By Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, the U.S. could continue to rule over Okinawa and have the exclusive right to maintain military bases there. After the ratification of the treaty in April 1952, people of Okinawa voiced opposition in regard to the use of land by the U.S. military. In June 1956, the U.S. authorities in Okinawa released a Report of the Price Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (hereinafter called the Price Report) that supported the land policy proposed by the U.S. military. The Price Report recommended lump sum payments for fee title and accepted to the planned acquisition of additional land. However, the release of the report inflamed the opposition movement of the people of Okinawa.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political process over the Price Report in 1956 by focusing on the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State.
After the release of the Price Report, Okinawans requested that the Japanese Foreign Office negotiate with the U.S. government to solve the land dispute. During June and July of 1956, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu requested the U.S. Ambassador John Allison to abandon lump sum payments and to reduce the acquisition of additional land.
Following the recommendation of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, the U.S. State Department carefully reexamined the Price Report in regard to the possibility of abandoning lump sum payments in order to improve U.S.-Japan relations. However, shortly before the State Department was due to hold a conference with the Department of Defense (which supported the Price Report), the issue of abandoning lump sum payments was dropped, because the U.S. Consul General in Okinawa strongly recommended that the State Department not retreat from the Price Report. However, the State Department did ask the Pentagon to make some modifications, such as abandoning the acquisition of the fee title, in view of possible damage to U.S.-Japan relations.
After this political process revealed the importance of taking into consideration the involvement of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department, it was clear that the U.S. military was not capable of ruling Okinawa on its own. Thereafter, U.S. military control over Okinawa was always considered in the context of Japan-U.S. relations. Therefore, the political process over the Price Report in 1956 marked the start of Japanese Foreign Office and U.S. State Department involvement in U.S. military control of Okinawa. Concomitantly, it also was the starting point of recognizing that the role of the U.S. military in Okinawa was an issue affecting Japan-U.S. relations.

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 本稿は、アメリカ統治下の沖縄に対し文部省が学校教員の研修指導者として委員を派遣した沖縄派遣教育指導委員制度について、その発端となる1950年代後半から沖縄の本土復帰（1972年）までを対象時期とし、とくに制度の形成変容の節目となる制度の発足（1959年度）、第2年目の派遣（1960年度）、中断を挟んでの再開（1962年度）に注目し、日本政府、米国民政府、琉球政府の三者関係に留意しながら、その制度展開を明らかにしたものである。

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　"The Cornerstone of Peace," which is located in the southern half of Okinawa prefecture, is a very famous symbol for war and peace. The monument is engraved with the names of about 240,000 men and women who lost their lives in the Battle of Okinawa, regardless of nationality or whether they were military or civilian. Many journalists, newscasters, and politicians mention it as an ideal monument for the war dead.
　In this article, I will argue about the correlation between official memorial places and public opinion. In case of Okinawa, before "the Cornerstone of Peace" was built, hundreds of monuments had been built by the war bereaved in Okinawa as well as by administrative units of local government. Such monuments by local governments were often looked at critically as selfish, so that a new kind of monument was needed to dedicate to the whole war dead. After 1991, when the project to build the Cornerstone was announced, some people argued against it and others for it. Then once the monument was erected in 1995, it was praised as an ideal monument without controversy, especially in Japan proper.
　More importantly, these days, the need for a new kind of memorial which can replace the controversial Yasukuni Shrine is becoming an issue. The case of "the Cornerstone of Peace" in Okinawa can offer some solutions to this issue.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze USCAR's administration policies in terms of High Commissioners' perception of political situations in Okinawa, thereby clarifying what advice and information High Commissioner offered to Washington. It is hoped that this paper will supplement the Clapp paper and also serve as a sort of link between Okinawan-Japanese pressures and U. S. policy. As background, organizational and political setting in which USCAR operated is discussed, and the two following sections analyze USCAR policies between mid-1964 and 1969, namely, the concession policy (mid-1964-1967) and the policy of maintaining effective use of the bases after reversion (1968-1969), in relation with the perceived Okinawan pressures and Japanese participation in Okinawa. The concluding section summarizes consistencies and changes in USCAR policies, and analyzes their possible relations with moves in Washington.

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  Precedence research considers consistently that the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland (CROPF) is leftist forces. But, in fact, early CROPF avoided confrontation with the Okinawa conservative forces, and performed nonpartisan movement. Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA) which was the center of CROPF also held cooperative relations with an education office and the Okinawa conservative forces. OTA was not opposed to twin education bills itself, and required the improvement about the regulation side. Since the school staff's election campaign activated around 1965, the Conservative Party feared change of power. The Conservative Party tried to legislate the bills for restricting a teacher's political activity forcibly. CROPF was extensively opposed to the Okinawa conservative forces, and the bills turned into a rejected bill. Thereby, an Antagonistic Conservative-Progressive Axis centering on the security and the base problem in Okinawa was established, and nonpartisan movement disappeared.

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　「国立感染症研究所ハンセン病資料アーカイブス」に所蔵された資料の中で、現在まで関係者以外に未公開であった資料、または部分的にしか公開されていない資料の公開を2020年5月から「近現代ハンセン病資料アーカイブス」（URL: http://www.archhdjp.jp/）で行っている。「近現代ハンセン病資料アーカイブス」と併せて本誌にも日本ハンセン病学会関連の資料のアーカイブスを行い、多くの方々に本学会の果たした役割を検証し理解していただくと共に、本誌に本学会の歴史とその役割をアーカイブスして行きたい。

　今回は前回の「沖縄らい検診等援助計画報告書（昭和44年度）」に続き「昭和42年度沖縄らい検診等援助計画報告書」（原本は手書き）をアーカイブスする。本資料は前回の資料と関連するものであり、前資料と同様、本土復帰前の沖縄のハンセン病医療を援助した記録であり、軽快退所者の実態とその管理を沖縄と本土の比較で検討するなど、当時の沖縄と本土のハンセン病管理の違いや疫学状況を知る貴重な資料である。表などの数値も原本に従いそのまま記載した。

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