In the People’s Republic of China, the Criminal Procedure Code was revised on October 26, 2018. In China, RENZUIRENFA system, the judgment by default system and the prompt decision procedure were introduced by this revision. As for this report, an exegesis does the Chinese revised Criminal Procedure Code from these three systems. The defendant confesses it about own criminal act, and there is not an objection about a crime fact pointed out, and RENZUIRENFA system is the system that it is tolerant and processes by law when I agree about the assessment of a case. It is a system of so-called plea bargaining. The prompt decision procedure must conclude a hearing for a person agreeing to RENZUIRENFA and the application of the prompt decision procedure as a general rule for (when you may be sentenced to penal servitude more than one year less than 15 days) for less than ten days on a case acceptance day of the court and must start judgment in the court which you examined. And when the judgment by default system is a crime of the national crime and terrorist activity to harm serious safely that the best People prosecution House ratified when it is necessary to let a trial go promptly in the case of a corruption bribe crime, evidence is certain, and a crime suspect and defendants are enough when I am abroad and are the system that can submit an indictment for people method House when you should investigate a criminal liability by law even if the defendant is absent.

About RENZUIRENFA system and the prompt decision procedure, it was taken effect before Criminal Procedure Code revision experimentally in some cities. Therefore, in this report, I examine the statistics documents of the experimental enforcement. A limit points out the point that there is not the rule in the text is very plain, and what kind of crime RENZUIRENFA system in particular is applied to about the point that I can interpret, the prompt decision procedure in this report even how. And an application is done about the penalty used for political oppression about RENZUIRENFA system and the prompt decision procedure in the district enforced experimentally. Therefore, political oppression and a crime to get will point out the aggressive evaluation in future from a point to have possibilities to let a trial progress without an investigation and public speaking in China that hard to please. And I point out that I can read it when I take an opportunity of the public speaking away from the defendant because the case by the circumstances of the government “to have to let a trial go promptly” applies about the judgment by default system.

And this report settles a conclusion as follows. It is said, “there was the agreement of the defendant” formally by RENZUIRENFA system, and there will be possibility to have that a criminal trial is over in future without letting others inspect the contents of the criminal trial by a prompt decision procedure. In other words, I can impose punishment on the defendant if said, “the defendant agreed to RENZUIRENFA” without stopping by to real evidence. Furthermore, I became able to let a criminal trial progress without giving the defendant the opportunity of the argument by a judgment by default system and a judgment, “it was necessary to let a trial go promptly”. The revised Criminal Procedure Code of 2018 goes away from human rights security when I generalize it.

インターネット管理は中国政府が高度に重視している領域である。本文は中国政府のインターネット管理の基本制度に基づき，インターネット管理下における政府権力と国民の個人のインターネット権益の状況を考察した。そして中国政府が行った一連の法制度整備により，政府のインターネット管理の能力は最大限に拡大した代わりに国民個人の電子情報活動の権益が縮小されたことが分かった。これら制度の整備は，一般的な社会管理の意義をもつだけでなく，中国政府の情報通信技術の応用に対する選択にも重大な影響を与えている。本文では，政府のインターネット権力が大幅に増大する一方，国民個人の電子情報活動の権益への充分な保障が相対的に難しくなる状況下，中国政府の情報化政策は技術発展と社会全般の発展とのバランスを考慮し，技術の硬直化が社会進歩に与える不利な影響を防止することが必要であると考える。

One of the problems that an authoritarian leader will face is that of power sharing with regime insiders; there is a dilemma in when and how much power is shared. This paper explores the institutionalization of judicial function as a solution to this problem through the case of the Administrative Procedure Law (APL) in China revealing how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) institutionalized the “democratic” function of the People’s Court to control regime insiders. Previous work has explained that the CCP aimed to normalize the relationships between the Party and the government, and between the upper and lower government, by installing the APL which has often been recognized as a fire-alarm system. However, the benefits of such a system cannot be expected under the CCP’s political system. The specific research question here is why the CCP focused on judicial function to supervise the administrative organs of government. As such, this paper first considers the political circumstances of the CCP when it began to develop the APL. Under Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “Democracy and Legality” from 1978, the CCP encouraged regime insiders to develop a legal sensibility with the idea of supervising them by judicial means. The CCP particularly emphasized the supervision of the administrative organ by the citizen which required the “democratic” function of the People’s Court. Second, this paper explores the personnel administration of the Political-Legal Committee to analyze how the CCP worked to establish an environment that avoided conflict with regime insiders during the law-making process. For example, the Committee started evaluating a person who held a position in the legislature or judicial branch therefore it reflects to weakening the influence of public security. Third, the paper explains the legislative process of the APL as an example of how the CCP resolved conflict with regime insiders. The CCP constantly claimed that the administrative branch must follow the law and emphasized the role of the People’s Court; this attitude was summarized in the APL which regime insiders could not refuse because the CCP stressed supervision from the citizenry. According to the paper’s analysis, it is concluded that the CCP, in developing the APL, was attempting to obtain control of regime insiders while emphasizing the “democratic” function of the People’s Court to avoid or resolve conflict.