This article attempts to analyze the background of Foreign Minister Uchida's positive policy toward China. Uchida strongly advocated the recognition of “Manchukuo” and in August 1932 said that “we have to do it at all costs, even if Japan is reduced to ashes”.
There are several reasons why Uchida gave such an emotional speech in the parliment. The first and primary one is that Uchida changed his soft policy toward Manchuria under strong pressure of the Kuantung Army. When the Manchurian Incident occurred on September 18, 1931, Uchida was the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company. At first Uchida tried to arrange a cease fire through negotiations and was critical of the use of force. But Uchida suddenly changed his attitude after September 26th when he heard that the Kuangtung Army was complaining that Uchida was not cooperative to them. After that, Uchida beamec the spokesman for the Kuantung Army and went to Tokyo to persuade the Prime Minister and other political leaders to support the policy of the Kuantung Army. Finally he became Foreign Minister with the backing of the Kuantung Army.
However, there are other reasons why Uchida easily followed the military line.
One is Uchida's idea of “Asia under Japan's leadership”. He advocated this idea as early as 1890 when he entered the Foreign Ministry. This idea was repeated many times after that. Another reason is connected with his social background. Uchida came from Kumamoto, and had no connection with Hanbatsu. Because of his background, in order for Uchida to advance in the diplomatic service, he needed to have supporters behind him from other personal connections. He found Mutsu Munemitsu in the 1890's and Hara Kei in the 1910's and it is no wonder that he turned to the Kuantung Army in the 1930's.
His respect for the Chinese Imperial system is a third reason why he supported “Manchukuo”.
These and other reasons are discussed by the author in the article.

抄録全体を表示

Konoe Fumimaro served three times as prime minister for over almost three years in prewar Japan. He played an important role in the Sino-Japanese War, the Axis Alliance and the advance to southern French Indochina to guide Japan closer to war. In ideology he was very complicated making efforts for peace with the Allied Nations at the sacrifice of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, while he claimed to break the status quo from his youth (For example his article ‘Ei-Bei Hon'i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu’)
In the postwar period the estimates of him were divided broadly into two categories, namely, those who felt he was a tragic premier and those who saw him as a warmonger. Konoe himself regarded his cabinet as having only a weak existence manipulated by the army. But was he usually passive or not.?
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine how Konoe saw international relations and how Japan's diplomatic policy was influenced by them in the first cabinet from the Marco Polo Bridge-Incident to the New Order in East Asia Proclamation.
A true peace based on international justice which Konoe stated immediately after the inauguration of the new cabinet put emphasis on the justificaiton of Japan's policy towards East Asia from the Manchurian Incident. But international justice converted from negative to positive meanings would lead to the New Order in East Asia through Sino-Japanese War. It was not the result of no clear prospect on the future of the war, but the embodiment of Konoe's world view.
On the other hand though Konoe tried to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, the issue split the Konoe cabinet to lead to a general resignation by the rejection of key ministers of the Cabinet. After all the Axis Alliance was concluded in the second cabinet.
In spite of such hard-line policy of the Konoe cabinet toward Britain and America, Konoe himself did not intended to appeal to arms. He flattered himself that Britain and America would recognize Japan's situation sooner or later if Japan checked them more strongly.
In any case the New Order in East Asia based on international justice was an attempt to escape from the Washington Treaty System in Japan's Diplomacy.

抄録全体を表示

The extended introduction to the essay serves the three-fold purpose of calling attention to the necessity for further study of Arita Hachiro, raising some general interpretive issues pertaining to early Showa diplomatic history which are addressed later in the essay, and introducing pertinent English-language literature.
Arita's importance in the diplomacy of the early Showa period is partially reflected in the key positions which he occupied in the Foreign Ministry's decisionmaking structure: Asia Bureau Director during “Tanaka diplomacy” and the renewal of “Shidehara diplomacy”; Vice Foreign Minister during Uchida Yasuya's “scorched earth diplomacy”; Foreign Minister during the Hirota, first Konoe, Hiranuma and Yonai cabinets.
That Arita occupied the above posts also provides a unique opportunity to examine the foreign policy decision-making problem at several levels. The major interpretive viewpoints concerning this problem in English-language literature are: the civilian cabinet members were robots of the military (R. J. C. Butow); the highest military and civilian officials were real decision-makers (J. B. Crowley); they were not robots or rubber stamps but their influence was basically limited to revising or rejecting the proposals of middle-echelon subordinates (C. Hosoya).
The case o Arita Hachiro is also of special interest with regard to the question of responsibility for the course of Japan's foreign policy during the early Showa period. On the one hand is the late Morishima Goro's claim that Foreign Ministry leaders strove to restrain and guide the military through indirect means. On the other hand is Professor Usui Katsumi's argument that the “Arita faction's” policy line “opened the way to Pearl Harbor” and that its outlook was more similar than not to that of the military. The usuzumi iro (thin ink color/grey) middle ground occupied by Arita's dipolmacy certainly allows for various interpretations of its significance.
The main body of the essay, which is part of an overall study of Arita's diplomatic career currently being undertaken by the author, is basically a case study of Arita's thought and behavior in relation to the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936. Of particular interest are the reasons for and the factors affecting Arita's attitude towards an agreement with Germany and his role in and influence upon the conclusion of the Pact. The main points made are: (1) Arita's approach to a rapprochement between Germany and Japan stemmed more from a negative attitude towards their common opponent than from a positive attitude towards Germany; that is, his strong conviction that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to Japan and the greatest obstacle to close Japan-Manchukuo-China relations was the main reason why he came to favor an agreement with Germany; (2) despite this strong anti-Soviet attitude he took a prudent, middle-of-the-road attitude with respect to dealing with the Soviet problem which was also reflected in his attitude towards an agreement with Germany; (3) in this case the Foreign Minister played a crucial role in the decision-making process since it was his view which determined the Foreign Ministry's basic attitude towards an agreement with Germany; (4) he also seems to have had a significant influence upon the formulation of the Pact; (5) since Arita was successful in obtaining a pact drawn up in “thin ink” he cannot be said to have been pressured by the Army into concluding an agreement which he did not want; on the other hand, he was by no means in complete agreement with the Army; (6) the ways and extent to which the Army determined the framework within which Arita felt compelled to carry out the responsibilities of his office should not be lost sight of.

抄録全体を表示

This article investigates that how Japan pursued inconsistent diplomatic conceptions, establishing a New Order in East Asia and avoiding the deterioration of the U.S.-Japan relationship, by focusing on Foreign Minister Arita’s diplomatic strategy toward the United States from the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War to 1940. It argues that Arita tried to maintain the U.S.-Japan relationship within the framework of the Nine Power Treaty by rectifying the open door policy for establishing a New Order in East Asia.

During the initial stage of the Second Sino-Japanese war, Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita devoted his primary attention to the creation of so called Toa Shin Chitsujo (New Order in East Asia) by establishing an economic block with China and a puppet state “Manchukuo.” The United States had been opposing this policy as it infringed upon the Nine Power Treaty which reaffirmed the open door policy and guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. At the same time, Japan was economically dependent upon the US especially for raw materials that were of vital importance for Japan’s war against China.

The preset study reveals in what way Arita pursued two inconsistent diplomatic goals: avoiding the deterioration of US-Japan relations while attempting to establish a New Order in violation of the Nine Power Treaty. Previous researches interpreted Arita’s Statement of 18 November 1938 as abandonment of the Nine Power Treaty and alteration of the status quo. However, this article shows that Arita made efforts to keep Japanese engagement consistent with the Nine Power Treaty by asking the Department of State, through the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, to rectify the interpretation of the open door policy in exchange for the protection and respect of the US rights in China. In that sense, the Nine Power Treaty served to Arita as a valuable asset in achieving inconsistent diplomatic objectives.

In order to alleviate the Depart of State skepticism about Arita’s approach and gain the US trust, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to engage in protection of the US interests in China. Then policy makers of the Foreign Ministry decided to settle the problem of the blockade of the Yangtzu River. However, this policy had never been implemented because of the strong opposition from young diplomatic officers. As a result, the Department of State made their perception of Japan worse, and it bankrupted the Arita’s foreign policy.

抄録全体を表示

The Chinese Currency Reform of November 1935 and the Kodama Mission to China of March 1937 are generally thought to be important events in the lead up to the Sino-Japanese War. With regard to the currency reform, revisionists have tried to show that representatives of the Ministry of Finance, such as Takahashi Korekiyo and Tsushima Jyuichi, and others from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Shigemitsu Mamoru sought to help make it a success. This paper however demonstrates that this is false by introducing new evidence. It also analyzes the manipulation of information by the army and the two civilian agents, Takahashi Kamekichi and Tachibana Shiraki, who sought to separate North China from the rest of China. Experts on China, such as Uchida Katsushi tried to insist on helping China to succeed in its currency reform from the viewpoint of financial interests. However, the army forced him not to express his opinion.
With regard to the Kodama Mission, this paper emphasizes its unusual importance. The mission sought to solve the Japan-China crisis in two ways. The first was to make a strong channel of cooperation between the business associations in the two countries in order to check the Japanese local army's plot to invade China and to lower the Chinese government's high anti-Japanese tariffs. The second was to make the Chinese government understand the Japanese government's will to control the army, prevent anti-Chinese smuggling and abolish the puppet government in North China. Its messenger was Fujiyama Aiichiro, the son-in-law of the Finance Minister Yuki Toyotaro, who promoted Sato's Peace Diplomacy. Fujiyama proposed to China a type of economic cooperation based on the idea of helping the Nanking Government to unify China and to reconstruct the Chinese economy. This idea grew out of his experience in Java. Yuki, his father-in-law, represented the financial sector and was one of the leaders of “Zaikai”, the Japanese business elite circle. At that time the only way to solve the Japan-China problem was to slow down the Japanese local army and to avoid the clash of economic and nationalistic interests between the two countries. The Kodama Mission and its planners, Finance Minister Yuki and Foreign Minister Sato tried to do that.
Their efforts failed in the end, but it was not an insignificant episode without any political support, as is often said. Konoe Fumimaro also pursued a similar plan, and he conveyed it to the Nanking Government through Uchida Katsushi. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he started to make peaceful advances along the lines of the Kodama Mission's economic diplomacy approach.

抄録全体を表示

岸信介は戦後日本政治の重要人物である。加えて戦前の満州での活動や東条内閣商工大臣としての経歴から, 戦前戦後の日本政治を架橋させる役割を期待される存在である。ただ, 戦前からの有力者として描かれてきたことで, 結果的に一種神話化された岸像が形成されてきた。本稿では商工官僚としての 「岸の限界・失敗」 を取り上げることで, 等身大の商工官僚・岸の姿を示そうと試みる。その際に1940年末に岸信介商工次官が更迭された事件を検討の対象とする。同事件はしばしば小林一三商工大臣との大臣・次官の不仲や, 「自由経済―統制経済」 の対立として説明される。改めて背景にある政界官界財界の関係の変容や安定的な戦時の政治秩序や均衡状況の中に位置付け直すことで, 「政党政治以後」 の政治経済構造の把握に繋げたいと思う。結果的にこの分析の過程は当該期の構造変化に翻弄される岸の状況を映し, 戦後を視野に入れた岸像の検討にも役立つものと考える。

抄録全体を表示

本稿の目的は, 昭和初期テロ事件の司法過程を, 減刑嘆願運動の展開及び, 運動を契機とした政治勢力からの圧力に対して司法部・陸海軍がどのように司法権の運用を行ったのかという視点から分析し, 一連のテロ事件をめぐる司法部・陸海軍の司法権の実態と人心の変化を明らかにすることである。

　本稿の結論は主に次の2点である。第1に, 五・一五事件の陸海軍側公判開始後, 減刑嘆願運動は初めて全国的運動となったが, 海軍側判決後には停滞した。以後, 運動の主体は国家主義団体に移り, その性質も相沢事件後には皇道派による公判闘争へと変化したことである。第2に, 司法部の動向を陸海軍との比較の上で分析を行い, 五・一五事件において海軍側は当初, 法に基づく刑罰を科そうとした。しかし, 論告反対運動と加藤寛治らの圧力を受け, 陸軍と同様, 寛大な判決が下された。一方, 司法部は減刑嘆願運動や他の政治勢力の動向からの相対的自立を模索し, 概ね法に基づき対処したことである。

抄録全体を表示