“The end of the Cold War” could be paraphrased as “the revolution to U. S. -Soviet Joint Action” in regards to their policies towards the Korean Peninsula, recalling that the tragedy of the national division of Korea was brought about by the failure of “U. S. -Soviet Joint Action”. This meant the so-called “Cross Contact” in a situation where the enmity between North and South Korea transcended that between the U. S. and Soviet Union. The new international environment eventually resulted in the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and Soviet Union. Accordingly, the comprehensive security framework in Asia and Pacific advocated by Gorbachev was largely localized, for Roh Tae-woo's initiatives for Nordpolitik were accompanied by proposals for an international conference regionally defined within Northeast Asia.
Roh Tae-woo's address before the U. N. General Assembly in 1988 signified an attempt to improve the inter-Korean relations. Roh, in his address, proposed to adopt a “nonaggression declaration” within “the framework of mutual trust and security”. For the declaration to have the effect of a formal nonaggression pact, the proposed framework would have to be defined in concrete measures.
In spite of Seoul's new initiative, however, there can be no real hope for advancing inter-Korean relations as long as North Korea sticks to the Tripartite Talks within which the North regards the talks between Pyongyang-Washington as the prerequisites for progress in unification issues. The policy speech made by Kim Il-sung in May 1990 was highly significant in that Pyongyang dropped its insistence on the Tripartite Talks.
Moreover, North Korea unveiled a disarmament proposal incorporating a number of measures for mutual confidence building. North Korea's plan was principally concerned with taking direct actions on the adoption of a nonaggression declaration and on phasing large-scale military cutback. But confidence-building measures, as South Korea is aware, are not intended to bring about automatic military cutbacks.
Although efforts to improve inter-Korean relations resulted in the commencement of High-level Talks, disparities remain unsolved even after the adoption of the comprehensive North-South accord. The actual accord, for example, endorsed Seoul's position emphasizing the implementation of confidence-building measures on the one hand, and endorses Pyongyangs' insistance on reducing armaments on the other.
The North-South accord provides a case where the European experience should be applied, localized though it may be, in that the accord has comprehensive contents as seen in the CSCE. North and South Korean are supposed to seek for a sort of bargaining with the main agenda moving within the framework.

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The admission of South and North Korea to the United Nations is one of the unresolved issues around the Korean Peninsula. Although the issue has not been the major topic, it still maintains its meaning as the present and future topic while most of other issues have only historical meaning.
1. Application by South and North Korea in 1949 and 1951
In 1949, South and North Korea applied for the membership of the United Nations. Each of them asserted that it be the only legitimate government representing the interest of the whole Korean people.
The admission of North Korea was not even adopted as an agenda of the Security Council. The admission of South Korea, on the other hand, was rejected by the veto of the Soviet Union at the final stage.
2. Package Deal and the Admission of South and North Korea
Package deal was a kind of compromise between the Western and the Soviet blocks made by admitting the membership of allies of the Western and Soviet blocks all at once.
In the latter half of 1950s the issue of the admission of South and North Korea was dealt with in the context of the package deal. In 1955 the membership of South Korea failed to obtain support even from some of its allies since they feared that it might destroy the almost reached compromise of the admission of other sixteen States. On the contrary, the membership of South Korea was supported even by the Soviet Union in 1957 and, 1958 on the condition that the membership of North Korea also be admitted simultaneously.
3. Seven-Point Declaration for Peace and Unification on June 23, 1973, and the Admission of South and North Korea
On June 23, 1973, President Park made the Seven-Point Declaration for Peace and Unification and declared therein that South Korea would not object to its own admission to the United Nations together with North Korea provided that it would not cause hindrance to the unification of Korea. In response, however, North Korea made public its objection to the admission of the two Koreas in the Five-Point Program for National Reunification.
In June and September, 1975, South Korea urged the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures for its admission with its new policy mentioned above. The Security Council, however, did not adopt the application of South Korea even as its agenda. The Soviet Union obtained one third of the votes in the Security Council, which enabled the Soviet Union to reject the membership of South Korea without using its veto. It reflected the change in the power balance in the United Nations beginning in 1960s.
After 1975 the situation around the admission of South and North Korea does not seem to have changed.

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Germination of South Korea's ‘Nordpolitik’ was first evidenced by Park's declaration on June 23rd 1973 of ‘Special Statement on the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.’ The main political background of the declaration could be attributed to the friction in the U. S. -R. O. K. relationship symbolized by Nixon's gradual reduction plan of U. S. forces in South Korea.
South Korea's positive posture towards the North-South dialogue and its appeasement to the communist nations emerged as a result of South Korea's insecurity. In this process, the South Korean government enlarged the concept of the ‘non-hostile communist nations’ to include the P. R. C. and U. S. S. R., which was accompanied by growing tolerance of North Korea's participation in the debate of the Korean question and its affiliation in the United Nations.
As a consequence, South Korea was not able to adhere to the U. N. resolution 195-[III] any longer owing to the growing international status of North Korea and the realization of the P. R. C.'s representation in the United Nations. Therefore, Park's declaration was coupled with the apeasement towards the P. R. C. and U. S. S. R. by renouoncing its assertion as the sole legitimate government in the Korean Peninsula.
Around the time of Park's declaration, South Korean government, which left out of the aegis of the U. N., shared in part some of the U. S. S. R.'s view regarding the settlement of the Korean question. On the one hand, unofficial contact between South Korea and U. S. S. R. would be one of the aspect of ‘Asian Collective Security System’ offered by Brezhnev.
On the other side, at that time, P. R. C. began to give vent to the inability to achieve political rapproachment to R. O. K., since the P. R. C.'s recognition of ‘The Two Koreas’ formula, would be related to ‘The Two Chinas’ formula.
The subtle relationship R. O. K.'s relationship with P. R. C. and U. S. S. R. in the early 70s could be said as the archetype of the South Korea's ‘Nordpolitik’,

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This essay reviews the Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula in the 80s from the view point of a Chinese scholar.
The situation around the Korean Peninsula now is at an important and historical turning point. After 80s, the relationship between North and South Korea is to improve to some extent. In the dialogues newly started in the 80s, the North and South leaders have tried to take their advantage over the opponent, and have changed their policies toward each other. These policy changes are appreciated as the efforts to relieve the tension in the Korean Peninsula. These changes were caused by two factors. The one is international situations, which are detente between the U. S. and Soviet, the normalization of Sino-Soviet relation, the good relations maintained between the U. S. -China and Japan-China, and the probability of improvement of the Japan-Soviet relation, etc. These are international factors. The other is internal affairs, which are the equality of South and North Korean gross national powers, economic developments both in the North and South, and internal problems still to be solved in both, etc. These are internal factors that would promote an improvement of the political situation around the Korean Peninsula. These changes will likely affect the situation around the Korean Peninsula.
The situation around the Korean Peninsula has a dual character. On the one hand, peace and stability are being maintained in the Peninsula, and on the other, there are many factors to instabilize the situation. At the same time, it is a present trend that the Korean problems have become those of Koreanization, whereas adjacent big countries still keep strong influences upon the Korean problem. This dual character will eventually affect the future situations around the Korean Peninsula.
The basic stance of China's foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula is to maintain the peaceful and stable situation of this area, and this will be the benefits to the North and South Korea and to China as well. China is one of the powerful agents to promote to improve the situation and to maintain peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. And China will surely pay her efforts for the purpose to the extent of not interfaring the Korean internal affairs.

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The Allied Nations publically announced their intentions to establish Korean independence through the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. Furthermore, the Allied Powers decided to apply trusteeship in Korea and not to land their forces for combat. Japan, on the other hand, in order to encounter the American-Soviet joint attack in Korea, increased military strength there while inducing the Koreans to cooperate with Japan in her war aims by improving their treatment and allowing them a certain amount of privilege to participate in politics.
Soviet troops invaded northeastern Korea immediately after the declaration of war against Japan. The Soviet participation in the war brought about U. S. -U. S. S. R. joint occupation of Korea for the purpose of demilitarization of the Japanese troops in Korea, establishing the 38th parallel as a border line between the two occupation armies. On the last day of the war the Secretary-General of the Government-Genreal in Korea invited the cooperation of a Korean leader, Yo Wun-hyong, in maintaining law and order. Yo organized the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, and directed the people through his organization.
The Soviet troops which invaded northern Korea organized Korean People's Committees in each province and took over administrative power from the Japanese. The American troops, meanwhile, carried out a ceremony of the signing of surrender in in Seoul with the Japanese, and established the United States Army Military Government in (USAMGIK), patterned after the Japanese Government-General in Korea. Since then, both North and South Korean regimes carried out a separation process between Japan and Korea, involving repatration of Japanese nationals, and take-over of Japanese property. Meanwhile, approximately 1, 500, 000 Koreans returned home from Japan, leaving some 500, 000 behind.
Three years after the liberation of Korea, there emerged two independent nations in Korea, one in the North and the other in the South. After three years and eight months since the emergence of the two regimes in Korea, the Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and the Allied Powers, recognizing the independence of Korea.

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