Dai Hon'ei 大本営 (Imperial Military Headquarters) refers to the highest office organizing wartime military operations. This office was set up in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War with China which extended into the Pacific War. This paper deals with Dai Hon'ei established at the beginning of the War with China in November, 1937. It has been said that the Dai Hon'ei was very much the same in function as its Russo-Japanese War counterpart, or that it was merely a kind of the General Staff Office whose function was reorganized to meet the demands the war. World War I, as the first total war in human history, however, must have greatly influenced Japanese military authorities and stimulated them to study seriously the war tactics and the wartime systems of the participating countories. We may therefore conclude that the Japanese military authorities took into consideration the results of this careful study when establishing the third Dai Hon'ei. Based on this assumption, this paper discusses the formation process and characteristics of the Dai Hon'ei during the Japan-China War. The first chapter discusses the great changes which took place in the Dai Hon'ei set up in the Japan-China War in comparison with its predecessors. At the time of establishment it increased the authority of such military administrative authorities as the army minister, the vice minister, the director and the chief of military affairs, and the military chief, vis-a-vis the supreme command authorities. The Dai Hon'ei's functional emphasis on the military administrative authorities theoretically should have caused the Prime Minister to be concerned with the Dai Hon'ei, since the army minister was also Minister of State. What leads us to believe that more emphasis was now being placed on the minltary administration is the recognition that in the case of total war the administration and the supreme command should not be separated, but unified in terms of policy and strategy. The second chapter examines the fact that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei was not an isolated decision, but was made in relation with the Councillor System (Shangi-Sei 参議制), which was created by the government during roughly the same period, and was regarded as a cause of those government reforms which went as far as to totally revamp the cabinet system. Therefore it becomes clear that Konoe Fumimaro and the military authorities attemped to reform the government at the time of the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei, out of consideration that any dualism between state affiars and the military command would cause severe limitations on war mobilization efforts. While the move to the separate the Ministry of State from the Director of the Administrative Affairs was not realized, the successful establishment of the Sangi-Sei, was significant in empowering a minister without portfolio (Muninsho-Daijin-Sei 制). By including the unrealized cabinet reformation plan in the discussion, this paper emphsizes that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei in the Japan-China War played a number of important roles not only in improving the capabilities for meeting the war demands, but also by being part of the reform plan for a wartime government system.

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New Zealand has a parliamentary system, in which parliament is supposed to be supreme. The prime minister is in its original sense first among equals, i.e., formally on the same footing as other cabinet ministers but virtually ahead of them to play a leading role. In reality the prime minister stands aloft at the apex of power. Surprisingly 22 out of 38 New Zealand prime ministers throughout history were born abroad. Quite a few prime ministers come from humble, unprivileged family backgrounds without necessarily high educational attainments. Prime ministers' tenure of office has become much stronger over the years due to the better organised political parties and government units. However, the introduction of Mixed Member Proportional in 1994 has complicated the electoral map a bit because it is now more difficult for a governing party to win the majority of seats alone, thereby making it necessary for one of the two major parties to consult with rather newcomer small parties. It will be a worthwhile task to compare New Zealand with other Westminster countries to appreciate the phenomena observed in New Zealand, thus to know better if they exhibit shared traits or unique features.

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In the study of prewar Japanese political history, the issue of colonial rule has been taken up only as an “external issue,” so to speak. In recent years, excellent research results have been published from the field of colonial history studies, and there has indeed been progress in understanding Japanese political history from an empireorientated perspective. However, in order to truly cross-link the studies of colonial history and Japanese political history, it is essential to clarify how the expansion of imperialism in prewar Japan affected the political structure of Japan as a whole. The author believes that this is the key to building an understanding of “Imperial Japanese Political History,” and is diligently researching the Takumushō（Ministry of Colonial Affairs）, which was newly established in 1929 as the government agency with jurisdiction over colonial affairs. As a part of this analysis, this paper presents the validity of this perspective by analyzing how the Takumushōʼs movement affected the retreat of the “responsible cabinet system” in modern Japan, taking up the issue of the South Manchurian Railway Company（SMR）reorganization that became a problem between 1932 and 1934 as a case study.

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1.Introduction 2.Change of Bureaucratic Dominance 3.Political Reformation 4.Necessity of Further Reformation 5.Conclusion The administrative organization is going to be reformed at the very beginning of the year 2001. This reformation was performed by the strong leadership of the former Premier, Ryutaro Hashimoto. Though it is quite significant for the administrative organization to be reformed for the first time in this half century, this reformation should be considered not merely as a reorganization of the bureaucratic system, but as a part of the whole governmental reformation. It has been said that the power and the influence of the bureaucrats are extremely strong in Japan. But since so many problems arose, there were and still are remarkable movements to weaken the power of the bureaucrats, that is, deregulation, decentralization to the local governments and political reformation. Concerning to the policy-making process, the third point, the aspect of political reformation is especially meaningful. In this study, the relation between the administrative reformation and the political reformation is described by focusing on the improvement of cabinet system etc.. Also, the important points to complete the the governmental reformation are examined.

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It is generally explained that parliamentary government in the Japanese Constitution belongs to the English type. But, in the MacArthur draft it was not modeled upon the English type. The drafters of the MacArthur Constitution thought that the Cabinet was not made as powerful as a Cabinet in England. For example, the power of the Cabinet to dissolve the Lower House was limited only after the passage of a resolution of non-confidence. However, the provision of the dissolution was amended on the part of Japan and changed to the English type. We can find several different points between the Japanese Constitution and the MacArthur draft. This paper contains the following items:1.Introduction 2. Thoughts of parliamentary government on the part of Japan 3. Thoughts of parliamentary government on the part of G.H.Q.4. The process from the MacArthur draft to establishment of the Japanese Constitution 5. Conclusion

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This article attempts to provide as much detail as possible about the background, process, and end of Khruba Srivichai’s second house arrest in Bangkok (November 1935–May 1936), while clearly indicating the sources of the documents. Most of the articles related to Srivichai in The Srikrung Daily News and Krungdeb Varasab Daily News, two Thai-language daily newspapers, used in this study have not been cited in existing studies.

For more than six months, from early November 1935 to mid-May 1936, Khruba Srivichai was recalled to Bangkok, far from Chiang Mai, and placed under house arrest at Wat Benchamabophit by the existing Sangha. During this period, in Northern Thailand (Phayap Region), where Srivichai was no longer in existence, the existing Sangha thoroughly suppressed Srivichai sect’s temples and ordained monks who had broken away from the existing Sangha and tried to follow the “ancient customs” with Srivichai as the head of the sect. The existing Sanga also forced Srivichai in Bangkok to sign a written pledge to abide by the Sangha’s Governing Law and the Sangha’s rules and regulations.

As a result, the Srivichai sect temples in Northern Thailand (937 Buddhist temples existed in Chiang Mai Province in 1935, of which about 90 temples belonged to the Srivichai sect) and their monks were extinguished, and Srivichai was completely bound hand and foot, making it impossible for him to act independently of the existing Sangha after that.

Srivichai and his disciples belonged to the existing Sangha until 1934. It was around April 1935, when the Doi Suthep mountain road, which Srivichai had proposed to construct, was nearing completion, that Srivichai sect became clearly independent from the existing Sangha. The enthusiastic devotion to Srivichai shown by many people in Northern Thailand during the construction of this road must have given the Srivichai sect a great deal of confidence in their ability to break away from the Sangha and become independent.

After the 1932 Constitutional Revolution, the People’s Party, which came to power in 1932, made the spread of primary education one of its major policies and opened private primary schools (Prachaban schools) throughout the country to provide uniform education in standard Thai language. Standard Thai texts were also used in the education of monks, novices and others by the Sangha. This was a cultural invasion and forced Thaification of Northern Thailand, which had its own Lanna Thai script and language by Bangkok. This was unacceptable to the Srivichai people, who valued the “ancient customs” of the Lanna Thai.

The suppression of the Srivichai sect was carried out in cold blood by the existing Sangha’s bureaucratic elite, most notably Somdet Phra Phutthakhosachan (Charoen Yanawaro, 1872–1951), head of the Supreme Sangha Council, and Phrathamkosachan (Plot Kittisophano 1889–1962,the Supreme Patriarch of Thailand from 1960 to 1962), a member of the Supreme Sangha Council and head of the Phayap Regional Sangha. On the other hand, the secular government cooperated to some extent with the Sangha elite’s suppression of the Srivichai sect, but not as forcefully as the Sangha. The Sangha belonged to the Ministry of Education, which could consult with and advise the Sangha but did not have the final authority to command and control it.

Whether the Sangha or the secular authorities, the basis for their suppression of the Srivichai sect is probably the traditional principle that, while freedom of religion is allowed in Thailand, Buddhism, in particular, must be the State Religion with the King as its patron, and therefore the Sangha must be a single entity.

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This paper examines British trade policy plans during the First World War with special reference to the links with the Economic Conference of the Allies, the Imperial War Conference, and the Imperial War Cabinet. As regards the former conference, the British government rejected the Clementel plan to form an Allied economic bloc through the joint control of raw materials and preferential tariffs. Their alternative plan had two elements. One was the assumption that Britain could not discriminate against neutral countries because of the size and importance of trade links with them, by comparison to links with the Allies. The other was the protection of essential industries for which Britain had depended upon Germany before the war. By the time the latter took place, international conditions had changed. The various governments of the British empire agreed to refuse preferential imperial tariffs for foodstuffs. Britain was therefore able to pursue non-discriminatory trade policies within the empire, and with both allied and neutral countries. We can therefore conclude that the British government made wartime trade policy plans which were based on a 'third' path. This combined the protection of essential industries and open empire policy, instead of the 'Imperial Expansion' or 'Imperial Zollverein' line.

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The political change after the "May 15 Incident" marked an important turning-point in the modern history of Japan. It put an end to party-based cabinets, a practice that had persisted for about eight years, and brought about "national cabinets," the first of which was formed under Saito Makoto. At that time the Seiyukai commanded an absolute majority in the Lower House (which actually did have wide legislative power), but from then on the importance of political parties declined. Political parties, especially the Seiyukai, could not regain power for the following reasons. The Seiyukai had to pay attention to the other party, the Minseito, as it feared that a determined opposition against the ministry would leave the Minseito as the ruling party. As such, the Minseito could have dissolved the Diet, thereby possibly damaging the Seiyukai. At the same time, the Seiyukai, itself bothered by factional disputes, feared that opposition against the ministry would further its own intra-party factional tensions and thus lead to a loss of the party's majority in the House. The Seiyukai did indeed hold institutional power, for it dominated the Lower House and thus held great legislative power. But, such power lasted only as long as the party's majority in the House lasted, and that majority could easily be lost in the event of the dissolution of the Diet or disunity inside its own ranks. Thus, the Seiyukai adopted the strategem of a "peaceful transfer" of power, whereby it would support the ministry over a certain period and then have power transferred to it in reward for this support. If such a strategy had proven successful, The Seiyukai could have regained power, maintained its party unity, and avoided the dissolution of the Diet. The Saito Cabinet, aware from the start of the party's weakness, intended to make a reverse use of this strategy to manipulate the party. Thus, the Seiyukai could not force the cabinet to accept a "peaceful transfer" of power, and so the party leaders' internal authority over party members declined. The dissenting faction within the Seiyukai then by itself virtually came to an agreement with the ministry. The Seiyukai thus split up and lost its majority in the House. The National Cabinet attempted to attain political stability by exploiting conflicts between the groups which supported the government and between the dissenting factions within these groups.

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