In August 1935, Colonel Ishihara Kanji was appointed Chief of the Plans and Policy Division of the Army General Staff, and produced his concept of a grand politico-military strategy for Japan. This was the “Hokushin, Nanshin” (First North, then South) concept, and called for first focusing northwards and denying Soviet Russia's ambitions in Manchuria and northern China and excluding the British from east Asia, after which preparations for the expected decisive war in the south with the United States would be carried out. The Navy, however, opposed Ishihara's concept, because it felt Japan should concentrate on preparing for the war with the U. S. It expected to fight over control of the Pacific, and produced its own concept, which was “Hold in the north, and advance in the south.”
The highest authorities of the Army and Navy eventually jointly produced the “Kokusaku Taiko” (National Policy Guidelines), which called for concentrating simultaneously northwards and southwards, thus basically resolving none of the differences between the Army and Navy, and also the Third Revision of the National Defense Policy, which called for a short, decisive war against one opponent at a time in case of war. Since Ishihara could not agree with these plans, he submitted his own concept, mentioned above, as the “Kokubo Kokusaku Taiko” (National Defense and Political Policy), which called for the Army to direct the development of the military industrial capabilities necessary under Ishihara's plan in Armycontrolled Manchuria. This would enable Ishihara to realize his plans through the Army's efforts alone.
In March 1937, however, Ishihara's supporters in the General Staff and Army Ministry were transferred out, and Ishihara himself was transferred after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident in July. As a result, Ishihara's plan faded away without being realized.

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本論は、宗教研究史の視点から、トルコ学者の大久保幸次が所長を務めた回教圏研究所について、昭和前期のイスラーム研究史における意義と位置付けを試みたい。日本のイスラーム研究は、一九三七年の日中戦争勃発を機に組織化され、「大東亜共栄圏」建設を目的として、複数の機関で調査研究された。一九三八年に大久保は、小林元や松田壽男と共に回教圏攷究所を創設した。一九四〇年回教圏研究所と改称後、一九四五年の敗戦で解散した。しかし戦後以降、昭和前期のイスラーム研究は、国策や時局と結び付いて研究された側面だけが語られ、その全般的な研究史が軽視されてきた傾向があった。だが回教圏研究所の活動を検証すると、大久保は大正期よりトルコやイスラームを研究し、研究所からは戦後も活躍する中東研究者を輩出したなど、研究史上において重要な意味を持つ研究機関であることがわかるのである。

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The Interdepartmental Liaison Conference on Anti-Comintern and Counterintelligence Measures (hereafter, "the Conference") was established as a working-level conference in July, 1937, on the initiative of the Police Security Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was one of a number of committees and other such entities arising at that time, outside the process of administrative reform. Other participants in the Conference were the Ministries of the Army, Navy, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Finance, Justice, Colonial Affairs and Education, the Bureau of Resources and the Bureau for Manchurian Affairs, the Committee on Intelligence, and Military Police Headquarters. Records are extant for four meetings of the Conference ; and there may only have been four. The Conference's existence was secret. The objective of this essay is twofold : First, by examining the structure and function of the Conference, the author delineates the actual measures undertaken in the exercise of its dual mandate. Secondly, the author attempts to place within a larger political context conditions obtaining within the Ministries of the Army and Home Affairs, which played leading roles in the exchange of information, etc., within the Conference. Among the Army representatives to the Conference was Iwakuro Hideo, who had been instrumental in the preparation of the Military Secrets Act reform bill recently submitted in the Diet. In Conference deliberations as well, the Army addressed chiefly matters relating to counterintelligence, seeking comprehensive measures for the preservation of military secrets even after passage of the reform bill. Previously, in the 69th Diet, deliberations on a General Mobilization and Preservation of Secrets Act, based on a concept of national security broadly defined, had ended inconclusively. Subsequent efforts to pass a Military Secrets Act reform bill represented a retreat to a concept of national security narrowly defined in accordance with the prerogative of supreme command. One may surmise that the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry, which was in charge of counterintelligence, saw the Conference as providing some compensation for this policy retreat. From the point of view of the Home Ministry, the original proponent of the Conference, it would appear that the Conference was envisioned as a Trojan horse for the standing committee provided for under Section III of the Protocol to the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact. This was denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but may nevertheless be inferred from the subsequent dispatch to Rome of a Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs with the objective of establishing just such a committee. The committee was never in fact established. The Conference thus provides a perspective on the ineffectiveness of the Anti-Comintern Pact. A further point of interest is that among the other governmental agencies represented in the Conference, the Ministries of Communication, Justice and Education, and some others, thanks to current administrative reforms, had parallel sections perfectly suited to participation in the Conference, and participated actively. The Conference was succeeded by a Committee on Counterintelligence established in December, 1938 ; a consideration of that committee will be undertaken in a separate article.

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Nagata Tetsuzan is known as one of the leading figures of the Imperial Army after Manchurian incident. However, it can be said that the full- scale research on him has not been done yet. The author has interpreted so far Nagata's visions and policies during 1920s and Manchurian incident. This paper focuses on the period from April 1932 to August 1933 while he was chief of the intelligence divisions of the general staff to explore what Nagata was thinking particularly in 1933. Those are the times when a committee was organized among chief officials in the war ministry, which brought about contentions between two factions of army officers; the Imperial Way group (Kohdoh-ha) and the Control Faction (Tohsei-ha). And furthermore, during that time, Nagata and his group were clearly coming out with their political stance towards the movement of national reconstruction by younger military officers. This period historically has a significant meaning.

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This article takes up the issue of how a region (Huabei) was formed in parts of northern China under military occupation as the result of what Japan referred to as a "incident" (jihen 事変), also known as the undeclared 2nd Sino-Japanese War, taking up the case of that region's educational policy and institutions. The question of what influence the fact that war was never declared (prior to the involvement of the World War II Allied Forces) exerted on the governance of Huabei has not been given much attention in the research to date, despite that fact that it is an important factor when examining the characteristic features of the Japanese occupation. In order to demonstrate that importance, the author takes up how education was administered throughout Huabei and the problems posed for third country operated schools. To begin with, in order to continue its military activities in Huabei it was critical for Japan to explain its aggression as a "incident" short of declaring war on China, not only to implement military rule by the North China Area Army (NCAA), but also to legitimize the full scale adoption of the rules of engagement without giving third countries the impression of Japan's intention to open full scale hostilities. Consequently, a government was set up in Huabei manned by Chinese nationals assisted by Japanese advisors under the supervision of the NCAA. This kind of indirect governance affected every attempt to administer education in the region, which took priority over every other aspect of governance (food supply, resource allocation, the maintenance of public order, due to its importance in training indigenous subaltern personnel acquiescent to de facto Japanese rule over the region. However, the "incident" was bound to cause serious friction between the occupation authorities and the interests of third country (US, German, ect.) nationals who continued to reside in the occupied territory. In particular, trouble arose between the occupation authorities and institutions of higher learning operated by third country nationals over issues ranging from acceptance of the new occupation order to the recruitment of the elite who were earmarked as the region's future leaders. While the occupation authorities applied pressure on third country high schools through their mobilization of Japanese teachers and introduction of Japanese customs, the foreigners resisted through diplomatic channels between their home countries and Japan, succeeding in preserving both their social prestige and popularity. It was in this way that the necessity of treating the 2nd Sino-Japanese War as a "incident" made it impossible for the Japanese Army to take direct control over administering occupied Huabei, enabled third countries to retain their interests under the occupation and thus significantly restrained the Japanese occupation of China until the outbreak of the Pacific War.

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