Is it necessary or desirable to involve international actors in post-conflict state building processes? If the answer is yes, in which way? And, how it should be made compatible with the principle of local-ownership? This paper takes the position that interventions by the international community are sometimes essential to bring and keep the peace since parties of violent conflicts are usually not able to agree on the resolution by themselves and, even when agreed, they often lack necessary resources to build a functional mechanism to keep and consolidate the peace. However, if involvement of international actors is not regarded as legitimate by local actors, there is no chance for the solution brought in by outsiders to take root among local actors and endure after international concern over the case declined. This paper conceives the legitimacy as the key for the international actors to be successful in intervening in the post-conflict statebuilding process and considers the legitimacy from 3 perspectives: how acceptable for local actors; how consistent with international and local norms; how suitable to international and local laws and rules.
Based on this notion, this paper looks into the process of statebuilding in Macedonia. Although it had enjoyed relative peace and stability in the region through the turbulent 1990s, Macedonia finally faced an internal armed conflict in 2001. The National Liberation Army (NLA) attacked police and military units and accused the Macedonian government of treating Albanian people, the largest national minority in Macedonia, like second-class citizens. They demanded that the government introduce measures to upgrade the status of Albanians in several spheres, including recognizing them as a constituent nation, granting their mother tongue official language status, and so forth. The majority, ethnic Macedonian side rejected these demands and refused any negotiation with the NLA accusing them as terrorists. Then, the EU, NATO,and the United States, self-acknowledged representatives of the international community, intervened and brokered the peace accord. This accord, the Ohrid Framework Agreement, was based on the notion that the grievances of the Albanian people concerning the alleged discrimination against them were the biggest cause of the conflict and approached this by significantly improving the Albanian people’s status. On the other hand, it caused major discontent to the Macedonian side and led part of them to resist its acceptance and implementation.
This paper closely looks into the process whereby international actors attempted to overcome such resistance by simultaneously pressuring and giving incentives to Macedonians to implement the accord. In the end, the author finds that external commitments were crucial for the peace process but at the same time had several significant flaws from the perspective of legitimacy and not leading local actors in a genuine co-existence or building fully functional state.

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The Republic of Macedonia has a complex ethnic structure. The majority group consists of Macedonians with about two-thirds of national population. Among ethnic minorities, Albanians overwhelmingly dominate over other minority groups, with a share of about a quarter of the population. Although ethnic conflicts had not arisen on the surface since the independence, ethnic relation undoubtedly was a sensitive issue in Macedonian society.
In early 2001, the Macedonian Crisis took place. After the armed conflict extending over half a year, an agreement for disarmament was settled between the government and Albanian guerillas in August. In accordance with the agreement, constitutional amendments were approved in the parliament in November. The crisis was over. However, this does not mean that an ethnic problem has been solved in Macedonia. It is considered that various factors that led to the Macedonian Crisis still exist in Macedonian society. One of them is economic inequality between ethnic groups. Although such economic inequality was not a direct cause of the crisis, it must be associated with escalating ethnic conflicts.
The purpose of this paper is to characterize Macedonia's ethnic problem, with focus on economic inequality between ethnic groups. This is done by investigating two hypotheses: (A) Distinct economic inequality exists between ethnic groups; and (B) Economic inequality between ethnic groups has widened since the independence. Three variables were chosen to assess these hypotheses: i) per capita income (social product), ii) unemployment rate, and iii) educational attainment. Although it is not an economic variable, education was chosen because it represents the level of human capital that is strongly associated with individual lifetime incomes.
The results generally support hypothesis (A) but reject hypothesis (B) . Distinct ethnic disparity was found for all three variables throughout a period of study. However, the widening of ethnic inequality was found only for education. The educational level of Albanians, on average, has declined markedly after the independence. On the contrary, a gap in unemployment rate between Macedonians and Albanians has narrowed in late 1990s. Also, the widening of ethnic inequality in per capita income was not observed during the period 1986-1995.
There are two remarks regarding these results. First, the fall in the education level of Albanians may be attributed to their own decisions. Throughout the period of transition, unemployment rates were consistently high, reaching above 30%. The rates were especially high for young adults, reaching more than 50%. Under such circumstances, it may be a rational decision to start working in the informal sector and accumulate business experiences that would be more effective than pursuing formal education in order to establish their careers in an emerging market economy. This attitude is considered to be stronger for Albanians because working in the informal sector has been common in Albanian society since the Yugoslav era. Second, hypothesis (B) for per capita income was generally rejected; however, when the year 1989 was used as a reference year under socialist regime, it could not be rejected. This implies that if Albanians viewed 1989 as a representative year before the independence, they would likely feel that their living standards declined both in absolute and relative terms compared with those of Macedonians during the period of transition.

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The aim of this paper is to describe the present situation of the group of citizens designated by the term of “Macedonian-Muslims” in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
The term “Muslim”, in Yugoslav usage, has dual meaning, designating both religious confession and ethnic affiliation. In 1969, the Yugoslav government finally recognized a Muslim nation, which included the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovia. The former Yogoslav Republic of Macedonia, however, officially resisted the expansion of the concept of a Muslim nation beyond the area of Bosnia Sanzak. Macedonian-speaking citizens of Slavic descent would be considered Macedonians even if they were of the Islamic faith, since the newly created Macedonian nation was struggling against Bulgarian or Greek claims and for national recognition.
Although about forty thousand citizens of the Macedonian Republic described themselves as belonging to the Muslim nation in the census in 1981, in the latest 1994 census the number has decreased to fifteen thousand. One of the reasons was that the Macedonian leadership had encouraged Macedonian-speaking Muslims to raise their consciousness of its membership in the “Macedonian mother-nation”. Muslim ethnologist Nijazi Limanoski, one of the representatives of the Republic association “Cultural and Scientific Manifestations of Macedonian-Muslims” founded in 1979, insisted that they would be considered as “Islamized Macedonian”, not as “Macedonian Muslims”.
An identification of Macedonian-Muslims is difficult, however. Current problems originate among the diverse groups of Muslims themselves, especially in claims for education in mother-tongue. The Muslim community of Macedonian Republic comprises Macedonian-Muslims, Albanians, and Turks. In recent years, representatives of the Turkish community in the western part of the Republic have been trying to get official permission for opening Turkish classes in primary schools. These efforts were met with a negative answer, arguing that as they were Macedonian-Muslims they had hence to study in Macedonian.
This brief overview of the present situation has not sought to draw conclusions. The objective here has been to present one complex aspect of the Muslim national identity that is politically sensitive.

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Following the end of the Cold War, various tentatives to achieve peace have been made, most notably through the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The first attempt to be carried out was, one called “preventive deployment” and consisted in the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces before a conflict takes place. Under the name United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), such a force was successfully dispatched to the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia) and was able to achieve its purpose of preventing the conflict in Yugoslavia from spreading to Macedonia.
If we consider the terrible events that took place during the Yugoslavia civil war and their consequences as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, numbers alone cannot accurately measure the positive impact this mission had in preventing the conflict from spilling into Macedonia. However, it is doubtful whether one should expect that such a singular success in conflict prevention could easily be reproduced. In this article I propose to examine the case of the UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia and to clarify why it succeeded. In Section 1 I will present an outline of UNPREDEP. In Section 2 I will focus on the reasons that can explain why UNPREDEP succeeded.
Concretely speaking, the mission took place under the following conditions: (1) international trend towards conflict prevention, (2) support for preventive deployment in the country concerned (Macedonia government and domestic players), (3) existence of a reliable force with deterrent capacity (U. S. A participation), (4) existence of a reward (participation to the EU and cancellation of sanctions from New Yugoslavia, etc.), (5) a domestic shared understanding of the potential aggressor country, (6) existence of other conflict prevention means (activity of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), NGOs etc.), (7) clarification/limitation of purpose/mandate, (8) establishment of a division of labor system, (9) good timing. All these can be considered factors that contributed to the mission's success.
This leads us to the following conclusions: UNPREDEP did succeed in the carrying out of its deployment and in the prevention of conflict in Macedonia at that time, because various activities were performed very well, and, at the same time, supported by a set of favorable conditions and environment. So, we can deduce that changes in some of those factors could have led to quite a different, and less favorable, situation. The success of UNPREDEP should not be seen as a solid model. Rather, it serves to show the possibilities, but also the limits of achieving conflict prevention through such preventive deployments.

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　戦後，わが国の生活水準は著しく向上してきたが，居住環境の水準はまだ低い。特に，都心の居住環境は最低居住水準に達していない世帯がおよそ20％，平均居住水準に達していない世帯が70％以上にも及んでいる。近年のように社会情勢が急速度で進展する中では，社会資本のストックとなる質の高い生活環境を整備することが重要である。このために都心部の再開発や，湾岸地域の再開発等，良好な都心部での生活居住環境の創造こそが肝要である。本研究は，わが国の都市が人間の生活基盤となるにふさわしい環境と，次世代の都市生活者の基本的な生活様式の確立のために，先進欧米諸国の都心居住者の生活実態を調査し，もってわが国の都心居住の生活様式研究に資することを目的として実施したものである。欧米先進諸都市の都心居住の生活様式の実態について，以下の対象都市に関して調査を実施した。①ロンドン，②パリ，③リスポン・バルセロナ，④ベネチア，⑤アテネ。早くから週休2日制が敷かれ，特に夏及び冬の長期休暇が浸透している欧米先進諸国の都市では，自ずとそのライフスタイルについても，居住空間についても，わが国と大きな違いが見られることが予想されていた。特に，都心居住と同時に長期休暇活用のバカンスを前提としたリゾート居住についても，一部調査の対象としてアテネ市海岸部にも歩をすすめた。研究の方法としては，現地の生活者の実際の家庭を訪問し，写真，絵画，スケッチ等を主として，ビジュアルな資料収集を実施した。また，懇談や質問を通して，生活体験や意見などを聴取した。

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The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the role of agriculture in the process of transition to a market economy, with a primary focus on its contribution to regional income distribution in the Republic of Macedonia. During the transition, the Macedonian economy has deteriorated; both output and employment have significantly declined while income inequality has become worse. In these contexts, what are the effects of economic transition on agriculture? Has the agricultural sector buffered transition shocks, contributing to societal stability during the transition? What about the role of agriculture in income distribution across regions? This paper addresses these questions, with special attention to the dual structure of Macedonian agriculture: small individual and large corporate farms.
It is found that the agricultural sector has kept its level of output throughout the transition period. Further, a trend analysis by organizational form shows that a distinct difference existed in response to transition shocks between the two farm sub-sectors. The in-dividual farm sub-sector has been stable and even increased both output and employment during the transition. In contrast, the corporate farm sub-sector experienced substantial falls in output and employment.
Decomposition analysis of Gini coefficients reveals that agriculture has played an important role in alleviating income inequality across regions during the period 1986-1995 and the role is more striking for individual farms. The differential between the two farm sub-sectors reflects the fact that there exists a marked difference in behavioral response to transition shocks.
These results lead to the conclusion that while large-scale corporate agriculture was vulnerable to changes in market conditions and public policies, individual agriculture has contributed to societal stability by offering a buffer against the risk of poverty that has been increasing, particularly in lower-income regions under the continued stagnation of the overall economy during the transition.

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On the 3rd of July 1908, Major Niyâzî, who was the vice commander of the 3rd Battalion, 88th Rejiment, 3rd Osmanli Army Corps, in Resne (now Yugoslavia) and who was also a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, rebeled against the Osmanli Government. He, along with approximately two hundred sympathizers consisting of armed Osmanli officers, soldiers and civilians, went into the mountain to plan their revolt. The purpose of their revolt was for the re-establishment of the Osmanli Constitution of 1876, which was guaranteed to all Osmanli subjects. This rebelion was the birth of the Young Turks Revolution. The Young Turks Revolution was started by Major Ahmet Niyâzî and his sympathizers themselves with no order of the Committee of Union and Progress.

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