This paper presents an historical analysis of the policy formation process within the Japanese government regarding the issues of claims between Japan and South Korea (below, “Korea”) for the period from February 1951, the start of the first round of Japan-Korea talks, to October 1953, when the talks were suspended. This paper aims at providing an overview of the Japan-Korea talks from a novel perspective via elucidation of the situation within the Japanese government during the early 1950s—a period mostly blank in previous research. The process of forming concrete policies for relations with Korea during this period in Japan was clarified as described below.
The paper first presents its overview findings, while referencing previous research, of the Japanese government’s negotiation strategies regarding the Japan-Korea claims issue before the Japan-Korea talks officially began, specifically in regards to how these initial strategies impacted the first round of talks. It was during this period when differences in attitudes towards the claims issue surfaced between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and considerations are presented regarding the background for such.
Described next is the formation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the “mutual abandonment of claims ‘plus alpha’” concept around the time that the negotiations became locked and had their first suspension. This included the concept of justifying Japan’s claims on Korea, with both sides then together abandoning their claims, and Japan agreeing to make monetary payments to Korea while avoiding the nomenclature of “claims.” Examination is made of how the processes of discussions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs converged on this idea, with focus on the interactions of the logic of the Asian Affairs Bureau, which viewed foreign relations with Korea as important, international circumstances at that time, and commitments Japan had to the United States.
Finally, in the midst of opposition between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance regarding policy proposals for the Japan-Korea claims issue, clarification is made as to what kind of arguments were presented that led to the Japanese government’s adoption of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ plan as the official policy for negotiating with Korea. The flexible attitude toward Korea by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to its emphasis on international relations was taken up as part of the Japanese government’s initial Korean strategy, and made possible a conceptual framework for government policy proposals that were more suited for mutual agreement. Also, in tandem with the changing international circumstances on the Korean peninsula, Japan could not avoid improving its relations with Korea, and this served to soften the hardline policy stance that the Ministry of Finance had adopted towards Korea.
When one considers the progression of the debates within the Japanese government, most worthy of notice is that Japan did not abandon its original perceptions towards Korea, but rather conceived a solution that had as its premise exclusion of the term “claims” (literally, “the right to make claims”). It is of deep interest that this concept was similar to that inclusive within the solution of the claims issue in 1965 with the adoption of the “economic cooperation” policy in the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

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In January 1955, Prime Minister HATOYAMA Ichiro emphasized that Japan's primary objective is to attain for Japan full independence and self-reliance by pursuing as “independent diplomacy”, while at the same time Japan will adhere its basic principle of close cooperation with the United States. And HATOYAMA sought to adjust its relations with countries with which Japan still does not have diplomatic relations. So, He began Japanese-Soviet negotiations. U. S. Government took the position with the Japanese Government that the United States did not oppose establishment of diplomatic ralations with USSR, because they thought Japan was already an independent nation.
But, U. S government feared that Japan chose the Neutral policy or Anti-American policy. And they are discontented with Japan's attitude toward the national security problems. They thought that Japan did not regard the threat of communism as seriously as did the United States and NATO countries. U. S. Government was irritated by the fact that Japan lacked self-knowledge of their position and responsibility.
U. S. Government suspected whether HATOYAMA cabinet understood the importance and significance of mutual security systems or not. Moreover, they understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was so weak that difference of foreign policy between HATOYAMA and the Foreign ministry became very serious. HATOYAMA's directions to the Foreign ministry was sometimes not transmitted, and HATOYAMA's action did not sometimes coincide with the policy of Foreign ministry.
There were two typical examples. One is Japanese-Soviet negotiations, and the other is Japanese-SouthKorea negotiations. Japanese Government and LDP also understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was very weak and unreliable.
But, U. S. Government could not censure HATOYAMA publicly for his independent diplomacy, because in Japan, the anti-American feeling was growing rapidly by reason of U. S. troops and bases. In March 1956, when Secretary John F. Dulles visited Tokyo, MIKI Bukichi, who was the member of proxy committee of Liberal Democratic Party, said to Dulles, “even a mountain can be undermined and crumble because of ant holes”. MIKI warned Dulles against Japanese anti-American feeling. Indeed, HATOYAMA's independent diplomacy came to a deadlock. Japan failed to negotiate with USSR, South korea. The abuse of veto by USSR and Chinese Taipei prevented Japan from admitting to the United Nations in the 10^th session, December 1955.
So, it was very important for the U. S. Government to make HATOYAMA succeed in his Independent diplomacy. U. S. Government thought that HATOYAMA should resign honourably when Japanese-Soviet negotiation was concluded. It was called “Hanamichiron” in LDP. MIKI Bukichi once said to KISHI Nobusuke, who became Prime Minister in 1957, as follows.
“What is most important is to make HATOAMA resign without injuring his political reputation”.
The cognition of U. S Government was coincided with Japanese one.

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One of the most important reasons why the Japan-Korea conference had taken so long time for 14 years until the conclusion of the treaty, was that both sides had the very different stance about the property claim problems. It was the Ikeda Hayato administration (1960-1964) that led the property claim problems to an agreement. But in those days, nobody thought that it was Ikeda administration's achievement, even though it was criticized as a suspicion.
Post Cold War globalization politics has extended the definition of security to include more than just that of government and military matters to incorporate environmental issues, drugs, refugee problems, as well as economic, resource, energy, and food policy matters. Security, in a word, has become to be defined as comprehensive concept. An examination of postwar Japanese diplomatic policies, however, demonstrates a previous use of this “Post Cold War” phenomenon. During the Ikeda Administration, the prime minister's income doubling plan, for example, represented an attempt to ensure the Japanese Cold War security through increasing the wealth of Japan's citizens.
This paper examines Ikeda administration's security policy regarding the Japan-Korea Conference, in particular the negotiations over the property claim problems. Firstly, it focuses on the administration's setting of the defense budget under its second defense plan to present a survey of Ikeda's security plan. It argues the logic behind compiling of this defense budget to be alignment of defense matters with those of economic concerns.
Secondly, this paper tries to clarify the relations between Japanese security and Korean peninsula, through examining arguments about the situation of Korean peninsula in the National Defense Meeting and contents of Mitsuya Kenkyu.
Thirdly, this paper considers how the United States foreign policy based on the viewpoint of security strategy in the Far East commits to the Japan-Korea conference.
Contrary to previous studies that Ikeda administration's foreign policy toward Korea was developed by pressure of the United States, this paper argues that the Ikeda administration carried out a policy sufficiently taking into consideration Japanese security, and in opposition to pressure by the United States for the earlier resolution of the Japan-Korea conference suggesting limits to U. S. influence on Japan at that time.
Finally, this paper examines this issue in terms of the on-going negotiations for diplomatic normalization between Japan and Korea, in particular the negotiations over the property claim problems, as an example of the role of economic issues in security matters.
Ikeda said that if Korean peninsula is occupied by communist, its circumstances give fatal influence to the Japanese security as indicating her history so far. As indicating Ikeda' speaks, it is not hard to understand that the agreement of the property claim problems had the very important implication to the Japanese security.

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Interaction occurs between the media and public opinion, and understanding content reported by the media and its trends can serve as basic data constituting people’s ideas and opinions, and is useful in investigating social interest and viewpoints. During a games period like the Paralympics, the attraction of the games as well as various details stemming from the games is reported by the media. As the 2020 games approach, this study attempts to examine the kinds of issues identified during the Paralympics period, and changes observed since the 2016 Summer Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. Referring to analyses of three researchers of the Paralympic Research Group, the author systematically categorizes media content of newspaper coverage during the PyeongChang Paralympic Games period and ultimately establishes 11 categories.

Upon calculating the ratios of coverage of these categories in 6 newspaper’s articles, the author determined that the most frequently covered categories during the games period were the “evaluations, analyses and recommendations based on the game results and achievements” and “analyses of game outcomes and technical theories.” There was an increase in the number of articles featuring the results of the Japanese team as well as strong athletes and teams of other countries, and more attention was paid to sports aspects of the games. The performance of Japanese athletes is believed to have prompted the question as to how they could achieve such fine results and to have drawn attention to elite sports measures for improving international competitiveness. Furthermore, throughout the coverage, reporting of “recommendations for the 2020 Tokyo Paralympic Games” was observed, and although some differences between the summer and winter games were noted, many suggestions for the 2020 Tokyo Paralympic Games were evident.

As Japan performed well, a characteristic viewpoint evident in the reporting of the winter sports was the analyses of sports equipment provided by Japanese companies as being precise and sophisticated, such as the development of chair ski technology. The prominent featuring of Japanese “craftsmanship” of manufacturers including SMEs as playing a key role in supporting sports may also be considered characteristics of the winter Paralympic sports.

Furthermore, the training of young athletes and generational change were raised as issues. In this Paralympic games, media coverage featuring the performance of young athletes such as Momoka Muraoka and Gurimu Narita is believed to have resulted in more attention being focused on the training of athletes.

As a result, much of the media coverage focused on the competitiveness of sports in this Paralympic games. This is believed to be due in part to an attempt in the media to pay attention not only to “how athletes are overcoming their disabilities to tackle sports” but also to convey the attraction of the Paralympics as sports. Meanwhile, it is considered that discussion concerning the uniqueness of the Paralympic games, the importance of conveying their essence, and the media’s stance on the Paralympic games will continue in the future without placing undue emphasis on the exact same content as the Olympic games.

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