In August 1945, the Korean Peninsula came under the partitional occupation by the U. S. and Soviet armies at the 38th pararell. However, Korea was not doomed to a fate of perpetual division as a result of partitional occupation itself, but rather, as a result of the postwar U. S. -Soviet confrontation. The U. S. postwar plan for Korea was to place it under an international trusteeship for a certain period at the time from its national liberation until the time of national independence. Although the U. S. needed to take prudent policies towards the Soviet Union in a situation where the northern half of Korea was occupied by the Soviet Union, the policies that the U. S. actually took in relation to the other critical problems were quite the contrary.
The Council of Foreign Ministers (London, September-October 1945), was broken off due to disagreements between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. During the conference, the Western nations and the Soviet Union recognized it impossible to adjust their mutual interests under the name of the Allies. This marked abandoning the ‘principle’ among the Allies. Immediately after the conference, Soviet foreign policies became uncompromizing, exerting notable influence on its occupation policies towards North Korea, as an example.
The only legitimate measures the U. S. could take was to promote a trusteeship plan. This, however, might have given the Soviet Union the opportunity not only to ‘Sovietize’ North Korea but also to place the whole of Korea under Soviet influence.
The Conference of Foreign Ministers (Moscow, December 1945) adopted with minor changes the Soviet proposal that Korea should be placed under an international trusteeship for a period of five years among the U. S., the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain. The distinctive feature of the Soviet proposal was that it entrusted the design of trusteeship to the U. S. and the Soviet Union, and actually excluded China and Great Britain. This marked recognizing ‘reality’.
The U. S. -Soviet Joint Commission, based upon the agreement at Moscow, started in March 1946, but failed at the outset due to the fact that the Soviet Union adhered to a policy excluding the prominent nationalists in South Korea, who opposed the agreement, from participating in the provisional government. The Soviet Union, judging this impossible, made a bold move to communize North Korea by hindering the implementation of the trusteeship. Although the U. S., which proposed the partitional occupation of Korea, made certain efforts to dissolve the division, the U. S. -Soviet relationship was not in a situation where the U. S. could demand the Soviet Union to diminish its influence on Korea any further.
The division of Korea could not help but be perpetualized when the Moscow agreement based upon the compromise between the U. S. and the Soviet Union could no longer be implemented.

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Multi-agent simulation (MAS), or agent-based simulation, is very powerful in representing and analyzing system's emergent properties based on interactions among agents. The emergence of social order or norms based on interactions among nations has been one of the central subjects of International Relations (IR). Mutual compatibility being taken into account, MAS could have been applied to IR more extensively. In reality, technical difficulties and excessive abstraction have been most formidable obstacles for the application of MAS. Aiming at a wider use of MAS in IR, we developed a user-friendly simulator, and have built various types of models, from the crisis decision-making to the balance of power, with lesser abstraction and more substantial attributes that represent characteristics of international society.
In this paper, we focus on the spread of an international norm in the manner of cascade on the tipping point, which constructivists of IR such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) tried to understand. To date, discussions on this subject have been very suggestive, but far from conclusive. In order to give a theoretical account for norm emergence and cascade, we construct the Norm Emergence Model (NEM). NEM is the combination of the threshold model originally developed by Granovetter (1978) with the persuasion mechanism suggested by Risse (2000) and other constructivists, so that NEM can generate cascades of norm emergence based on dynamic multi-agent interactions that affect the threshold of individual agents.
The case we analyze by NEM is the spread of anti-colonialism that affected the membership of intemational society in the mid 20th century, probably the most fundamental norm-change in international society as Philpott (2001) and others argue. One of the most illustrative events must be the United Nations Declaration of Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. Within less than a generation, the norm of trusteeship was completely replaced by the norm of unconditional independence.
NEM represents virtual international society that sharply split over whether to accept the colonial rules as trusteeship or reject them unconditionally, with the initial condition (agents as UN members, their thresholds and their positions) that more or less reflects the reality at the end of the 1940s at the United Nations. The simulation begins with the year 1950, and finishes in 1969, during which each agent decides which position it should take, and persuades other members aiming at gaining more support of its position. New agents join in the same manner as the reality.
The result of MAS depends on the setting of parameters, and we show results based on four scenarios. Scenario 1 makes persuasion impossible, which means only the entry of new members affects norm emergence. The cascade did not take place. Although ex-colonial countries increase in number, their positions were not as radical as socialist countries. Scenario 2 allows persuasion. Norm change did not happen either. For, socialist countries are persuaded, and change their position so as to accept trusteeship. Scenario 3 allows persuasion, but only anti-colonial norm is influential; trusteeship lost legitimacy. Now, the cascade happens in the mid 1950s with much more sudden pace than the reality. In addition to the setting of Scenario 3, Scenario 4 limits the range of successful persuasion so that agents are affected only when the distance of thresholds is close enough. The cascade takes place in the late 1950s that looks like the reality. Thus, the specific type of interactions and the entry of new members turn out to generate a norm cascade, sometimes after the confrontation for a few years, which seems to reproduce what happened in the arena of the United Nations.
NEM is a very simple model, but can reproduce a cascade of international norm from trusteeship to unconditional independence to a successful degree. ...

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ミクロネシア連邦ヤップ州の本島と離島の関係は，本島と離島を二元的カテゴリーとして対比する側面と，序列化された交易ネットワークとして結びつける側面が存在する。1980年代離島出身公務員は個別的な島嶼を越えた離島アイデンティティをを受容＝生成した。発表では離島カテゴリーの生成を，本島主導政府に対抗する対抗的公共圏の生成として捉える意味を考察する。

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After World War I, American diplomacy in the 20th century is characterized as being rooted in the Wilsonian principle. After entering the 21st century, the Wilsonian principle in American diplomacy is still powerful. By paying attention to such continuity, the first concern in this paper is to examine how the Wilsonian principle in American diplomacy operated in the process of establishing the government of South Korea after World War II.
The reason it is important to pay attention to Wilsonianism is that the Wilsonian principle is one of the standards by which the foreign policy of the United States was led, not only concerning ideals and humanism, but also in the sphere of national interest. In addition, the purpose of this paper is to examine the Wilsonian principle, including both the country of origin and countries falling under Wilsonian influence.
In particular, when Korea during the process of independence is considered, it was influenced by foreign trends of thought, repeating the conflicts related to those foreign trends of thought. The diplomacy of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG), initiated by Rhee Syngman, began to carry out its activities based on self-determination, which is one of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Strictly speaking, the Wilsonian principle was applicable only to European countries, and not to Asian countries such as Korea.
The idea of Korean trusteeship was prepared as a post-war plan of the United States, and was influenced by the Wilsonian principle. This idea was applied through U. S. -Soviet cooperation that was installed as a transition period to lead the colony of pre-war days to independence. Both sides of the U. S. -Soviet cooperation wanted to prevent the establishment of a hostile nation on the Korean peninsula during the transition period.
In addition, the Wilsonian principle was actively adopted by the military administrative officers who were inclined to the neo-Wilsonian ideology in regard to occupation policy and the establishment of the South Korean government by the United States. The South Korean policy of the United States tried to transplant American democracy, characterized as the Wilsonian principle, and to transplant the system and the values of the home country.
The influence of the United States over South Korea stands out because South Korea strongly trusts the power and leadership of the United States in the international sphere. There were wishes and actions to invoke the power of the United States for independence and establishing a South Korean government around the end of WWII.
At present, the friction between the United States and the Korean peninsula including North Korea is continuing. The friction is caused by the problems with national security, democracy and human rights. That is to say the confrontation over the Wilsonian principle.
South Korea has accepted the Wilsonian principle and has worked to modernize and drive economic development while repeating various trials and errors since the establishment of the government. It is important to make the best use of the experience accumulated in this process.

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米国領下のマーシャル諸島では、各地の離島で日本の青年団をモデルとした「クミ」と呼ばれる協働組織が形成された。同組織は、70年代には政治等の分野において強い影響力を見せたものの、90年代以降は急激に消滅していった。本発表では「クミ」という組織を巡る歴史的変遷を通じて、マーシャル人にとっての日本統治時代に対する過度に理想化された憧憬と急激に進む米国化に対する抵抗の関係について検討していく。

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The Korean policy of the United States cannot be judged in isolation from the Korean policy of the Soviet Union or from the internal political development in Korea. These three and many other minor factors are interrelated in such a complex fashion that it is difficult to single out any one factor as being solely responsible for the continued impasse in Korean problems. This study, however, is concerned primarily with American foreign policy toward Korean independence and unification from the time of the Cairo Declaration to the eve of the Japanese surrender, and especially with how various policies were arrived at and why these policies ended in dismal failure by creating the 38th parallel.
Contrary to a widely held view that the division of Korea was another secret agreement either at Yalta or Potsdam, the truth would appear to be that the division had its origin in the War Department recommendation in Washington. Asthe war against Japan was moving rapidly to its conclusion after the first explosion of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and the subsequent declaration of war by the Soviet Union, War Department planners were busily working on instruction which General MacArthur was to present to the Japanese on the procedure for the surrender of their armed forces.
The 38th parallel as a dividing line in Korea had never been the subject of international discussions among the wartime leaders. President Truman made it clear that the line was “proposed by us as a practical soulution when the suuden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vaccuum in Korea.” However, there was no thought, Truman recalled, of a permanent division of Korea. The choice of the 38th parallel as the line of division between the Soviet and American forces was thus taken “on purely military grounds with no thought of possible political consequences.”
The United States, however, made a grave mistake in proposing the 38th parallel as the boundary for military occupation. This mistake could easily have been avoided had the American Government previously had some arrangement with the Soviet Union on the problem of the military occupation of Korea and had they set up a concerte plan for a unified administraton as recommended by the State Department. Unfortunately, the policy planners under the Truman administration followed the path set by President Roosevelt and gave little attention to the future of Korea. They accepted the idea of a trusteeship, a cherished invention of Roosevelt's, without criticism or much scrutiny.
The war had made apparent the close connection between foreign policy and military policy. During the war, of course, foreign policy had, in a sense, been an adjunct of the military strategy of the United States, the War and Navy Departments had more to say about some foreign policy decisions than had the State Department. During the war, military consideration naturally and properly had priority. The military-minded foreign policy, however, inevitably created immense problems which could have been solved if they had been given a little political consideration in the process of their formulation.

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With the political problems and strategic considerations relating to the United States military presence in Okinawa and East Asia undergoing re-examination at official levels in recent years, a historic look at the formation of U. S. military and political policy toward the region in the early postwar period has become necessary. One curiously unexplored factor in that critical period remains the role of George F. Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff in the examination of policy for Okinawa.
In the middle of the reevaluation of U. S. policy towards occupied Japan during the Fall of 1947 and the Winter/Spring of 1948, particularly in the context of the peace treaty goals of the U. S., Kennan and his staff helped to focus American policy-makers' attention on Okinawa-its vital strategic importance yet curiously undetermined political, military, and international status. Their first study of the issue, “Special Recommendation on the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyus, ” also known as PPS/10/1, was inconclusive. As a result Kennan visited Okinawa, a trip surprisingly undiscussed in most scholarship, during his visit to the Far East in March 1948 to meet with General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Linking the strategic considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with his own ideas of “containment, ” Kennan was able to break the impasse between the State Department and the U. S. military which had existed since 1946. Kennan's opinions formed the basis of National Security Council document NSC 13/3 (“Recommendations With Respect to Japan”), which upon approval by President Harry S. Truman, became the two-staged U. S. position with regard to Okinawa: immediate base development combined with economic rehabilitation of the islands occurring during the first stage and the acquisition of international recognition put off until a future peace treaty.
This paper seeks to trace Kennan's views on Okinawa in this period with particular reference to his visit to Okinawa as well as to examine the influence that Kennan's recommendations had on U. S. policy toward Okinawa. Using extensive archival materials from Washington, Tokyo, and Okinawa, as well as interviews conducted with Kennan, his assistants, and fellow diplomats at the time, this paper aims to fill a void in the history of U. S. -Japan relations, with particular reference to U. S. politico-strategic policy toward Okinawa and Japan.

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