The Third World nations are often the target of intervention. Especially during the cold war period, but not limited to then, the United States intervened in the internal affairs of those nations, claiming to protect its national interest. What constitutes American national interest which should be protected by intervening in other nations, however, remains dubious at best.
Aiding the Angolan civil war was among such intervention policies, but was exercised over two different time periods: failing détente in the 1970s and emerging new cold war in the 1980s. This article examines what factors were given priority in each of the decision makings, and points out the problems.
The first covert aid was a typical cold-war intervention, although delayed in time. Wherever the Soviet Union expands into, the United States should also get in and stand tall. In the decision making process on covert aid to FNLA and UNITA among the limited circle, consideration for Angolan interests was missing. Moreover, covert manipulation gave an open invitation for South African intervention, which complicated the southern African situation.
The legacy of such covert aid remained even through the Carter administration. While the political landscape of the Angolan civil war shifted from U. S. -Soviet rivalry to struggle among African nations over Apartheid, the United States entered the new round of intervention with old mind set.
The United States intervened again using covert aid to UNITA, but this time such covert policy was publicly mentioned by the President and others. This is so-called overt-covert action. While promoting the public approval of this policy, the administration denied the opportunity for Congress to openly discuss the policy content of Angolan intervention.
Deprived of the proper Congressional function to terminate the wrong policy, covert aid to UNITA continued to flow, thus dragging out the process of peace agreement, and the subsequent establishment of the national government. Although elections were finally conducted, UNITA, which enjoyed the distorted image of national popularity, could not accept its loss and refused to go along with the terms of the agreement. A new round of civil war was thus launched.
American covert aid first avoided the opportunity for a national government by turning the Angolan civil war into an East-West confrontation. The second intervention did not help strengthen the basis for democratic government among the Angolan population either, but rather helped Savimbi's individual aspiration at the cost of the nation at large. American Angolan policy may have been a lost cause from the beginning but covert action cannot be the method to promote constructive foreign policy. For its decision making by-passes the democratic system at home and thus fails to enjoy a lasting support, while the hidden aid is subject to manipulation which fails to convey a clear message to the recipient nation.
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