本研究はわが国において最初に策定された全国総合開発計画（全総）において採用された開発方式である拠点開発構想がどのような基盤的理論を以て着想され、具体的政策へと展開していったのかについて、当時の開発官僚らの言説をもとに明らかにした。拠点開発構想はその後の新産業都市をはじめとする産業立地政策の展開によって具現化されたために工業開発のイメージが付されているが、開発官僚の狙いとするところは異なっていた。欧米における開発経済学の摂取や国内の若手研究者との交流を通して、彼らは拠点開発構想の到達点を「都市の創造」と定め、全総の閣議決定後も拠点としての「地方開発都市」の具体化・法制化に向けて研究を進めていたが、政治的理由によって実現には至らなかったのである。

抄録全体を表示

The purpose of the present study was to examine the relationships between political knowledge and political attitudes, which are the principal components of political orientation.
The questionnaire was administered to 543 male and female students in Nagano prefecture, ranging in age from the third year of junior high school to the senior year of college (113 third year junior high school students; 204 senior high school students, of whom 80, 87, and 37 were first, second and third year students, respectively; 226 college students, of whom 100, 103, 13 and 10 were freshmen, sophomores, juniors and seniors in that order).
The questionnaire contained 32 items which were concerned with political knowledge and 40 items which were concerned with political attitudes. Five knowledge scales were construtted from the 32 items regarding political knowledge: they were 1) US. Japan Security Pact-Japanese Self Defense Army scale, 2) Japanese Constitution-Labor Movement-Okinawa Problem scale, 3) Japanese Politics-Economics-Diplomacy scale, 4) US Politics -Economics scale and 5) US Military Affairs-Diplomacy scale. From the 42 items regarding political attitude, four attitude scales were constructed: they were 1) US. Japan Security Pact-Japanese Self Defense Army-Japanese Militarism scale, 2) US Politics-Economics-Diplomacy-Military Affairs scale, 3) Japanese Politics-Economics-Diplomacy scale and 4) Okinawa Problem-Peace Movement scale.
These nine scales were analyzed using principal factor analysis. The solution was varimax-rotated with two factors. It was found that the first factor was the knowledge factor (have (+) not have (-)) and the second factor was the attitude factor (progressive (+) conservative (-)). From these two factors, the means were calculated for each year and were plotted on two-dimensional plane; the abscissa for political knowledge, the ordinate for political attitude. The resulting curve was a J-shaped one.
The third year students of junior high school had their position on the left end of the J-shaped curve. At this stage of development, the political knowledge was low and the political attitude was not well structured yet. For the second year students of high school, their mean political attitude score inclined to the conservative side, in spite of their increased political knowledge. Hereafter, both political knowledge and political attitudes changed rapidly from the stage of little-knowledge and conservative to one of greater-knowledge and radicalism in a nearly linear relationship. At the junior and senior year of college, both the degree of political knowledge and of progressivism reverted to levels between those of freshmen and sophomores.
Next, after removing statistically the effect of developmental difference and making the entire sample homogeneous, factor analysis was carried out again. The result was not substantially different from that of the above analysis; that is, both the political knowledge factor and the political attitude factor were extracted. From these results it was concluded that the factor structure of political orientation was not affected by the developmental stages of the individual.

抄録全体を表示

Ishibashi Tanzan, the Finance Minister under the first Yoshida cabinet (May 22, 1946 to May 24, 1947) was purged on May 16, 1947, in accordance with category G of Appendix “A” of SCAPIN-550, dated January 4, 1946. Ishibashi's purge was clearly unreasonable. As president and editor-in-chief of the Oriental Economist, Ishibashi had been firmly in opposition to the Manchurian Incident (1931), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), The Triple Alliance (1940), and the Pacific War (1941-45). He was well known as one of the few liberalists opposing the totalitarian government in those days. That is why Colonel Kramer, who became the first chief of the Economic & Scientific Section (ESS) of GHQ and had been a reader of the Oriental Economist even during the war, asked for Ishibashi's cooperation from September to December, 1945.
This article aims to clarify the factors and process of Ishibashi's purge as GHQ's attempt to silence him and to squelch his economic enlargement policies in favor of their own economic retrenchment policies. There were three purge actions on Ishibashi. The first purge movement was requested by the Soviet representatives at the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) conference; GHQ disagreed. The second occasion arose when Ishibashi and ESS came into extreme conflict over the Extraordinary Tax Legislation issue, but General MacArthur denied his purge for fear that the Yoshida cabinet would fall. And finally, the situation that led to the purge of Ishibashi was the clash on the cost problems of the Occupation that occurred between Ishibashi and GHQ. Moreover, the Government Section (GS) viewed Ishibashi as a dangerous man for offering such stout resistance to GHQ. GS had to purge him not as a politician, but as an journalist because there was no clause on resistance to the Allied Powers as a justification in SCAPIN-550. Prime Minister Yoshida assumed an indifferent attitude because Ishibashi was becoming powerful in the Liberal Party.

抄録全体を表示