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  • (敬文堂、一九九三年)
    鍛冶 智也
    年報行政研究
    1995年 1995 巻 30 号 140-143
    発行日: 1995/05/20
    公開日: 2012/09/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 梅澤 昇平
    法政論叢
    1999年 35 巻 2 号 13-21
    発行日: 1999/05/15
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    More than 20 drafts on the law amendment on political ethics have been presented to the Japanese Diet until now. Yet they remain not discussed in the Diet. Parties are eager to express their concern on political ehics, however, some differences lie between the drafts by various parties: to what extent informaton about political activities is disclosed; whether a politician is punished when acting as a middleman or not; whether political contributions from companies and organizations are prohibited or not. Political ehics ofren becomes a subject of mass media and is concerned with people. Then what on earth is the "political ehics"? What do they expect of politics when people refer to it? According to some past opinion polls of the Asahi Shinbun and the Yomiuri Shinbun, people generally expect (1) politicians to be definitely "clean." (2) prime minister to be "resolute" rather than "clean" and (3) does not necessarily expect the government to think "political ethics" high priority. I think that the "political ethics" is (1) not to violate laws and criteria, (2) to protect morals and (3) to concentrate on their business as politicians. Besides, people are also responsible for the "political ehtics." There would be no democracy if they do neither join a party, make private political eontributons nor involve themselves voluntarily in politics.
  • 池田 直隆
    国際政治
    2002年 2002 巻 129 号 173-185,L20
    発行日: 2002/02/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In January 1955, Prime Minister HATOYAMA Ichiro emphasized that Japan's primary objective is to attain for Japan full independence and self-reliance by pursuing as “independent diplomacy”, while at the same time Japan will adhere its basic principle of close cooperation with the United States. And HATOYAMA sought to adjust its relations with countries with which Japan still does not have diplomatic relations. So, He began Japanese-Soviet negotiations. U. S. Government took the position with the Japanese Government that the United States did not oppose establishment of diplomatic ralations with USSR, because they thought Japan was already an independent nation.
    But, U. S government feared that Japan chose the Neutral policy or Anti-American policy. And they are discontented with Japan's attitude toward the national security problems. They thought that Japan did not regard the threat of communism as seriously as did the United States and NATO countries. U. S. Government was irritated by the fact that Japan lacked self-knowledge of their position and responsibility.
    U. S. Government suspected whether HATOYAMA cabinet understood the importance and significance of mutual security systems or not. Moreover, they understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was so weak that difference of foreign policy between HATOYAMA and the Foreign ministry became very serious. HATOYAMA's directions to the Foreign ministry was sometimes not transmitted, and HATOYAMA's action did not sometimes coincide with the policy of Foreign ministry.
    There were two typical examples. One is Japanese-Soviet negotiations, and the other is Japanese-SouthKorea negotiations. Japanese Government and LDP also understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was very weak and unreliable.
    But, U. S. Government could not censure HATOYAMA publicly for his independent diplomacy, because in Japan, the anti-American feeling was growing rapidly by reason of U. S. troops and bases. In March 1956, when Secretary John F. Dulles visited Tokyo, MIKI Bukichi, who was the member of proxy committee of Liberal Democratic Party, said to Dulles, “even a mountain can be undermined and crumble because of ant holes”. MIKI warned Dulles against Japanese anti-American feeling. Indeed, HATOYAMA's independent diplomacy came to a deadlock. Japan failed to negotiate with USSR, South korea. The abuse of veto by USSR and Chinese Taipei prevented Japan from admitting to the United Nations in the 10th session, December 1955.
    So, it was very important for the U. S. Government to make HATOYAMA succeed in his Independent diplomacy. U. S. Government thought that HATOYAMA should resign honourably when Japanese-Soviet negotiation was concluded. It was called “Hanamichiron” in LDP. MIKI Bukichi once said to KISHI Nobusuke, who became Prime Minister in 1957, as follows.
    “What is most important is to make HATOAMA resign without injuring his political reputation”.
    The cognition of U. S Government was coincided with Japanese one.
  • 竹内 桂
    法政論叢
    2018年 54 巻 1 号 121-
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2018/07/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 本邦の部
    燃料協会誌
    1951年 30 巻 7-8 号 219-221
    発行日: 1951/08/30
    公開日: 2010/06/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小森 義峯
    憲法論叢
    2000年 7 巻 1-21
    発行日: 2000/12/20
    公開日: 2018/01/10
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    In Japan, after restoration of sovereignty, there was the first movement (1952-1960) of amendment to the Constitution for rearmament. Secondly, there was a resting stage (1960-1990) in high growth of economy. Thirdly, since 1990 there is a new movement of amendment to the Constitution for international contribution of man power. But I am sorry to say that they forget the traditional Emperor system as a fandamental problem of amendment to the Japanese Constitution in all period.
  • 竹中 龍範
    英学史研究
    1999年 2000 巻 32 号 13-23
    発行日: 1999年
    公開日: 2009/09/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Of the language schools founded during the Meiji Era in Kagawa Prefecture, Eika Gakko established in 1893 by Hanzo Okauchi, who learned English at Kokumin Eigaku-kai, was one of the most prosperous private schools. Those schools made a contribution to the development of secondary education in the prefecture before public secondary schools were established, and produced a large number of promising young men, among whom was Bukichi Miki. Okauchi closed the school after eight years, and, then, he studied his English in the United States. After teaching in Tokyo for several years, he moved to Talien and there he founded another language school, Dairen Gogakko (Talien Language School) in 1920.
    This paper sheds light on his contribution in Kagawa, investigating the history of his English language learning. His contribution through the establishment of and teaching at Dairen Gogakko is to be reported in another paper.
  • 日本外交の国際認識と秩序構想
    奈良岡 聰智
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 139 号 74-90,L10
    発行日: 2004/11/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article aims to analyze KATO Takaaki's diplomatic vision in connection with his political leadership. As is well known, KATO took the initiative as foreign minister when Japan entered World War I and submitted the Twenty-One Demands, and tried to actively expand Japanese interests in China. But after World War I, he accepted the results of the Washington Conference and as a prime minister promoted a moderate diplomacy, the so-called “Shidehara Diplomacy”. What vision had KATO had in this period? How did he or did he not change his vision? I will attempt to answer this question, which has thus far not been clearly answered.
    KATO regretted his poor dealings with the controversial negotiations of the Twenty-One Demands. However, he tried to convince himself that he hadn't failed in the Twenty-One Demands securing Japanese interests in Manchuria and Shandong, and he continued to make an excuse even after the end of the Washington Conference. He also insisted that the return of Shandong to China should be done only in accordance with the Twenty-One Demands Treaty and Japan should make no concessions at all to China at the Washington Conference. Kato's attitude led the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party to a hard line on the matter of the Twenty-One Demands, as well as attacking the government. Elder Statesman Saionji Kinmochi was worried about this, so KATO was not appointed as prime minister and the Kenseikai party was kept away from government for a long time.
    On the other hand, at the same time, KATO continued to try to make the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party more moderate. KATO's excuse for the Twenty-One Demands gradually toned down. He expressed his sympathy for Wilsonianism and the new trend in diplomacy after World War I. He was strongly opposed to the intervention in Siberia and China carried out by the Terauchi Cabinet, so he controlled the hard-liners on these matters within the Kenseikai party and refrained from making partisan attacks toward the HARA Cabinet with which he shared a fundamental diplomatic vision.
    It was at about the end of 1923 that KATO stopped clinging to his excuse about the Twenty-One Demands and made the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party more moderate and coherent. He decided to do this because he had realized his excuse was too emotional and nonsensical. Also, Saionji's anxiety was preventing the Kenseikai party from returning to government. This change of diplomatic policy was the foundation of the Shidehara diplomacy in the KATO Cabinet. I conclude that although KATO's clinging to the excuse for the Twenty-One Demands was a manifest failure, his effort to make the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party moderate should be duly evaluated.
  • 清水 聡
    開智国際大学紀要
    2025年 24 巻 176-183
    発行日: 2025/03/10
    公開日: 2025/04/02
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―“臨床政治'’的考察―
    岡野 加穂留
    組織科学
    1981年 15 巻 1 号 2-10
    発行日: 1981/03/30
    公開日: 2024/09/10
    ジャーナル フリー

     政治組織の活動体として,自由民主党の分析に焦点をおく.西欧先進諸国の政党組織との比較考察を念頭におきながら,党の組織化の度合いを知るための党員率の比較,カルテル型政党としての自民党の構造内における政策立案・決定のプロセスと,それにかかわる財界との構造的結びつきを観察する.政党以上に政治的活動をする田中角栄派の政策立案過程における政治機能のスケッチについてもふれておく.

  • 石田 雄
    年報政治学
    1953年 4 巻 141-183
    発行日: 1953/03/14
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 古賀 倫嗣
    社会学評論
    1988年 38 巻 4 号 421-430,493
    発行日: 1988/03/31
    公開日: 2009/11/11
    ジャーナル フリー
    わが国の政治過程を考察するさいもっとも重要なのは、一九五五年社会党統一と保守合同により成立した保守-革新の政治枠組をもつ「五五年体制」の検討である。国民経済レベルでの高度成長とパラレルに、政治レベルでの自民党長期政権が続き、「経済大国日本」を実現させた。ところが、六〇年代後半、高度成長路線は大都市における過密と公害、生活問題を引き起こす。こうした都市問題に対しては、中央より地方での反応が鋭く、七三年には東海道メガロポリスに沿った主要都市に「革新」自治体が誕生した。「地方革新」が「中央保守」を包囲するという政治戦略とともに、対話による行政、市民参加といったその政治手法は選挙以外に政治参加の手段が存在することを現実に示した。
    ところで、「革新」自治体の後退は七〇年代末期には始まり、横浜・沖縄・東京・京都・大阪と相次いでその拠点を失った。だが、地方「革新」の崩壊は「保守」の復権ではなかった。今や政治枠組としての有効性を失った保守-革新の図式にかわって「保革相乗り」で登場したのは、「脱イデオロギー」を標榜する自治省 (旧内務省) 出身の行政テクノクラートであった。こうしたタイプの首長を選択した住民の側にも「生活保守主義」という新しい動きがみられたのも、この時期からである、この層は、一般には浮動票層、支持政党なし層と呼ばれるが、彼らは政治的行為の有効性についてきわめて敏感で、どのチャンネルを使えば自己の利益がうまく実現できるかを常に考えるタイプの市民層といってよい。八七年四月、統一地方選挙のさいの「売上税反乱」はそうした一例にすぎない。
    戦後長期にわたって政治の基礎的な枠組であった保守-革新の図式は、こんにち中央-地方の図式に編成替えされ、さらに四全総にみられるように、東京-非東京との対立、「地方」内部の矛盾がいっそう深化している。そういう意味で、現代は「巨大な過渡期」なのである。
  • 金戸 嘉七
    新聞学評論
    1957年 6 巻 1-16
    発行日: 1957/01/30
    公開日: 2017/10/06
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 奥健太郎・河野康子編『自民党政治の源流』と研究の進展に向けて
    川人 貞史
    選挙研究
    2016年 32 巻 2 号 77-86
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2019/12/01
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 小宮 京
    選挙研究
    2010年 26 巻 1 号 5-13
    発行日: 2010年
    公開日: 2017/05/08
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    2009年9月,1955年の結成以来,ほぼ政権の座にあり続けた自由民主党の一党優位体制が崩壊し,民主党を中心とした鳩山由紀夫内閣が発足した。政治報道も変化した。とりわけ派閥という存在は,従来の自民党政権と,新しい民主党政権の断絶あるいは連続性を考える上で,興味深いテーマである。本稿は,この問題を考える前提作業として,自由民主党における非公式組織である派閥の機能について歴史的に検討する。その際,総裁選出過程における派閥の役割を,1920年代,1945-55年,1955年以降の三つの時代に分けて, 分析した。その結果,派閥のあり方を規定したのは,第一に,大日本帝国憲法や日本国憲法のもとでの運用,第二に,総裁選出方法との強い関連が明らかにされた。そして,派閥は,非公式の組織でありながら確固たる存在となったことが判明した。
  • 日本政治学会文献委員会
    年報政治学
    2019年 70 巻 2 号 2_361-2_397
    発行日: 2019年
    公開日: 2020/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 野村 高将
    法政論叢
    2006年 42 巻 2 号 80-97
    発行日: 2006/05/15
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    There was the time when the Japanese people looked for a 'Real Independence' of Japan. The typical politicians was Ichiro Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi. Although the 'Real Independence' which they aimed at suffered a setback, the tendency to based on nature of Kishi in the reason is deep-ro-oted. This viewpoint is important. However, in my idea, abandonment of the single-seat constituency system introduction which Hatoyama tried is greatly related to the frustration of 'Real Independence' This paper describes the deliberation process of the single-seat constituency system of 1956, and the influence which its frustration had on the future generations.
  • 信夫 清三郎
    年報政治学
    1953年 4 巻 53-68
    発行日: 1953/03/14
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大日本体育協会の「建議」を背景として
    大林 太朗
    体育学研究
    2019年 64 巻 2 号 675-686
    発行日: 2019/12/16
    公開日: 2019/12/20
    [早期公開] 公開日: 2019/10/24
    ジャーナル フリー
     The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 that struck Tokyo was one of the largest-scale disasters in the history of Japan. Almost half of the city was destroyed by fire. This paper describes how the government constructed new athletic parks in Tokyo under a policy recommended by “Dainippon Taiiku Kyokai”, the Japan Amateur Athletic Association” (JAAA). The findings were as follows.
     1) After the Great Kanto Earthquake, the JAAA held a meeting of the board and submitted a proposal to both the president of the Imperial Capital Reconstruction Department and the Mayor of Tokyo. It requested the government to construct new athletic parks in affected areas of Tokyo in order to cultivate the physical strength and mental health of citizens.
     2) The government officially received the proposal and constructed 3 new parks (Kinshi Park in 1928, Hamacho Park in 1929, Sumida Park in 1931). Various sports facilities such as athletic fields, tennis courts, and swimming pools were set up in each park. Notably, pools had a night lighting system installed for office workers and arranged specific hours for women only.
     3) In particular, various events for general citizens were held at Sumida Park. These included a comforting sports day for city officers’ families, public radio calisthenics, and a baseball league made up of Kabuki actors. In a commemorative bulletin issued in Tokyo, the park was referred to as “Downtown Olympia”. In the 1920s, the early period of sports history in Japan, athletic parks were arranged at the request of the JAAA in the post-disaster phase. These 3 parks, still in existence, supported the development of sports in prewar Japan.
  • 「革新」から「保守」へ
    井上 敬介
    選挙研究
    2022年 38 巻 1 号 47-59
    発行日: 2022年
    公開日: 2025/03/26
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    本論の目的は,改進党北海道支部連合会及び日本民主党北海道支部連合会と衆議院議員総選挙との関係を考察することで,立憲民政党の出身者(主に北海道議会議員)を中心に,自由民主党北海道支部連合会の前史を明らかにすることにある。改進党道連及び日本民主党道連は民政党北海道支部から道議主体の集団指導体制を継承した。民政党系と国民民主党系が農民協同党系に主導権を奪われた結果,改進党道連(1952年8月発足)は「革 新政治勢力の中核」を担う路線を選択,十勝支部の宣言には社会主義が明記された。2度の衆院選の敗北にともなう農協系の後退を機に,民政系と国民系は鳩山自由党と合流,1955年3月に日本民主党道連を結成し,「保守勢力の結集」を企図した。日本民主党道連は会長以外の要職を道議が独占した。日本民主党道連の結成は,北海道における1955年体制成立の契機と見なすことができる。
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