In Japan, bureaucrats have been usually recruited to run for the Diet, and moved from successful bureaucrats to elective public office. At a first glance, the idea of "the separation of politics and administration" seems to be ignored here, but this feature is a political phenomenon particularly unique to Japanese political culture, and rooted deeply in its own historical experience. During the Taisho era (1912-1926), when the political phenomenon mentioned above "partilization of bureaucrats" - took place so often, people tend to think that the phenomenon indicated the party cabinet would be possible, and also strongly impressed that Hanbatsu was in declining from position of influence. The purpose of this article is to focus upon, and will seek the explanation of the relationship between the political parties and the progress of the constitutional government in Taisho era-mainly Hara cabinet (1918-1922). At that time, even Hanbatsu was falling into decay, Genro still had a tremendous influence in politics, especially in the time to select the Prime Minister. So political parties had to inevitably coopt with political actors who could stand inside the bounds of Genro's acceptance; bureaucrats in higher positions were their only plausible choice. Hence, those bureaucrats were picked as party members, though this was largely a political parties' ploy to achieve their goals. For bureaucrats, indeed, they either had no choice but to become members of political parties because their very survival was depended highly upon whether they would be able to swim with the tide of the constitutional government.

抄録全体を表示

本稿の目的は、満蒙問題に注目し、新四国借款団の結成過程における日本の国際関係や対中国政策の特質を再検討することである。本稿の視角は以下の三点である。第一に、旧借款団（六国借款団を起源とする）と新借款団との関係である。第二に、旧借款団の中心的な存在であったイギリスの動向である。第三に、日本国内の政策主体の相互関係である。
　原敬内閣は、満蒙を地域として新借款団の事業範囲から除外する概括主義を閣議決定した。シベリア出兵が行われているなか、特に田中義一陸相は日本の国家的前途という観点から満蒙の重要性を説明し、概括主義を主張した。は英米に満蒙の概括的除外を要求した。これに対し、英米はともに日本の要求に反対した。しかし、「勢力圏」認識に基づき、イギリス外交は次第に方針を転換し、日本と満蒙との特殊な関係に理解を示すようになった。
　しかし、は新借款団への参加を正式に決定しなかった。なぜなら、同時期にイギリス政府は500万ポンド借款を提案し、この借款の条件のなかに寺内正毅内閣の支援によって創設された中国の参戦軍を解散することが含まれており、日本陸軍の反発を引き起こしたからであった。イギリス外交は新借款団結成の遅延を懸念し、参戦軍の解散を500万ポンド借款の条件から撤回した。その結果、は満蒙の概括的除外を譲歩した一方、「満蒙の鉄道利権」を新借款団の事業範囲から除外するように主張した。英米は日本の要求を認めることはできず、結局、日本が洮熱鉄道を提供することで妥協した。
　日本が新借款団に参加する際、国外ではイギリスによる日本と満洲との特殊な関係の承認、国内では陸軍の利害関係が重要な判断基準となっていた。特に後者は、旧借款団の結成時と比較すると、特徴的である。また、は国際協調をとりつつも、中国情勢の変化にともない、干渉政策を実施していたのであった。

抄録全体を表示

  In 1925 the Law of the election of the Lower House was revised, and the medium-sized constituency system was introduced. This system had been continued for about 70 years and given great influence to Japanese politics. Why and how was the medium-sized constituency system introduced in 1925? The aim of this paper is to answer this question.
  It has often been said that the three parties in power introduced it in order to escape from competing each other and to keep their base. This is the case, but the background was much more complicated. This paper focuses on three points.
  First, quite a few medium-sized constituencies had already been made when Hara Cabinet revised the Law of the election of the Lower House in 1919. It reflected wishes of Upper House, which was afraid of Seiyukai's mastery over Lower House, and wishes of some Seiyukai or independent MPs, who were afraid of changes of their constituencies.
  Second, the small-sized constituency system was greatly criticized among journalism and academic world after World War I. They insisted that corruption in election and higher cost for election was due to the small-sized constituency system, and they were generally welcome to proportional representation and multi party system in Europe. In 1923 Advisory Committee on Law expressed that proportional representation should be adopt. These voices promoted the review of the small-sized constituency system.
  Third, it was Kenseikai rather than three parties in power that took the initiative in introducing the medium-sized constituency system. Kenseikai did it in order to avoid returning to the large-sized constituency system, which was likely to make excessive multi party system, and to introduce the favorable election system to it. The medium-sized constituency system was favorable for Kenseikai in that it would not lose heavily. Kenseikai aimed to grow as one party in two party system, and the plan really came true after that.

抄録全体を表示

Many scholars in the United States and Japan have related the East Asian international politics of the 1920's to a concept called "the Washington System." In short, they regard this system as an international order depending on cooperative diplomacy between America, Japan, and Britain; while China was subordinate under the system, and Soviet was excluded from the system. Needless to say, they assume the starting point of the system to be the Washinston Conference held from 1921 to 1922. Though there are a wealth of studies on the Washington Conference, some questions still need to be addressed. First of all, to what extent was the consensus among the three powers established, which should have been the base for the cooperative diplomacy ? In particular, did the American government accept Japanese "special interests" in Manchuria ? Or did America's East Asian policy compel Japan to change her "sphere-of-influence diplomacy"? Secondly, what, if any, transitions took place in America's East Asian policies during the period of the Washington Conference ? Relatively few works have examined the Harding administration's East Asian policies from within the administration and their relation to those of the former Wilson administration. It is not widely known that there were serious disparities between American policy makers on the framework of East Asian policies during the conference itself. Specifically, the role of John Van Antwerp MacMurray, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, has not been evaluated sufficiently. Thirdly, if the Chinese position was subordinate in the Washington System, why the Chinese government accepted such a position must be analyzed. However, again, there have not been many works which fully utilized Chinese diplomatic documents. The fourth question addresses foreign policies towards Soviet. Considering the fact that Soviet was not invited to attend the conference and U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations were not established until 1933, one can conclude that Soviet was excluded from the Washington System. The question, therefore, is why the powers could not agree about their foreign policy towards Soviet, though they deliberated on an agenda which could have laid the foundations for diplomacy towards Soviet. In order to answer these questions, after surveying the conflict between America, Japan, and China before the conference, the author attempts to approach the reality of the "agreement" reached at the conference between the three powers, focusing on "the Hughes amendment proposal," which followed the Root Principals. Next, the role of MacMurray in the negotiations of the Shantung question is discussed, comparing the lines of the Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and Elihu Root, plenipotentiary of the American government. Further, U.S.-Japanese-Chinese negotia Lions on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which ltad a significant influence on their respective foreign policies towards Soviet, and the failure of these negotiations are scrutinized. In addition, it is one of the objectives here to analyze Chinese activities during the conference, using Chinese diplomatic documents which are almost completely available now.

抄録全体を表示