignty change” including “returning to motherland” two to three times after entering modern times. Thirdly, identity problem becomes a grave concern in the relationship between the three areas with their old and new suzerain states particularly in recent years. The paramount issues focused on the identity crises in the “Peripheral East Asia” have been: the huge wave of “Taiwanese nationalism” against China, the appearance of the new “Hongkongese Identity” since the sovereignty handover in 1997, and the reinforcement of Okinawan identity against the mainland Japanese.
Based on the three major characteristics of the “Peripheral East Asia”, the new regional concept can be summarized into the following keywords: “peripherality”, “sovereignty change” and “identity”. The notion of “sovereignty change” should be perceived as most important in the concept in comparison with other peripheral areas in the world. In addition, the definition of “sovereignty change” does not merely refer to the formal transition of territories between two or more sovereignty countries, but also includes all political, economic and cultural problems generated due to the “sovereignty change”, as well as the related identity issue on national integration in the “Peripheral East Asia”.
Regarding my research on “Peripheral East Asia” up to now, I have been concentrating on the relationship between “sovereignty change” and the formation of identity in the' three areas. My argument is that the dynamism of identity politics with the phenomenon of “de-peripheralisation” in “Peripheral East Asia” occurs as a result of the clash between the centripetal force from the “center” and the centrifugal force from the “peripheries”. Furthermore, I believe that the centrifugal force issuing from the “Peripheral East Asia” against the “center”, their suzerain states or central governments, arises due to the repeating experiences of the “sovereignty change” in Okinawa, Taiwan, Hong Kong and even Macau since modern period.
In the paper, I suggest, in place of a rather stable state system and world system built from the “top” following the logic of the “centers” or powerful countries in pre-modern and modern periods, it is about time to rethink the worth of establishing a new state system and world system from the “bottom”; the localities or “peripheries”-based regional orders in this globalization era.

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When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August 1945, the latter was almost exhausted after over three years of the Pacific War. Ironically enough, at that moment Japan was trying in vain to find a way out of the war by means of the good offices of the Soviet Union. Because of such circumstances, the people in the Soviet Union seemed to be apathetic at best to another round of war after the deadly fighting with Nazi Germany. Thus, to justify the war with Japan, Stalin felt it even necessary to cite the old humiliation due to the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 to 1905.
Until August 1945, a major concern of Stalin was how to adroitly find an opportune moment to enter into the war against Japan. After the Japanese surrender, he was very resolute in trying to ensure the Soviets a proper place as a great victorious power. The present paper intends to show what Soviet Russia attained and how, through joining her allies in defeating Japan.
Though Stalin wished to expand the Soviet security zone as far as possible, he also recognized that such an advancement of Soviet power would be possible only in areas subdued by Soviet armed forces. In this sense, his foreign policy reflects his trust in strength. General V. Chuikov, designated a military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Chungking in autumn 1940, records an interesting statement suggestive of Stalin's future policy in Asia after the war. Stalin told Chuikov then that as long as Chinese communists were less able than the Kuomingtang to resist Japanese aggression, the USSR could not help but bolster Chinese nationalists despite her ideological sympathy for the communists, because any Chinese prolonged resistance would lessen the Japanese threat to Soviet far eastern borders (V. I. Chuikov, Missiya v Kitae, 1983).
Such a view about the importance of strength in foreign policy may be considered an ingredient of a general belief system rather than a circumstantial perception. Consequently, this “operational code” probably convinced Stalin, after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union should be cautious in conducting her occupation policy in Japan. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept U. S. predominance in Japan provided that Soviet basic security requirements would be satisfied. Besides this precondition, all Stalin wished for was an apparent equality with the U. S. in controlling Japan.
The Soviet Union and the United States had heated arguments over the allied control machinery regarding Japan. The United States was in a much more advantageous position because of the sheer fact of the existence of American armies in Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union also had a lever for influencing the U. S. policy in Japan. This lever was her dominant status in Eastern Europe. If the United States wanted to gain some concessions in Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, the former was obliged to make concessions regarding Japan. Thus both countries could, before the end of 1945, come to a compromise to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. Afterwards, with the advent of the Cold War, the Soviet Union became more and more antagonistic towards U. S. conduct in Japan. But that is another story.

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The Korean policy of the United States cannot be judged in isolation from the Korean policy of the Soviet Union or from the internal political development in Korea. These three and many other minor factors are interrelated in such a complex fashion that it is difficult to single out any one factor as being solely responsible for the continued impasse in Korean problems. This study, however, is concerned primarily with American foreign policy toward Korean independence and unification from the time of the Cairo Declaration to the eve of the Japanese surrender, and especially with how various policies were arrived at and why these policies ended in dismal failure by creating the 38th parallel.
Contrary to a widely held view that the division of Korea was another secret agreement either at Yalta or Potsdam, the truth would appear to be that the division had its origin in the War Department recommendation in Washington. Asthe war against Japan was moving rapidly to its conclusion after the first explosion of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and the subsequent declaration of war by the Soviet Union, War Department planners were busily working on instruction which General MacArthur was to present to the Japanese on the procedure for the surrender of their armed forces.
The 38th parallel as a dividing line in Korea had never been the subject of international discussions among the wartime leaders. President Truman made it clear that the line was “proposed by us as a practical soulution when the suuden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vaccuum in Korea.” However, there was no thought, Truman recalled, of a permanent division of Korea. The choice of the 38th parallel as the line of division between the Soviet and American forces was thus taken “on purely military grounds with no thought of possible political consequences.”
The United States, however, made a grave mistake in proposing the 38th parallel as the boundary for military occupation. This mistake could easily have been avoided had the American Government previously had some arrangement with the Soviet Union on the problem of the military occupation of Korea and had they set up a concerte plan for a unified administraton as recommended by the State Department. Unfortunately, the policy planners under the Truman administration followed the path set by President Roosevelt and gave little attention to the future of Korea. They accepted the idea of a trusteeship, a cherished invention of Roosevelt's, without criticism or much scrutiny.
The war had made apparent the close connection between foreign policy and military policy. During the war, of course, foreign policy had, in a sense, been an adjunct of the military strategy of the United States, the War and Navy Departments had more to say about some foreign policy decisions than had the State Department. During the war, military consideration naturally and properly had priority. The military-minded foreign policy, however, inevitably created immense problems which could have been solved if they had been given a little political consideration in the process of their formulation.

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