Fierce and continuous political battles broke out in Romania immediately after its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007, with President Traian Băsescu’s leadership style as the main issue. Băsescu declared that he would be an activist president, a “player-president,” who would advance his own political agenda, control the parliamentary majority, and actively shape policy. He fulfilled this vision to some extent and won the re-election; however, the Romanian Constitution stipulates the role of president as a mediator and obliges him/her to adopt a nonpartisan stance. Moreover, since the late nineties, semi-presidential systems in Central and Eastern Europe (except the former USSR) have tended to be more parliamentarian, shifting supreme executive power from the president to prime minister. Thus, Băsescu’s presidency poses the difficult and interesting question for scholars: Why and how might President Băsescu behave as a “player-president”?
To answer this question we must analyze the resources for presidential leadership in the semi-presidential context. Here we can identify three factors of particular importance: the president’s constitutional power; partisan power, focusing on the nature of the parliamentary majority and relationship between the president and majority; and the president’s popularity. The present study describes and analyzes the successes and failures of Băsescu’s initiatives during the period between December 2004 and August 2012 from the perspective of these three factors. Specifically, we focus on the following three situations in which the president’s action became a serious issue: “government formation,” “intraexecutive conflict,” and “referendum.”
To examine specific constellations of political resources available for each actor, especially the president, we take the constitutional text as our starting point. The Constitution’s ambiguity allowed the president to expand his formal institutional capacity. For example, according to the Constitution, the Romanian President must consult with the parties in Parliament when nominating the prime minister. However, Băsescu always declared that he would nominate a member as the prime minister from the party or alliance that supported him before he officially consulted other parties in Parliament, and he continued holding initiatives to choose the prime minister.
Here, two other factors played an important role. Băsescu was the recognized leader of the parliamentary majority, especially between December 2008 (when his party, the PDL (former PD) became the top party in the general election) and spring 2012 (when the governing coalition collapsed). Furthermore, the president maintained high popularity until the economic crisis worsened and his PDL government introduced austerity measures in spring 2010. His partisan power and popularity enhanced Băsescu’s constitutional power, making him a president with considerable material power. In addition, the president is the only office holder who is popularly elected nationwide. Therefore, winning the post gave him additional leverage, especially immediately after winning the elections. In this context, the threat to dissolve Parliament, which is very difficult according to the constitutional provisions, could be a bargaining chip for him.
At the same time, the lack of party discipline and cohesiveness expanded the president’s room for maneuvering. However, Băsescu’s actions to avoid “cohabitation” (sharing power) as much as possible caused political polarization and led to the suspension of the President by the Parliament twice.

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The French General Election of March 1993 replaced the Socialists-led minority by a large majority of the Center-Right coalition in the National Assembly and opened a new period of Cohabitation.
An analysis of the results shows plainly the victory of the Center-Right coalition owed much more to the collapse of electoral support for the Socialists Party and the distorive nature of the electoral system than any massive increase in the popularity of the Center-Right coalition.
The election of march 1993 also saw the realinement in French Politics. There are four noticed tendencies.
(1) The voting patterns are less certain than are. The voter's attachment to their patterns are less definitely.
(2) The simple model of a bipolar quadrille in French party systems no longer works since the explosion of the Front National and the Ecologists.
(3) The Left is at a historic low. The Lefts' electors have moved to abstention, the Ecologists, the Right and to the FN.
(4) It is clear that the era of the Mitterrand is the end. Mitterrand's strategy has failed particurally at the Regional Election of March 1992 and at the Referendum of September 1992.

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　実践に取り組んできた研究者という立場から, 不登校支援の実践現場と研究者の連携に関わる諸問題を分節化し問題提起的に論究した。第1に, 方法論上の前提となる問題として, 「現場」と「連携」という用語の概念と実践研究の方法論を含め3つの離陸点を設定した。第2に, そうした視点から, 研究と教育機関（実践現場）の間にある問題群について整理し, 総合性という「つなぎ」の必要性, 連携やネットワークに内在する問題, 研究者と実践者の関係の3点について, 理論的考察を加えた。第3に, そうした理論的文脈に立ち, 実践現場から生成する具体的問題の中から, 研究者に求められる課題がどのようなものであるのかを, 具体的な事例をもとに考察し, それらの研究枠組みの試論を例示した。その結果, 研究者と実践現場との連携における諸課題を乗り越える思考枠として, 関係とプロセスに焦点化してアプローチする視点が浮かび上がった。そうした〈関係・プロセスアプローチ〉の方向性は, 研究者と実践現場との連携を深化させていく可能性があることが導かれた。今後の課題として, 一人の研究者における内なる連携について簡単な考察を行った。

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Since 2015, we have seen the EU facing a refugee crisis, and very complex EU common immigration policies might be collapsed now. However, each member state still manages to control migration flow by making policies at the EU level and establishing bilateral agreements with the third countries. In other words, in Europe, we can see complex and multi-layered migration governance which is composed of three actors: EU member states—EU—third countries.

This article examines the nature of this multi-layered migration governance that appeares after the mid 2000s by analyzing the function of each institution (for example, EU readmission agreement, EU mobility partnership, and French bilateral agreement) and each actor’s preference. This article analyzes the relationship between France as a member state and Senegal, Cap Vert, and Tunisia as the third counties which have established international agreements on migration issues with France and the EU.

I reach three conclusions as follows. Firstly, I confirm that EU common external migration policies and French bilateral agreements have similar contents such as issue linkage between irregular migration policy and development aid or visa facilitation. Moreover, I show the intention of the EU to replicate the strategy of existing French bilateral agreements in their partnerships. Then, I identify the relation between EU-level policies and French bilateral agreements not as mutually exclusive but as a complementary one.

Secondly, the preference of each actor is identified as follows. The EU has a strong motivation to accomplish the coherence among policies of EU member states on the control of migration flows by including other actors in their policy framework and making EU return directives. However, France and the third countries make their political decisions strongly based on the cost-benefit calculation. They pursue the discretion to implement restrictive or beneficial rules which put priority on their interests. Therefore, the EU has not accomplished the consistency in their external migration policies.

Thirdly, even though the preferences of member states and the third countries, the EU has increasingly made more success in concluding new Mobility Partnership and EU readmission agreements than before. The key elements that lead this progress are to compromise the strategies of member states and to establish the funds to support the third countries’ development to offer the incentive to participate in the EU migration framework. Therefore, we can still see the EU’s resilience in the external dimension of migration policy area.

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The “region”, sub-national entity in Europe, plays some more important roles in a place of Nation-States in a context of European integration. However, “island regions” around European Continent have a risk to be more marginalised by the economic integration advanced by the central regions. The island region in Europe has a special socio-economic backwardness caused by its remoteness from the Continent and this special character is called “insularity”.
Political autonomy is, I think, one of the best choices that activate an island region without delete its insularity. Thus European insular regions have a special status that is different from the regions in the Continent, that rules their political autonomy. However, there are many cases that island regions have a heterogeneous historic-cultural fact and a strong identity that could appeal to nationalism or separatism from the mainland country. So that autonomous status of island region in Europe is not homogeneous.
Corsica, Mediterranean island region that belongs to France, has not been autonomous for a long time because of its special socio-political situations, Corsican nationalism and “clan”, one of patriarchal formations typically observed in some Mediterranean insular regions.
In 1982, by the decentralization policies of socialist President Mitterrand, France was reorganized into 22 more autonomous “regions” from the “prefecture” whose prefect has been nominated by the Ministry of Interior, French administrative. Corsica was ruled by an act as a region with a special status. The Regional Assembly of Corsica consisted of 61 representatives elected by the islanders was created in this year and could vote projects of program on mainly Corsican linguistic and cultural education of a supplemental course in a school, regional transportation and development of new energy. The regional administration of Corsica could exert these programs.
However, instability in the Regional Assembly because of lack of a strong core party and frequent elections, shortage of competence or finance of the Region of Corsica caused their dysfunction and discredit from the islanders.
And in 1991, Corsican act was revised and Corsica changed a Territorial Collectivity, original local entity, from a region, common local entity. Though this renewal act defined Corsica as a “people”, Constitutional Council judged that this definition would be against the French Constitution that rules French national unity and its equality, and deleted Article 1 that contains this definition.
However, Corsica was authorized to be more autonomous with an original competence. In addition to education and broadcasting of regional language and culture, special taxation and some economic development program are ceded to Corsica. And Corsican regional organization also was changed. Regional Assembly was divided into Corsican Territorial Assembly and Corsican Executive Council. The president and 6 members of Executive Council exert Corsican regional administrative and vote projects of budget and cultural and economic programs, and these members are elected from the representatives in the Territorial Assembly by election. Executive Councilors are obliged to make some annual reports on the executive situation and their results in the Assembly and to be credited by it. Thus after 1991, Corsica establishes its collegiality and responsibility for the smooth practice of the larger competence.
It is doubtful whether Corsica has a political autonomy by the status reform in 1991. Because there is not any articles on Corsican status in the French Constitution though those of TOMs' status, French Overseas Islands, are in it, and those of Sicilian and Sardinian status are in the Italian Constitution. And Corsican Territorial Assembly can vote only motions, some taxation and programs of local cultural and economic development, but not any

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François Mitterrand was elected as the President of French Republic in 1981. The article asks if this change of government in France had a substantial and direct effect to the foreign policy of the country, especially when one compares it with the previous administration.
It starts with an examination of the existing literature of the relationship between national politics and foreign policy. The author states that there is no direct and mechanical effect between the change in national politics and in the diplomacy; however, the latter is activated by the former when some conditions are met.
When analyzing the case of “Euro-missile Crisis” in the early 1980’s, we clearly see that the Mitterrand Presidency has changed its policy stance as compared to the opposition period and also to its predecessor. The Mitterrand Presidency showed a clear preference to the “Atlantist” policy, and supported the deployment of the U.S Pershing Missile in West Europe. At least this case leads to the fact that there is an obvious shift in policy that has been made by the change of government, and that the literature stressing on the continuity in French diplomacy doomed to be false.
In fact, the reasons of the decision made by the new presidency were multi-faced: 1) to give assurance to the U.S. that the new presidency, even there are Communists inside the government and to be recognized as the legitimate Left government, 2) to show its electorates the difference compared to the former government, 3) to exclude the possibility that the West Germany possess a nuclear weapon, and finally 4) to keep French strategic independence. But the decision was not clearly taken from the beginning; the above-mentioned policies were consequence of a strategic consideration after failure of the Socialist diplomatic agenda which intended to change the U.S monetary policy and to strengthen North-South cooperation.
The French diplomatic historian Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle pointed out that in the age of democratic governance, political leaders had to be careful about the “mood” generated by the direct and indirect demand from the internal politics. If they are only adaptive to the international environment, it can be contrary an obstacle to the diplomacy. In other words, a skilful diplomacy means to conciliate the state as an actor and as an arena.
After a close examination of the Mitterrand diplomacy in the early 1980’s, we can conclude, despite many miscalculations, that at least the maneuver on missile deployment has been a success as a result of the change of government, and has restore the equilibrium between France and conditions of the New Cold war.

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本研究は、フランスにおける都市圏交通政策を、国レベルでの計画コントロールシステムとして捉えることで、各都市圏の計画が高い実効性を持っている要因を明らかにしようとするものである。具体的には、各政策の、都市圏交通政策全体の中での位置づけを行うとともに、その枠組みの中で実際に地方がどのような条件のもとで計画に関する意思決定を行ったかを示している。結論としては、フランスでは国が LOTI（国内交通基本法）を策定することで PDU（都市圏交通計画）の向かうべき理念を明らかにし、政策に関する全ての責任を負う組織である AOTU（都市圏交通機構）を設置させて計画策定を義務づけ、 VT（交通税）に代表される自由度の高い財源制度システムと法定の住民参加制度を構築することで、政策実施の枠組みを作った。それに対し、地方はその枠組みの中で、各地域に固有の問題をルールに則って解決することを大きな役割としているのである。このように国と地方の間で明確に役割を分担したこと、特に国による計画枠組みの設定こそが、フランスにおける地方の交通政策がスムーズに進むようになった大きな要因と考えられる。

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