フランスで誕生したエコミュージアム概念が、日本で独自に発展し、山口県萩市の「萩まちじゅう博物館」というエコミュージアム概念に基づいた文化資源マネジメントによる開発手法が確立した。独立行政法人国際協力機構によって全くコンテクストの違うに技術移転された、エコミュージアム観光開発技術が、特に保守的な市の地域社会において、エコミュージアムの「コア博物館／サテライト／ディスカバリー・トレイル」のシステムにより、来訪者に見せていきたいもの、見せたくないものの判断が地域側にあり、コントロールできる点、来訪者に地域の文化を尊重してもらうための仕掛けがある点においては適用できたと考える。このように、遺産の保護、地元に利益が還元される観光開発といった点において、エコミュージアム概念に普遍性があり、最適なシステムであると言えよう。しかしながら、と日本の社会構造が違う中で当然であるが、博物館として備えるべき機能を十分に持つことに関しては課題が残る。今後は、大学やの歴史家との連携を強化し、の地域住民自身が学芸員となれるような取り組みを行なっていくことによって解決していきたい。

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We are paying attention to the Democratization in the Middle East because of so-called “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative” taken by the G-8 Summit in 2004. This initiative, in turn, reflects the latest round of pressure on the Middle Eastern countries generated by measures such as the EU Barcelona Process, the UNDP Arab Human Development Reports and the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative. However the different target countries on the basis of their unique geographical situations and capabilities are demonstrating differential limits to the pressure. Furthermore, it is very difficult for us to generalize the political dynamics of the Middle East because of its heterogeneity. Therefore, initially, we need to devise a basic framework to get a clear picture of the common features and problems of politics in the region. This framework would be useful to study the pressure for democratization as well as democratization itself.
Concerning the evaluations for the democratization in the region, the Freedom House and Polity IV Project give very negative scores to the Arab countries. Studies conducted on the region in general point out the political instability of political Islam and an inherent structural problem of the region to perpetuate the existing power structure. At the same time, the country-specific case studies show better results on the social and political aspects and consequences of the democratization. There is a large gap between the studies on the Middle East as a part of worldwide democratization and the studies on each country in the region. This gap also indicates the lack of a basic framework to study and evaluate the democratization in the Middle East.
In this paper, I attempt to show a tentative framework through the theory of party systems by Giovanni Sartori. The governmental parties of Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria and Iraq are the dominant parties. Independent politicians who support the monarchy in Jordan and the rural leaders in Lebanon are playing the roles of governmental political parties. Thus, it is impossible to analyze their party systems here. Applying the theory of Sartori, I analyze on the political system of each country on the basis of its election and other political variables. On the basis of such an analysis, I classify the party system in Syria into “one party pragmatic, ” ones in Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia into “ideological-hegemonic party, ” ones in Yemen, Algeria and Iraq into “predominant-party systems” and one of Morocco into “polarized pluralism.” It is interesting that all states with “one party” and “hegemonic party” except Sudan prohibit the Islamic parties and all states with “predominant-party” and “pluralism” approved those.
This framework is different from the studies and evaluations of the past. Although there must be objections and criticism, I hope this paper may give a basic plan for further discussion.

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本発表は、東地中海地域アラビア語圏における、アブラハム一神教徒すべてによる聖者アル・ハディル崇敬の共有の事例をとおして、非イスラーム的、非一神教的要素を取り入れたイスラーム実践のありかたを提示することを目的としている。一方で、イスラーム主義復興の影響により、イスラームの文脈で「純化」され、排他性を帯びつつある聖者崇敬の様態とあわせて、映像と写真をもちいて紹介する。

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It is often assumed that, even if opposition parties can participate in electoral politics, they are fragmented, insufficient and insignificant under authoritarian regimes in which the ruling elites have maintained their political power for the long term. Recently, however, there have been not a few pre-electoral coalitions in various countries in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Post-Communist World and the Middle East that opposition parties have formed with each other during the parliamentary elections. Under what conditions do opposition parties form pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty authoritarian regimes?
There are still a few studies on pre-electoral coalitions under authoritarian regimes, though even such arguments have not consider a possibility that opposition parties could form them not only in competitive context but also in hegemonic one: In other words, these studies have treated a degree of party competitiveness as a given condition and dismissed a question of how it affects coalition formation among opposition parties. Therefore, this article focuses on party competition and electoral institutions, and attempts to testify their effects on the pre-electoral coalitions formed by the leading opposition parties by using an original data of the parliamentary elections from 1961 to 2008 in multiparty authoritarian regimes in which ruling elites have maintained their political power for more than a decade.
The first section outlines it as a background of pre-electoral coalition formation of opposition parties that the number of authoritarian regimes which adopted a multiparty system has dramatically increased since the 1990s. Although compelling to adopt a multiparty system as a part of political liberalization, ruling parties have still tended to maintain their economic, social and political dominance and the opposition parties have tended to be in a disadvantageous position: It is authoritarian single-party dominance.
The second section provides four hypotheses of pre-electoral coalitions focused on the party competition and the electoral institutions on the basis of two contrasting logics derived from the analyses of authoritarian regimes:One is that multiparty elections can facilitate their political liberalization, and another is that they can foster their political stability.
The third section testifies several models with a large-N logistic regression with a sample of 248 parliamentary elections in 54 countries in the period 1961-2008. These models show that the leading opposition party is more likely to form pre-electoral coalitions with other parties when (1) the opposition parties as a whole have more seat share and when (2) the Effective Number of Opposition Parties (ENOP) increase, but that it is less likely to do it when (3) the numbers of the interaction term of seat share and ENOP increase and when (4) the plurality voting system is adopted. Finally, this article concludes by emphasizing that political institutions matter in authoritarian regimes.

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