On Dec. 8, 1991 the dissolution of the USSR was declared at the three power summit conference of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and Dec. 21, 1991 heralded the beginning of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which consists of eleven countries of the former Soviet Union. Their economy, which was structured in the communism era, was based on the vertical division of labor and therefore it was clear that the newly-borne republics could not exist by themselves without substantial assistance from the wealthier countries within the CIS.
As a result, the CIS economy in 1992 showed stagnation and contraction. Compared with the previous year, industry output decreased by 18.2% and agricultural production also dropped 10%. In addition, foreign trade shrank dramatically by 25% in terms of the value of foreign currency.
As for the inter-republican relationship, especially between Russia and the former Soviet republics, it can be sketched as follows:
1. Concerning the supply of energy, Russia used to provide Belarus with 100% of its oil and gas requirements and Ukraine with 86% and 52% respectively of its oil and gas needs. But in 1992, Russia could not meet their demand and the supply was reduced significantly.
2. Regarding the financial position, the Russian Central Bank reports that Russia's credit balance including settlements between banks in the former Soviet republics, interstate records and emissions amount to 2.31 trillion rubles. In fact, the corresponding account for the procurement of goods and services as of the end of 1992 shows credit from Russia's account stood at 1.29 trillion rubles.
To fight inflation in order to protect the domestic market from neighboring countries, to cope with the shortage of the ruble cash and also to prepare for the introduction of own national currency “Hryvnia” as the symbol of its independence, Ukraine introduced a monetary unit on Jan. 10, 1992 which can be used repeatedly and issued coupons called “Karbovanets” to be circulated in parallel with the Russian ruble. In the case of Kyrgyztan, its own national currency “Som” was introduced on May 10, 1993 with the support of IMF and World Bank.
CIS is currently an aggregate economic region where Russian financial support is much expected. But this situation is starting to normalize as the former Soviet republics recognize that Russia is not in such a strong position.
Under these circumstances, CIS countries are now moving to strengthen their economic relationships by concluding economic cooperation agreements on a bilateral basis. It seems that this will be a new step to strengthen the structure of CIS where member countries can be satisfied.

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第22回バイオフィリアリハビリテーション学会大会の開催に当たり、国際学会理事長として、国際学会から心からのお祝いを申し上げます。本大会では多年創動運動の脳機能からの研究を行われた慶応大学田中敏幸教授の大会長講演があると聞きます。多くの人の今後のリハ実施に役立つものと期待しています。

今日世界は人口転換の時代を迎え、民主主義の基礎である「自由・平等・博愛」の概念だけでは人類の幸せを確立することが出来ない時代になっています。我々の学会はリハビリ医学の「障害の受容」と「インペアメント」を死語にするべく研究活動を続けてきました。学会は年々充実し、2016年は厚生労働省大臣官房国際課のご協力の下世界保健機構（ＷＨＯ）の参加があり、2020年は4月に

で2020国際学会を開催します。また9月にポーランドで研究会が開催できるよう準備を進めています。

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The disintegration of the Soviet Union was inevitable, since those three elements which had served to integrate the approximately 120 nationalities into one artificial entity, i. e., the U. S. S. R., had recently severely weakened its cementing functions. These were the threat from outside, the Communist ideology, and the organs which had supervised the enforcement of that ideology, i. e., the CPSU, KGB, and the Soviet armed forces. The first two cements had for long reduced its centripetal functions, and the third ones lost it through their badly organized August 1991 abortive coup attempt. When the Soviet Union collapsed, three choices existed: its reorganization into a loose form of federation, for example, the Union of Federation advocated by Gorbachev; the complete interdependence of the 12 republics; and the formation of the CIS. The main reasons why the 11 former republics chose the CIS option seems to be the following: (1) the 11 former republics found themselves unable to become economically independent for the time being, at least in the period right after the demise of the USSR, partly due to the heresy they inherited, namely economic reliance upon each other, which was the result of the Stalin's skillful application of the “socialist principle of divided labor.” (2) Even if these republics had decided to become completely independent, the chances were that they would not have been recognized as independent states, and hence nor admitted to such international organizations as the UN, IMF, CECS, by the U. S. and other important Western countries, which were greatly concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other undesirable consequences of the breakup of the USSR. (3) These former republics needed some sort of a mechanism or forum through which they could solve those mounting problems and issues which were left over with the sudden disintegration of the U. S. S. R.
What is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)? No one so far seems to have provided a definitive, satisfactory, clear answer to this question. It is understandable for the following three reasons. (1) The CIS is not necessarily a concept with a positive substantive content but rather a counter concept against the USSR, the Center and its personal embodiment, Gorbachev. (2) The leaders of the CIS participating member states hurriedly decided to build the CIS, without having any agreed-upon concept of that institution. (3) They interpret differently the CIS scheme, according to their own ideas and even wishful thinkings.
As indicated above, the CIS thus contains, from the very beginning, the seeds of disagreements and even its own disintegration. Particularly, the following three constitute such a centrifugal element: (1) the sudden disappearance of the common enemy (the USSR, the center, Gorbachev), against which each constituent republic used to unite in the past; (2) different understanding or interpretation of the CIS scheme among CIS member states; (3) existence of potential and even actual seeds of contradictions, disagreements and cinflicts among CIS states with regard to their territorial boundaries, mother language tongue policies, and concern over the rise of Russian hegemonism.
What will be the CIS's future? Three scenarios are likely to take place. The first is what one may call “Yugoslavianization, ” i. e., the disintegration of the CIS and the starting of the civil war between and within some CIS member states. This dreadful scenario has in part begun. The second is what one may call “block building”, i. e., CIS member states build close ties, mostly economic, with neighboring countries within and without the CIS. The third is an effort to reorganize the CIS in a more tight or loose fashion. One may conclude that a combination of all these three scenarios are simultaneously occurring now.

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