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  • 吉村 健蔵
    国際政治
    1960年 1960 巻 13 号 1-14
    発行日: 1960/08/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小川 浩之
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 136 号 79-96,L10
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine how the Commonwealth has experienced enlargement and changes after the Second World War. In this attempt, particular attention is paid to South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961. The Government of the Union of South Africa under H. F. Verwoerd made an application to remain within the Commonwealth as a Republic, but eventually decided, or was virtually forced, to withdraw the application as a result of strong criticism against apartheid mainly from Afro-Asian member countries. Therefore, the Republic of South Africa was established on 31 May 1961 outside the Commonwealth. As increasing number of newly-independent states joined after 1947 (when both India and Pakistan became independent and then joined as new members), the Commonwealth which had been originally formulated by Britain and six ‘white’ Dominions was transformed into a multi-racial institution. The major character of the ‘old Commonwealth’ was that the member states maintained traditional ties among the peoples of British origin and did not regard each other as ‘foreign’, while, at the same time, the mutual recognition of internal and external autonomy was the central raison d'étre. However, as newly-independent non-white countries joined one after another and the norm of racial equality was strengthened, both the old intimacy and the conventional principle of mutual non-interference were increasingly faced with strong pressure.
    In those changes which the Commonwealth has experienced, the disputes about apartheid among the Commonwealth countries and the departure of South Africa marked a crucial turning point. Firstly, the departure of white-dominated South Africa clearly demonstrated that the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of member states was increasingly under pressure from the norm of racial equality. Secondly, the often uncontrollable and open rows over South Africa's racial policy symbolized the fact that the old intimacy had been largely curtailed as newly-independent members added ‘alien’ elements into the Commonwealth. Thirdly, the sequence of events culminated in South Africa's departure made some of the original members such as Britain and Australia feel increasingly discontent with the ‘new Commonwealth’ and therefore facilitated the centrifugal forces working in the Commonwealth relations. Britain's attempts to accede to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC) in the 1960s and the early 1970s were noticeable examples of the centrifugal tendencies. However, at the same time, the inter-Commonwealth disputes on racial issues such as South Africa's apartheid in 1960-61 and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Smith regime of Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) in the mid-1960s can also be considered as inevitable hurdles which the Commonwealth had to tackle in the process of becoming a truly multi-racial association.
  • 岡部 達味
    アジア研究
    2008年 54 巻 4 号 126-130
    発行日: 2008/10/31
    公開日: 2014/09/15
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 阪口 功
    国際政治
    2008年 2008 巻 153 号 42-57
    発行日: 2008/11/30
    公開日: 2010/10/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    IWC regime was originally established as an institution to manage whaling in a sustainable manner. However, due to the intensive anti-whaling campaign conducted by activist NGOs such as Greenpeace and the Friends of Earth, a moratorium on commercial whaling was adopted in 1982. Since then, it has changed to be an institution to prohibit whaling for a humanitarian reason, and six whaling countries, fearing of the U. S. sanction, with-drew from commercial whaling tamely. To the contrary, Japan, Norway and Iceland became determined to continue whaling. However, when the moratorium was adopted, they had showed rather passive reaction to the prohibition norm and had not been determined to sustain whaling. Nevertheless, the three countries began to show a strong resentment to the prohibition norm, and went on to sustain whaling firmly.
    What caused such a difference in attitude among the whaling countries? The answer exists in the strategies that the activist NGOs adopted. To stop whaling, they took full advantage of physical pressure against the three countries where whaling has either cultural or economic importance without making substantial campaign efforts to persuade their citizens. According to the theory of psychological reactance, pressure as an imposition or proscription of a specific behavior, causes resistance to persuasion, provided the freedom of the behavior is regarded as important to a certain extent. However, pressure does not always cause a reactive response. This depends on the balance between pressure and persuasion. As a persuasive argument has power to effect consent, a psychological backlash will not happen when the power to effect consent exceeds the reactance force. However, the activist NGOs, not having run a campaign zealously in the three countries, consolidated a situation that the latter exceeds the former significantly. The result is a strong backlash by the three whaling countries.
    Then, why could the anti-whaling NGOs not conduct an active campaign in the three countries? It was because they were faced with financial constraints. To change the public opinion in the three countries, it seemingly requires more resource investment. Activist NGOs, if failed in costly campaign activity, will suffer from financial problem and may be forced to restructure its business toward downsizing. Therefore they tend to decide their campaign strategies based on the cost-benefit calculation. However, if they concentrate their campaign effort on countries where the issue does not have much importance while depending fully on physical pressure against those that appear to be more resisting to their normative project, activist NGOs are doomed to function as an agent of a global fragmentation of norm and faced with a serious democratic deficit. Thus Activist NGOs are faced with a difficult dilemma whether, in constructing campaign strategies, to choose predominantly easy countries for the sake of sustaining and expanding organization, or to get bravely involved in more resisting countries however risky such a choice is.
  • 西浦 昭雄
    アフリカ研究
    2003年 2003 巻 63 号 52-54
    発行日: 2003/12/20
    公開日: 2010/04/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 申 昌沫
    社会言語科学
    2000年 3 巻 1 号 39-42
    発行日: 2000/12/31
    公開日: 2017/04/27
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 初瀬 龍平
    学術の動向
    1998年 3 巻 1 号 12-18
    発行日: 1998/01/01
    公開日: 2009/12/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 古賀 慶
    国際政治
    2017年 2017 巻 189 号 189_161-189_176
    発行日: 2017/10/23
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル 認証あり

    Regional security institutions are founded on security systems, such as cooperative security, collective self-defense, and collective security, which play an important role in ensuring member states’ survival in an anarchic international environment. However, such a materialist perspective tells only a partial story about the roles of regional security institutions; these entities also help to define member states’ cognitive template of regional security. Given the concepts of “region” and “security” are both socially constructed, “regional security” is the concept that is ultimately defined and redefined by the group of states, and thus inter-state regional security institutions play an imperative role in that process.

    How do regional security institutions shape the concept of regional security? The most relevant theoretical framework to answer this question is the Copenhagen School’s “securitization” theory. It offers analytical insights in understanding the social construction process of regional security by emphasizing important factors such as speech acts, audience acceptance, and extraordinary measures. Nevertheless, its recent research focus has deviated from inter-state relations and regional security institutions, and the question has been left unanswered.

    In this context, this article, employing a synthesized analytical framework of securitization theory and an agent-centered historical institutionalism, argues that regional security institutions become a “securitization” tool for member states by providing them a staged process to collectively define their own regional security. Specifically, this article proposes a two-stage hypothesis. First, the member states’ perception of a change in the regional distribution of power triggers the securitization process. Second, the securitization process will be completed if member states accept a new threat perception by a securitizing actor and conduct extraordinary measures to deal with the threat. These measures can be conducted only when the existing institutional function cannot manage the new threats. After this cognitive template of regional security is consolidated within the institution, it begins to constrain member states’ strategic thinking and choices.

    To test the hypotheses, this article conducts a comparative case study with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—in the process of establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994—and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—in the process of establishing the protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security.

    The basic findings are three-fold. First, member states’ perception of a change in the regional distribution of power mattered in setting off the securitization process. Second, member states’ agreement with new security threats and extraordinary measures are imperative to complete the securitization process, but a securitization actor can be varied in at each step of the process. Third, historically embedded norms of the regional security institutions should be taken seriously as it narrows the range of strategic choices on extraordinary measures. Despite a lack of sufficient number of case studies, the ASEAN and ECOWAS cases revealed that the complex securitization processes through regional security institutions created and recreated a cognitive template of regional security, which framed their security perspectives.

  • 五十嵐 誠一
    国際政治
    2009年 2009 巻 158 号 158_89-103
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    The regional order in Southeast Asia has undergone a rapid change in the context of the end of the Cold War and the spread of economic globalization. The mainstream theories such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism have offered competing explanations of this transformation. However, recently, a new phenomenon that cannot be grasped by these state-centric theories has arisen—the movement toward constructing a regional order from below by transnational civil society actors.
    As ASEAN made a full-fledged start in constructing the ASEAN Community after the late 1990s, the transnational civil society actors began to engage in its decision-making process. Such engagements were specifically observed in the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter starting from 2006. Even after the establishment of the charter, these actors continue to remain involved in the panel and committee related to the framework of the ASEAN Community.
    This article attempts to empirically analyze the activities of such transnational civil society actors, and to explore the scope and limits of alternative regionalism advocated by them. Furthermore, it seeks to examine the embryonic change toward the establishment of a new regional order in Southeast Asia from the bottom-up perspective.
    Section I focuses on a theoretical analysis. After an overview of the New Regional Approach, which is one of the critical international theories and has a vested interest in civil society, it develops a theoretical perspective on transnational civil society in the context of regionalization. Using such a perspective, it also extracts the characteristics of new regionalism in Southeast Asia. Section II describes the basic features of transnational civil society actors, and explores the configuration of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic actors in transnational public space. By focusing on the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter, Section III analyzes the alternative regionalism advocated by the transnational civil society actors. Section IV highlights the two issues that these actors have given special emphasis to after the establishment of the ASEAN Charter: the terms of reference of the human rights body and the rights of migrant workers.
    In conclusion, the article proves that by engaging with transnational civil society actors, ASEAN is gradually moving from an “elite club” to a peoplecentered organization, but given the predominance of neoliberal discourse, alternative regionalism has not enough led to the realization. As regarding the establishment of a new regional order, although the Westphalian system has not yet dissolved, as symbolized by the “ASEAN way” that the nationstates still adhere to, the transnational public sphere has been more rapidly expanded by transnational civil society actors. Furthermore, they have attempted to transform the “ASEAN way” by tackling with issues such as human rights. Such issue-oriented movement would give some impetus to the realization of a post-Westphalian system.
  • 西村 めぐみ
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 137 号 103-117,L12
    発行日: 2004/06/19
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Aspirations for minority group rights are one of the most pressing issues facing the UN in the post cold war era. This article analyzes the issues of minority rights in relation to the current debate on how the international consensus on state sovereignty has changed. The main thrust of the UN position on minority issues is to balance the integrity of multi-ethnic states with the protection of minority rights. While the UN Charter lacks specific criteria on how to accommodate these conflicting demands, the member states have attempted to establish certain rules to resolve these conflicts.
    Questions concerning minority rights include whether or not states should protect not only individual human rights but also the group rights of minorities which have developed their own identities. I argue that during the early post-war period the UN was primarily concerned with the stability of nation states, and thus was negative on the group aspect of minority rights. It had taken sides with the existing states or assumed hands-off policies in various conflicts relating to the rights of minorities, such as in Katanga, Biafra, and Bangladesh.
    However, since the 1960's, minority group rights have gradually to be seen as legitimate issues in UN debates, and since they have come to the forefront of UN discussions. Although the member states acknowledged the danger involved in the recognition of a right to ethnic self-determination, they nevertheless have tried to place minority rights within the framework of conflict prevention and democratization of former authoritarian regimes. Efforts of the UN members on minority issues have been demonstrated in the UN Declaration on Minorities and the activities of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Apparently the UN has increasingly recognized that the protection of the group identities of minorities would prevent radical ethnopolitics. Thus, it is particularly important for the UN to develop mechanisms in which minority rights are protected in a democratic framework. The final section of this article briefly compares the UN mechanisms on minorities with the European system in which various regional organizations have developed multi-layered mechanisms for the protection of minorities. It shows that the UN still lacks effective and proactive mechanisms for the protections of minority rights.
    The article concludes, first, that the perceptions of state sovereignty among the UN member states have changed, as was shown in recent debate's on minority issues. Second, the UN needs to further develop the current pragmatic approach so that the group aspects of minority rights will be protected within the framework of the democratization of a state in order not to destabilize multi-ethnic states.
  • 半澤 朝彦
    国際政治
    2001年 2001 巻 126 号 81-101,L12
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper reveals the ‘hidden’ United Nations' role in bringing about the ultimate demise of the Britain's formal Empire. The UN from the late 1950s onwards, with a significant increase in African membership, became a stronghold of international critics of colonialism. Contrary to the conventional image that the UN did not play much role in Britain's decolonization, newly-released archival evidence clearly shows that the dramatic downfall of international legitimacy of colonialism and the ever imminent possibility of UN intervention into UK's most sensitive colonial possessions such as Kenya and Central African Federation were constantly a real source of concern for Britain's top policy makers during the early 1960s. Though UK's sensitivity was not admitted openly, the UN anti-colonialism should be considered as one of the most decisive factors that precipitated Britain's sweeping decolonisation after 1960.
    The article starts with the review of postwar UK-UN relations with particular reference to the British attitude towards the rising anti-colonialism at the UN. Britain's basic policy to keep the UN hands off her colonies did not have to change until the end of the 1950s largely because Article 2 (7) of the UN charter, the domestic jurisdiction clause, effectively barred interference into the affairs of her dependent territories. The static picture changed dramatically in 1960, when the South African racial problem shook the traditional, strict interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause and the famous UN Resolution 1514 on colonialism was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The British then recognized the need to seriously cope with the unwelcome development at the UN and tried to secure as much cooperation as possible from her major allies such as the US. However, the prospect of UN intervention into UK's most sensitive colonies was so imminent that the only viable course left to Britain was to inevitably ‘jettison’ her remaining colonies, small or large, as quickly as possible. The episode illustrates how strong Britain's desire was to remain in the mainstream of international politics. The possibility of a break-up of the Commonwealth was a major reason why the British did not want to antagonize the anti-colonial camp at the UN. Fortunately for the British, the pressure for an ever faster decolonization receded when most of the sizable British colonies had attained independence by 1963 (Kenya). Nevertheless, the British continued to be fearful lest the issues such as Aden should be given undue attention in the UN and were no longer able to pursue a policy of an ‘orderly decolonisation’, which had characterised Britain's imperial policy up to the previous decade.
  • 定形 衛
    国際政治
    1992年 1992 巻 101 号 57-71,L8
    発行日: 1992/10/24
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the meaning of national sovereignty in diplomacy of the socialist and federal states, especially in Yugoslavia.
    Excommunicated from the Cominform in June 1948, the most important item in Yugoslav diplomacy was to secure full sovereignty of its own. It held true of Yugoslav foreign policy after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer 1968. According to the Constitution of 1974, considering peaceful coexistence and active cooperation among states and peoples, irrespective of differences in their social systems, as indispensable conditions for peace and social progress in the world, Yugoslavia based its international relations on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. From this view point one may say that Yugoslav nonaligned diplomacy had achieved great success in the field of foreign policy.
    However, what has to be noticed is that Yugoslav inner politics had continued to infringe on national sovereignty from within. In other words, democratic centralism as the basic principle of the Communist Party (League of Communists) had ascendancy over federalism as the principle of the state order.
    Consequently it was natural that the collapse of the Communist party followed malfunction of the federal organizations and stripped Yugoslav national sovereignty of all its contents.
  • 吉川 元
    国際政治
    1986年 1986 巻 81 号 115-130,L12
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to examine the development of the Soviet human rights movement which started in the early 1970s under the impact of detente between U. S. -Soviet relations. In view of the possible infiltration of “bourgeois ideology” into the Soviet and East European societies, Soviet leaders sought to restructure alliance relations among the Soviet bloc countries by institutionalizing consulting system at every level. Accordingly the 1970s saw a rapid progress of integration of the bloc on interstate and inter-party relations at the highest levels.
    It is at this time when the Soviet human rights movement started. Under the tightened and unified ideological control in the bloc, the Soviet dissident movement, which was isolated socially at the time, was forced to make an attempt to win popular support and international aid. The approach adopted by the movement was legal and non-ideological one with special emphasis on the protection of human rights. Based on Soviet constitution and international law, the newly born Soviet human rights movement began to demand the Soviet government to observe its own law, and to appeal to international public opinion to interfere in the internal problems of the Soviet Union.
    It is the concluding document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that made great impact on the development of the Soviet human rights movement. Now that the Soviet government has signed the document which reaffirms unbreakable relation between international peace and the protection of human rights in a country, the movement has found legitimacy in calling upon signatory countries of the document and international public opinion for international humanitarian interference. At the same time, while winning wider popular support in the society by focussing its aim specifically on human rights issue, the Soviet human rights movement has spread to East European countries. Because of the common goal and strategy among many ethnic movements in the Soviet bloc, there came to appear a loosely unified human rights movement in the second half of the decade.
    The internationalization of the Soviet human rights problems and the international humanitarian interference by the West in Soviet internal affairs, however, has made little contribution to the improvement of the problems. On the contrary the movement has come to suffer from harsher political suppresion particularly with the beginning of Carter's human rights policy, and the U. S. and the Soviet governments came to be confronted as the human rights issue became one of the most important issues between the two governments, The rise and fall of the Soviet human rights movement may suggest that, firstly, under the conditions of the detente human rights problems of the Soviet Union can not be immune from the impact of international concern on human rights problems, and, secondly, only the legal and non-ideological approach can successfully internationalize human rights issue.
  • 角田 順
    国際政治
    1959年 1959 巻 7 号 80-89
    発行日: 1959/01/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中野 尚夫, 杉本 真一
    日本作物学会紀事
    1999年 68 巻 3 号 357-363
    発行日: 1999/09/05
    公開日: 2008/02/14
    ジャーナル フリー
    緑肥作物の立毛中に不耕起播種した水稲の苗立ちを検討した. 前作緑肥作物は1994年と1995年がレンゲ, クリムソンクローバ, ヘアリーベッチ, アルサイククローバで, 1996年と1997年がこれらとアルファルファであった. いずれの年にも裸地に播種する対照区を設けた. 水稲の播種期は1994年が4月15日, 4月28日と5月13日, 1995年が5月8日, 1996年が4月23日, 4月30日と5月9日, 1997年が4月16日, 4月25日と5月12日で, 供試品種は吉備の華であった. 前作緑肥作物の被陰度は, 地際相対照度でヘアリーベッチ, アルサイククローバ, アルファルファが5~10%, レンゲ, クリムソンクローバが約20%であった. 水稲の出芽開始は播種期が早いほど早く, 緑肥作物立毛播種で遅く, 被陰度の大きいアルサイククローバ, ヘアリーベッチで顕著に遅かった. 最終出芽数はレンゲ, クリムソンクローバでは裸地よりやや少なかったが, 裸地と同様に播種期による差がなかった. これに対し被陰度の大きい緑肥作物での最終出芽率は裸地に比べ少ないばかりでなく, 播種期が早いと少なくなった. この出芽の違いは, 前作緑肥作物の被陰度に応じて地温が低下したことに基づくと考えられた. さらに, 被陰度の大きい緑肥作物のもとではその立毛中と, 被陰の解消した入水後に枯死する水稲個体がみられた. このため, 被陰度の大きい前作緑肥作物立毛中への不耕起播種では出芽の低下, 枯死の両面から水稲の苗立ちが著しく低下した. これに対しレンゲ, クリムソンクローバの場合には裸地での苗立ちと大差なかった.
  • 門間 卓也
    現代史研究
    2015年 61 巻 67-72
    発行日: 2015/12/21
    公開日: 2018/06/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鈴木 佑司
    アジア研究
    2005年 51 巻 2 号 23-29
    発行日: 2005/04/30
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小川 修三, 安野 愈
    素粒子論研究
    1961年 22 巻 6 号 639-645
    発行日: 1961/02/20
    公開日: 2017/10/02
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 浦野 起央
    国際政治
    1967年 1967 巻 33 号 77-84
    発行日: 1967/06/01
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鈴木 基史
    学術の動向
    2011年 16 巻 6 号 6_60-6_66
    発行日: 2011/06/01
    公開日: 2011/10/14
    ジャーナル フリー
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