Russia, perceiving the U.S. political actions in Eastern Europe as threats to its vital interests there, developed the concept of ‘Strategic Deterrence.’ According to Russia’s ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014, this concept means countering non-military and military threats to Russia’s interests by non-military, conventional, and nuclear means. Nuclear weapons can serve three purposes within this concept: ultimate means, conflict localization means, and narrative offensive means. Russia officially shows its readiness to use strategic nuclear forces as ultimate means to counter conventional threats to the existence of the state, and to develop conventional forces for local conflicts. When Russian officials mention the use of nuclear weapons, it serves as a narrative offensive means, which they expect will incite fear among the adversaries’ populations and weaken their united will to confront Russia, and thus fulfill the role of a non-military means of the ‘Strategic Deterrence’ framework. Russian military might think of what I call ‘conflict localization means’ in this paper, popularly known as an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine, a posture of using nuclear weapons to persuade adversaries to cease further military actions in a local conflict. ‘Military Doctrine’ of 2014 and other factors show little evidence of the existence of such a posture, but do not necessarily exclude the possibility. Partly to enhance a nuclear ‘narrative offensive,’ the possibility of use of nuclear weapons as a conflict localization means is made deliberately ambiguous. The Russian military did officially seek to realize the conflict localization means in the 2003 reform document, and debates on this matter continue. The ‘Grom-2019’ military exercise in October 2019 showed a possibility of forming a unified command and control not only of strategic nuclear forces but also of local-level weapons such as Kalibr and Iskander cruise missile systems with nuclear warheads. The issues of the nuclear threshold and strategic stability will depend on further development of forces and doctrines of Russia and the United States.

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2022年2月24日、ロシアが隣国ウクライナに軍事侵攻した。圧倒的な軍事力を背景に、空からのミサイル攻撃と並行し地上軍も進軍させた。当初は首都キーウの陥落も時間の問題とみられた。力による一方的な現状変更にアメリカはじめＧ7各国は強く反発し、経済制裁を強化した。世界各地で反戦デモが行われ、ロシア国内でも反対の声が上がった。 21世紀に起きた侵略戦争を日本のテレビはどう伝えたのだろうか。それをつかむため、報道量の調査を行った。調査対象期間は侵攻初日から最初の停戦交渉が行われた2月28日までの5日間。調査対象はNHKと民放の夜のニュース番組5番組とした。またこの間の、スタジオ解説や中継・リポート、オンライン取材、SNSで発信された映像についても調査・分析を進めた。調査の結果、期間中の報道では戦況や被害、ロシアの思惑、経済制裁に関する報道量が多かったことが分かった。さらにSNS映像が多用され、一連の報道を「ソーシャルメディア時代の戦争報道」と位置付けられることも判明した。 本稿校了時点で戦闘がやむ兆候は見られず、事態は長期化している。今回の調査は侵攻初期に焦点を当てたものだが、戦争報道の全体像をつかむためにはさらに長期間を対象にした調査や過去の戦争報道との比較も重要となる。

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The aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the nature of Russia’s security issues with China by focusing on two areas. Firstly, the study will see examples from Russia’s bilateral security relationship with China. Secondly, the analysis will subsequently provide an overview of the countries’ wider global interests. Resultantly, the article hopes to show that there exists no governing principle per se in Moscow’s relationship with Beijing but rather a cautious case-by-case approach.
Reconciliation over border demarcation, an issue that spilled over into the actual conflict in 1969, has been critical in assuaging security relations between Moscow and Beijing. In their settlements of 1997 and 2004, both China and Russia made significant concessions on this issue despite fierce opposition within each country. This negotiation process was combined with the development of their relationship from reconciliation towards “strategic partnership.” However, Moscow’s efforts were driven by a longstanding desire to remove unstable elements on the border rather than an actual aspiration for greater security cooperation.
Furthermore, Russian arms sales to China were a significant factor in their relationship and did reinforce China’s modern military capabilities especially towards the sea. However, arms trade has declined since 2007, largely due to the changing interests of Russian manufacturers and the Chinese equipment program. An export of RD-93 engines to China was suspended following the claim from a military industry executive that such components would be used in the construction of FC-1 fighters, a major export competitor to Russia’s own MiG-29. A dichotomy therefore exists in Russia between those seeking export income and those who wish to keep Chinese military capability below their own. Interestingly, Russian exports to India, a potential rival to China, are not so constrained.
The first joint military exercise between China and Russia called “Peace Mission 2005” involved thousands of troops and was partly driven by a desire to show power and solidarity. Yet recent military exercises correspond to each country’s practical needs. In the “Peace Mission 2010” joint exercise, China for example focused on long-range flight capabilities. Russia meanwhile devotes more time and resources to joint exercises with former Soviet partners within the Collective Security Treaty Organization than it does with China.
Finally, China and Russia share resistance to Western humanitarian intervention and pressure for democracy yet both countries found it hard to coordinate their opposition efforts in the 1990s due to varying interests. In the late 2000s each of Russia and China increasingly conducted independent foreign policies, confident in their increased international influence. But whilst common interests make both countries take similar approaches, coordination between them remains scant.
In conclusion, the progress of each security issue depends on practical situations related to it rather than an overarching concept between Beijing and Moscow, such as that which used to determine relations during the Cold War. Whilst both share common non-interventionist policies, these are more often sought independently rather than cooperatively. In essence, a deeply embedded fear of China makes Russian bilateral policy cautious, eager not to turn China into a security concern.

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