Since the Gulf War, the United States has built up a joint information system, which is interoperable among the military services--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The application of information technology to the military system has contributed to maintain the prominent position of the United States in international politics. According to Kenneth Waltz’s theory, however, the United States cannot sit on its laurels. His balance-of-power theory leads us to expect states to emulate the successful policies of others.
João Resende-Santos has developed a “neorealist theory of emulation.” This theory contains two noteworthy points. First, the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation vary in accordance with the level of threat in the surrounding security environment. Second, when the option of relying on the capabilities of other states through alliance formation (external balancing) is available, the perception of reduced threat weakens the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation. In other words, emulation, as well as innovation, is regarded as one form of arms buildup relying on one’s own capabilities (internal balancing).
However, is the level of threat in the surrounding security environment a really decisive factor of emulation? Do the timing, speed, and scale of military imitation vary with the region of the world? Moreover,don’t states emulate others for the formation and strengthening of an alliance? By verifying these questions,it is possible to contribute theoretically to research on the international diffusion of military technology and ideas, especially the diffusion of information revolution in military affairs, on which little research has been conducted.
This article attempts to refute Resende-Santos’ arguments, by analyzing the diffusion of the joint information system of the U.S. Armed Forces to two allies, the United Kingdom and Japan. As a result of this analysis, I make two points. First, even in regions where the levels of threat in the surrounding security environment are different, the military emulation of similar timing, speed, and scale may occur. Second, states emulate others not only for their own military buildup but also for the enhancement of their alliance through ensuring interoperability.
The body of this article is divided into three sections. First, I describe the development of the joint information systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan during the post-Cold War period. Second, I suggest the diffusion of the joint information system from the United States to the other two countries and present a framework for analyzing emulation, a concept that is similar to but different from diffusion. Third, I consider the emulation of the U.S. military system by the United Kingdom and Japan in more detail.

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Japan's ODA (Official Development Assistance) has increased rapidly over the past ten years, yet political analysis of the impact of Japan's ODA on the international system has not kept pace. Nonetheless, we are beginning to see various arguments emerge concerning Japan's ODA, and this article will explore some of the recent arguments on the role and influence of Japan's ODA to clarify the parameters of the current debate. There are roughly two theoretical perspectives from which to analyze the influence of economic assistance; (1) the “liberal” perspective which regards ODA as an international public good, (2) the “realist” perspective which regards ODA as a means to pursue national interest. Furthermore, we can characterize the objectives of economic assistance into two general categories; (1) political motivations and (2) economic motivations.
According to this categorization, this article will analyze how the Japanese government has rationalized its aid policy by surveying both the “Diplomatic Blue Book, ” (published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the “White Paper on Economic Cooperation, ” (published by MITI) over the thirty years since 1958. A categorization of the changes in aid rationales is presented in Table 1 and 2 and Chart 1. In general, over the past three decades, we find that Japan's aid rationales shift from a national interest orientation to an emphasis on Japan's international responsibility, and shift from being motivated by promarily economic interests to wider political interests.
In fact, the increase in Japan's overseas aid has not only made an international contribution, but has also increased Japan's economic and political influence over the recipients. If we look at the Japan's decision-making on ODA, however, we find that there are few cases in which the Japanese government has employed ODA as a tool for political leverage or as a positive sanction. Japan gains what Klaus Knorr defines as “non-power influence” (Knorr, Power of Nations), by fostering a more interdependent relationship with the developing countries through its ODA. Instead, the Japanese government has promoted the untying of its aid and co-financing with international organization such as the World Bank in order to contribute more to the international common interests.
What then motivates Japanese ODA policy? In analyzing Japan's aid to the Phillipines, which has increased markedly since 1986, some policy makers (e. g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have give weight to political cooperation with the United States in their support for increasing aid to that country. Other policy makers, however, (e. g. MITI and business circle) have stressed Japan's own economic interests in the Philippines. Many analysts of the Philippine case stress the importance of “external pressure” on Japan's ODA policy-making. But the influence of “external pressre” in Japan's aid decision-making may not be a major factor because Japan's iterests frequently overlap with the interests of the Western allies (especially the United States).
To date, the debate on both the implications of and the motivations for Japan's ODA policy has, for the most part, been shaped by the “liberal” and “realist” conceptions of state behavior. Concrete case studies now need to be done to test these general assumptions made in these arguments.

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冷戦期にアメリカで確立した軍事社会学は同時代の軍隊・軍人・民軍関係などを中心的主題とし，軍事組織への積極的な社会調査を実行し，西側諸国を中心に国際的に普及した．これに対して日本では軍事社会学は長らく輸入されず，総力戦の社会的影響や経験・記憶の探究を中心に近年「戦争社会学」というかたちで学際的な研究が集積しつつある．しかし，日本にも社会学の軍隊研究は存在し，軍事社会学を参照した研究者も皆無ではない．本論の目的は，軍事社会学を参照した社会学者による軍隊研究の検討を通して，国際的に普及している軍事社会学と，日本社会学の軍隊研究との位置関係ならびに，ありえた接続可能性を明らかにすることにある．まずアメリカにおける軍事社会学の確立と各国における受容状況，日本の社会科学の隣接分野における軍事社会学との接点について検討した．そして冷戦期日本社会学における軍事社会学の参照状況として，従来から注目されてきた文化論的な戦争研究に加え，産業社会学からの組織・職業論の理論枠組みへの関心，ならびに教育社会学のエリート論からの実証研究の試みを明らかにした．それらは相互参照がなく孤立していた．しかし，軍事社会学の枠組みの直輸入でも，狭義の政軍関係論的展開でもなく，日本社会学との接続および戦後日本特有の実証的研究対象の発見によって，軍隊と社会の関係性に関するユニークな認識を生産しえたものだった．

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In the wake of the Cold War, the largest security challenges are dangers posed by regional powers, and dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At this time of uncertainty, US leadership is essential for world peace.
For the US, East Asia is a region of growing importance. The Pacific Rim countries are collectively America's largest trading partner. The confrontation and conflict that are recurrent reality in the region, however, make US military presence an essential element of regional stability. And for both regional security and US glogal interests, an alliance with Japan is necessary.
The presence of US forces in Japan affords their rapid deployment to trouble spots in East Asia and as far as the Persian Gulf in the event of a variety of contingencies. Their stationing here is also cost-effective, thanks to Japanese financial support.
The counterproliferation initiative of the Clinton Administration may have made Japan the most important ally of the US. The two countries must work in tandem to strengthen the present non-proliferation regime. Japan could make important contributions to the Theater Missile Defence project of the united States. The context for the Japan-US connection also includes North Korea's nuclear development and exports of missile technology to ‘rogue states’ in the Middle East, which are serious threat to Asian and global security.
The bilateral alliance was reaffirmed with the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security announced in April 1996. Close cooperation between the two countries, it was agreed by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, is the most effective framework for the defense of Japan. The Declaration also clarified that Japan would not seek sutonomous defense capabilities. Further, the continued commitment to the alliance was reiterated at a time of debate over Okinawa, with Japan pledging its continued contribution for maintenance of US forces in Japan. The adjustment and realignment of US bases that is now underway will not result in any substantial change in overall US force structure.
The redefined alliance includes one important change, being a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation by both countries. The development of contingency plans for future military conflicts in East Asia is now a key security agenda in the bilateral cooperation. The controversial issue here is Japan's military support of US forces in regional crises. Japanese government policy has been one in which the Self Defense Forces might be used only in the event of a direct attack on Japan.

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