This article attempts to explore Jacques Ellul's view of violence and shed some light on its political implications. In Contre les violents, Ellul examined Christian involvement in the violent world of politics. In this article, I try to explicate the crux of his argument and evaluate its validity in contrast with political ethics of Machiavelli (interpreted by I. Berlin) and Weber. The main purpose of this contrast is to prove that Ellul's standpoint which he calls “Christian realism” is in diametrical opposition to Machiavellian/Weberian political ethics while sharing its basic political sensitivity.
I begin by examining Ellul's sociological diagnosis of violence. Ellul views violence as a sociologically autonomous dynamics. In parallel with Weber, Ellul depicts politics as being essentially based on the dynamism of violence. It is this viewpoint that makes him contend that Christian must be realistic through and through in the Weberian sense and that they must have a keen awareness of the tension between the sphere of politics and the sphere of Christian faith.
I then tum to consideration of some implications of his Christian realism. Introducing Berlin's interpretative framework, I argue that Ellul is in accord with Machiavelli in that he puts much emphasis on the unbending distinction between those two spheres and the fundamental irreconcilability that arises therein. By reversing Machiavelli's republican perspective and Weber's sober Realpolitik, one can clearly see that Ellul is looking at the reverse side of the medal and that his stance is that of an “Unarmed Prophet”.
In the next section, I will go on to examine some political implications of the prescription Ellul writes out for Christian. Ellul posits a kind of nonviolence which he calls “violence of love” as the only position concordant with Christian vocation. It is a mode of being which is, in his understanding, as agonistic as political action. Ellul's stance leads to a certain formulation of “anti-politics”, but, as I shall contend, this “anti-politics” is to be best understood as a peculiar form of inner-worldly agonism.
I conclude with brief reflection on Ellulian agonism. I suggest that his agonism might be interpreted as a form of citizenship, if not “political” in the ordinary sense of the word : it is rather a form of citizenship as “foreign object”, an alienated and abstentionist variant.
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