唯物論=観念論、実在論=現象主義.存在=意識、心=身、等の問題での核心の一つは知覚の問題である.知覚をどう考えるかが、これらの問題の一つの岐れ目になるものと思う.ところが自然科学の進歩は、ますます知覚の因果説、即ち知覚の物理生理的説明を支持してゆくようにみえる.だが、知覚の因果説は、大脳や神経組織を含む物理的事物 (や場) と知覚内容との区別を前提し、この意味で二元論の立場をはっきり採っているように思われる.そこで、以下ではこの知覚の因果説を検討し、次の諸点を明瞭にすることを試みたい.
(イ) 知覚の因果説の二元論的解釈は重大な困難に導く.ケラーの提案も成功しない.
(ロ) その解決のため、現象主義の一元論を考えてみる.但し、センスデータ説はとらない.この現象主義は科学知識のを損わない.
(ハ) この現象主義をとると、 (イ) の困難はすべて消滅する.しかも知覚因果説の科学的内容には変化がない.

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The concept of geometry is being investigated very actively on the basis of cognitive theory. But there are very few reports about the methods to develop the curriculum of the teaching of geometry as well as to describe the process through which the concept of geometry is recognized. So to reflect upon the teaching of geometry, I intended to investigate the recognition of the concept of geometry by use of phenomenology. The main purpose of this study is to clarify the meaning of ideality and objectivity on the concept of geometry. First I reviewed the results of a series of previously reported studies on the concept of geometry. Then I listed up the problems worthwhile to investigate. What is ideality and objectivity on the concept of geometry? What characteristics dose ideality and objectivity has? How is ideality and objectivity recognized? How is ideality and objectivity taught? The characteristics of ideality on the concept of geometry are as follows: nonentity, identity, repeatability, meaningfulness, consideration, recognition along stages and dependence upon perception. Ideality on the concept of geometry is recognized along the following three stages: sensitivity, imagination and ideality. There are two types of recognition from sensitivity to ideality, that is to say, from sensitive entity to idealistic entity. One type of recognition is so-called "abstraction" from object to shape, and the other is so-called "generalization" from diagram to figure. In this study I used the term "objectivity" on the concept of geometry from the idealistic point of view. The characteristics of objectivity on the concept of geometry can be expressed as follows: intersubjectivity, identity, evidence, dependence upon anyone, anytime and anywhere, repeatability and linguistics. Objectivity on the concept of geometry is recognized along the following three stages: dialogue, linguistics and objectivity. Special attention should be paid to the recognition from "ideality" of individual concept of geometry to "objectivity" in the teaching of geometry. Then "imagination" of treating sensitive entity, "dialogue" among classroom members and "linguistics" which is objective in mathematical world should be emphasized.

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Durch die neuen Gesammelten Werke und Vorlesungen können wir heute Hegels vielfältige Aktivitäten in seinen späteren Jahren im Detail verstehen. Diese neuen Auflagen machen es aber zugleich schwieriger, die Veränderungen und Vermehrungen in Bezug auf das gesamte philosophische System Hegels einheitlich zu erfassen. Warum bemühte Hegel sich kontinuierlich bis zu seinem Tode, sein System zu revidieren? Bedeutet das eine Niederlage der Hegelschen Philosophie gegen die immer weiter zunehmende Zahl von verschiedenen Meldungen und Erkenntnissen der empirischen Wissenschaften und der geschichtlichen Tatsachen?
In Bezug auf dieses Problem versucht mein Aufsatz, noch einmal das Hegels System am Leitfaden des Begriffs “Nachdenken” zu interpretieren. In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass das System, das Hegel in seinen späteren Jahren konzipiert hat, die Vielfalt der empirischen Kenntnisse aufnehmen, aber dennoch zugleich immanent und selbständig sein kann.
In seiner Berliner Periode (1818-1831) bringt Hegel seine eigene philosophische Aufgabe mit dem Wort “Nachdenken” zum Ausdruck. Seine theoretische Erörterung dieses spezifischen Denkens, das nicht rein und bloß, sondern immer “nach” etwas denkt, findet sich im “Vorbegriff” der zweiten und dritten Auflagen der Enzyklopadie, dessen Kapitel die Rolle einer Einleitung zur Darstellung des Systems spielt. Hegel diskutiert darin, dass, insofern das Denken, obwohl es sich in dem Feld des Emprischen bewege, ein Moment der “Beziehung auf sich selbst” besitze, dadurch es von seinen Einzelheiten und Zufälligkeiten befreit und zum allgemeinen Wissen erhoben werden könne.
Diese Erhebung durch das “Nachdenken” muss jedoch wegen ihres “Nach” - Charakters nicht in der reinen begrifflichen Sphäre, sondern gerade innerhalb der Arbeit an der Erfahrung vollzogen und bestätigt werden. Bei Betrachtung dieser Theorie können wir den paradoxen Satz: “das Aufnehmen des empirischen Inhalts ist die Sichentwicklung des Denkens” (in der “Einleitung” der revidierten Enzyklopädie), als das Fundament des ganzen Systems Hegels interpretieren. Indem Hegel das “Nachdenken” zur Methodenidee seines Systemaufbaus bestimmte, zeigte er schließlich, dass sein philosophisches System nur im Zusammenhang mit der Erfahrung offenbart.

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Recently, a controversy occuered in the United States between scientists on the one hand, and researchers of science studies (sociologists of science and cultural theorists., etc.) on the other hand. In these so-called "Science Wars", Bruno Latour was criticized by scientists as a "relativist", who tried to reduce scientific knowledge to inter-subjective construction.
This criticism was due to misunderstanding, because his books only describe how scientific facts are confirmed. But he was, in part, responsible for this misunderstanding, because he didn't consider what the facts are and denied the importance of scientific theory.
To supplement his argument, I consider scientific theory as a summary of nature and a system of operations. I distinguish four kinds of scientific facts: "the fact explained", "the fact that explains", "the fact that explains the fact that explains" and "the fact predicted". Scientists would also agree that the latter three facts were constructed in the history of science. But was "the fact explained" constructed?
This is a subtle question. The first facts explained are everyday facts. And all sciences, including humanities like philosophy, are constructed on the basis of everyday facts. On the other hand, everyday facts can be also modified as a result of scientific research or philosophical reflection.
This reciprocity between everyday facts and sciences poses a difficult question about the basis of sciences. We philosophers must challenge it.

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In this essay, I examine discussions of John Hart Ely, Mark Tushnet, Ronald Dworkin, and Cass R. Sunstein, and show that interpretation of Constitution relates to jurisprudence. For example, they discuss constitutional Interpretation based on subjective judgment of justices, or degree of justification by the theory. And their positions are different respectively. But, including skeptic positions about theory, they all logically talk about validity in own position, and the discussion is related to jurisprudential discussion. Their arguments show that if we argue about constitutional interpretation logically, the argument will finally step into the domain of the argument of jurisprudence. The position that jurisprudence has nothing to do with interpretation of constitution is possible. But, it is necessary for the claim in itself to be justified by logic or theory. And if we try the justification, we cannot avoid jurisprudential argument.

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Textbooks on Japanese writing note that kara and dakara, which indicate a cause or reason, are inappropriate in academic writing. However, the word kotokara, derived from kara, is deemed acceptable in academic writing. Kara and dakara, which subjectively state a cause or reason, are not often used in the medicine or engineering, where the research is often based on objective numerical values. However, those field use kotokara. The expressions kara and dakara are subjective expressions, but adding koto to form such words as kotokara and kono kotokara makes them objective expressions.

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Textbooks on Japanese writing note that "kara," which indicates a cause or reason, should not be used in academic writings; instead, "node" or "tame" should be used. However, "kara" is being used in a certain number of academic journals on liberal arts and mathematics. Previous studies have shown that "kara" shows a subjective reason or cause while "node" or "tame" show objective reasons or causes. Since a cause or reason could be subjective in actual research, "kara" can be in those instances. Learners must be instructed to be flexible rather than simply being told that "kara" should not be used in academic writing.

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