The purpose of this paper is to make clear the change of wartime finance policy in the end of the war against China and analyze its backgrownd of money market. The characteristic of monetary policy during the war against China was nationwide mobilization of funds for the public loan and strategic industries. This mobilization made the financial structure unstable and lead it to reorganization. In deposit market concentration trend turned. Some provincial banks, especially influential ones grew big rapidly partly owing to the amalgamation movement. The cheep money policy in local money market and the funds control policy made provincial banks change their banking operation, rush in the urban money market. The advance competition became intense. That was a result of the control policy. But large equipment funds controled by financial adjustment law was supplied by a few financial organs oligopolistically. They had organized joint financing groups excluding other banks. Influential provincial banks increased advance as rapidly as big banks, but they supplied funds for newly rising or subcontract enterprises with some risk. After the outbreak of WWII, risky advance competition was going to result in credit crisis. Ministry of finance and Bank of Japan requested financial circles to organize a council of financial association aiming at stabilization of money market. Local Banker's Association joined it positively aiming at extending finance of the strategic industries through co-operation with monetary policy, so did big banks aiming at maintaining oligopoly. Thus the organization of financial constitutions was promoted with conflict objects.

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In Japan, the WWI "bubble" and the long depression of the 1920s greatly impaired banking management and caused serious problems with bad loans. Financial crises broke out continuously in 1920, 1922, 1923 and 1927. 1927 is often considered a "landmark" year in the sense that the financial crises in that year led to drastic changes in the financial structure, and led to several major bank mergers. Thus, most previous studies of bank regulation have emphasized the importance of The Bank Act of 1927, and insisted that the bank merger policy was at the center of bank regulation, and that all other regulations simply complemented it. Subsequently, many studies of bank policy at that time have focused primarily on bank mergers. Furthermore, some studies conclude that bank regulation at that time was clearly different from bank regulation in the postwar period. However, after carefully analyzing numerous historical documents and materials such as "Showa Zaiseishi Shiryo" (Archives of Showa Financial History), "Saitamaken Chiho Kinnyu Shiryo" (Archives of Saitama Prefectural Financial History) etc., I am suspicious of such one-sided views. We need a more balanced view, considering not only The Bank Act of 1927 but also other laws, official notices and guides. In this article, I analyze twelve kinds of bank regulation: bank chartering, liquidation or reform policy, bank merger policy, branching restriction, dividend restriction, separation of banking and industry, interest rate regulation, MOF's bank inspection, BOJ's bank inspection, auditing, disclosure requirement and LLR. I study not only the framework and philosophy of these bank regulations but also the interaction among them in order to clarify the whole system of bank regulation. In conclusion, there were many kinds of bank regulation in 1920s, including the bank merger policy. The MOF's bank inspection system was especially effective in leading bank management better, and it nicely complemented the other regulations. It is clear that bank regulation at that time functioned not only as structural regulation, but also as prudential regulation.

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日本の社債市場が大きく発展した1920年代には,朝鮮の植民地企業も鉄道業を中心に相次いで社債を発行する。こうした社債発行は鉄道金融の展開と新たな植民地投資を示していると言えよう。そこで本稿は,朝鮮鉄道会社を対象に,戦間期朝鮮における鉄道金融の展開過程とその意義を考察するとともに,この植民地投資の実態の一端を解明していく。朝鮮鉄道会社債(朝鉄債)の発行は,その引受機関である植民地銀行からの借入金を返済するものであった。これは,朝鮮銀行にとっては債権整理の一環であり,朝鮮殖産銀行にとっては「産米増殖計画」関連融資の強化を結果する。1920年代後半には本国証券業者が朝鉄債の引受に進出するが,これは植民地銀行の鉄道金融からの後退と表裏をなすものであったと言える。このうち山一証券は発行企業との人的・資本的関係をもとに進出していく。また山一証券による第5回・第6回朝鉄債(28,29年発行)の売捌き先から,その投資実態は,財閥系金融機関及び広範な地域の地方金融機関と特徴付けられ,生損保と大都市の個人投資家がこれに加えられる。

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