The aim of this article is to reconsider the motives of Germany's declaration of war on the United States by examining the talks between Japan and Germany over the conclusion of the “no-separate-peace” treaty in November/December 1941.
The Japanese cabinet led by Hideki Tojo was on the one hand making its last efforts to conclude some agreement with Washington, but on the other preparing to re-approach Germany in case the negotiation across the Pacific broke up. In late November Japan asked Germany unofficially if they would conclude a treaty, that prohibited making a separate peace with Britain or the United States, and if it would open war against the United States in case Japan entered first.
Although there is no document that shows directly how Hitler reacted to this Japanese inquiry, telegrams in the Magic documents and in the archive of the Japanese foreign ministry suggest that Hitler began to take a hard posision against the United States on November 28 at the latest.
Hitler did not declare war, however, immediately after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7. It was because he wanted to wait for the “no-separate-peace” treaty to be concluded in order to give “a good impression” to the German people by announcing it on the same day as declaring war on the United States. Japan was anxious about this German delay of declaring war, but the Japanese did not consider the German co-entry into war as their essential condition of starting the war against the United States.
In a series of meetings of the Liaison Conference between the government and armed forces preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, they discussed the question case Germany should ask Japan to take part in the war against the Soviet Union in return for their entry into war against the United States. They had concluded that if Germany brought up this question, they would give up concluding the treaty with Germany. Some historians still regard Japan's bold action was encouraged by Germany's pre-assurance on their co-entry into war with the United States, but Japan, especially the navy, did not calculate Germany's co-entry as a neccesity.
For Germany, declaration of war on the United States was not suicidal, nor a part of Hitler's aggressive war plans. Hitler went into war with the United States because the war seemed unavoidable, and also because Japan, whose war potential was over-estimated by the German Navy, was at Germany's side this time unlike the situation in the First World War.

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　日本が受諾した「ポツダム宣言」には日本の戦争犯罪を厳しく裁くと明記されていた。東久邇宮稔彦首相は議会で「軍官民、国民全体が徹底的に反省し懺悔しなければならない」と演説、「自主裁判」を行うことも閣議決定、議会は「戦争責任に関する決議」を採択していた。

　だが、戦争犯罪の追及は、連合国による

（通称：東京裁判）と米英蘭豪中など7カ国による軍事裁判（通称BC級戦犯裁判）が実施した。BC級裁判は、捕虜虐待、性暴力など「通例の戦争犯罪」2,244件、5,700人を裁いている。日本人だけでなく朝鮮人、台湾人も「敵に使用された者」として裁かれた。1952年4月28日、サンフランシスコ平和条約で、日本は「日本国民」の刑の執行を引き継いでいる。この中に日本国籍を喪失した朝鮮人、台湾人戦犯も含まれていた。日本の戦争責任、植民地支配はどのように清算され、責任はどうとられたのか、朝鮮人戦犯から考える。

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グローバル化が進展することで、地球共同体がイメージ（想像）されグローバルな課題への取り組みが行われている。これは同時にグローバルな規範が形成されるプロセスを伴う。しかし、他方で正義、人権、民主主義など従来普遍的とされてきた概念が、地域の歴史的文脈、集団の文化、社会、宗教的背景によって多様であることが顕在化している。本分科会ではグローバル・ジャスティスの形成とローカリティの関係性を検討する。

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