従来、西晋末の永嘉の乱については、五胡十六国史・北魏前史の観点から研究が進められてきたが、五胡諸族の主体的な発言・行動に注目した研究が多く、当時彼らと戦っていた晋朝系勢力との角逐を踏まえ、彼らの行動を相対的に把握するという視点に乏しかった。本稿では、五胡と晋朝系勢力の相克の過程を、厳密な編年と史料批判により復元し、永嘉の乱の実像を解明することを目指した。
西晋と戦った劉淵・石勒らは、乱の初期においては晋朝系勢力に圧倒されており、とりわけ西晋の并州刺史劉琨は、南方の劉淵（漢）を終始圧迫し続けていた。劉淵は劉琨の圧力に押される形で南方への進出（遷都）を行わなければならなくなったが、それを継続すればいずれ西晋の首都洛陽にぶつかることが避けられなくなった際に、漢の皇帝を自称し、西晋打倒の姿勢を最終的に明確化し、洛陽に進攻した。しかし折から洛陽に帰還した越に撃破され、劉淵は死去してしまい、西晋側はこれが契機となって劉琨―越による対漢挟撃戦略がはからずも形成される。以後の漢はこの挟撃戦略の克服が課題となったが、このときより晋朝系勢力の越からの離反などの動揺が続き、また越の洛陽からの出鎮・死去など、洛陽からの戦力流出が続出したため、挟撃戦略は弱体化し、永嘉5年（311年）に漢の攻撃により、洛陽が陥落した。北方の劉琨も漢の攻撃により撃破され、挟撃戦略は破綻することとなった。
以上の経緯から、永嘉の乱は必ずしも劉淵ら胡族の主体的な戦略や、西晋に対する一貫した優位により進んだのではなく、自勢力内外の軍事的・政治的環境に左右された結果であったことが判明した。

抄録全体を表示

本稿は, 中国6世紀最大の詩人ともいわれる北周の使信の作品を通して, 南朝の帝都建康にあり当時を代表する園林の一つであった東宮の園林や, 北朝の帝都長安にあったらしい彼自身の住居な、どについて基礎的な考察を試みるものである。建康の東宮の園林は「池平樹古」の趣があるいわゆる「池と築山の園林」であったらしい。また, 彼は,「小園賦」において, 自らの住居を周囲とは異なる次元に存在する居住空間のごとく説いており注目される。

抄録全体を表示

This article examines the context in which the Qing Dynasty placed the relationship between the kingdom of Annam's Tay Son Dynasty and pirates during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in order to show how China legitimized its diplomatic policy when an existing tributary fell and a new one was established. After the Tay Son Dynasty was granted tributary status in 1789, the relationship between Annam and pirates was regarded as a problem by China; but for a number of reasons, the Qing Dynasty avoided bringing the problem to Annam's attention so as not to raise tension between the two kingdoms. However, when China recognized in 1801 that the Tay Son Dynasty was going to collapse, the Qing government accused Annam of instigating piracy in order to legitimize that fall. Then in 1802, when the king of the new Nguyen Dynasty petitioned for tributary status, China granted it on the grounds that Annam was cooperating in dealing with pirates. Within the process of such a policy change, the Qing Dynasty's emphasis on a failing Tay Son Dynasty's relations with pirates extended from actual fact, while in its dealings with the new Nguyen Dynasty, nothing but praise was lavished upon it in dealing with piracy. In both cases, the existence of pirates was used to legitimize China's attitude towards Annam; and from the related documentation, it should be concluded that such legitimization was solely a domestic matter within the Qing court, not diplomatic. Therefore, from the above process, China's basic policy of nonmilitary intervention in Vietnam after its unsuccessful attempt to do so in 1789 was consistent, but was legitimized for different reasons, and pronouncements regarding the intimate relationship that existed between Annam and pirates was none other than an attempt to legitimize diplomatic policy within the Qing court.

抄録全体を表示

At Present an important theme in historical research of the Han dynasty is how the nature of the state's power in the Qin-Han Imperial Period known as personal rule was determined by two sets of production relations. That is, the production relations between the state and the peasantry 小農民 -production relations of the peasantry and the production relations of Powerful Clans versus domestic slaves and Jiazuomin 仮作民 -production relations of Powerful Clans. This article takes the production relations of the former as the dominating relations of production which have the realization of personal rule as a premise. Production relations of the latter are considered from the viewpoint of the regionality of the power of Powerful Clans that have been prescribed as production relations of a secondry nature by the former. An arrangement according to the Jun Xian 郡県 administrative divisions of the distribution of the surnames "Daxing 大姓" and "Haoxing 豪姓" recorded in the literature, and of the surnames that can be recognized as and presumed to be a continuing lineage in the Former and Later Han period, has revealed that there were three regional characteristics of Powerful Clans in the Han dynasty. First, Guandong 関東, Jianghuai 江淮, and Bashu 巴蜀) were the regions where the break up of communal society and the growth of Powerful Clans as great landowners was conspicuous. The growth of local Powerful Clans could not be confirmed in Guanzhong 関中 or the Jun 郡 on the border regions in the north and south. Powerful Clans in Guanzhong and the Jun on the northern border regions were moved to the Lingyi 陵巴 and national boundary districts situated in the channel irrigation regions as a link in the policy of suppressing Powerful Clans. Second, there was a concentration of Powerful Clans in the Old Xian 旧県 that orignated from Yi 巴 communal society in the Guan-dong 関東 and Jianghuai 江淮 regions where the growth of local Powerful Clans power was most marked. Third, there was a time difference between the growth of Powerful Clans in regional areas. It took place in the three regions in the following sequence Guandong, Jianghuai and then Bashu. In particular, attention should be paid to the second characteristic. That is to say, we cannot understand it as the growth of Powerful Clans from the disengagement of the peasantry which in turn came out of the dissolution of communal society. The management of the peasantry arose as the dominating relations of production in the New Xian 新県 which were established by the power of the state after the Warring States period. On the other hand, we should consider the Powerful Clans as secondary production relations in the Old Xian 旧県 that grew out of the disintegration of the Yi 巴 communal society.

抄録全体を表示

This article attempts to elucidate institutions of imperial rule under the Han 漢 dynasty by examining the way in which the Later Han developed the Former Han's political system formed from the reign of Wudi 武帝 onwards and describing the structure of the political system that was created as a result. In order to resolve these issues, the author discusses the spatial relationship between the workplace and living space of the emperor and empress dowager and the workplaces of their officials, while throwing into relief the structure of the political system of the Later Han, in an attempt to present the process behind its formation in visual form. He then goes on to examine the realities of imperial institutions with respect to the three aspects of government organization, political history, and political space. Beginning with Wudi, the emperors of the Former Han attempted to exercise their rule by stationing a group of close aides, known as officials of the Inner Court (neichao guan 内朝官), within the area of the imperial palace where the emperors themselves resided. These officials were entrusted with both policymaking and document-based communications. However, imperial in-laws seized control of these Inner Court officials and began to exercise enormous power, leading eventually to Wang Mang's 王莽 usurpation of the throne. In response to this turn of events, the emperors of the Later Han scaled down and restructured their group of close aides, in order to prevent governance centred upon officials of the Inner Court and thus strengthen their own system of rule. In addition, they transferred responsibility for policymaking and document-based communications to officials whose main place of work was outside the imperial palace (either in their own offices or in the Outer Court (waichao 外朝, i.e., conference halls). These officials included the three dukes (sangong 三公), military generals (jiangjun 将軍 the nine chamberlains (jiuqing 九卿), and the imperial secretariat (shangshutai 尚書台). In light of the above developments, the author suggests that the Later Han was not a dynasty that blindly took over the Former Han's system of imperial rule in situ, but was rather one that reorganized in a major way the political system engineered by its predecessor in a search for new imperial institutions. However, the author recognizes that although the political reorganization described here did have a short-term effect in strengthening the system of imperial rule, it was not necessarily very effective in the long term, since from the very outset the whole system itself already contained within it serious contradictions.

抄録全体を表示

In the fourth month of Zhongdatong 中大通 3(531), about thirty years after the Qi 斉 dynasty of the Southern Dynasties had been replaced by the Liang 梁 and at a time when the realm was at peace, the emperor Xiao Yan 蕭衍 (Wudi 武帝) was confronted with the question of choosing a successor. His eldest son Xiao Tong 薫統 (Zhaoming Taizi 昭明太子), the crown prince, had died suddenly at the early age of thirty one. At the time, the major contender for the position of successor to the throne was considered to be Xiao Tong's eldest son Xiao Huan 蕭歓. But after the position of crown prince had been left vacant for about three months, it was to much surprise Wudi's third son Xiao Gang 蕭綱 -Xiao Tong's uterine brother and the subsequent emperor Jian-wen-di 簡文帝 who was designated crown prince by Wudi. This deviated from the principles of the contemporary inheritance system, and it has generally been considered that this investiture of Xiao Gang as crown prince, which caused popular disquiet, had its origin in antagonism between Wudi and Xiao Tong and became one of the causes of the political upheavals towards the end of the Liang. But it can hardly be said that there has until now been adequate discussion of Wudi's intentions in reaching what was an extremely important political decision, namely, the nomination of crown prince. In this article, I undertake an analysis of the background to this incident and examine the reasons for Xiao Gang's investiture as crown prince. In doing so, I ascertain the nature of the institution of crown prince from the Qin 秦 and Han 漢 through to the Northern and Southern Dynasties and touch on the characteristics of the institution of crown prince during the Southern Dynasties. I do this because it is to be supposed that, through an examination of the background to and characteristics of this political question, some light may be shed on the distinctive nature of the crown prince during the Six Dynasties and also on the historical position in which crown princes found themselves in ancient China.

抄録全体を表示

In the Present article, the author begins with a comparison of the descriptions of the Wei 魏 dynasty contained in Zhushu Jinian 竹書紀年, which form the framework for its Warring States period section, and the partial content of Weishijia 魏世家 in the Shiji 史記, discovering that before kings appeared in the Yellow River basin during the Warring States period, the first year of the era of each king or feudal lord was recorded according to the linian 立年 chengyuan 称元 method, that is, from the year the previous king or lord died. Through this investigation the author was able to verify for each chronicle that (1)we can rely on the Shiji items indicating eras and deaths of kings, except when there are inconsistencies with the Zhushu Jinian ; (2)a transition from the linian, method to the yunian 踰年 cheng yuan method of using the following year occurred at the time when the kingdoms of the Yellow River basin adopted titles for their kings; and (3)Sima Qian 司馬遷, in order to solve the problem of repetitive eras that arose from his understanding of linian in terms of yunian, deleted royal accession years and kings lacking concrete documentation. From an investigation of the chronicles related to Wei Wenhou 魏文侯 and Tianji Huangong 田斉桓公, the author concludes that the periodization scheme contained in the Zhushu Jinian did not distinguish between the linian and yunian methods. Therefore, he was able to get satisfactory results using the Suoin 索隠 interpretation (which was based on the yunian method). However, the Chu 楚 kingdom, which had used its king's title from the Spring and Autumn period, did not change its chengyuan method accordingly. This is also probably true for the Zhou 周 kingdom as Well from the time it defeated the Shang 商, and the Yue 越 kingdom from the Spring and Autumn period. In addition, Sima Qian made mistakes in arranging some dates of royal accession even after the general diffusion of the yunian method and the use of titles (for example, King Xiangai 襄哀 of the Wei dynasty, and Kings Wei 威 and Xuanmin 宣〓 of the Ji 斉 dynasty). This is because many of the source materials Sima used were from this latter period, when it was difficult to distinguish individuals simply referred to as Wang 王, Weiwang 魏王 or Jiwang 斉王, for example. Sima Qian, used a number of important historical events as his standard for revising and editing these materials, and thus presented his own unique interpretations of them. In order to overcome the contradictions that occurred as the result of mounting errors in chengyuan dating, Sima simply deleted a few kings and accession dates here and there in constructing his chronology of the Six Dynasties. However, now that we can see how and why concrete historical facts were left out of Sima's record, we should be able to reconstruct a more accurate chronolosy of all the documents contained in the Shiji's Benji 本紀 and Shijia 世家. Nevertheless, the chronology reconstructed by the author in this paper confronts the difficulty of adequately arranging all of the above-mentioned important events which Sima probably added later to his Six Dynasties chronology. Since all these events are recorded as involving several kingdoms, as long as the era they are baased on is not mistaken, they should pose no problem to reconstructing the chronolology. May be it is necessary to arrange in the new chronology items contained in the Zhushu Jinian that could not be used in reconstructing the framework, because they either were not dated or interpreted in relation to a certain era. Here the author cautions about possible differences in calendars among the various kingdoms. The present article thus constitutes the starting point for the necessary task of re-investigating the extant Chuuqiu 春秋 records according the yunian chengyuan method of dating eras.

抄録全体を表示

During the Six Dynasties period, particularly the Southern Dynasties, the fact known as "the Distinction between Shih 士 (Scholars) and Shu 庶 (Commoners)" is conspicuous. This fact is found in the various aspects of the society : marriage, social intercourse, official appointment, implication in penal law, corvee obligation, the education system and criminal law. This paper is an attempt to explain one part of the special characteristics of the State and its social structure during the Six Dynasties period by a study of these distinctions. "The Distinction between Shih and Shu" can be divided into two types. One type has the social position of the individual and the clan as its standard. Discriminations in marriage and social intercourse belong to this type. The other type takes the existence of political privileges of the individual and the clan as its standard. Differences in treatment before criminal law and with respect to corvee obligations, etc., belong to this type. These facts, then, permit us to suppose that there were two aspects to the Shih and Shu. Conclusively speaking, the Shih and Shu fundamentally existed as social groups. In local village society, once a person was rated among villagers as being fit to become a bureaucrat, he obtained Hsiang-P'in 郷品 (the qualification for bureaucratic rank) and was included among the group of bureaucratic candidates. Though the majority of them were soon to become bureaucrats, even if this was not the case, people who had obtained Hsiang-P'in had a special existence in local village society. In their own time or after the accumulation of such individuals in the family lineage, these people formed the special social group, that is, Shih. The group of villagers who were excluded from this group was called Shu. Thus, the authority of the Emperor did not interfere at all with the formation of a status group called Shih or Shu. Therefore they may be said to be social groups. The Shih and Shu that constituted such social status groups had a strictly differentiated existence as members of local village society. The Shih and Shu, however, were not distinguished in this way as subjects of the Emperor. This was due to the fact that obligations and privileges due as Imperial subjects were given out by Imperial authority, and that in making such grants both groups alike as subjects were in principle subject to the same treatment. Furthermore, it was because these obligations and privileges were granted on the basis of whether the person was an Imperial bureaucrat or not. Thus, at this point, a status order with bureaucratic rank as its momentum was formed and it was also known as Shih and Shu. From its organization we can say that it was the Shih and Shu as a political rank. These types of Shih and Shu were not perfectly mutually corresponding, but were completely separate heterogeneous groups, yet at the same time they were reciprocally regulated. In particular, the formation of Shih and Shu as political rank was strongly regulated by the existence of Shih and Shu as social group. For this reason the political ruling structure with the authority of the Emperor at the apex had to make this social class system inherent, and the result of that was to have a stratified structure that corresponded with the social class system. The conspicuousness of "the Distinction between Shih and Shu" was determined by this historical nature : in the Six Dynasties period, there was a strengthened and actualized Social class system and the Imperial authority, while internalizing the system, had to build up the political ruling structure. Subsequently the special characteristics of the aristocracy in the Southern Dynasties period owe much to such a historical nature.

抄録全体を表示