近年、アジアを含む世界各国で「民主主義のゆらぎ」が指摘されている。日本はアジア諸国と軍事を含む様々な連携を強めており、どのようなかたちで「民主主義」が各国の外交・安全保障政策に反映しているのかを知ることは、日本の今後を考えるうえで、喫緊の課題となっている。アジア諸国の民主主義のゆらぎを確認するにあたり、ヨーロッパ政治との比較から3つの共通項を見出すことができる。まず1つ目は、「既存の政治秩序の溶解」である。欧州では、既存の2大政党がグローバル化や国内産業の空洞化などの問題により、支持を失っている。こうした政党秩序の溶解・変容は、アジア諸国にもみられる。2つ目は、「上からの」権威的支配を拒否し、「下からの」政治を望むポピュリズム政治が拡大していることである。近年の欧米では、ポピュリズム勢力が、反既成政治・反既成政党の立場から無党派層の支持を動員し、拡大をみせている。同様のことがパキスタンやタイでみられる。そして3つ目は、「宗教の政治的役割」である。欧州では、多くの国でキリスト教民主主義政党が有力政党として存在し、その政策にはキリスト教の社会観・国家観が反映されてきた。こうした宗教のもつ政治的重要性は、アジア諸国でも同様であるが、インドやミャンマーなどでは排外主義へとつながる政治の「宗教化」が進行している。アジアという「一大成長センター」における政治的な不安定要因は、国際的なインパクトを与える。そのアジアとどのように関わり、民主主義をどう共鳴させ、展開していくのかが、日本の未来のカギとなる。

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Ⅰ．研究の背景と目的 シンガポールでは独立（1965年）以来、

（PAP: People’s Action Party）が国会において9割以上の議席占有率を保持してきたが、総選挙における得票率は6~7割に留まる。この非比例性の一因として、各政党が1選挙区につき3~6人の候補者グループを擁立し、最多得票の政党が当該選挙区の割当議席を総取りする仕組みである集団選挙区（GRC: Group Representation Constituency）制と、このGRCを中心とした選挙区割の変更が挙げられる。GRCは、従来の選挙制度である1区1人選出の単独選挙区（SMC: Single Member Constituency）と並存して1988年に導入され、1997年以降は総議員数の8~9割を選出する重要な制度となっている。なお選挙区割は、首相によって指名される選挙区割検討委員会（EBRC: Electoral Boundaries Review Committee）が各回の総選挙に先立って改訂を行っている。 これまで複数の候補者を揃える必要があるGRC制は、人材が乏しい野党にとって不利であるとの指摘がなされてきたが、2020年総選挙においては野党が初めて2つのGRCで勝利を収めた。そこで本報告では、シンガポール総選挙において選挙区割が選挙結果に及ぼす影響を検討するために、GRCを中心に過去の選挙区割の変更パターンを整理し、野党が勝利したセンカンGRCを事例に取り上げて考察を行う。

Ⅱ． 選挙区割の変更パターン 　GRCは導入当初、1区あたりの定員が3人であったが、1991年には4人、1997年には5~6人と定員の増加傾向が見られ、これに伴ってGRCの選挙区割も拡大した。一方、過度なGRC制に対する批判が高まり、2015年以降は1区あたりの定員を減らすために、SMCを含めて以下の類型化に基づく選挙区割の変更が見られるようになった。 ①変更なし：直近の総選挙で野党が勝利した選挙区の区割は変更しない。（例）ホウガンSMC、アルジュニードGRC ②隣接選挙区との調整：域内の人口動態に対応して、隣接する選挙区との境界線を調整。（例）ウエストコーストGRC ③SMCのGRCへの統合：与党得票率の低いSMCをGRCに統合。（例）ジューチャットSMC、フェンシャンSMC ④GRCからのSMCの分離：与党得票率の高いGRCの一部をSMCとして分離。（例）イオチュカンSMC、ケブンバルSMC

Ⅲ．2020年総選挙におけるセンカンGRC センカンGRCは、2020年にシンガポール北東部に新設された4人選出の選挙区であり、センカンウエストSMCの拡大（一部区域はアンモキオGRCに編入）、プンゴルイーストSMCの統合、パシリス・プンゴルGRCの一部区域の分離という、前述の変更パターンの中で②、③、④の特徴を併せ持つ。 　センカン地区は、北東部における代表的なニュータウンであり、高齢の親と幼い子どもを持つ「サンドイッチ世代」と呼ばれる30~40代の若年層家族の居住が多い。 　2020年総選挙において、PAPは隣接GRCから閣僚大臣を鞍替えさせ、ベテラン議員を中心としたグループを擁立したが、最大野党の労働者党（WP: Workers’ Party）から立候補した新人グループに敗北した。

Ⅳ．選挙区割の選挙結果への影響と今後の展望 　センカンGRCでの勝敗につき、同地域の住民構成が野党得票につながったとする分析もある一方で、センカンGRCに隣接し同様の住民構成を有するプンゴルウエストSMCにおいてはPAPが勝利しており、選挙区の地域差が選挙結果に影響を及ぼすという単純な帰結は導くことができない。しかし同じく北東部のホウガンSMCやアルジュニードGRCではWPが勝利を継続させており、選挙地盤としての確立が見られた。 2011年総選挙以降、シンガポールの政局が変動期を迎え、野党がGRCにおいても与党と互角に競争できるようになる中で、今後の選挙区割として、GRCの平均定員減少（４人制GRCの増加や３人制GRCの再誕）、およびSMCの増加が予想される。また野党の選挙地盤が隣接選挙区の選挙結果に及ぼす影響の検討が必要となるだろう。

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Singapore is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nation. Its 2.4 million population consists of 77 percent Chinese, 15 percent Malays, 6 percent Indians, and 2 percent Others; It has four official languages, Chinese (Mandarin), Malay, Tamil, representing its three major ethnic communities, and English, reflecting its colonial past. Each ethnic community is further divided into a number of subgroups either in mother tongue or in the language of education or both. Most Singaporeans, moreover, are relatively new migrants who still maintain human, cultural, and/or emotional ties with their ancestral lands. These divisive factors could pose a threat to the security of the city-state and have prompted its government to create a common language for national indentity.
The effort was initiated by the British shortly after World War II, anticipating the independence of the then Crown Colony. English was chosen as the common language mainly for political reasons. Firstly, English was affiliated with none of the major ethnic communities and easier for all to accept than any other language. Secondly, English had been used for inter-ethnic communication and its speakers, though relatively few, were a multi-ethnic group. Thirdly, having been the only official language, the high status and prestige of English was well established. Finally, above all, those educated in English were politically docile and tolerant of ethnic and linguistic differences, as compared with the majority Chinese educated, whose strong sense of identity with China and political activism constituted a security problem.
The problem of the Chinese educated derived from the prewar education system of four language streams separate from one another in every respect, under which Chinese-medium schools had been allowed to inculcate their pupils loyalty to China. Worse still, the Chinese educated with little knowledge of English, the dominant language, were left out of prestigeous and well-paid jobs and tended to be discontented and prone to Communist influence. As the postwar British policy of promoting English-medium education proved successful in drawing more and more pupils away from Chinese schools, the Chinese community feared that Chinese education was in danger of extinction. The 1950s saw mass upheavals against the policy of “killing Chinese education” interlocked with militant labour movements. The straight-forward policy of favouring English thus effected more division than integration, contrary to what it was expected to attain.
In 1955, the first elected government of Singapore adopted a new policy based on two principles, i. e., equal treatment of the four official languages and promoting English as the common language. The twin principles were mutually contradictory. If the first was strictly observed, the second was impossible, and vice versa. But the government had to stick to the principle of equality in order to prevent the explosion of communal emotion. On the other hand, promotion of English was imperative for national integration and had to be done tactfully. The new policy secured broad consensus and formed the basis of Singapore's language policy thereafter. Under this policy, bilingual education was introduced with English and one of the three other languages made compulsory; official aid was extended equally to all schools; and unified curriculum was adopted for all the language streams. English retained its importance and continued to increase its weight in education.
After Independence in 1965, Singapore embarked on a development strategy of becoming a Global City. The government of the People's Action Party (PAP) emphasized English education, for the spread of English, the language of international business and modern technology, was needed for economic development. The remarkable success of the strategy in the past two decades raised the economic value of English and accelerated the influx of pupils from the non-English

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Singapore's multiracial policy has been one of the most important planks in its post-Independence approach to national management. The survival of the small Chinese city-state surrounded by big Malay neighbors has always depended on its good relations with these countries. In this geo-political context, ethnic relations within Singapore, i. e., the relationship between its majority Chinese and minority Malay communities has long been linked to the island Republic's relations with the Malay world. The protection of Malay rights in the Singapore Constitution and introduction of multiracialism as an ethnic management policy to highlight equal treatment of the Chinese, Malay, Indian, Eurasian and other ethnic groups was to show that Singapore was not a pro-China state or a Third China. This concern was especially strong in the Cold War period when Southeast Asian Chinese were often perceived as agents of Chinese communist influence. The Singapore government's erosion and containment of many aspects of Chinese-ness have also been used to tone down the island's explicit Chinese character and boost its multiracial appearance. However, rapid economic development fuelled by internationalization has in effect wiped out the original consideration for Malay rights. The meritocracy system has marginalized the Malays and the social gap between the Chinese and Malays has widened. However, the island's vulnerability, including its dependence on water supply from Malaysia still looms large in Singapore's geo-political environment. The government stance towards the Malays has been coloured by the cultural deficit thesis which views Malay culture as lazy or lacking competitiveness. This has been put forward as an explanation for the Malay community's entrapment in the lower socio-economic stratum. The continuing questioning of the Malay-Singaporeans' national loyalty by senior government ministers has upset the Malays as it justifies discrimination against them in the armed forces. However, the Malay neighbors do see Singapore's Malays as brothers and often consider their own Chinese minorities as an extension of Chinese Singapore. China's emergence as an economic power from the late 1970s and the Singapore government's attempt to counter the spread of Western cultural and political values led to the introduciton of a series of ‘Sinicisation’ programs aimed at promoting aspects of Chinese culture among Chinese-Singaporeans. Although sinicisation has been carefully implemented in recognition of multiracialism and sensitive relations with Malay neighbors, the Malay and other communities have been concerned about this movement. The recent immigration of Chinese from China and elsewhere to maintain the Chinese majority has the potential of straining the delicate ethnic balance further. These new Chinese settlers and the rise of China as a dominant economic and political power have introduced a new element in Singapore's evolving international relations with countries in the region and beyond.

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