Ishibashi Tanzan, the Finance Minister under the first Yoshida cabinet (May 22, 1946 to May 24, 1947) was purged on May 16, 1947, in accordance with category G of Appendix “A” of SCAPIN-550, dated January 4, 1946. Ishibashi's purge was clearly unreasonable. As president and editor-in-chief of the Oriental Economist, Ishibashi had been firmly in opposition to the Manchurian Incident (1931), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), The Triple Alliance (1940), and the Pacific War (1941-45). He was well known as one of the few liberalists opposing the totalitarian government in those days. That is why Colonel Kramer, who became the first chief of the Economic & Scientific Section (ESS) of GHQ and had been a reader of the Oriental Economist even during the war, asked for Ishibashi's cooperation from September to December, 1945.
This article aims to clarify the factors and process of Ishibashi's purge as GHQ's attempt to silence him and to squelch his economic enlargement policies in favor of their own economic retrenchment policies. There were three purge actions on Ishibashi. The first purge movement was requested by the Soviet representatives at the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) conference; GHQ disagreed. The second occasion arose when Ishibashi and ESS came into extreme conflict over the Extraordinary Tax Legislation issue, but General MacArthur denied his purge for fear that the Yoshida cabinet would fall. And finally, the situation that led to the purge of Ishibashi was the clash on the cost problems of the Occupation that occurred between Ishibashi and GHQ. Moreover, the Government Section (GS) viewed Ishibashi as a dangerous man for offering such stout resistance to GHQ. GS had to purge him not as a politician, but as an journalist because there was no clause on resistance to the Allied Powers as a justification in SCAPIN-550. Prime Minister Yoshida assumed an indifferent attitude because Ishibashi was becoming powerful in the Liberal Party.

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 With a focus on GHQ/SCAP, GS documents, the objective of this study was to clarify the basic facts of the purge to which Mitsuhashi Kikuo was subjected. The findings are as follows:
 1.  Circumstances in the lead-up to Mitsuhashi undergoing review for public office qualification and the outcome of the review were clarified.
 1)  After Japan's defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, Mitsuhashi made every effort to restart the field of sports and physical education. He also attempted to run for office in the first upper-house elections (March 10, 1947). He underwent a review by the Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee in an effort to qualify as a candidate. His intended “public office” was that of a Diet member.
 2)  The review concluded that Mitsuhashi should be subject to a purge under SCAPIN 550, as he had held the post of Director of the Great Japan Industrial Patriotic Association before the war. Although the Committee had initially declared him “passed” (March 17), GHQ did not recognize the Japanese decision and decided to subject Mitsuhashi to a purge under SCAPIN 550 (March 31). The apparent reason was that GHQ emphasized the formal criteria, and thus declared him a Memorandum Case.
 2.  The lead-up to Mitsuhashi's appeal for re-review and its outcome was also clarified, in addition to his arguments during the appeal process.
 1)  Working within the system, Mitsuhashi petitioned the Public Service Qualifications Appeal Board for a re-review (April 14). In the re-review process, he submitted 5 memoranda testifying that he had not been influential as a director. In addition, he also testified orally twice before the Board.
 2)  He argued that his role was unpaid and merely titular, and that he had not attended meetings or made any positive contributions. He added that his appointment had been a mere formality; he had not intended to utilize the organization, and his contribution merely involved gymnastic instruction.
 Furthermore, he claimed that he was a liberal who had consistently criticized prewar physical education policy as militaristic, and who had studied sports instruction abroad.
 3)  After the re-review, Mitsuhashi was delisted as a subject of the purge under SCAPIN 550 (Dec.22). However, GHQ only accepted this decision about 5 months later following appeals from the Japanese government (May 22, 1948). Though Mitsuhashi's arguments were accepted by the entire Japanese membership of the Committee, it took more than 13 months for GHQ to acknowledge the decision.

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Per il Tumulto dei Ciompi, che scoppio in Firenze nel luglio 1378, il governo oligarchico fu distrutto dai popoli mezzani e minuti, che si impadronirono del potere. Possiamo trovare i fattori che causarono questo grande tumulto, negli anni della guerra contro il Papato (1375-1378)-si chiama la guerra degli Otto Santi. In fondo a questa guerra, ci sono stati alcuni problemi: l'acquisto in Toscana della supremazia di Firenze e la dissoluzione della relazione alleata fra lo stato fiorentino ed il Papato: gli antagonismi fra il gruppo oligarchico e quello anti-oligarchico nella classe politica fiorentina: e poi, l'aderenza del gruppo oligarchico agli ecclesiastici. Per questi, i fiorentini hanno aumentato l'antipatia contro il Papato e gli hanno dichiarato la guerra. Ma questa guerra ha esposto il reggimento fiorentino alla crisi e ha messo i popoli nelle inquietudini sociali. Le hanno sentite nella vita per le depressioni, per i ristagni economici a causa della guerra, e per le censure dell'interdetto papale. Nei primi mesi della guerra, le antipatie popolari erano volte contro il Papa e la sua sede. Ma quando la guerra si prolungava, i discontenti popolari aumentavano, ed anche nel governo la classe politica si e divisa in due gruppi-l'uno e degli Otto di guerra, l'altro e della Parte Guelfa. Finalmente alla fine della guerra, per le agitazioni del gruppo degli Otto, che hanno voluto assalire le case dei nemici, si e portato tra i popli l'occasione che hanno toccato gli avvenimenti politici. Per conseguenza, le lotte politiche si sono estese in tutta la citta, e si sono sviluppate nel Tumulto dei Ciompi. Quando proiettiamo questo tumulto nelle situazioni storiche degli anni della guerra degli Otto Santi, possiamo trovare un'altra spiegazione sul Tumulto dei Ciompi. E la spiegazione diversa dall'immagine della rivolta degli operai della lana, che e stimata in genere.

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This is a Japanese translation of the Dai-Nippon-Butokukai (Budo association) sections in Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948, vol. I, (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C.,1949) and History of Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, vol. III, (1951). These books were written by the staff of. GHQ/SCAP (General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) as official records on the occupation of Japan. The former book was edited by GS (Government Section), and the Dai-Nippon-Butokukai section was written by Jack Napier, Major. The latter book was edited by CHS (Civil Historical Section). I believe that these records are indispensable to understand the dissolution process of Butokukai.

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Bei der Interpretation des Artikels 9 ist der Unterschied zwishen der Notiz MacArthurs, dem Entwurf des GHQs und der endgultigen Fassung von grosser Bedeutung. An fangs wollte MacArthur dem Staat Japan auch einen Verteidigungskrieg verbieten, aber diese Absicht findet sich nicht mehr in dem Entwurf seiner Untergebenen. Zudem anderte der Unterhausausschuss Ashidas einen kleinen Teil des Textes ab. Die Absicht Ashidas ist unklar, doch reagierte die Far Eastern Commission der Alliierten auf die Anderung und forderte die Regierung Japans auf, in der Verfassung festzulegen, dass nur Zivilisten Ministerposten bekleiden durfen. Unserer Ansicht nach bedeutet dies, dass Japan Streitkrafte unterhalten darf. Im Regierungssystem Japans gibt es zudem ein weiteres Problem: Das Zweikammersystem kann sich als Stolperstein fur einen reibungslosen Regierungswechsel erweisen. Allgemein herrscht in Japan zwar die Auffassung, dass das Oberhaus nur uber geringe Befugnisse verfugt, tatsachlich aber ist diese Kammer hinsichtlich der Gesetzgebung recht stark, kann sie doch Entscheidungen des Unterhauses die Zustimmung verweigern. Nur mit einer Zweidrittelmehrheit kann dann das Unterhaus eine solche Ablehnung uberwinden, was in der Realitat jedoch nur selten moglich ist. Somit muss eine Regierung nicht nur im Unter-, sondern auch im Oberhaus uber eine absolute Mehrheit verfugen. Wurde eine Oppositionspartei wie die Demokratische Partei bei einer Unterhauswahl tatsachlich siegen, konnte sie somit wegen des Widerstands der sich dann in der Opposition befindlichen Parteien LDP und Komeito keine eigenstandige Politik betreiben. Aus diesem Grunde pladieren wir dafur, das heutige Zweikammersystem zu andern.

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The subject of this research is to discuss the aspect change of rural societies during and after the war through the change of age group that leads rural societies by means of examination of age structure of municipal agricultural land committee during and after the war. We have two subjects to approach. The first subject is to discuss the agricultural land committee members' average age and standard deviation in the period of postwar reform in order to explain the regionality of age structure of agricultural land committee and how age structure of agricultural land committee changed during and after the war. The second subject is to discuss the choice of a president of municipal agricultural land committee in the period of postwar reform from the viewpoint of age. In the traditional research, municipal agricultural land committee during and after the war was discussed mainly from the viewpoint of people of each rank such as landowner, landed farmer, and peasant, but not from the viewpoint of age. Therefore this research is something of a novelty in its field. Firstly as a result of the analysis of age structure of municipal agricultural land committee in the period of postwar reform, it has been found out that the average age of all the committee members in Japan was 48.5 with the member between the ages of 45 and 50 making up the largest number and that younger generation accounted for a large share of the total. Concerning the average age divided by prefecture, the members in Iwate, Aomori, and Ishikawa were younger than the others while those in Chiba, Ibaragi, and Oita were older. Secondly as a result of the discussion of municipal agricultural land committee members' average age during and after the war, it has been found out that the members got younger by five years while the presidents got younger by ten years. This movement looked the same as the case where the president of a large industrial conglomerate got younger during and after the war. Thirdly it has been found out that the seniority system clearly worked when a president of municipal agricultural land committee was chosen. The seniority system was clearly seen in Shiga, Fukushima, and Nara Prefecture

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